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Abstract
This study engages the problem of ethical space in the work of Emmanuel
Levinas by situating the 'production' of what Levinas will term the 'face' (/e
visage) against the horizons of its institution. It is against these horizons, it
will be maintained, horizons apt for phenomenological reconstitution, that the
face is revealed qua face. Through a broadening of such Levinasian
explicata as 'filiality,' 'fecundity,' 'fraternity,' 'teaching' and 'maternity,' the
heritability of the face will be deduced and the face placed within the context
of its imperative milieu - the ethical circumstances of its signification. This
injunctive environment, the staging or mise-en-scene for the face-to-face
relation Levinas assays, will, pace Levinas, be exhibited upon the ground of
its constitution and its provenance scrutinized, in order that the legacy of the
face might be complicated, and its putative non-historical status, challenged.
It will be argued that Levinas limits, unnecessarily, the ambit of what he
permits to signify as a face, and thus that tacitly deposited suppositions
regulate the composition and configuration of the face within his work. These
posita will be worked loose from their situs and critically examined with a
view to assessing their influence upon the development of Levinas' thought.
Through recourse to the phenomenologies of Edmund Husserl and Martin
Heidegger, Levinas' presentation of ethical space (the espacement of ethics)
will be appraised in the light of the phenomenologies it purportedly interrupts.
The cogency of Levinas' proto-ethical insight will be evaluated in relation to
the cultural and religious illustrations to which he appeals. The tension, or
torsion, between Levinas' self-styled 'confessional' and 'philosophical' works
will be laid bare, and their underlying confluence mooted. Effort has been
made to delineate the overall trajectory of Levinas' thought and to treat the
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INTRODUCTION
Philosophy commences in wonder (0aupa£siv). That the matter should be so arouses
wonder in those for whom the question of beginnings, the question of origins
(apxai),is of some purport. Wonder excites questioning of this kind, and thus excites
the interest of philosophers, since the philosopher is one who, according to a
venerable tradition, is compelled to question, and impelled to do so by 0aupa£eiv.
Even the 'lover of myth' (o (})iA6pu0os) Aristotle confers, may accede to the status
of philosopher (cj)iA6oo(j)os), accede to the Stdtte or tottos of wisdom, because myth
occasions aporia (drropicx), and perplexity inspires the pursuit of knowledge, such
knowledge (emaTfjpq) being precisely the tsAos of philosophy.
The wonder (etonnement) in which philosophy begins is commended by
Levinas in among other places Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, a work of
startling originality and complexity that is certainly apt to induce a state of a nop t a
in those who read it. That Levinas' thought should occasion the very astonishment it
would seek to explicate is not incidental, of course. For Levinas' work begins and
ends in wonder: the wonder of all wonders (la merveille des merveilles) being the
face-to-face relation, he will advert. Yet, the etonnement of which Levinas writes is
traumatic, a veritable 'traumatism of astonishment' (traumatisme de I'etonnement)
(TI 73; Tel 71) that afflicts the subject in whom this ttcx0os is aroused. Indeed,
wonder describes 'the astonishing or traumatising - trauma not thauma - possibility
of a sobering up in which the ego, facing the Other, is freed from itself, and awakens
from dogmatic slumber' {PA 111). To be sure, the astonishment Levinas details is
an-archic, and attests to a certain revisioning of sense {sens) in the wake of
philosophy's beginning. The sense to which Levinasian first-philosophy {la
philosophic premiere) is recalled is that 'absolute orientation' to the other person
{MS 52), an orientation in which the work of ethics is accomplished. What Levinas
will term the 'face' {le visage), is the 'starting point of philosophy [le commencement
meme de la philosophieY (PI1 59; 11 178). That beginning in place, as it were, before
philosophy takes place and takes leave of its own beginning, an apxq that subtends
the principium in which philosophy - the science of origins - would seek to ground
its enterprise.
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The space of ethics, or, what I shall call proto-ethics, opens in and as wonder;
an espacement or spacing to which philosophy, as reflection and critique, is
summoned, and before which it is placed in question. Pace Husserl, for whom it is
the wonder (das Wander) of the pure Ego (reines Ich), and the marvel of
consciousness (Bewufitsein), that command the attention of the philosopher, Levinas
will assign wonder to the fissuring of egoic consciousness, that is, to the opening up
(ide-claustration) and coring out (denudeation) of the self. Despite its an-archic
pretensions, however, this thought that would aspire to contest the primacy of
consciousness, and to wrest the ego from its site of autarky, suffers the impediment
of self-evidence, where it might have endured the aporetic and remained true to the
indeterminacy that is its mandate. To clarify, and here the topoi of this study will be
brought into focus. The subject (subiectum) Levinas assays is created through
exposure to others. Extirpated from its conatus essendi, subjectivity is structured as
the other-in-the-same. The subject is susceptible rather than receptive. Susceptibility
to and for the face - creaturality (la creaturalite) - is not, apropos of Levinas,
something one chooses to undergo, but one's pre-originary condition of
vulnerability. Prior to the assumption of principia, through which one might mitigate
the trauma of hetero-affection (hetero-affection), prior, therefore, to the certainty of
judgement under which one might subsume the encounter with the Other, the oneself
is radically exposed. Yet, the radicality of this exposure is, I maintain, extenuated by
principles to which Levinas adheres throughout his work, principia that substruct the
putatively an-archic space (both 'locus and non-lieu' (OBBE 45)) of proto-ethical
relations, and regulate what may or may not signify as a face.
That Levinas should be guided in his research by precursory suppositions is
hardly surprising. As Nietzsche, a thinker never far from Levinas' purview,
intimates: 'There is no such thing as a science without assumptions; the very notion
of such a science is unthinkable, absurd. A philosophy, a "faith" is always needed to
give science a direction, a meaning, a limit, a raison d' etre' (Nietzsche, 1956, 288).
And, did Husserl too not concede that phenomenology 'prescribes rules a priori for
its actualities' (CM §12 [66])? This much is incontestable, I think. However, the
ethical circumstances of the face-to-face relation are delimited by Levinas in
decidedly nuanced ways, and such delimitation warrants careful analysis and
critique.
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In my reading of Levinas I have sought to situate the 'production' of the face
against the horizons of its institution, in order to demonstrate how and why the
jurisdiction of signification is limited unduly by Levinas. The configuration of the
face within Levinas' work (its composition and assembly) is governed by
presuppositions that restrict the ambit of its provocation and delineate the trajectory
of its appeal. By returning the face to its injunctive environment, that is, through a
reconstitution of the horizons against which the face 'reveals' itself qua face, I have
endeavoured to complicate the presentation of the face within' Levinas' thought, and
to broaden its applicability beyond the terms of Levinas' discourse. It will be argued
that the espacement of ethics is constrained by Hebraic and, more pointedly,
Mitnagdic imperatives, that condition the upsurge of the face and manage 'the plot of
proximity [I'intrigue de la proximite\ (OBBE 190n. 34; AE 82n. 1). A certain
licentia rabbinica is to be discerned behind the deductions Levinas implements, and
the cogency of the latter's attempt to render in concreto the predicament of the
'interhuman' is undermined, for reasons I will enumerate.
The field of ethics is besmirched with unsolicited and tacitly deposited
suppositions, and such posita, I will aver, must be worked loose from their situs and
critically appraised if the staging (mise-en-scene) of the face-to-face relation is to be
laid bare and exhibited upon the ground of its constitution. That what Dominique
Janicaud has termed, a 'metaphysico-theological montage' (Janicaud, 2000, 27),
should undergird the thought of Levinas would be of little import, were Levinas not
to claim, and moreover, to do so repeatedly, that his work is a 'phenomenology prior
to a theology that would use what it has borrowed as its premises' (ETE 109). I will
contend, however that in its enunciation of themes and by way of the logic to which
it subscribes, Levinas' thought, in addition to being iterative, is indeed illative, and
illative in precisely the manner abjured by Levinas above.
Through recourse to both Levinas' self-styled 'philosophical' and 'Talmudic'
writings (the underlying thematic consonance of which is, I believe, indisputable) I
will undertake to locate the face within the context of its imperative milieu, so as to
elucidate what one might, with Husserl call, its 'generative nexus' (CM §61 [169]) of
signification. By way of a heightening and amplification of such Levinasian
explicata as 'filiality,' 'fraternity,' 'fecundity,' and 'maternity,' the heritability of the
face will be mooted and the thesis proposed that the sense (sens) of ethics is an
endowment won through acquisition and sanctioned as normative (and thus to some
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extent invariant) through the reiteration and repetition of its 'performance.' The
schema of the face, as that which one acknowledges within a given axiological range
as morally probative, is installed (let us say, cleared for signification) through
education, inculcation and socialisation, or through what, for the purposes of this
study, I will nominate under the heading of 'lore,' deliberately apposing the latter to
the 'teaching' (enseignement), whether non-maieutic or otherwise, Levinas treats in
works such as Totality and Infinity.
To propose a reading of Levinas along these lines is, no doubt, a 'fine risk to
be run' (OBBE 167). Yet, in seeking the 'condition of empirical situations' and,
further, pursuing the 'meaning invisible in that condition' (77 173), does Levinas not,
in fact, invite this reading and solicit such midrash? To reduce the face, in its
exteriority, to the implicit horizons of its latency and birth, to aspire to retrieve its
lieu de naissance and probe the structuration of its genesis (the matrix of its
gestation), is to disentangle the intentional ffla in which the legacy of the face, the
legacy of its 'production' qua face, would be dissimulated.
That the face transcends the limits of its structuration attests, I believe, to the
degree of invariance it attains through frequentation and dramatization, rather than to
the 'non historical simplicity' (MS 58) with which it is accredited by Levinas. This is
not to maintain that something like the face does not beleaguer one ethically, nor that
one is not charged with orientating oneself in being. That one is 'summoned' is, I
suggest, beyond question: from the directive given by elemental nature to seek out
sustenance and shelter, to the ordinance of the teat that the newborn suckle and be
nourished. The 'form' signification assumes, and the 'sense' it is awarded, however,
refer one back to the multiplicity of constitutive acts, the plurality of co-constitutive
endeavour, through which these indices of value and determinacy are first set forth. It
is to this space of production that I will attend throughout my study of Levinas, for it
is here, I will argue, that the sense of transcendence, which prevails in the work of
Levinas, is encoded, and its determination fixed.
I do not propose here a genealogy of ethics, therefore. I do not lay claim to a
genealogy of Levinas' ethical thought, such as that which John Llewelyn has
advanced. Nor do I promulgate a genealogy of morals (Nietzsche). Instead, I offer
what might be regarded as a generative account of the conditions under which the
face, adduced by Levinas, signifies as a face within his work, the conditions under
which, to employ Levinas' terms, the 'primary frankness of revelation' (77 98) may
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occur. It has thus proved requisite to disengage (degager) the face from the form in
which it is instantiated within Levinasian thought (and to challenge the disjunction of
face and form in Levinas' thinking) in order to elucidate the themata under scrutiny.
Commentators on Levinas' work have tended, more often than not, to
dimidiate the latter's oeuvre and restrict their attention to either his 'philosophical' or
'Talmudic' writings. While I do not believe that such an exegetical policy is entirely
unjustified, the problem I address necessitates engagement with both registers of
Levinas' thought. I understand that caution is advised when attempting to relate these
orders of enquiry (Levinas, after all, intended his publications for different
audiences), but do not feel that timidity is called for in academic research,
particularly when the exigencies of one's topic demand otherwise. I thereby treat
Levinas' oeuvre as a whole, not with the intention of rehearsing the development of
his thought chronologically, but so as to exhibit the internal spacing (espacernent) of
my theme within the work of Levinas and establish the principles (apxcu) that
regulate its description. In pursuit of these ends, my disquisition of Levinas will
adhere to the following itinerary, and is divided into three parts.
In part one, which is largely expository, I situate Levinas in relation to his
principal textual interlocutors, Husserl and Heidegger, in order to assess their
influence upon Levinas' presentation of ethical space (chapter one). The dimensions
of this space will be charted, and the conditions of its production evaluated, with a
view to accenting the terms under which it is delimited by Levinas (chapter two). In
part one my aim is twofold, then. Firstly to bring into focus Levinas' method and to
evaluate its phenomenological credentials; and secondly, to clarify, through my
engagement with Husserl and Heidegger, the ways in which Levinas endeavours to
move beyond phenomenology and to subvert the legitimacy and scope of the
'reductions' it implements.
These preparatory considerations will be deepened and refined in part two,
where the topos of the subject (le sujet), in its susceptibility, will be examined and its
pedagogical predicament, brought to light. Holding sway (walten) ethically, it will be
maintained, takes place within a predetermined orientation: susceptibility to and for
the face is primed. One must come to acquire the schema (oxqpcx) of the face and
accept it as normative and binding (chapter three). That the subject is 'called upon to
concern itself also with itself' despite the 'unlimited responsibility' (responsabilite
illimitee) with which it is assigned (OBBE 128; AE 204), that the trauma of
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exposedness might be managed, and the compass of ethical obligation limited,
underscores a tension within the work of Levinas, I will argue, that obtains between
the 'emphasis' of ethics and the 'esteem' in and to which one is summoned to hold
oneself. This tension will be exhibited and its implications gauged. How, it will be
asked, 'if one is not to abandon oneself to violence' (OBBE 193n.33), can the
mandate that one be for-the-other to the point of 'haemorrhage (OBBE 72) be
fulfilled? The 'liturgical' basis of Levinasian first philosophy (the catena of study,
rite and lore) will be elucidated and its possibility accounted for (chapter four). In
part two I thus attempt to challenge Levinas' claims that susceptibility (la
susceptibilite) is a 'traumatism' (le traumatisms) that surprises one 'absolutely,' a
traumatism that precludes the assumption granted by receptivity (TDTT 105). I
suggest that the ethical 'moment' need not be described in these terms and that the
privilege Levinas accords to 'passivity' (la passivite) in his account of ethics is
misplaced, if not unduly simplistic.
In part three, the sense (sens) of the face defended by Levinas will be
affirmed in the dimension of its historicality and its provenance questioned. The
'norms' of morality which, according to Levinas, permit one to 'judge Cultures' (MS
59), will be interrogated and their 'straightforwardness' confounded. The suggestion
that such norms might be 'prescribed by a non-archaic monotheism' (BV xvii) has
led me to complicate the accord between proto-ethical insight and its religious and
cultural illustration in the work of Levinas (chapter five). Levinas' many opera and
opuscula, I will argue, form a collection of midrashim on the theme of 'holiness' (la
saintete). Levinas' works, I contend, seek to 'disengage' this holiness (OBBE 59) -
to pursue 'the meaning of the beyond' (BPW 190n.22) - and this prompts him to
'engage' in a process of what he will term, 'demythicization' (715 53). The Western
philosophical tradition and the positive religion of Judaism have, Levinas suggests,
colluded in their desire to expurgate the last vestiges of myth from the margins of
history. In so doing, however, as I will seek to prove, both have disclaimed, as mere
marginalia, the thought of peoples for whom the ratio of Athens and Jerusalem is not
authoritative. I conclude, then, by challenging the presumptions operative behind
such claims and arguing for what I have called a pagan attestation, the freeing of a
space of contestation within the work of Levinas from which the voices of those
extruded by the terms of his ethical metaphysics might be heard (chapter six).
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Liberating and preserving this space is, I assert, the work of Levinas work (oeuvre),
the performance toward which his opera tend, their exergual destiny.
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Part I
The Staging of Ethical Space:
The production of the face
1. PRESENTATION
Levinas' analysis of sensibility is problematic. Two instantiations of sensibility are
advanced, prescinded by a distinction that is integral to Levinas' project as a whole.
This distinction, which is internal to the logic and progression of Levinas' thought,
cannot be evidenced phenomenologically, at least not without recourse to the
acceptance of certain unregulated positings. Levinas deduces two mutually
antagonistic forms of sensibility. Sensibility to and for the 'element' {I'element) in
which the ego bathes and from which the 'playthings' (jouets) it enjoys emerge, and
sensibility to and for the 'face' (le visage) of the other person, which summons the
ego to responsibility. A factious relationship pertains between the mode of affection
the ego enjoys through its involution in the elemental and the affection it suffers
through exposure to the Other (Autrui). Affection by the face assumes a qualitative
precedence over the sensations discharged upon contact with the surfaces of objects
and things. While both modalities of affection are characterised by the impression of
an Empfindung, the encounter with the face impresses itself upon the ego with the
force of an imperative. This imperative reveals an Empfindung that is quite literally
sensational, sensational, that is, in an ethical, or rather, proto-ethical sense, for it does
not accommodate the enjoyment which accompanies the savouring of one's
immediate sensuous environs (although the 'yoke' of this law can excite a moderate,
and moderated, form of ethical jouissance (DJ 7)). The face of the Other is the site of
a distortion and derangement of the laws which govern the perception of material
things. A veritable heterotopia, the face contravenes the ordinances of
phenomenological procedure and challenges the dominance of the ego-advertence
Husserl situates at the heart of phenomenological science.
To contest the import of Levinas' proposal here, and to support the assertion
to which I have laid claim in my introduction, that Levinas' project is conditioned
throughout by tacitly deposited suppositions, it is paramount that a careful
examination of the face be conducted. In order to sanction the distinction Levinas
imposes above, one would need to provide a more detailed phenomenological account
of the production of the face qua face. Levinas offers no such account. However, an
account of the face that would seek to draw signification back into the dimension of
its heritability, in accord with the thesis ventured here, would appear to pose a serious
threat to the tenor of one of Levinas' most basic claims regarding the face. If, as
Levinas maintains, the face disrupts the horizons of intentional consciousness and
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thwarts constitutive freedom; if, that is, the face signifies 'without a context' (77 23)
(it is the deracine par excellence), then surely a phenomenological disquisition of
Levinas' thought which seeks to analyse the significance of co-constitution, and the
inheritance and dissemination of 'sense' (sens) between generations, compromises the
integrity of Levinas' position? The cogency of Levinas' presentation of the face is
therefore subject to critique, critique being understood here as both the demarcation
and transgression of limits. Can the face signify kcx0' aiiTO and yet itself be the
accomplishment (,accomplissement), or achievement (Leistung), of co-historization,
one wonders? Surely one must learn to recognize the face as a face that commands, in
contradistinction to the surface of the thing, which does not? It is to the presentation
of this face that we now turn with the purpose of refining and sharpening the line of
enquiry broached here. In what follows, which is of a largely preparatory nature, the
exposition of Levinas' thought will be interwoven with critique, with a view to
disengaging the themes exhibited from the situation of their assembly within Levinas'
work. The attempt will thus be made to fix key Levinasian explicata in their
determination, in order to provide the groundwork for their subsequent elaboration
and interrogation in parts two and three of this study.
§ 1. The locus ofmeaning
In the essay 'Freedom and Command' (1953), Levinas details his account of the face
as a '"phenomenology" of the noumenon' (FC 21). Similarly, in Totality and Infinity
he describes the structuration of a 'metaphysical relation' that 'connects' one with a
'noumenon which is not a numen' (7/ 77). The face is enigmatic, Levinas avers,
resisting the designation phenomenon (c^aivopevov), which, for Husserl, gestures to
the appearance of that which appears and highlights an essential ambiguity between
an object's modes of presentation, and the acts of consciousness (whether active or
passive) for which it appears. Despite defining intentionality (i.e., ego-advertence or
thought's being about its object) as itself highly enigmatic, Husserl retains confidence
in the prowess of phenomenological procedure and the enigma (Rdtsel) he describes
rapidly yields to scientific scrutiny (although he continues to recognize the
philosophical life as essentially enigmatical (Crisis, Appendix IX, 394)). Phenomena
surrender themselves to the intentional gaze. The phenomenon ((jicuvopevov) may
well be the appearance of that which appears in and through its own 'appearing' (the
phenomenon is thus credited with a modicum of independence), but the 'apparition'
in question, that which appears to and for the ego, is to be understood, ultimately, as
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the achievement, or work, of constitution. The 'absolute givenness' of the
phenomenon is secured by consciousness. Consciousness, apropos of Husserl, is the
staging or rnise-en-scene for the 'givenness' (gegebenheit) that is disclosed there.1
An object is thus given, Husserl will contend, to the extent that it is 'meant'
(gemeint). It is prima facie inconceivable that an object be given to consciousness and
yet not be meant by it. The activity of Sinngebung (the bestowal of meaning) is thus
basal to the work of consciousness. It is arguably its very conditio sine qua non.
Husserl's axiomatic 'Principle of Principles' (Id §24) - clearly an indication of
Husserl's archontic predilections - states that 'every originary presentive intuition is a
legitimising source of cognition,' and, furthermore, that 'everything originarily
offered to us in "intuition" is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being'
(Id §24). However, the phenomenon (cj)aiv6psvov) which is presented here,
presented, that is, in accordance with the strictures of the 'principle' to which Husserl
subscribes, is always already the product of noetic activity. Husserl may well concede
that this principium, or apxp, is itself the residuum of a certain process of limitation.
That which appears is given as such 'only within the limits in which it is presented
there' (Id §24), we will recall. Nevertheless, these limits delimit the range of
phenomena (c})aiv6psua) appertinent to a 'science' of 'cognitive phenomena' (IP 11).
These limits delimit the very possibility of the possible, the possible being that which
is possessable by consciousness.
The phenomenological reduction, therefore, entails 'a limitation to the sphere
of those things that are purely self given' in the 'strictest sense' (IP 48-49; emphasis
mine). This restriction, moreover, attests to a constriction and a construction of sense.
Certain phenomena, namely those that cannot be 'restricted to the sphere of pure
evidence' (IP 48), fall outside the compass of phenomenological investigation (an
admission to which Levinas is clearly alert), while phenomena are themselves
precisely those things that are to and for consciousness as the achievement of
constitutional activity.2 Intuition (Anschauung), or 'immediate "seeing"' (Id §19),
likewise has a 'legitimizing function' because it is the 'originally presentive source'
of 'meaning' (and hence all rational assertions). Yet, the remit of possible meaning is
1 As Levinas comments in the essay Question and Answers (1977), phenomenology aims to bring the
things in themselves 'to the horizon of their appearing,' namely 'that of their phenomenality.'
Phenomenology thus endeavours to 'make appear the appearing itself behind the quiddity that appears'
(QA 87).
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circumscribed prior to the performance of the reduction(s). The very 'evidence' of the
evidential is, as it were, ordained prior to the phenomenological epoche (ettoxp) and
the process of suspension initiated by it. Thus, the phenomenon 'falls under a
principle' to which the phenomenologist 'must subject' him or herself 'in the critique
of cognition:' the 'principle of the ettoxt)' (IP 34). This limitation demonstrates that
Husserl's 'principle' is a regulative one. Phenomenological science is, after all,
oriented toward a 'horizon of undetermined determinability' (CM §13 [69]), and the
'determinability' (determinierbarkeit) stipulated here in turn guarantees the value of
the principium it prescribes.3
The locus of meaning, for Husserl, is thus consciousness itself. And, more
pointedly, the place at which this meaning is 'unqualifiedly given' and in which the
'pure' phenomenon of the intentional relation is accomplished as given, is the place of
a decisive activity, namely cogitation (IP 36). Phenomenology, as a pure eidetic
science, may well purport to be a discipline operating 'entirely' within 'the limits of
mere immediate Intuition' (Id §65), however, the vectors of the region it surveys are
pre-delineated in accordance with the dictum of rigour to which Husserl submits
himself. Husserl limits the universality of the sttoxp in order to 'discover a new
scientific domain.' The parenthetical method he executes is thus a 'definitely
restricted one' (Id §32), restricted, that is, by the scientificity of the principle he
expostulates, and the ideal of rigorous science (strenge Wissenschaft) he pursues.4 An
ideal ultimately rooted in a conception of the philosopher as one who is, above all
else, 'self-responsible;' responsible, Husserl would argue, for bringing to fruition 'the
possibility of universal knowledge,' a goal, or rather task, to which philosophy
(4>iAoao(|>ia) is uniquely called (Crisis §7).
Levinas contests the Husserlian location of meaning throughout his works.
Indeed, the topos (tottos) where 'meaning' is accomplished (the site from which
sense (sens) signifies) occupies centre stage in Levinas' disputations with both
Husserl and Heidegger. Although Husserl acknowledges the 'self-givenness' of what
is simply 'seen' (IP 33), this very seeing, Levinas will suggest, englobes phenomena
within consciousness. The phenomenal appearance of the phenomenon, given to the
perceptual gaze, may not contain its object - things admit of transcendency, after all -
3 As Bernet notes, phenomenology, as an investigation into the Aoyoj that 'allows phenomena to be
given, fixes in advance the conditions the Other has to meet in order to mean anything to me.' As such,,
'phenomenological openness is a determinate openness' (Bernet, 2000, 44; emphasis added).
4 Even such a staunch apologist for the phenomenological 'method' as Dominique Janicaud observes
that there is a 'pretension' in the 'resolve to make all philosophy pass through the Caudine Forks of a
scientifically rigorous project' (Janicaud, 2000, 87).
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the ontic status of the thing and all judgments relating to its spatio-temporal factual
being are subject to parenthetical exclusion (Id §32). However, the concatenation of
appearances, in their various syntheses and categorial forms (which Husserl identifies
as the 'shifting and remarkable' structure of appearances), do 'create objects in a
certain way for the ego' (IP 56). Construction (Konstruktiori) is thus rudimentary to
givenness. Givenness is embedded in the constructive operations of consciousness.
In consonance with the 'self-givenness' of phenomena, evidence 'sets up' or
'institutes' and 'abiding possession' for the ego (CM §27 [95]). As noted, the possible
is that which is possessed and retained by consciousness - the ideal object pole
toward which noetic activity is directed.5 It is this institution that Levinas opposes in
his account of the face (a term which features throughout his various opera yet which
is engaged with particular acuity in Totality and Infinity). Consciousness, for Levinas,
is not the 'source' (Quelle), or 'origin' (apxh, Ursprung), of meaning. If this were the
case, the Other would be set up, and set up, what is more, in a manner that is truly
bathetic, for a fall from significant 'height' (hauteur). A fall that would see it,
together with the Platonic 'sun' or ayaSov, usurped from its position of prominence
as that which orients sense within the work of Levinas; a fall not so much into
'inauthenticity' (Uneigentlichkeit), as a recession into a 'nocturnal' space (the il y a)
antecedent to (Existents and Existence), yet somehow contemporaneous with
(Otherwise than Being), the very advent of meaning.
The 'sovereign ego' (RR 121), Levinas will argue, is dislodged from its
occupancy as the source of meaning by the other person. It is through the face that
such a displacement (deplacement) is effectuated. The 'I' loses face in the face of the
Other, one might say. As Bernet cautions, however, such talk of displacement is
ultimately misleading, and at best, 'provisional,' for it suggests that the subject
occupies a 'stable' position prior to the encounter with the other person (Bernet, 2000,
53). Levinas, of course, is keen to dispel misunderstanding of this nature, and to
demonstrate the absolute (structural) apriority of the Other in relation to the self. As
we will discover, the contradictory logic of the 'anterior posteriorly [anterieure
posterieurementf (TI 170; Tel 184) enables Levinas to argue against the grain of
standard chronometry, and to bring to light the situation of diachrony that underpins
the face-to-face (face-ci-face) relation he describes.
5 As Levinas observes in 'Intentionality and Sensation,' the 'intentional object has an ideal existence in
relation to the temporal and spatial position of consciousness' (IS 137; emphasis mine).
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Husserl's 'object' of cognition, presented originally leiblich da, remains
decidedly spectral for Levinas. The spectre of consciousness and its lucubration
literally looms about it. Indeed, in the final analysis is intentionality, for Levinas,
anything other than a kind of ghastly or geistly looming about; that is, a controlled,
disengaged, theoretical appraisal of things? As Levinas remarks in Otherwise than
Being or Beyond Essence, intentionality ultimately delineates the 'centripetal
movement of a consciousness that coincides with itself (OBBE 48). Throughout his
endeavours to further concretise the science of putative concreteness (i.e.,
phenomenology), Levinas strives to render concrete the encounter with the other
person and to recast it ethically. He thus aspires, as it were, to traduit I'homme
concret (77 139; Tel 147). This demands a radical revision of Husserl's 'Principle of
Principles' and a contestation of the primacy of consciousness as Husserl depicts it.
The 'exteriority' (exteriorite) in which the face of the other person opens differs
markedly from the exteriority of represented objects, an exteriority Levinas deems to
be correlative with the 'very exteriority of what is thought with respect to the thought
that intends it' (WED 59).
Through his 'face,' Levinas informs us, the Other displaces the ego from its
stabilitas loci and sets it within 'his' own hetero-tropic orbit (this stabilitas loci has,
as noted above, always already been destabilized). The Other places the ego's centre
of 'gravitation' outside itself (77 1 83). Levinas' thought, one could argue, effects a
Ptolemaic reversal of the Copernican revolution orchestrated by Kant. Levinas
deploys the term katK auto to contrast the 'expression' of the face with the
presentation (and presentification) of objects grasped within the phenomenological
attitude. The face expresses itself Ka0' auxo because its 'manifestation' is not
contingent upon the antecedent structuration of consciousness. The Other presents
'himself' ex proprio motu. The remarkable structures through which, according to
Husserl, 'objects' are created for and by consciousness are destructured in the face-to-
face encounter.
Experience, for Husserl, is characterized, throughout its various stratifications,
by the accomplishment of synthetic unity. The conceptual order is thus always already
inscribed within the sensible order; sense data (uXrj) are organized by predetermined
intentional schemata. Intuition, as Husserl elucidates it, is the apprehension of both
the data of immediate sensory experience and the prearticulated synthetic form(s) into
which this manifold is ordered. Intuition is simultaneously the confirmation
(Bestatigung) and the cancellation (Durchstreichung) of intentional regard because
the intentional is already predelineated, as such, according to the conceptual schemata
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that synopsize the sensible. As Levinas notes, 'the intuitive act is at once intention
thinking a presence and the indispensable presence of a content in the subject' (IS
140). For Husserl, therefore, sense (Sinn) is always constructed in accordance with the
mandate of a preordained intentional proto-sense. Phenomenological science is
preceded by prescience, sense subtended by pre-sense.
However, the Other, apropos of Levinas, is given (and this phrase is
employed advisedly) qua face as an excession of sense and the interruption of order.
Intuition is struck down by an excess or surplus of signification, a surplus that is
'inassimilable' (77/ 19) by consciousness (an excess itself reflected in the 'surplus of
duties' (NGTT 123) that befalls the ethically reconfigured subject of responsibility).
Of course, it may be the case that Levinas' distinctly ethical intuition (Anschauung)
similarly attests to the cancellation and confirmation of pre-articulated intentional
horizons (which we might also term inherited horizons, adapting a phrase Husserl
enlists to describe the 'instinct intentionality' (Instinktintentionalitat) of the infant, a
theme to which we will return in part two), horizons that delimit what may and what
may not signify as a face.
Where Husserl posits the self-identity of 'things' as a prerequisite to
phenomenological explication - one can only 'conform to the things themselves' and
'consult them in their self-givenness' (Id §19) if a principle of identity regulates their
appearance - the ethical field Levinas excavates posits the identity of the face with
itself in distinction to the face's other, namely its form, with which the face is
disunited. The face is congruent with itself. It is, Levinas proclaims, 'in touch with
itself,' such that it 'expresses its very expression' (PII55). The formal structure which
guides the analyses of Totality and Infinity (77 79) is itself structured according to this
basic polarization, a polarization no less apparent in Otherwise than Being, I suggest.
The bifurcation of 'face' and 'form' opens the field of Levinasian ethics (itself opened
within the interstitial space of separation (separation) that disparts the existent from
the Other, ab origine). This severance, one might argue, functions within Levinas'
philosophy much in the way that the 'bipolarity of the lived and the thematised' does
in that of Husserl (OBBE 167).
One is enjoined by Levinas to heed the face, qua face, and yet this very
injunction is not, it seems, 'given' to an 'originarily donative intuition' (Id §24), but
predetermined (and hence limited) by the edicts of, dare one say, a grounding
principle. Levinas will speak of the 'rigorous determination' of transcendence
described by 'ethical attitudes and exigencies' (HB 106), yet one may enquire as to
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what confirms the status of this rigour. Why, for example, is the face the other of its
form? Despite being congruent with its self, is the face not two faced? Does a certain
perfidy not attend its visitation, since it faces in two directions, being both heliotropic
(it gestures toward the ettekei vex Trjs ouaias) and geotropic (it remains terrestrial)?6
How does the supra-sensible form, through which the face signifies, differ from the
material format that occludes it? Is it not somewhat ironic that despite struggling in
the agon of concretion Levinas fails to root the Other down? Does Levinas not, in
fact, fail to demonstrate how the face is informed by its context?
Arguably, Levinas exhibits the symptoms of acute ontico-phenomenological
rhizophobia; that is, he is suffering from a severe fear of the radix or root (a condition
typically undiagnosed in the secondary literature on Levinas, with the exception
perhaps of Visker (Visker, 1999, 392-5)) Is the Other not, to employ the argot of
adolescence, quite literally off his face, and thus bereft of countenance, so marked is
the diremption of the phenomenological and the ethical in the description of the face
Levinas outlines? Being off one's face would thus appear not to be solely the vocation
of the crapulent or those prone to bibulous excess. Perhaps, the discipline of 'ethical
metaphysics' is itself susceptible to bouts of temulence, that is, to lapses of 'sobriety,'
in which the heady spirit of allegiance - and ligation - to the face (the governing law
of Levinas' scientia regulatrix) interrupts the vigilance of ethical regard, and where
'things' that might regard me (or m'accusent), are regarded by Levinas as simply
donanda: 'things' to be used and dispensed with at will.
In the encounter with the face, consciousness cannot access its 'object' - its
intentional routings are impeded - and a relationship of 'adequation' no longer
obtains between noeses (mental acts) and noemata (mental objects); relationality, as
Levinas construes it, must no longer be conceived exclusively in these terms. The
'rigorous parallelism' {01 23) between noema (voqpa) and noesis (voqais) is
interrupted. Access accedes to excess. This decisive suspension of access is part of the
sense of the face, comparable to the way in which the access to the phenomenon
((jxaivopsvov) is 'part of the meaning' of the phenomenon {MS 44). It may be that the
'human being is accessible - as a face' {OF 8), yet such 'expression,' Levinas opines,
'is not less, but more direct than intuition' {FC 21). A 'face is not known,' and this is
not because it is devoid of meaning, sens, or Sinn, rather 'it is not known because its
relationship with us does not refer to its constitution and, to use Husserl's term, is
6 In an interview with Richard Kearney, Levinas will claim that the interhuman is an 'interface,' or
'double axis,' where 'what is 'of the world,' qua phenomenological intelligibility, is juxtaposed with
what 'is not of the world,' qua ethical responsibility' (Cohen, 1986, 20).
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prior to all Sinngebung.'' This sense, he continues, is a 'plenitude of meaning prior to
any Sinngebung (FC 22), in fact, 'signification precedes Sinngebung' and 'marks its
limit' (77 207). The signification of the face thus delimits the very delimitation of
sense upon which the regulative principle of Husserlian phenomenology is founded.
Where Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence cautions against the idioticon of
'intentionality' and 'Sinngebung,' associating both with the autarky of the ego, and
subsequently reversing them under the headings of creation (creation) and passivity
(passivite), Totality and Infinity, in concert with those essays immediately preceding
and proceeding it, condones such terms, thereby retaining these bastions of the
phenomenological lexicon, albeit subverting their application considerably.7
Husserl is guilty of a kind of second order naivete, Levinas argues, for the
phenomenological reduction, intended, after all, to counter the methodological
naivete of the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften), exhibits a perturbing laxity of
its own. The reduction withholds itself, that is, holds itself in abeyance (or obedience
to its regulative ideal) to the extent that it is held in place (and put into play) by a
principle, which, as we have discovered, circumscribes its range in advance. Levinas
extends the scope of the reductions implemented by phenomenology and thus permits,
what to Husserl's thinking at least, would be the sheer devastation of intuition. The
conventionally non-phenomenal is henceforth included within the parameters of the
'more radical phenomenological analysis' practiced by Levinas (ET 43). An 'ethical
Sinngebung becomes possible,' therefore, a 'Sinngebung essentially respectful of the
Other' because it does not presuppose the work of a 'sovereign ego' (RR 121) but
gestures to the disruption of the horizons of cognition by alterity. The extent, of
course, to which the 'radicality' of this alternative programme is hindered by the
conservatism of Levinas' own principle(s) of regulation, remains to be seen.
The reduction Levinas performs uncovers a distinctly ethical structure, or
rather de-structure (GCM 199), that is not the 'product' of consciousness and its
'destiny' but that within and from which consciousness is itself brought to light. This
de-structure inverts the logical sequence of accomplishment adduced by Husserl and
attests to an order of constitution in which the constituted becomes ('within
7 For example, the 'essential of ethics,' Levinas will maintain throughout Totality and Infinity, is 'in its
transcendent intention' and this ruptures the formal structures of thought (77 29). However, despite the
fact that the ethical subject cannot be reduced to the field where beings are displayed in their
phosphorescence - consciousness does not establish the limit for all that appears - do formal,
conceptual 'structures' not remain in place to manage the distinctly 'ethical' Empfindungen that strike
the subject? Does the subject not impose its own limit (or have a limit imposed upon it) upon what may
or may not obligate it qua face?
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constitution') the 'condition' for the constitutive activity that accomplishes it (77
128). 'Representation' thus 'already finds itself placed within horizons that it
somehow had not willed, but with which it cannot dispense' (RR 121; emphasis
mine). Such a dispensation confirms, for Levinas, that the ego does not so much 'let
the Other be,' but instead speaks to the Other in response to 'his' summons. The
'ethical reduction' must not be conflated with Heideggerian Gelassenheit, or
begegnen lassen, for this would be, according to Levinas (and however misguided this
reading of Heidegger might be), to situate the will, and consequently volitional
activity, at the heart of ethics. As Levinas will indicate in Otherwise than Being, the
way I appear is itself a 'summons' (OBBE 139). In more traditional
phenomenological terms, one might say that I am given to 'myself,' qua ethical
subject, against the horizon of my being summoned by the Other. Indeed, language
itself 'comes to me from the Other' and is not 'enacted within consciousness' but
rather 'reverberates there' putting me into question (7/ 204). Language, in opposition
to vision, is the 'medium' through which the relationship with the Other 'takes form'
and the 'horizon' against which it is presented (7/ 195).
Levinas is resolute, therefore. The other person is not a 'thing' available to
comprehension, nor an object apt to be besieged by consciousness. The Other does
not 'sparkle' for consciousness (MS 36). Alterity is not defined by its emication.
Contra Heidegger, first philosophy (upcoTq 4>iAoacfsia) is by no means
phainaesthetics; the face does not 'show itself forth' or (JiatveaBcxt (although Levinas'
thinking of the 'face' may well be, as I hope to demonstrate, phainaesth-ethical). The
Other does not, to adopt the nomenclature of Totality and Infinity, 'manifest' him or
herself against a predelineated or 'illuminated horizon' (MS 36). Again, this would be
tantamount to rendering the Other secondary to consciousness and it constitutive
structures. Levinas believes that the 'comprehension' of the Other is 'inseparable
from his invocation' (OF 6). The two are interlaced such that the Other is given to
thought, albeit as that which disrupts and exceeds it, as that which both orders and
ordains thought, as that which invokes and provokes thought, and that towards which
the ego is called. However, the intertwining evidenced here, between what one could
call the twin poles of 'interpretation' and 'interpellation' (and defended above in the
essay 'Is Ontology Fundamental' (1951)) does not retain its priority in later work
where the face increasingly resists all comprehension and refuses the residency of
8 As Levinas intimates in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, the 'I,' qua creature, is 'already
constituted when the act of constitution first originates' (OBBE 105).
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form, passing obliquely into an immemorial past beyond recuperation and immune to
synopsis.
Levinas' prejudice against the 'optical' and its position of primacy within
phenomenological inquiry rises to prominence in the account of the face he assays.
His disavowal of the metaphorics of 'light' and 'vision' is notably pronounced in this
regard. Light and the vacuity of 'space' cannot be the conditions for the relationship
with the Other, Levinas asserts, because 'vision is not a transcendence' (77 191).
Vision does not breach the horizons within which consciousness confers meaning
upon the world; vision 'opens nothing beyond the same' because it 'empties space'
and compels things to release themselves to the ego's intentional regard. Such
compulsion traduces the transcendence that must be preserved if the call of the Other
is to be heeded in its exigency. Speech, therefore, 'cuts across vision' (77 193),
Levinas urges, because the Other is first and foremost an 'interlocutor' and not an
object through which one's gaze my pass. The Other's very passing by effects a
desistance of intentionality in which the 'pure Ego' (reines Ich) is literally stood down
from its pole position.
§ 2. The ordinances ofphenomenological procedure
In attempting to provide an analysis of the ways in which the Other presents 'himself'
to the subject (the effectuation of the Other, as it were) Levinas, as we have seen,
broadly adheres to the edicts of phenomenological explication. Indeed, as early as the
1929 essay, 'On Ideas,' Levinas had identified the 'way in which an object is given to
consciousness and the meaning of its objectivity' as the leading directives of
phenomenological enquiry (01 10). However, for Levinas, phenomenological access
is consistently (dis)qualified by phenomenological excess, and while the face of the
Other appears to me, it presents itself in a manner that is refractory to 'vision,' thus
falling outside the jurisdiction of theory (Bscopia).
The Other appears to me in the modes of invocation and summons; manieres
d'etre which obtruncate all attempts to grasp the Other as phenomenon. It is through
language (ultimately emphasized by Levinas as exposedness and vulnerability, that is,
as the 'approach to and contact with the neighbor' (LP 125)), conceived as 'hearing,'
'heeding,' and 'listening,' in response to 'commanding,' 'teaching' and 'petitioning,'
that the Other person is apprehended as one who faces me. Such apprehension does
not appraise, or contemplate, the Other but is precisely the 'way' in which the face is
'welcomed' (77 1 89). Moreover, transcendence is 'not an optics' but is rather the 'first
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ethical gesture' (77 174), since the face is not merely seen and subjected to the
computations of constitution. Its arrival 'deforms' vision (77 291), effecting a
'mutation' of the intentional aim that would proffer to thematize it. Somewhat
paradoxically though, 'of itself ethics is an "optics'" (77 29), Levinas affirms, for it
effects a seeing that is at once a seeing to the needs of others, a vision that is at once a
kind of service, as if the hand that probes the element of the world were, rather, an
eye. The hand (arguably the excellence of corporeity for Levinas, for it is that which
gives (OBBE 67)) obeys the summons of the face as the eye heeds the imperative of
light, one might conclude.
A notable ambiguity plagues Levinas' account of the face. An ambiguity that
is perhaps deliberate, as the 'confusion' of theory and practice is said to be in Totality
and Infinity (TI 29), but which troubles the coherence of Levinas' thought. It is an
ambiguity marked by disparity, for the face occasions a curious disjuncture between
what we might call the ontico-phenomenological and the ethical regions of inquiry. (I
am not, however, disclaiming Levinas' thought as simply a kind of regional ontology
qua the region (Gegend) of ethics.) Levinas analyses the face in both registers, and his
descriptions are often inconclusive, or worse, nebulous as a result. The demarcation
between the ontico-phenomenological and the ethical domains is poorly upheld by
Levinas and the two registers regularly bleed into one another (to the point of
haemorrhage perhaps, as the well known Levinasian trope would indicate;
haemorrhage in need of torsion, perhaps, as the title of my study intimates). This is far
from problematic. Indeed, this very descriptive reticence serves to strengthen the case
for an account of ethicality based on the heritability of 'sense' (sens). However, for
the project undertaken by Levinas the indeterminacy adduced here is grave. Levinas is
obliged to enforce (and it certainly is an enforcement) a distinction between the
ontico-phenomenological and the ethical dimensions in order to guarantee the validity
of his arguments concerning the face. Yet this polarization aggravates the cogency of
his position precisely because it is repeatedly frustrated in the accounts of the face
Levinas imparts.
Of course, the indeterminacy suggested here informs critical debate
regarding the phenomenological credentials of Levinas' thought. Levinas himself
concedes that 'phenomenology defects into a face' (OBBE 90). This defection is a
cause for celebration, moreover, and not for concern, as critics like Dominique
Janicaud would maintain. Such defection jeopardizes the concreteness of the face,
however, and attenuates its appeal and appealingness, because the material conditions
of the Other's manifestation are robbed of their descriptive force. The Other is thus, it
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seems, bereft of sensible qualities (or 'qualities' susceptible to theoretical appraisal)
and intentionality suffers a bereavement before the face. The perceptual regard is
thereby bereaved of its relata. Levinas recognizes this critical impasse but remains,
nevertheless, committed to explicating the predicament of thought, and highlighting
the deposition it suffers, before the other person. The Other, he will claim, 'bears
alterity as a quality' {EE 94; emphasis added). As intimated, the Other is 'recognized'
(EP 70) in the manner of an invocation. An invocation given through the modes of
appearance of 'misery' and 'poverty' {MBCJ 18); modes of appearance which one
might also term Levinasian Seinsweise, providing one understands the Being, of such
'ways of being,' to be a being otherwise than the Being of Dasein in its
circumspective concern, and the being of the conatus in its nisus toward self-
preservation. This is how the Other 'appears' to me, or rather, the one who faces me is
produced in this way (77 291).
Before questioning more closely the fragmentation of face and form upon
which Levinas' thought is founded, and arguably founders, it is important that the
'non-phenomenality' of the face be clarified. Until a grasp of that which spurns all
grasp is attained, accentuating the discordance between a face that reveals one
suffering the paucity of their condition, and a condition that is itself extirpated from
the field of phenomenological explication (is the Other poor precisely because she is
deprived of 'form'? Is materiality not the very format of the face?), would be
decidedly premature.
'Vision,' Levinas will insist (and vision here serves as a metonym for a
certain phenomenology, a phenomenology governed by representational and
recuperative acts) is 'consummated' in the ethical vis-a-vis (77 23). Vision, and the
synopsis it entails, in inured in the face of the other person. The face is an enigma, or
noumenon, before which phenomenal form recoils and from which the rays of the
intentional regard do not return to synthesise their referent (77 23). Continuing this
pyral motif, Levinas suggests that in the face 'cognition and the manifestation of
being' are 'engulfed in an ethical relationship' {EP 120). As our analysis proceeds, we
will need to consider carefully what mechanisms, if any, prevent the individual from
being 'consumed' in the relationship Levinas describes here. Levinasian first
philosophy {philosophic premiere) appears close, at times, to terminating in a kind of
ethical sutteeism. Quite what protects the subject from the 'consummation' of being
that murmurs in the depths of the il y a {EE 57), and the 'expiration' in which the
adventure of ethical life ultimately culminates (can one even say this, for 'my'
responsibility exceeds the limit of 'my' death?), is debatable. As Bloechl and Ricoeur
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have both argued, 'morality' might involve 'managing' the 'conflict' that arises
between 'economic desire' and 'religious desire' (Bloechl, 2000, 282), that is,
between 'self-attestation' and the 'injunction coming from the other' (Ricoeur, 1992,
355), rather than simply suppressing one of these dyadic poles, in Levinas' case the
needs and interests of the self, in favour of the other.
While during the period of Totality and Infinity Levinas will seek to describe
the (non)relation with the face as an 'intentionality of a wholly different type' than
that commandeered by Husserl - a mode of intentionality accomplished in an ethical
Sinngebung, a nonintentional intentionality, as it were - he is adamant in his
conviction that the presentation of the face not be conflated with the perception of
physical 'things.' The typological distinction Levinas enforces between thetic modes
of intentionality and ethical intentionality informs his prejudice against the application
of the face to the nonhuman creature. This typological distinction spares the face from
the degeneracy of its form, Levinas maintains. The face repels its form. Like the
element, it is monstrous, exorbitant, and this 'mutation' is brought to light through the
'opening of a new dimension' (77 197), a dimension hitherto foreign to
phenomenological science, the dimension of the proto-ethical. Material things,
however:
Manifest themselves as answering to a question relative to which they have a
meaning - the meaning quid ? [...] This content cannot be detached from the
context... it answers to the question by its place in the system. To ask what is
to ask as what: it is not to take the manifestation for itself (Tl 177).
The quiddity of the thing is predicated upon its comparability. One grasps the quiddity
of the thing (its quality or qua-lity) by experiencing it as such and such a thing,
Levinas insists. A pre-established referential system is always in place, therefore,
prior to the perception of a material thing. It is into this system that the perceived
object is installed. To unravel an object is to 'situate the object in a perspective of
thoughts' and thus to 'determine its ontological place' (WEH 55). The signitive 'as'
upon which the systematism in question is founded is the basic axiom of perceptual
experience.
In Levinas' thought (at least up to and including the period of Totality and
Infinity) the metaphorics of the 'said' are troped by the superlation of the face, a sur-
impression which exceeds the capacity of thought and disrupts the synchrony of
comparability. In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, the standing of metaphor
within philosophical thought is challenged further by the resolutely anti-systematic
hetero-affection of the 'saying.' The surimpression of the face in its exorbitance is
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rethought, in conjunction with insights gleaned from Husserl's lectures on internal
time consciousness, as the Ur-impression of the other-in-me. The figure of maternity
(.maternite), the bearing of the Other, is gestatorial, both in the sense that I bear the
inscription of the Other's passing like a naevus, or birth mark (a permanent reminder
that my origin qua 'creature' (creature) is irretrievable, unlike the 'source-point'
described by Husserl (PIT §36)), and because 'I' carry the Other to term in an endless
gesture of ethical portage, such that the terminus ad quem of responsibility is at once
its terminus a quo. Indeed, the 'saying' bears the 'said' as the an-archic origin of
signification.
But what, it may be asked, is one to make of the copulative 'is,' and the
signitive 'as,' in operation here? What kind of relation obtains between them? Indeed,
can this relation be an accord of kind, that is of ysvos, given the absolute singularity
of the face, which purportedly interrupts essence and breaks with the Aoyos of
commensurability? Perhaps Levinas' suggestion, that metaphor is itself troped by the
'one-for-the-other' (GP 147) - arguably the trope of tropes - is relevant here. For,
through 'my' substitution for another, the T of egoity (idem) and the 'me' (ipse) of
diacony are chiastically intertwined and enfolded one within the other. T am the
work of substitution: I am in so far as I am 'for' the Other. My being, qua creature, is
taken up as a subjection to the neighbour. As Levinas notes in 'Questions and
Answers' (1977), the Hebrew word kamokhah communicates something of the
audacity of this extraordinary proposal. Kamokhah, a term deployed in the Biblical
edict to 'Love your neighbour as yourself' (Leviticus 19:18), comes to encapsulate
those words that precede and proceed the phrase 'your neighbour' in this Levitical
formulation. Thus, one is, as Levinas explains, to love one's neighbour, for 'all that is
yourself; this work is yourself; this love is yourself.' (QA 91). The passage between
the copulative and the signitive is accomplished as substitution, therefore. Ontologico-
grammatical order is itself posterior to the declension I undergo through exposure to
the face. Substitution is not a metaphor (OBBE 57). The ethical sense (sens ethique)
engendered by the face is not deferred or transferred to it, by analogy, from another
source. The face does not resemble any 'thing:' all comparables derive from its
incomparability.
By contrast, or so Levinas will declare, the 'thing' is assimilated to the
'correlation between thought and being' which 'thinking itself founds' (GCM xii). It
is present leiblich da before consciousness because it can be synthesized and ordered
by cognition. Things, apropos of Levinas are, we recall, 'movables' (muebles) suited
to the domiciliary space of consciousness; the desiderata in which acts of enjoyment
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terminate and the 'world-space' across which the relation with the other person is
enacted. The clarity of evidence, with which the 'thing' (and by thing it is clear that
Levinas includes the nonhuman creature) furnishes consciousness, commissions the
disappearance of that which could shock or awaken the ego from its complacency.
The thing is a thing among other things: one among many. It is a member of a genus
(ysvos). It does not signify ethically. However, the face shatters all systematicity and
interrupts the predelineated horizonal structures of experience. The face, contra the
thing, cannot be lodged within any system or programme of thought. It cannot be
accommodated as such. The face's essential 'homelessness' reflects at once both the
material poverty of the other person in his or her state of need, and the lack of shelter
accorded the face by its form.
The question that pursues the quiddity of the 'thing' - the question that
would seek to disclose it and corroborate what it is - is 'put to someone,' Levinas
adverts, and thus presupposes the encounter with the face. The face, of course, in not
'a modality of quiddity' and is 'prior to every question' (77 177). Above all, the face
signifies prior to the posing of the Seinsfrcige, for it is not the 'question of Being' so
much as whether it is righteous to be that impels Levinas' thought. The 'Da of Dasein
is already an ethical problem,' Levinas quips (AB 48). The tenancy of my ontological
place is not an assured one. The Grundfrage, ethically reordered and realigned
according to the vertical axis of the face, contests its very own constation. The
'ontological form of the said,' Levinas argues 'devolves from the very contestation of
this signification' (OBBE 156). The posing of the question effects a deposition of the
constituting ego, displacing it from the pleasure of its aprication. Similarly, and as it
were by default, the identity of the oneself (the singularity of the responsible subject)
is not, Levinas avers, 'the inertia of a quiddity,' nor is it due to 'some distinctive
quality,' such as the colour of the hair or eyes that would make of such a subject a
'unicum' (OBBE 194n.9), but is instead the product of a veritable ethical metanoia
(pETavoia).
Levinas will argue that the face is the presentation of 'an entity as an entity,'
a 'personal presentation' (FC 20). Here, then, the conjunctive 'as' singularises rather
than compares, for the face of the Other is incomparable. The face composes its own
ysvos, hence the Other does not 'belong to the same genus as the ego,' Levinas will
maintain (HA 138). The indicative 'as' is emphatic, therefore, emphasizing the
uniqueness of the face without dissimulating it or translating it, qua 'thing,' into the
currency of the mundane and familiar. Yet the translation of form into face arguably
disfigures (devisage) the face and jeopardizes its injunctive force because that which
24
expresses itself xa0' auTO within Levinas' thought is managed by a regulatory
framework: a TTapaSsiypa that arguably governs the work of ethics and sets its
limits. A framework, moreover, which presents the face according to its own internal
mandates.
Might it not be possible to transfigure the 'thing'? Might limpid things not
retain an enigmatic quality and bear their transcendency as their 'identity'? Might the
sheer quoddity of the thing, the fact that it is (rather than what it is), be sufficiently
binding to warrant our being obliged to honour and respect it? If phenomenology
engenders a commitment 'to the things themselves,' an appeal to the Sachen Selbst,
then might part of what is entailed by phenomenological practice not involve a
willingness to return things to themselves and to let them be for their own sakes (and
not simply ours), since, after all, both Sache and sake share a common etymological
heritage and it is a question of the heritability of sense that is at stake here? The other
person may well be exempt from the laws of constitution, as it were. But the 'outside'
(<dehors) from whence this other issues is already 'inside,' that is, it is an 'outside'
ordered by, and arranged in keeping with, the principia (apxcu) that extend the field
of ethical space as Levinas ordains it. The 'outside' is relative to the conceptual
schema (axqpa) that schematises it, and the schema in question is dominated by the
polarization of face and fapade. One may naturally enquire, therefore, as to what
regulates the polarization evidenced here, and, furthermore, what enforces the
schismata that separate its poles, poles in many ways as basic to Levinas' project as
the separation (separation) that preserves the integrity of the dyads about which this
philosophy is oriented.
In signifying Ka0' auxo the face stands out from the world, unsettling the
horizons into which thought would place it. Similarly, through a kind of inverse
ecstasis, I stand out as one who is uniquely 'elected' to serve the Other whose face
confronts me. Unlike the thing, harboured by its form, the face presents the alterity of
the other person and signifies beyond the similitude of mental states in which the
Other (the alter-ego) is secured for cognition through an intentional modification of
my own states of mind (CM §52 [144]). The 'Other' is not, pace Husserl, the index of
an analogical transfer. As Derrida notes, the Other 'is not signalled by his face, he is
his face' (Derrida, 1978, 100). The face is the tottos, or site, of a chiasmic exchange
in which vision is decussated by speech, a decussation which, Levinas urges, attests to
the 'crux' of a 'plot' not reducible to phenomenology (OBBE 46). It is through
language, in turn, that one 'quits the order of violence' (ES 7) - the jurisdiction of
'light' - because language is the locus for the 'teaching of exteriority' (Tl 196). I am
25
the recipient of the offering which language is. (As Levinas will argue in Otherwise
than Being or Beyond Essence, I receive my very capacity to receive from the Other.
All remnants of volition are excised from the encounter, therefore. Receptivity is
henceforth conceived as radical passivity (passivite). I am created - a creature.) To
what extent this discourse on the Other is itself received, and to what degree the
designation of philosophy as the 'wisdom of love at the service of love' (OBBE 162)
is a product of received wisdom, handed down through the lineage of a particular
historical-cultural community, is moot.
For Levinas, language is a discursive medium, and discourse discides the
planiform space of equipmentality set forth by Heidegger in Being and Time, by
reordering relational space according to the strictures of interlocution. The laterality
of objects positioned alongside one another is intersected by verticality as space
inclines towards the face. The face-to-face delineates 'a distance in depth' and it is
here that conversation is 'enacted' (77 39). Indeed, the 'banal fact of conversation' is,
Levinas declares, the 'marvel of marvels' (ES 7); a marvel that exceeds the wonder
(<das Wunder) occasioned by the 'marvellous correlation between the phenomenon of
cognition and the object of cognition' which, according to Husserl, 'reveals itself
everywhere,' and excites sufficient wonder to inaugurate the discipline of
phenomenological science proper (IP 10). The face, as Levinas defines it, is, in stricto
sensu, 'nowhere' for it issues precisely from 'elsewhere' (ailleurs) (MS 60), and is not
contained within a series of limits which position it relative to an environing
boundary. Although, it is arguably delimited by a set of criteria that regulate its
'entry' into the mundane order and ensure that the 'sense' (sens) of the face is
properly managed. Managed, perhaps, much in the way that the hierophant manages
the altar or effigy through which the 'god' manifests itself, a form of priestcraft
which, in this instance, matches the brawn of rabbinical science with the
scrupulousness of Husserlian phenomenology.
The face, in its heteronomy, is thus taken to refute the universality of the
'marvellous correlation' Husserl believes to belie all intentional acts. It could be
maintained, though, and in opposition to Levinas, that the face qua noumenon is itself
correlative with the face qua phenomenon, i.e., the concept of the 'face' apprehended
as the counterpart to the 'facade' of things within a predetermined conceptual
configuration. As such, some kind of Begrijf des Ethischen remains operative
throughout Levinas' presentation of the face, despite his protestations to the contrary.
It is the 'marvel' of the face Levinas has in mind when he proclaims ethics to be
'spiritual optics, ' however (77 78). 'Religion' and 'metaphysics' are 'only possible'
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as ethical relationship; they are reconfigured, literally reordered, according to the
mandate of the face (FC 21). 'Religion' is given sense - it comes to mind {yient a
I'idee) - within the context of the ethical vis-a-vis. Ethics is the passage, or TTopos, to
the spiritual. The 'starry heavens above' (der bestirnte Himmel iiber mir), which,
along with the 'Moral law within' (das morcilische Gesetz in mir), provoke the
admiration of Kant in the closing pages of the Critique of Practical Reason (CPRR
269), do not fill Levinas with awe. Such ouranic wonder, the 'wonder' Kant fixes
with the term Bewunderung and directed toward oupavos, is decidedly misplaced,
Levinas beseeches, for the appropriate locus of astonishment (etonnement) is the face
of the other person. 'Heaven' and 'earth' align as such in the face of the Other, and
there alone. Thus, neither the 'light dove,' which, according to Kant in the Critique of
Pure Reason, cleaves the air in free flight, nor the air, whose resistance this 'bird'
suffers during flight (CPR A5/B8), arouse the wonder Levinas situates at the heart of
his ethical philosophy. Neither the nonhuman, nor the elemental, occasion the wonder
sanctioned by the face, for they are, apropos of Levinas, precisely faceless (77 140),
mere props strewn about the 'stage' of ethical life to enhance its 'performance,' the
donanda of supererogatory transaction. Hardly a mark of nobility, then.
§ 3. The enigma of the face
Husserl demonstrates convincingly that the unification of 'objects' within perceptual
experience (encountered within the natural attitude) is accomplished when the subject
is 'directed straightforwardly toward an object and what belongs to it' in such a way
that the perceptual regard traverses the manifold appearances of the 'object,' in its
various adumbrations, and grasps it, albeit naively, as a unity (Crisis §28 [105]). The
'straightforwardness' attested to here by Husserl is suspended in the 'reflective
attitude' in which phenomenological science commences. To be sure, in 'perceiving
straightforwardly' objects are 'grasped,' but the immediate seeing upon which the
'evidence' prized by phenomenology is based, remains occult. The reflective attitude,
by contrast, opens the sphere within which phenomenological inquiry is directed
toward 'perceiving itself' and the 'perceptual directedness' that apprises its object(s)
0CM §15 [72]). The phenomenologist thereby adverts to lived experience as it is lived
or inhabited. The phenomenologist takes up residence in the 'stream of mental
processes' (Id §34) and directs his or her 'mental regard' (geistigen Blickes) toward
the shifting panoply of appearances given there. Lor Husserl, 'experiential seeing' is
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thus of secondary importance to 'immediate "seeing",' the latter being the 'originally
presentive consciousness,' or source, of all sense (Id § 19).
Levinas contests the primordiality of this presentive source, underscoring the
dubiety of its originality. The 'intentionality of a wholly different type' (77 23), which
he commends as the 'condition' for 'every objective truth' (77 25), is revealed post
ethical reduction. Again, the significance of Levinas' declaration that 'the difference
between objectivity and transcendence' serves as a methodological 'guideline' for the
analyses of Totality and Infinity, should not be underestimated (77 49). The reflective
attitude lauded by Husserl is itself reduced under the auspices of an ethical recovery
of sense. The reflective attitude defers to the 'aptitude for speech' (77 23; emphasis
mine). Representation may be the 'natural locus of evidence.' However, it is
necessary to 'proceed from' an immediate seeing of the phenomenon (4>aivopEVOv)
'back to' the 'situation that conditions it' (Tl 24; emphasis added). Hence, the
reflective stance is itself proved to be naive, and the latent naturalism it conceals is
now subject to an ethical excavation from which a supra-natural (metaphysical)
source of meaning, or sens ethique, is deduced (OBBE 148; AE 231).
The phenomenological excavation (fouille) Levinas undertakes, uncovers the
inflective dimension of the face beneath the field of pure consciousness opened in the
reflective stance. The 'straightforwardness' of 'natural' perception, abdicated by
Husserl in order to enter the 'reflective attitude,' is restituted within the supra-natural
(or contra-natural) aptitude as the 'straightforwardness' (droiture) of the face-to-face
relation. Here the 'straightforwardness of an orientation' is delineated (MS 55), an
orientation that challenges the 'sense' given in the 'straightforwardness that
characterizes the relationship between noesis and noema' (MS 36). This ethical proto-
sense, Levinas believes, counters the 'essential disorientation' that defines culturally
relative configurations of 'sense' and 'signification' (MS 44); an assertion that we will
need to interrogate as our analysis proceeds.
The face is frank in a way the thing is not, Levinas argues, because the face
is without fa£ade. The 'frankness' (franchise) of the face-to-face inhibits
thematization (TI 182). It presents itself as a commanding 'presence' (Totality and
Infinity) before which je ne pins plus pouvoir. I am dis-empowered before the face - it
is not that I am enfeebled, so much as mon pouvoir de pouvoir is defied, one might
say (Tl 198) - yet the thing remains vulnerable to the emprise of the 'grasp.'9 There is
9 One may dispute the authority of Levinas' claim here. Are all interpretative frameworks and
conceptual paradigms (7iapd8eiypaxa) thwarted in the encounter with the face? Surely the ethical space
in which the encounter with the Other is produced is opened by the distinction between 'face' and
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no possible vantage point from which 'I' am able to synopsize the face. The 'sway of
the I,' Levinas confers, 'will not cross the distance marked by the alterity of the other'
(77 3 8). The face is not a congeries of silhouettes (.Abschattungen) available to
perspectival variation. The Other conceals no 'other side.' The Other cannot be 'non-
intuitively cointended' in 'phantasy' so as to disclose 'his' hidden profiles and render
'his' invisibility, visible (CM §20). The exteriority of the face is 'inscribed in its very
essence' qua face (77 196). The 'merely sensuous, experiential seeing' (Id §19)
which, as we have noted, Husserl has recourse to reduce in order to appraise the pure
seeing appertinent to phenomenological explication, is reinstated, or reproduced -
Totality and Infinity, we recall is a philosophy of 'production' (77 26) - by Levinas at
the heart of his philosophy. This restoration uncovers the ethical substrate of
'experience,' however, and reclaims the sensuous, qua sensibility, as a being seized
by alterity, such 'captivation' keeping in play the ongoing trope of astonishment that
characterizes Levinas' work.
One's 'experience' of another (ethically revised) is not exhausted in the
machinations of retentional consciousness, in which the 'alter-ego' is manufactured
from a melange of fading sense impressions; experience is not first and foremost a
matter of recuperation. It is rather 'experience par excellence'' (77 196), whereby the
'absolutely other' animates all intellective endeavour - and as Levinas will confirm in
Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence literally animates 'me' (OBBE 180) - from
the hither side of egological constitution. Levinas propounds a 'radical empiricism
[I'empirisme radical]' (77 196; Tel 213) in which experience is straightaway
'straightforward' (franc). For, the lingua franca of the face-to-face heralds the
'appearance in the world' of that which 'unmakes and disorders' the established order
of things (OJRS 12). By this, Levinas does not simply mean the governing powers,
the pax Romana, or pax Americana, as it were, but the governing principles that
structure and instruct 'experience' in both its 'natural' and 'reflective' instantiations.
Radical empiricism treats the excellence of experience accomplished in the 'facing
position,' an 'excellence' that does not issue from the subject's 'a priori depths' (77
196) but which exceeds or excels its capacity as genitrix. Radical empiricism seeks to
present the very 'emphasis of sense' that reverses and inverts the for-oneself into the
'form' upon which Levinas bases his ethical 'teaching.' To recognise the face as a face this distinction
must be upheld and remain operative at all times (even during the interval of temps mort or diachronic
time). In order for this distinction to remain fully operative the conceptual montage from whence it
issues must first be imposed upon the space of encounter Levinas describes. Does it not appear,
therefore, that a conceptual schema regulates the sensible data of the face and its facing 'me,' however
traumatic (or proto-logical) such an encounter is purported to be?
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for-the-other of signification (OBBE 50). The ego's constitutive freedom (its
spontaneity) is itself founded and justified in the encounter with the face (77 197).10
But, one may ask, is the 'excellence' Levinas deduces here, an excellence
particular to the face as such, or is it an excellence that can only ever be prescribed?
In Levinas' case such prescription would take the form of the 'excellence of an
exceptional message,' a message (deposited within the 'square letters' of the Torah; a
message which, although 'addressed to all,' attests to the (^election of a people (the
Jews) and the 'uncomfortable privilege' borne by them (AC 199). A privilege, what is
more, that is concomitant with the principia that open the field of Levinasian ethics.
Bloechl's comments are, I think, once again insightful here. Bloechl notes that: 'one
might well experience something like what Levinas describes,' but it is 'another
matter to discern from that experience the consequences he prescribes' (Bloechl 2000,
234). To my mind, and here I am in agreement with Bloechl, the imbroglio between
description and prescription (where what is prescribed is at once a proscription) is
never resolved in Levinas' work, for reasons I hope to clarify in due course. To this
extent, one may legitimately characterize the encounter with the 'face' as an instance
of ethico-phenomenological embroilment. One cannot quite be sure if Levinas'
description of the face is a presentation (presentation) or an allocation (prestation) of
sense.
The ethical situation (scene) Levinas enunciates - the effectuation of the face
and its facing me (MG 57) - is enigmatic. The face is an enigma because through it
someone presents him or herself beyond, behind, and in the midst of the scattering
dispersion of presentifications occasioned by the countenance and the plasticity of its
form. The translucent space or 'clearing' (die Lichtung) within which manifestive
beings disclose themselves to the purview of sight is suffused with darkness, the
Lichtung is offset against the obscurity of its Dickung. Phenomenology, as such, is
arguably the science of (dis)appearance. The rifts fissuring these innumerable
presentifications are the passageways, or uopoi, through which the enigma of the face
enters the world. Indeed, the ontological difference, opened in the Riss between Being
and beings, is arguably rethought by Levinas here as the rift (suggesting at once both
fissure and disaccord) between face and form; namely between that which can be
stated and that which contests constation, the difference of distantiation that marks the
interval of separation between another and myself. As Levinas explains:
10 This encounter, or heteronomous experience, signals the imposition of a heterological order.
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The face enters into our world from an absolutely foreign sphere [...] from an
ab-solute, which in fact is the very name for ultimate strangeness. The
signifyingness of a face in its abstractness is in the literal sense of the term
extra-ordinary (MS 53).
The face is extraordinary, yet it presents itself amidst the banality of everyday life.
Conversation presages the arrival of the face and the common place of speech is its
very lieu de naissance (or perhaps its maison natale should we recall Heidegger's
famous dictum that 'Language is the house of Being' (Heidegger, 1947, 259)). The
'strangeness' (etrangete) of the face, through which the 'stranger' (etranger)
introduces him or herself, is not so much a bizarrerie, as it is the very oddity of the
ordinary. This extra-ordinariness (the excellence of the ordinary, one might say) may
well be, as Levinas proposes, the 'literal' sense of the face, however such literality is
itself littoral for the face arrives 'from another shore [d'une autre rive]' (77 171; Tel
186). The face is 'alien,' for it is somehow at once both 'otherworldly' and the
'origin' of the meaning of the world. Moreover, it 'remains terrestrial' (Tl 203), for it
is that which accomplishes the sense by which terrene life is oriented. The face, so
understood, is thus the cradle of civilization (berceau de la civilisation).
In order to explicate the pure saying proper to ethical proximity, Levinas
deems it necessary to 'revert to the hither side of civilization' (OBBE 198n.7). Yet,
the relationship between the face and civilization remains problematic. For I would
argue, that that which signifies as a face, signifies precisely as that which is
acknowledged by a given culture to be of optimal value within the axiological range it
recognises. The optima of the face may well signify otherwise than those values
enshrined in the practices, beliefs and injunctions of a given culture. However, a
distinction must be made between the fact that there is signification, and the specific
and culturally nuanced ways in which such signification is constituted (or civilized)
within the cultural nexus of values from whence it issues and against which it
signifies. For, as Husserl intimates, it is in conformity with the laws encoded in inter-
subjective 'constitutive systems,' systems that are 'actualisable' by the individual ego,
that the 'sense,' or 'meaning,' which in this instance the face may have, exists for an
ego (CM §37). I contend, therefore, that despite differentiating between signification
and significancy (and despite his antipathy toward the kind of systematism Husserl
underscores above), Levinas does not provide an adequate account of the generation
of signification and the consistency of his argument suffers as a result. Can Levinas'
descriptions of the face really avoid committing themselves to a certain axiological
bearing (tonalite axiologique), one may ask?
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Of course, Levinas will insist that value, in its 'original radiation,' signifies
before any 'intentional movement' without there being a 'free attitude toward value
that could be taken up' (OBBE 198n.28). The face is the 'origin of value and good,'
he declares (PGTI 199). The ethical factum, he states, 'owes nothing to values,' for
the 'Good,' rendered concrete, 'is the worth' of the other person (D 147).
Responsibility for the other person is, quite simply, 'outside of the axiological
bipolarity' in which values are thematized and set forth (HA 136). One may well
concur with Levinas here. But such a response hardly mitigates against the criticism
advanced above. For firstly, it confirms, albeit inadvertently, that the recognition of
value (here one's sensitivity to the face post impressible susception) is a by-product of
inculcation and acculturation. Inveterate tendencies, sedimented habits, and accepted
mores establish the forum, a forum or dyopa that arguably subtends the field of
ethics (champs ethique) Levinas charts, within which that which signifies as a face is
welcomed as such. This appears to hold even if Levinas associates the notion of
'welcome' (accueil) with the repose of domiciliary life (indeed, the Hebrew word for
'welcome,' pnbn, is, somewhat tellingly, also that for 'tradition'). The values
intimated here being, as it were, indigenous to the home-world (Heimwelt) he itemizes
under this heading. Domiciliary life, we will recall, is the sphere encompassing all
that is familiar and familial. In the idiom of phenomenology, it is the sum of those
access routes that open a world for us; a haven in the midst of the elemental, secured
for possession.11 And while one might agree with Levinas that the 'meaningful' is not
'architectonic,' and need not be 'expressed in architectural terms' (JW 80), its staging
does, invariably, require structural support.
To be sure, Levinas will maintain that the face interrupts the sphere of the
'same' (77 67) and that exposedness rather than receptivity is the mark of the ethical.
One suffers the face as the burden of the being one takes up, the levity of nutrimental
existence awakens to the gravity of ethical life (one's selfhood is one's love for the
neighbour, this 'work' is 'like yourself' Levinas argues (QA 90)): radical passivity
defines the encounter with the face, we recall. However, even if we accept the
proposals Levinas volunteers, are we not compelled to question the guise under which
they are proposed? If the face teaches the first lesson (I am no autodidact), the lesson
in which I am assigned my ontological place and in which I am assigned to myself,
11 It is precisely because Levinas identifies axiology with the ataraxy of domiciliary life (the 'dwelling'
being a trope for the sphere of the 'same') that he would refuse to accept the critique presented here.
For Levinas, axiology is prone to become 'a "cognition" of values or of what ought to be,' and
'practice' is likewise apt to become 'the cognition of what is to be done' (OBBE 65).
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then does it not also follow that I am similarly bequeathed an axiological inheritance?
Am I not taught to recognize the face as a face and schooled so as to maximize my
facial recognition? Apropos of Levinas, the 'contact' which defines ethical proximity,
the 'point' at which the epiphany of the face becomes proximity, teaches nothing 'but
the contact, by the contact itself.' Contact teaches only the 'very fact of saying and
learning,' one might argue {LP 121).
Clearly, the impact of the face is felt, as it were, 'after the fact' (apres coup).
According to the diachronic logic set forth in Otherwise than Being or Beyond
Essence, I am a late arrival on the 'scene,' I am always in arrears (consciousness is
always late for the 'rendezvous with the neighbor,' Levinas asserts {LP 119)).
However, am I not also affected by others, others whose traumatic incursions into my
dwelling remain somehow subterfuge (even repressed), others whose faces do not
quite surface because the gaze they direct toward me is concealed beneath the
surfaces and hides I "see' before me? Has Levinas not, in fact, limited the 'traumatism
of astonishment [traumatisme de I'etonnementY {TI 73; Tel 71) that such faces might
inflict by failing to include them within the range of what he permits to signify as a
face? If the 'persecution' of the face 'crosses a night of unconsciousness,' and if,
indeed, ethical 'trauma' is 'without warning' {OBBE 197n.27), then how is such a
delimitation warranted? Again, if the 'Good' has 'taken possession of the subject
before the subject had the time necessary for choice' {HA 134), that is, if the
subjecting character of responsibility exceeds the deliberation of choice, then can one
determine the terms of the 'facing position' as Levinas is wont to do? It appears as if,
and this is the brunt of Levinas' own criticism of Husserl's analysis of internal time
consciousness, a trace of volition remains on the thither side of the hither side of
constitution. Is the subject-hostage not imputed with a certain freedom, therefore,
despite Levinas' insistence to the contrary?
For the anarchic trauma Levinas details here to be truly anarchic (a trauma
'suffered prior to any auto-identification,' Levinas will argue {OBBE 123)), the
subject would have to remain incapable of assuming what it receives. Susceptibility,
as we will discover in due course, is susceptibility in spite of itself {OBBE 102),
susceptibility beyond and prior to thematization. The neighbour - the near one - is not
'clothed with cultural attributes,' Levinas urges, and signifies in a manner altogether
distinct from the way in which 'the "mineral" surfaces of things' {OBBE 191n.l0) and
the 'animal,' in its 'brutish dumbness' {PI1 55), obsess one - if, indeed, they obsess
one at all. But, is the 'near one' not assumed prior to his or her susception? Is the
neighbour one whose propinquity to me is determined by their belonging to the same
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species as me? It seems as if the Other belongs to the same Ta^i? as me (we
participate in the same species-being) even if 'he' composes 'his' own yevos. A
doctrine of participation is thus operative at the heart of Levinasian first philosophy
(philosophie premiere) despite Levinas' censorious remarks regarding the standing of
so called philosophies of 'participation.' It seems as if Levinas cannot quite extricate
himself from the 'community of genus and form,' after all (OBBE 8).12 It may be that
language, 'in terms of genus and species' (terms which promote the notion of a
'human race'), only recovers its 'rights' after the event of ethical intrigue.
Taxonomical distinctions, so Levinas will claim, are themselves 'founded' upon the
'fraternity' of the face-to-face relation {LP 123). However, this proto-taxonomical
fraternity already admits of classificatory qualification, for it excludes the 'animal'
and the 'mineral' from the brood of the ethical brotherhood (confrerie) it institutes.
One must, on this basis at least, concede that assumption and susception are
coeval. As Levinas himself intimates in Totality and Infinity, a line of thought he
generally retracts in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence where he seeks to
expedite all traces of the actional from his account of the ethical subject, the
'welcome' of the other person 'expresses a simultaneity of activity and passivity,' a
simultaneity, let us note, that enables one to distinguish between the relation with the
Other and the 'dichotomies valid for things' (77 89; emphasis added). Although in
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Levinas will characterize susception as a
'coincidence' of activity and passivity {OBBE 115), the general drift of his argument
in this text and, indeed, in later works, is that the self as expiation is 'prior to activity
and passivity' {OBBE 116). Yet again, despite enlisting the support of countless
hyperbolic tropes (the self is a 'passivity more passive still than the passivity of
matter,' we are informed {OBBE 113)), does Levinas not contradict himself when he
claims that the relationship with the other 'precedes the auto-affection of certainty'
{OBBE 119)? For, not only is the applicability of the face restricted to the human
creature, but the face faces me, as we have seen, in quite specific ways. The field of
the proto-ethical is so clearly defined by Levinas - at one point he confers that the
'ethical' admits of an 'exact range [etendue exacte\ {BW 49; EO 76) - that either one
must accept, as he argues, that the face of the human other signifies in an exclusively
ethical sense (and moreover that this sense is limited to the human other), or, one
must award the intervention of the 'third party' {le tiers) a greater status in Levinas'
12 Does the face, in its particular Levinasian configuration, not depend upon a set of genera, a set of
genera that condition, as it were, the possibility of its being a 'face,' and 'facing' me, in contradiction
to thzfaqade of the thing which does not?
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thinking than he is willing to admit. Hence, the third party - the sphere of the social,
the communal, and, of course, the conceptual - establishes the vectors of the space
within which the subject comes to acknowledge the face as injunctive.
Needless to say, Levinas will maintain that the posita of communal being are
suspended in the reduction to the 'saying' he executes. However, such posita (and the
'commitments' they elicit) are evidently in play during the encounter with the Other.
If this were not the case, one would be hard pressed to explain cultural variations in
signification. To the Jain of North-West India, for example, the insect signifies
ethically such that one is obligated to don the appropriate footwear and be mindful of
one's step when walking. To Levinas, such thinking is fundamentally confused, and
is, no doubt, indicative of the kinds of 'fads' from Asia he believes compromise the
rigor of 'Western' thought and captivate a largely fickle European youth (AGCW
176).
Commenting upon the exodus of the Jewish people from captivity in Egypt,
Levinas will admonish the pharaonic 'way of taking human faces for grasshoppers'
(.PLPL 68), yet his admonition of the heinous treatment of the Jews during this period
of bondage does not prevent him from excluding the aforementioned 'creatures' from
ethical consideration. The reader would be forgiven for finding the above critique
somewhat pedantic. It is not my intention to promulgate an entomological ethic. Far
from it. My criticisms are directed toward the structuration of the proto-ethical space
Levinas describes, a space always already crossed by the significations of culture, I
would argue (and intersected by the axis of what I will call, following Levinas' lead,
tertiality (tiertialite)), and thus not protomorphic in the manner Levinas claims. The
'simultaneity' Levinas deduces in Totality and Infinity between susception and
reception arguably pertains throughout the ethical encounter, as he maintains (even if
simultaneity is later rethought as the coincidence of activity and passivity that defines
the being of the subject-hostage (OBBE 57)). However, as I will endeavour to
demonstrate, I do not believe Levinas provides a thorough enough account of
receptivity and he is thus not able to justify the limitations he imposes upon the field
of ethics convincingly. The 'Da' of Dasein may be an 'ethical' problem, as Levinas
suggests (AB 48), but the 'ici,' of me void, is unquestionably a heritable one.
Might such an interpretation of the face not allow us to deepen our
understanding of what Levinas means by filiality (77 278)? The 'son' is not simply
begotten. The ideational and symbolic forms that 'house' its 'parents' are borne (and
born) along with it. The 'son' inhabits this dwelling before 'he' is in a position to
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accept it qua constituting 'ego.' Sense constitution is thus a direct product of
patrilineage (Totality and Infinity) and matrilineage (Otherwise than Being or Beyond
Essence)-, arguably it is their heir. Levinas' thought is thus committed to the notion of
a certain phenomenological heredity, that is, to the generative dissemination of sense
(filiation) between existents. In being heritable, or fecund, sense is dislodged from its
egological foundations (Fundierungen). My ability (and it remains an 'ability' despite
any initial susception to which 'I' am vulnerable, an ability, which we might, with
Ricoeur, call the phenomenon of 'self-attestation' (Ricoeur, 1992, 355)) to heed the
face as that which obligates me ethically, is predicated upon my pre-predicative
experience of 'tuition,' and my genealogical indebtedness to my 'parents' (where the
terms in question are liberated from the strictures of their biological and pedagogical
connotations and determined phenomenologically). Moreover, phenomenologically,
'tuition' presupposes the encounter with the face, and its facing me, which Levinas'
philosophy is dedicated to expounding.
The dimension of height in which the face opens, thus extends both vertically
and generatively. Indeed, vectorially, a parity obtains between heritability and
verticality. Structurally, the face-to-face relation is the precursor to sense constitution.
The conceptual armature that enables me to synopsize the other person and
understand them, despite their multifariousness and differences from me, the
schemata through which I negotiate the complexities of my being-in-the-world (my
coping mechanisms, one might say), schemata that are at once both conceptual and
corporeal (I inhabit postures, poses and positions, in addition to commandeering ideas
and grasping concepts - one works with tools and concepts, alike), are bequeathed to
me. I am a man or woman of substance only to the degree that I 'inherit' the estate of
my being (the condition of my creaturality (creaturalite)) from others. Creation, as
such, is a relation of transcendence - a relation 'of union and fecundity' - and it is this
that conditions the 'positing' of my 'unique being:' my ipseity originates in this event
(77 279). The position from which 'I' encounter the Other is in a state of being formed
during the encounter with them. My commencement qua 'me' is ongoing. As Levinas
suggests, 'the oneself cannot form itself,' as it is 'already formed with passivity'
(OBBE 104).
I simultaneously bear my forebears in me (the other-in-the-same) and am
borne along by them. As such, I am amphibological, something of a contradiction in
terms, adrift across time(s): the 'product' of disseminative dissipation. Of course, all
others are arguably my forebears, because any encounter I may have with an other, is
an encounter with one who has passed by. The Other always precedes me because the
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Other interrupts the time of my coincidence with myself. The Other, therefore, both
schismatizes and schematizes the schemata that permit me to cope with my worldly
being (where such coping is neither practical nor theoretical but proto-ethical) and
bear the burden of its demands upon me. The figure, or schema, of the face sets the
schematism of (the) understanding to work. The face, thereby, effects a deformation
of space and time, as pure intuitional forms, and reconfigures them as the passage
from interiority to metaphysical exteriority. In this way, as heritor or heritrix, my
being of-the-other is indissociable from my being for-the-other. Through a curious
doubling of sense, therefore, I am forxof the Other.13 The genitive 'of' is at once both
subjective and objective. Auto-affection is, one might say, always already hetero-
affection. The 'for' (pour), of my being for-the-other, expresses an orientation or
bearing within being, rather than a grammatical case (even if, as Levinas will say, 'I'
am declined (deposed) in the accusative, and receive 'my' being (qua 'me') in the
dative (GP 144)). As Levinas himself concedes, the 'past limits the infinitude of
being' (inherited precepts, formulations, and modes of comportment, thus limit and
delimit the scope of what manifests itselffrom itself and presents itself Ka0' auTo),
and this limitation is 'given' as 'senescence' (Tl 278).
It is not simply that one ages in the world (a notion to be discussed in part
two, where the problem of ethical 'maturation' will be broached). The thought that
thinks the Other, in response to his or her provocation - whether this thought persists
subvocally and in private, or is committed to the page - is a thought already grown
senescent, a thought disposed to aging, a thought, therefore, forever at odds with the
youthful epiphany (juvenescence) of the face it would describe. Can thought, which,
as noted, is ever late upon the 'scene' Levinas charts, really determine what one might
call 'enigmaticality,' and legislate its limits (the way, perhaps, that in Husserl and
Heidegger phenomenality is confined to objectity and beingness), if it is aged from
the moment of its inception, and if the passing of the 'near one' cannot be retrieved
through recuperative acts?
Perhaps thought ages as, and through, astonishment (etonnement). The
surprise, or start, thought undergoes in the face of the Other does not cause it to age
(which would be to set this whole procedure within the bounds of causality), but is the
very senescence of thought itself, a prolongation of the wonder (Gaupa^eiu) in which
13
Throughout my study of Levinas I have deployed the Greek letter chi (x) to draw attention to the
placement of terms in a relationship of apposition to one another. This is not done for stylistic
purposes, but rather to accent a relationship of creative tension between terms, such that their sense
(sens) might be exhibited upon the basis of their chiastic (dis)accord.
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philosophy is purported to begin. As such, Levinasian first philosophy might be taken
to be a branch of gerontology - a veritable science of aging - provided that one recall
that the trauma by which thought ages is a thauma that 'astonishes finitude' (CDNM
51). As Marion remarks, the Other's arrival, or advent (one of four saturated
phenomena discussed by Marion), is accomplished as an 'unpredictable landing.' The
initiative of the T is restricted to 'remaining ready' to 'receive the shock' of what
Marion calls, the Other's 'anamorphosis' (Marion, 2002, 132). I do not know what
'form' the Other will take, or the conduit through which alterity will strike me,
especially if the subject is conceived, as it is by Levinas, as a passivity beyond
preparative reception. However, does Levinas not attempt to predict the Other's
landing, and, in so doing, does he not (inadvertently) beach the Other and mollify the
shock of his/her/its arrival, despite the fact that the anonymity of the il y a purportedly
haunts the pronominal il of illeite in which a face shows itself? Does the ethical
subject (me void) determine what does and does not pass for 'unpredictable'? What
principle (apxh) is at work, or in play, here? These are questions of paramount
significance, I would argue, questions to which the reader of Levinas' must constantly
return.
§ 4. The face and the physiognomy
According to Levinas, the face, qua ethical signifier, discountenances the plastic form
of the human face, taking flight from the light of thematization. The face overwhelms
the plasticity of the countenance, which discloses itself to the public scrutiny of the
gaze. There is decidedly more to the Other than meets the eye (perhaps one is also
exposed to the there is (il y a) in the eyexface (panim) of the Other - illeity and ilyaity
are crossed to the point of confusion, Levinas insists (TPA 224)). The countenance is
given through its form, thus affording the ego the opportunity to represent it to itself,
an opportunity granted through a certain lapse of time, a lapse that permits the 'I' to
defer responsibility for the face that has passed it by. The face, however, signifies
with such immediacy - an 'anachronous immediacy,' no less - that it collapses the
image into which representation would fashion it, and destroys the 'death mask'
(masque mortuaire) into which it would be forced to congeal (OBBE 91; AE 145).
It is paramount, therefore, that the 'face' and the 'countenance' not be
confused. For any confluence between them would jeopardize the sanctity of the other
person who transcends her image and cannot be accounted for in terms of physicality,
gait, or even the idiosyncrasies of facial expression and the tonal variations of the
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voice. A face is 'dissimulated' by 'the physiognomy,' Levinas argues (OBBE 93).
These idiosyncrasies are rather the idiolocalities through which the face breaches its
form. For Levinas, it is not so much that our unique differences set us apart or
engender the Kedousha, or separation (separation), integral to ethicality. Rather, the
spacing through which such difference emerges is the 'production' of the altogether
more primal spacing (espacement) of the face-to-face relation. The Other is, to be
sure, quirky (tingle), and the face enters the world (in somewhat Joycean fashion) at a
jaunty angle - the intervalic space between the self and the Other is 'curved,' we
recall. Flowever, any behavioural, personality, and even sartorial eccentricities, the
Other might possess do not compound to generate the face; the Other 'is already an
object through his clothing' (EE 40). As Llewelyn confers, 'my empirical nakedness'
might actually 'serve as a clothing' and 'my empirical poverty might serve as a
property coming between the other and me as the other's absolute servant' (Llewelyn,
2000, 127). Thus, the nudity of ethical 'frankness' (franchise) literally strips me of the
raiment of my ontico-phenomenological form, remoulding me in the figure of a
vassal. Physical difference, Levinas will maintain, offers no rationale for ethical
responsibility. 'Reason,' on the contrary, is ratified by 'signification,' and the 'first
rationality gleams forth in the opposition of the face to face [luit la rationalite
premiere]' (77 208; Tel 229).
This divergence between the 'countenance' and the 'face' is contentious.
Critics will argue (among them notably: Rudi Visker, Dominique Janicaud, and Luce
Irigary) that in order to be for the other person who faces me, account must be taken
of their specificity. Some kind of general 'audit' of their 'qualities,' or personality
'profile' (a profile in which the various profiles silhouetted by the empirical
countenance are synthesized), is required, or rather demanded, in order that their own
unique needs are best honoured: sexual difference, together with racial, religious,
generation, and, of course, physical difference(s), being a case in point. Levinas
response to this line of argumentation is consistent. The 'ethical,' he suggests, does
not designate an 'inoffensive attenuation of passionate particularisms,' for the face
obligates beyond such differences (LP 116).
It may be, that at the level of 'ethics,' one is obligated to consider the
differences enumerated here as basic to any response one might make toward the
other person. However, the proto-ethical superstructure elucidated by Levinas is
logically (and chronologically) anterior to the mandates that order the principia of
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ethics.14 The singularity of the face - which we might term Levinas' principle of
individuation - commands before and beyond the multiplicity of factors of which one
must be cognizant in order to comport oneself ethically in a given situation. Levinas'
ethic is no situation ethic. The face, which signifies prior to the legislature of ethics,
and prior to the law the moral agent gives him or herself in consonance with the
ordinances of rationality, is in situs (while remaining a-topic) prior to the situations
analysed by the ethical sciences: The face-to-face (face-a-face) is the 'ultimate
situation' (situation ultime), Levinas will insist (77 81; Tel 80). The 'naturalism' of
ethical 'theory' thus requires reduction. Levinas is the progenitor of a fundamental or
pre-originary ethic (or, to be more precise, an an-archic ethic), an 'ethic' that uncovers
the structural subsoil of factical life. Yet, Levinas does not claim to have discovered
the 'transcendental foundation' of 'ethical experience,' because ethics 'breaks up' the
'originary unity of transcendental apperception' (OBBE 148). As such, Levinas'
believes his project is perhaps best described as an 'an-archaeology [an-archeologieY
(AE 19; OBBE1).
The extent to which this refutation obviates the severity of the
aforementioned critique is moot. Levinas' thought is clearly not immune to such
criticism. The lengthy exposition of Levinas' teaching on the face engaged here will
prove instructive in due course. We will shortly be in a position to assess the merits of
Levinas' account of the face and examine more closely the criticisms inveighed
against him.
Despite decrying the suggestion that the face can be stated in terms of
'consciousness,' that is, 'in metaphors referring to light and the sensible,' (7/ 207)
Levinas deploys photological leitmotifs to convey the 'production of infinity'
engendered by the face-to-face relationship. Thus, he catalogues variously: the infinite
which 'paralyses power' and 'gleams in the face of the other [luit dans le visage' (77
199; Tel 217); the 'gleam of exteriority [I'eclat de Texteriorite]' or 'transcendence in
the face of the Other' (7/ 24; Tel 10); the 'trace' which 'lights up as the face of a
neighbor [trace qui luit comme visage du prochainY (OBBE 12; AE 26); the 'glow of
the trace [la luisance de la traceY which 'bypasses' the present (OBBE 12\ AE 27);
14 In an interview with Richard Kearney in 1986, Levinas draws attention to an important distinction
between the ethical and the moral, offering the following by way of clarification: 'By morality I mean a
series of rules relating to social behaviour and civic duty. But while morality thus operates in the socio¬
political order of organizing and improving our human survival, it is ultimately founded on an ethical
responsibility towards the other [...] ethics as a 'dis-inter-estedness' ... is a form of vigilant passivity
to the call of the other, which precedes our interest in being [...] Morality is what governs the world of
political 'inter-estedness,' the social interchanges between citizens in a society.' (Cohen, 1986, 29).
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and the 'blinking light [lumiere clignotanteY of revelation occasioned by the
'question mark' in the 'said' which continuously crosses it (OBBE 154; AE 240). The
last of these (and there are numerous examples within the Levinasian corpus), the
'blinking light' as Levinas refers to it, is of particular import. For this light (lumiere
clignotante), shed by the face, conveys the latter's enigmatic nature through the
invocation of a kind of chiaroscuro, a crepuscular space in which the 'light' of
revelation (revelation), and the 'shade' of the 'trace' in which the Other 'lurks [se
love],' commingle (OBBE 93; AE 198). On the one hand, the face is its own light
source, it expresses itself Ka0' auTO, and 'to be xa0' auro is to be good' (77 183) -
the 'Good' being synonymous with the Platonic aya0ov or susxsiva Trjs ouaias
described by Socrates in the Republic in heliotropic imagery. The face emits its own
supernal light and its 'manifestation' in the world is thus not disclosed to the lighted
region of consciousness within which, as previously remarked, the quiddity of
'things,' according to Levinas, is illuminated. On the other hand, and this is the
implication of Derrida's critique in 'Violence and Metaphysics,' the absolutism of the
face, and the 'shimmer of infinity [ruissellement de I'infini]' (7/ 207; Tel 227) it
commissions and sends forth into the world, are nevertheless constituted, despite the
face's sui generis provocation, as a disruption of normal perceptual experience.
In the encounter with the face, the typicality of one's perceptual grasp is
interrupted. The efficacy of perception is challenged from without (and from within,
for the borders between interiority and exteriority are routinely challenged by
Levinas) and the ego's rule is devastated by a foreign investiture (i.e., the imposition
of a heteronomy suffered or 'experienced' as a hetero-affection). The Ichzentrum is
thus literally dis-appointed [des-appointe]' (SAS 158). It remains the case, however,
that the interruption adumbrated here is possible for consciousness. That it is an
adumbration is confirmed by the fact that the face casts a shadow across the pure Ego
(.reines Ich), forestalling its noetic activity, and because the interruptive event gives
itself, qua enigma, as that which undoes form, under the aspect of shadow. This
'event' (evenement) can be made the correlate of a noetic act precisely qua
interruption. Of course, Levinas will rejoin, the ego, somnolent and complacent in its
repose, is able to appraise its own inadequacy. The ethical Sinngebung Levinas
deduces does not so much highlight a relationship of inadequation between noeses
and noemata - here the status of the Other as a noematic object would retain its
primacy - but rather suggests that the intentional couplet 'noesis-noema' is itself
inadequate to the upsurge of the face within the ego's primordial sphere (7/ 67). If the
ego were not 'awakened' to this deficiency within itself, Levinas' redaction of first
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philosophy as 'morality' (77 304) would falter hopelessly. Philosophy in its
'diachronic' configuration is, after all, the 'consciousness of the break up of
consciousness,' Levinas will insist (OBBE 165).
The ego is capable of bestowing meaning upon the disturbance it suffers.
This disturbance discloses itself to phenomenological regard. However, the gaze that
would interrogate its own 'intersection' - 'vision is crossed by speech,' Levinas
argues (77 195) - attempts 'after the fact' (apres coup) (77 54) to reconstruct the
breaching of its defences. For the ego's 'apostrophization' by the Other (status quo
ante), an 'apostrophization,' no less, that testifies to the peculiar and inane logic of the
'anterior posteriorly' (anterieure posterieurement) - inane because the logicality of
formal logic is emptied of sense, and because the event (evenement) it describes
dumbfounds the ego, stupefying it (77 170; Tel 184) - brings to light the very
exposition of this event. The encounter with the face is the mise-en-scene for an
ontological mise en lumiere (77 26; Tel 11).
The ambiguity evidenced by the term 'production' enables Levinas to
circumvent the problem of whether or not the face might be said to be 'disclosed,'
because it attests to an 'operation' (operation) by which 'the being of an entity' is
'simultaneously' 'brought about' and 'revealed' (s'evertue I'etre d'une entite et par
laquelle il se revele) (77 26; Tel 11) through its very exposure to the face of the Other.
It is the being of this entity that is illuminated and not that of the Other whose
withdrawal from the ethical scene {scene) is marked by the disruption of the ego's
phenomenal field so deftly analysed by Levinas. Totality and Infinity, then, offers a
defence of subjectivity, and Otherwise than Being provides a reflection upon the
amphibological subject. Ultimately, Levinas attempts nothing less than a
'rehabilitation of the subject,' one might argue (MG 58).15 Of course, the ambiguity
highlighted here is itself revealed in the encounter with the Other as the alternance of
constitution (activity) and constituted (passivity): an alternance, which defines the
interval of 'dead time' {temps mort) - the time of production - that marks the passage
between the effectuated and that which effectuates it, albeit, as that which has always
already elapsed (77 54).
The being of the existent is brought to light as a deficit. Its being is its
perforation by the Other; monadic being is defenestrated. This punctuation, in which
15
Totality and Infinity claims, after all, to be 'a defence of subjectivity' (77 26). Thus despite
underscoring the inability of thought to 'comprehend' the face, Levinas preserves the integrity of the
subject, qua me void, against the onslaught of impersonal regimes and totalizing enterprises.
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the ego quite literally animadverts to its inadequacy before the face, 'reveals' the
placing in the ego of what Levinas will call, the idea of infinity. The infinite (the in-
the-finite), to which we will return proximately, heightens the meaning accorded to
Levinas' radical empiricism by emphasizing, once again, that the ego is given to itself
as such (as retardation or senescence) only through the encounter with the face. This
radical empiricism does not, therefore, purport to describe an 'ethical experience,' but
instead seeks to communicate the 'intrigue' of the paradox of the 'infinite in relation'
(WE 200). Taken strictly, the relation with the Other - the face is the Torros where
the infinite is produced, a 'place' that is literally cctottos, both in the sense of being
strange and out of place - is accomplished as a failure of experience and the
dissatisfaction of intuitive fulfilment. Against the horizon of the beyond (less,
perhaps, a horizon than a limit (limite), although not a limit that circumscribes, but
rather one which traverses and transverses the work of ethics), Levinas permits the
apparition of that which does not appear, to appear as such. To appear, that is, as that
which does not appear, to appear as the non-apparitional. The reduction(s) he
implements, allow the enigmatical to produce itself (and show itselfforth from itself)
as an enigma. As Levinas suggests in the essay 'Language and Proximity' (1967), 'to
come facing' is precisely to 'manifest oneself by undoing one's manifestation' (LP
121).
Undoing one's manifestation? Where production, as we have seen, is an
altogether ambiguous enterprise in Totality and Infinity, the attempt to reduce being's
other to its assembly in the said is designated, by Levinas, as a 'betrayal' (trahison) in
Otherwise than Being. This betrayal, which, as Dennis Keenan observes, denotes both
'to mislead and to reveal' (Keenan, 1999, 22), adverts to the 'extreme situation' of
'diachronic thought,' a thought given to leading the saying to betray itself in the very
themes and statements that would dissimulate it. Such betrayal, exceeds its status as a
methodological procedure, Levinas opines, because it is 'the very task of philosophy
[la tache meme de la philosophief (OBBE 7; AE 19); a task requiring the audacity of
scepticism (scepticisme), since it must venture to affirm the 'impossibility of
statement,' while confirming this 'impossibility by the very statement of this
impossibility' (OBBE 7; AE 19).
The face is an anomaly in the world (a glitch in the 'economic' system, de-
systematising totality) and its 'irregularity' is nowhere more apparent than in its
distortion of phenomenological protocol. Levinas describes the face as an 'enigma'
(enigme) to contrast it with the 'indiscreet and victorious appearing of a phenomenon'
(EP 70), and outlines its divergence from the ontico-phenomenological countenance.
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The 'whole body - a hand or a curve of the shoulder - can express as the face'
Levinas asserts (77 262): even the rib can signify as such (NTR 169). Despite Levinas'
description of the face as a 'head' that does not 'find a place to lay itself (77 299), the
face remains phenomenologically aloof. For, the face signifies as a 'head' through the
medium of the Other's suffering. Yet, paradoxically, the face is itself destitute, for it
cannot be 'laid bare,' or subjected to interpretation (Auslegung), as such (while
according to Levinas it lays itself out in me as the idea of the infinite-in-me). Again,
the interplay between the ontico-phenomenological and the ethical is evidenced here.
Yet, this very non-phenomenal face 'looks at me looking' (77 98). It witnesses the
ruse by which I would seek to represent 'it' to myself. The total transparency of 'its
gaze' is 'directed' upon 'my gaze,' Levinas asserts (77 182). As Derrida observes, the
face 'exchanges its glance' with me (Derrida, 1978, 98). Do I then 'perceive' this
gaze?
If, as Levinas admits, the 'eye does not shine' but rather 'speaks' (77 66) -
vision is striated by discourse - then the gaze that meets my gaze is less a case of the
Other being sighted (and my being sightable), as it is of my being cited or summoned
by 'him.' This being cited is a citation to appear or show up for the Other, the Other
being the regisseur of the production, or mise-en-scene, in which 'I' am mise en
question. It is tempting to interpret this summons to appear, or ethical subpoena
(.NGTT 127), as an 'ethical' counterpart to the appearance of phenomena (^aivopEva)
given to the intentional regard. Again, however, despite the fact that, for Levinas, the
subject is given to him or herself (qua conatus) through the affect of 'shame' (honte) -
shame being precisely a 'movement in a direction opposed to that of consciousness,'
an expulsion from oneself (77/ 17) - the subject is not reified by the Other. Levinas
subverts and inverts 'objectifying cognition' (77 67), such that the Other does not
'constitute' me so much as 'create' me. Hence, that which is 'aimed at unseats the
intentionality which aims at it' (77/ 16), yet without this movement simply being
counter-intentional as if it were the dialectical equivalent to the ego's intentional gaze.
Jean-Luc Marion's comments are perspicuous in this regard and summarize Levinas'
position here succinctly. Marion notes that:
The gaze that comes upon me provides no spectacle, therefore no immediately
visible or assignable intuition; it resides precisely in the black holes of the two
pupils, in the sole and miniscule space where, on the surface of the body of the
Other, there is nothing to see (not even the colour of the iris that surrounds
them) in the gaze facing me. The gaze that the Other casts and makes weigh
on me therefore does not give itself to my gaze, nor even to be seen - this
invisible gaze gives itself only to be endured. The Other is charged to me:
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strictly speaking, he weighs on my gaze like a weight, a burden (Marion,
2002, 232).
The gaze that the Other directs toward me, gives me to myself qua responsal. The
enigma of the face teaches me the lesson of my self, and therefore gives itself as that
which I am under an obligation to bear.
In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Levinas will allude to a
'listening eye' (OBBE 38), an 'eye that listens' with 'a resonance unique in its kind'
0OBBE 30). Here, then, the ocular is crossed with the otic - the eye at once auriform -
in a reconfiguration (a figuration effectuated by the figure of the face) of the body's
orificial schema. The eye hearkens to the face through the contours of its form. The
optical order is reframed according to the injunction of the face. Not only are the
ocular and the otic deliberately confused by Levinas, but the two are at once crossed
with the mouth such that the physical substrate of speech (simultaneously the site of
annunciation, mastication, gustation, osculation and fellation) signifies, qua face, as
that which beseeches me to attend to the Other's need, and as the place from which I
tear the bread of my material existence in a supererogatory gesture of substitution
(bread here already refers to the 'incarnate subject' who has 'earned it in the sweat of
his' or her 'brow' (OBBE 191 n.7)). Such decussation (the crossing of the oculo-otic
and the oral) highlights a situation of phenomenological hybridity at the heart of
Levinas' account of the face. A peculiarly ethical synaesthesia (a condition not treated
by Merleau-Ponty in the Phenomenology of Perception) is effected through my
bearing the other person. The physiological function (epyov) of the body is reduced to
its ethical basis. The body's orifices are no longer merely (sensory) gateways that
open onto beings but are, rather, points of contact through which one enters into
contact with the Other; loci for the dramatization of ethical proximity, as it were (LP
116).
Qua ego, the subject may escape 'its own critical eye' on account of its
constitutive freedom, which permits it to 'take refuge' in the very eye that judges it'
{OBBE 92; emphasis added). This dwelling place is sundered under the gaze of
another, however, insofar as the ego is reduced to a self - consciousness cedes to
conscience - and the imperious 'I' is reduced to an assignable 'me' (consciousness
and subjectivity are clearly not commensurable terms in Levinas' philosophy). This
eyeyface rends the sphere of pure consciousness and exposes me, in passivity and
obedience, to the Other. I am weighted with a surfeit of responsibilities, which exceed
my capability, and are disproportionate to what I may accomplish as a finite creature.
My assignation is thus a kind of 'death on order,' Levinas suggests, as if the gaze of
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the Other that falls upon me, were tantamount to my dying 'on the mouth of God'
(OBBE 200n.l). One must not, I think, conflate this 'death' with the terminus of life,
however (although my being for-the-other, to the point of expiration, might entail my
dying for the Other). Here, death ultimately signifies the 'shaking' of 'my conatus;'
that is, the 'shaking and inversion' of 'my persistence in being' (NM 164) - the
deposition of (my) positionality as such.
The ambiguity, which, as noted, complicates Levinas' presentation of the
face, and its reception among scholars, is perhaps partly explained by the consonance
between the Hebrew words for face (panim) and eye {ayn), which are etymologically
cognate. The secondary literature on Levinas is replete with references to the
correlation between the Hebrew words for 'face' {panim), 'eye' {ayn), and 'nudity'
(erva), and Levinas' own deployment, translation, and adaptation, of these terms
within his 'philosophical' thought. The overwhelming consensus among those
scholars given to such philological exhumation is, indeed, that concord pertains
between these two descriptive orders.
The sense denoted by the Hebrew word panim and that designated by the
Levinasian visage is remarkably congruent. The Biblical panim, as Shmuel Trigano
indicates, suggests '"respect," "attention," and "caring" for the other human being'
(Trigano, 2001, 289). The other person is thus the recipient of my regard and
attention. Significantly, panim also carries placial and temporal connotations. As
Edith Wyschogrod notes, in one of its forms panim conveys the sense 'in ancient
times,' as 'in the sentence 'Of old (lephanim) hast thou laid the foundations of the
earth' {Psalm 102:5)' (Wyschogrod, 2002, 197). Panim is therefore an adverb of time
signifying 'anteriority.' As adverbial of place, panim means to be positioned before
someone, or to stand in their presence. It denotes instantiation (the taking up of a
stance) and also connotes the sense in which I am instantiated by the other person
before whom I stand panim el panim, that is, face-to-face (face-a-face). Robert Gibbs
proposes that the 'obligation' Levinas deduces from the ethical vis-a-vis 'emerges in
the Hebrew word lifne which means literally "to the face," or "before"' the face
(Gibbs, 1992, 165). Again, therefore, a strong 'correlation' between 'philosophical'
and 'Hebraic' significations of meaning is asserted. The concept of 'nudity' {nudite),
which Levinas employs to communicate the abstractness of the face and its destitution
in the world, prompts Trigano to draw a parallel between it and the Biblical word
erva. Erva designates 'a being as it is exposed to exteriority,' 'exposed to everyone,'
and 'handed over to things, contaminated, profaned.' The term, Trigano continues,
'indicates all relationships in which there is a non-redeemed exteriority,' the purpose
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of ' "sanctification" - in Hebrew "separation"' being to 'hide the erva' or nudity
(Trigano, 2001,290).
How do such correlations instruct the present critique? It is clear that
Levinas' presentation of the face is informed by Jewish categories of thought. Yet,
this presentation, a presentation which 'calls for another phenomenology' (747 153),
claims to deduce the imperative it locates in the face of the other person from the
phenomenological explication of concrete empirical situations and encounters. Now,
the fact that the face signifies as an injunction, and signifies, moreover, in the form of
the Deuteronomic bx rran, or 'Thou shalt not commit murder' (77 173), suggests,
perhaps, that a certain interpretative liberty has been taken at the expense of
phenomenological method. Quite whether this perversion of phenomenological
method is, as Drabinski suggests, 'authorized by the very phenomenology it perverts'
(Drabinski, 2001, 14), is questionable. For, is my being 'ordered toward the face of
the other' (OBBE 11), an order that issues directly from the face, derailing the
trajectory of the ego's intentional regard, as Levinas states, or an injunction that has
come to reside there as a product of the (axiological) accretions of Biblical culture?
To be sure, I come to recognize the authority of the face, and acknowledge its
destitution, but is this not due to the 'establishment' (Stiftung) in my perceptual field
of a normative structure, a structure which functions there, in a regulatory fashion, to
direct my experience? After all, in any act of attention, am I not, as Husserl suggests,
'turned toward' the object of my 'perceiving,' and do I not 'seize upon,' and 'single
out,' the existent that confronts me against an 'experiential background' (Id §35)? In
the case of the face (which apropos of Levinas can never be a case as such, for it is
extrinsic to all genera), do I not choose to adhere to this normative 'principle' (apxh)
which has become sedimented in my field of action, conditioning the repertoire of my
possible responses, and does the face not thus signify upon the basis of its heritability,
against, that is, the background of the co-constitution and co-historization of values?
Clearly, the ability to select the 'norm' of the face, or reject its ingressions
into my primordial sphere, is resolutely antithetical to Levinas' teaching, particularly
that of Otherwise than Being where the self is construed as a radical passivity.
According to Levinas, I am taught my 'inimitable singularity' and confirmed in my
'semelfactive uniqueness' by the other person (OUJ 229). My individuality is
therefore equated by Levinas with my being 'unable to shirk' my responsibilities (77
245). I cannot take flight into the concept of an 'ego,' a 'self,' or an 'I,' because such
genera invalidate my singularity by submerging me within the universality of general
categories of being. This in-ability is effectuated through an act of proto-elective
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selection, an act that befalls me and which I do not initiate. But, if the term 'teaching'
(ienseignement) is to designate the 'height' from which I am called into question by
the Other, and 'teaching,' accordingly, is the 'very production' of exteriority, teaching
the 'ethical' through the opening of a 'new dimension' (77 171) - the face teaches
transcendence - then is one not compelled to award such teaching a generative
function and sense? Thereby, the face (the ethical signifier) teaches (gives itself to be
heeded as injunctive) through the dimension of height (heritability). Does the notion
of an ethical 'absolute' make sense outside the order of this heritability? And, dare
one say it, is it not against the horizon(s) of heritable constitution that the sense of the
face is disclosed, such horizons being themselves a catena of particular home-worlds
and epochal consortia? Is this 'generational' dimension, as Ricoeur intimates, not an
'undeniable component' of the phenomena of 'injunction' and 'indebtedness'
(Ricoeur, 1992, 353)?
On the one hand, and generally throughout his work, Levinas will oppose the
sort of argumentation advanced here. However, he will also indicate, at times, that he
is favourable to such thinking, as and when it suits his defence of Jewish particularity.
For example, Levinas conceives his task as a philosopher to be to 'express in Greek
those principles about which Greece knew nothing' (quite whether the 'principle' of
the face was unknown to the 'Greeks,' as Levinas intimates, is debatable). 'Jewish
peculiarity,' moreover, 'awaits its philosophy,' he adds (AC 200). Are we to presume,
therefore, that this 'teaching' on the face is peculiarly Jewish, a peculiarity of which
'Judaism as event, history and Passion' is the 'breach and actual figure' (AC 199)7 If
the face, which conveys a 'message of difficult holiness,' speaks the language of
'Scripture,' as Levinas avers, then is it not reasonable to deduce that this 'language of
the inaudible' (EN 199), which resonates at the heart of every speech act, signifies as
such because of the 'difficult destiny' (the generative circumnavigations) of Jewish
thought it accomplishes? Is, what Husserl terms the 'registry book of phenomenology'
(Id §64), simply a derivative transcription, or transliteration, of the teachings of the
Torah, given that all writing (and all language purportedly admits of a 'religious
essence') 'commemorates' the 'Holy Scriptures' (BV xi)? Surely not. Husserl may
prescribe for himself the 'norm of phenomenological reduction' (Id §64), but the
imperative 'expressed' in the face of the other person is no less the result of a
prescriptive act, and the fact that its injunction is held to normative is, similarly, the
product of what one might call a generative Sinngebung. Has Levinas, perhaps,
overlooked the fact that the thesis of the face is predicated upon what Husserl would
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call, 'lines of dependency' ('connections of motivation'), namely by posita
'motivated' by prior positings within a constitutive series or framework (Id II §56)?
Levinas' arguably attempts to think through, to imagine, a (Jewish)
'peculiarity' beyond (Greek) 'universality' (AC 199), a peculiarity prior to the
distinction, beloved of logicians, between the particular and the universal (a move
which replicates, at the level of philosophy, the diachronic logic upon which Levinas'
account of the subject-hostage is based). However, the philosophy of peculiarity to
which Levinas dedicates himself, cannot claim to be normative and binding
universally (which it ultimately endeavours to do (RFA 21)) without traducing the
particularity of alternative phenomenologies of the face, phenomenologies which
receive their instructive, or pedagogical, momentum from non-Jewish sources. To be
sure, Levinas' references to 'Scripture,' and to the authority of the Torah, can, as
Llewelyn notes, be taken to be figurations of the 'dissymmetrical relation in which 1
am more responsible than anyone for the other simply as other' (Llewelyn, 2000,
127). But, if 'language,' and the 'book that arises and is already read in language,' is,
as Levinas believes it to be, 'phenomenology' itself, qua the 'staging in which the
abstract is made concrete' (BV xii-xiii), then ought one to read Levinas' writing on the
face as merely one among many possible figurations of the face (revealing a situation
of ethical polytheism, perhaps)? As such, Levinas' work is but one way to approach
the phenomenological circumstances (circonstances) of the face; comparable to the
fact that, for Husserl, the Cartesian (epistemological) route into phenomenology is but
'one of the ways that has led to transcendental phenomenology' (CM §2 [48];
emphasis added) - one 'gate of entry' into phenomenological science, as it were
(Crisis §71) - other entry routes being via psychology and the life-world. While I
agree with Bernasconi that 'Levinas is not preaching,' but, as it were, trying to
'account for' the 'possibility' of ethicality (Bernasconi, 2002, 235). The 'possibility'
Levinas accounts for is a possibility which he feels is actualized in the 'spiritual
originality' of Judaism (AC 198), a paradoxical particularism, in which the peculiarity
of Judaism's 'exceptional' teaching involves a movement of self distancing, and an
internal nisus to disperse itself, that is, to disseminate the arropa of Jewish wisdom
among the 'Nations' and to let it take root there. An instance of enrootedness
(enracinement) Levinas is not so keen to extirpate, unlike the religions of the sacred
(le sacre) whose teachings he deplores.
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§ 5. Pre-philosophical experience
The face Levinas' details is not oculated (how could it be when it is devoid of surface)
but is rather that which sees. Not so much the power, or entelechy, of sight, for
Levinas does not subscribe to the credo of hylomorphism, as the invisibility of the
visible, permeating and suffusing 'form' (where form (pop^rj) once might have
articulated matter (uAq)) yet disdaining recourse to the shelter it provides, and thus
remaining forever 'homeless' and 'naked' in the 'concreteness of the world' (MS
53).16 Such invisibility of the visible is concomitant with the fullness of emptiness,
and the existence of nothingness, that define the ilyaity of brute being. In point of fact,
a plausible interpretation of the face might be proffered by considering it to be the
17'excluded middle' (tiers exclu) of invisibility and visibility. Certainly, this would be
consistent with its enigmatical nature (does the face admit of (f)uais though, when it is
putatively non-substantial and the very other of essence?) and would further explain
the 'blinking light' that marks its entry into the 'visual' order.
In its alternance, or scintillation (scintillation), the face calls attention to the
jarring of the ontico-phenomenological and the ethical registers and indicates,
perhaps, that it is their coruscation that is primary. Might this not be another way of
understanding Levinas when he claims that the legitimacy of his project stands or falls
with 'the possibility of vibrating with a meaning' (EP 67) that cannot be ordered
according to the metre of presence? It may be, of course, that 'signification' is, contra
Levinas, 'silhouetted' against a context (EP 69). The context in question is not the
order interrupted by the face, so much as the inter-space between the 'ethical' and the
'ontico-phenomenological' domains as Levinas presents them, against which the face
signifies as a face: a veritable Zwischenland between the 'ethical' (Levinas), the
'phenomenological' (Husserl), and the 'ontological' (Heidegger). I maintain,
therefore, that the face, in its lambency, signifies precisely as the alternance of the
16 Levinas censures Heidegger for his lack of sensitivity to the factical 'needs' of Dasein. Dasein
requires housing (shelter) and sustenance (Food and drink) etc. Yet Levinas' own account of the
'essential' homelessness of the 'face' might appear to be similarly abstracted from the demands of
'concrete' life. However, Levinas account of the face ensures that at the level of the ethical fouilles he
practices (comparable, although structurally more 'rudimentary,' than the fundamental ontology of
Heidegger) the 'homelessness' that defines the face in relation to the 'world' obligates one to minister
to the Other in her need beyond the empirical destitution she may suffer. Empirical deprivation is not
the condition of the face, rather the poverty of the face summons in the midst of the empirical as such.
17 For an extended treatment of the 'middle voice,' see Llewelyn The Middle Voice ofEcological
Concern. Derrida advances a similar conclusion, conferring that the 'phenomenon' of the face 'is a
certain nonphenomenon, its presence (is) a certain absence. Not pure and simple absence, for then logic
could make its claim, but a certain absence' (Derrida, 1978, 91; emphasis added).
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'ethical' and the 'phenomenological.' It is their interfluence. A situation of
decussation to which we will return in the conclusion to this study.
The somewhat questionable assertion that the enigma of the face is
phainaesth-ethical, rather than purely ethical, may now be substantiated more
convincingly. For the face is that which shines forth the most (EKcjiavEaraTov),
because it is simultaneously that which brings the 'subject' to light as a 'creature,' and
that which is itself brought to light as axiologically primordial against the horizon of
socially constituted, heritable being. The face shines forth from itself (as indicated, it
is its own light source), manifesting itself <a0' cxijto, and assigns me my ontological
station; where such assignation resounds with the archaic sense of marking out, so
that it is the Other who marks out the perimeters of my psychical, or rather,
pneumatological space. Moreover, the face 'shines forth,' Levinas argues, in and
through the 'poverty and 'hunger' of the other person (PV 139). I would argue,
therefore, that it is the configuration of the ontico-phenomenal and the ethical that
engenders the figure of the face, a configuration in which the 'ontological' does not
'turn into' the 'ethical,' as Levinas himself confers (NGTT 127), but rather striates,
and is in turn striated by the ethical, akin to the way in which the 'trace' of the Other,
according to Levinas, striates, 'with its furrows,' the 'clarity of the ostensible' (OBBE
100).
The liaison between Levinas' self-styled 'philosophical' and 'Talmudic'
texts is bald where discussion of the face is concerned. One could claim, for example,
that the face Levinas permits to manifest itself in his 'work,' is a uo0os, that is, the
bastard child of an Athenian (Greek) father and a 'foreign' (Jewish) mother (much in
the way that the figure of the 'orphan' (orphelin(e)xyatom) describes the destitution
of the Other). This suggestion would appear to be in keeping with Levinas' own
designation of his work as a kind of 'scepticism,' a 'bastard child of the Spirit'
returning to the 'paternal house' of philosophy in the aftermath of the 'refutations'
that cast it away (OBBE 192n.l8; emphasis mine); a paternal house that more and
more resembles the yeshiva, or Jewish house of study, than the AKaSfjpEia. Arguably,
the difficult frisson that prevails between the 'Talmudic' and the 'philosophical'
orders of enquiry reflects the vacillation one encounters in the face between the
phenomenal and the enigmatical, phenomenality and enigmaticality.18
18 That this is so is no doubt further compounded by the incorrect translation of 'legitimate child'
{enfant legitime) as 'illegitimate child' in the English language translation of Otherwise than Being.
See, for example, (OBBE 7, 182, 192n.l8) for at least three examples of this error.
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Levinas arraigns Husserl for his lack of attention to the facticity of human
existence, commenting that 'the ink of the world stains the fingers that put this world
between parentheses' (NI 148). The phenomenological reduction, Levinas insists, is
itself the product of the 'world' from whence it issues and the philosopher 'must
return to language' from the vaunted heights of theory 'to convey, even if betraying
them, the pure and unutterable' (NI 148). These sentiments set the basic
methodological agenda for Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. However, the
criticism Levinas inveighs against Husserl here can be readily applied to his own
thought. For not only does Husserl, contra Levinas, provide detailed explications of
the constitution of the life-world (Lebenswelt) and the home-world (Heimwelt),
locating the genesis of rational thought within an intersubjective and intercultural
community, but Levinas himself fails to account phenomenologically for the cultural
and religious inheritance that subtends his properly philosophical thought. He
willingly concedes that prephilosophical experiences undergird philosophical writing
(.MBCJ 5); and, indeed, that 'every philosophical thought rests on pre-philosophical
experiences' (EI 24), experiences, what is more, that cannot be transposed fully, and
finally, into the site of the philosophical Aoyos, since philosophy is ultimately
inadequate to the ethical destructure deduced from concrete empirical situations,
Levinas believes. Yet, in presuming the content of such experiences (rather than their
structuration) to be largely 'autobiographical,' Levinas deprives phenomenology of a
gainful field of research. Is this, perhaps, because Levinas positions his own scientia
regulatrix against the selfsame psychologism, and psychologistic tendencies of
thought, to which Husserl had opposed his own phenomenology (QA 82)? The
'ontological language' utilized in Totality and Infinity, and subsequently revised in
Otherwise than Being, is, after all, deployed 'in order to exclude the purely
psychological significance of the proposed analyses' presented in those works (S
295). Moral consciousness is subsequently 'not a modality of psychological
consciousness, but its condition,'' Levinas will insist (S 293).
How are we to treat the admission, therefore, that the 'phenomenological'
studies to be found in Existence and Existents, were 'written down for the most part in
captivity' (EE 15)? Is one to take such 'captivity' as a figure for the subject's being
held 'hostage' by the Other, that is, as a merely formal notion? Again, what are we to
make of Levinas' statement from the essay 'Signature' (1976), that the 'disparate
inventory' (inventaire disparate) into which the events and achievements of his life
are ordered, 'is dominated by the presentiment and the memory of the Nazi horror
[elle est dominee par le presentiment et le souvenir de I'horreur nazief (SI 291; SIG
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406)? How one assesses the implications and compass exerted by such 'domination'
is unclear, particularly given the juxtaposition of the aforementioned 'confession'
with the following comments on phenomenological method, which appear in the
proceeding paragraph of the same piece. The 'unsuspected horizons' within which the
'real is apprehended,' Levinas avers, beginning with the 'body' and the
'sedimentation' of a history, 'transcendentally condition philosophical activity {S
292). Does a term like 'persecution' {persecution), then, a term employed in Levinas'
later work to dispel all traces of the actional from his account of the ethical subject,
not, by default, owe its prominent place in Levinas' 'philosophy' to the 'pre-
philosophical' experiences of persecution he himself underwent, and witnessed
among others (including his close and immediate family), during the War, not to
mention the prosecutions of memory that would force him to relive those experiences
as trauma? The genesis of the 'concept' is particular, one might say, even if its
application is (purportedly) universal. Indeed, when Levinas intimates, in Otherwise
than Being, that it is 'as though' {comme si) 'I' were responsible for the Other's
'mortality' and 'guilty for surviving [coupable de survivre]' (OBBE 91; AE 145), does
he not meld the psycho-biographical and the philosophical to the point of
indistinction? Furthermore, the itinerary, whose stages Levinas traces in Otherwise
than Being, is, he declares, 'not completely disengaged from pre-philosophical
experiences,' an alliance philosophy must 'risk' if it is to remain true to its course, he
adds {OBBE 20; emphasis added). Is Otherwise than Being not perhaps, in a curious
and yet not entirely implausible way, what one might call a philosophical biodicy,
therefore, a justification to continue living after the catastrophe?
Ought (a) philosophy to neglect to explore the environs of its own inception,
one may ask? No doubt, the philosopher often fails to address these questions
adequately, because the 'empirical' ego personality is excluded from the field of
phenomenological consideration. It may be, therefore, that the 'origin' (apxh) is not
so much deposed (Levinas) as, rather, suppressed. Philosophy does not know quite
what to do with the psychism, it seems. Perhaps a more honest interrogation of what
one might call, the Selbstwelt, ought to accompany philosophical enquiry in some
guise. Certainly, the standing of this 'ought' is contentious, and rightfully so.
Philosophy would be quickly reduced to the level of some kind of diarial art, were it
to trade too liberally in the affairs of the personal. Yet the personal is clearly a
problem for the phenomenologist. For, even if one succeeds in holding in abeyance
what one takes to be the flotsam of one's psychical life, such realia cannot be
rendered totally inert, and continue to inform the character of the given as it presents
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itself to reflection. Of course, the 'meaning' (sens) of a philosopher's thought cannot,
as Levinas states, be reduced solely to the 'coherence - or incoherence - of the
signifiers that bear it,' nor to the 'psychological genesis' of the signifiers themselves
(JW 69). However, while we might agree with Levinas that this meaning must be
'listened to without looking down to scrutinize' its 'traces,' 'check' its 'logic' or
'invent a psychology' to account for it, can we really approve of his claim that
philosophical 'teaching' precedes, absolutely, the contingency of the philosopher's
temperament and, moreover, that it 'commands the psychological particularities' of
the philosopher (JW 69)? Surely philosophy's movement towards the concrete (vers le
concret) entails that it pay closer attention to its psychological provenance, rather than
dismissing the contingencies of the personal (not to mention the role of the
unconscious) as unnecessary impediments to philosophical thought. One may then,
with William Richardson, legitimately enquire as to whether Levinas provides us with
'a place to talk about unconscious influences in his protoethics' (Richardson, 1995,
125), and whether the insights of psychoanalytic practice are not sidelined by Levinas
in a thoroughly truculent and decidedly un-phenomenological way.19
Heidegger admonishes Husserl for suspending the question of the Being of
entities. In his pursuit of the originary, Heidegger endeavours to determine the origin
of the Grundbegriffe that guide and instruct the ways in which the 'meaning' of Being
has been disclosed within the philosophical 'tradition.' (BT §6 [22]) In order to
perform the Destruktion of that tradition - a destructive move in which Heidegger's
philosophical programme is initiated - Heidegger interrogates the Geburtsbriefes of
the ontological concepts in which the Seinsfrage has been formulated. The 'language'
to which the philosopher must return is always already encoded with the significations
of culture. Language possesses its own unique heritage and is a product of historical
lines of transmission, the product of co-historization. Who better than Heidegger has
taught us this? Because Levinas believes that pre-dictive 'saying' subtends the 'said'
of thematisation (and, furthermore, civilization) and because ethics, qua upcoTq
19 Levinas' basic position with regard to 'psychoanalysis' changes little throughout his career. In 'The
Ego and The Totality' (1954) he writes: 'psychoanalysis casts a basic suspicion on the most
unimpeachable testimony of self-consciousness. That the clear and distinct consciousness of what was
formerly called a psychological fact in now taken to be only the symbolism for a reality that is totally
inaccessible to itself, and that it expresses a social reality or a historical influence totally distinct from
its own intention, is what voids the very return of the cogito' (ET 34). Needless to say, simply because
the 'evidence' of the cogito is challenged by the theory of the 'unconscious' does not mean that the
latter should be viewed with disdain or rejected unfairly. Levinas, after all, will speak of the
'immemorial,' and will seek to describe a time on the 'hither side' of the ego and its recuperative acts.
Quite how one can discriminate phenomenologically between the psychoanalytical 'unconscious' and
the proto-ethical 'immemorial' is a moot point, of course. Might they not also, like ilyaity and illeity,
be 'crossed to the point of confusion,' one may wonder?
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(j)iAoao(j)ia, purports to describe the proto-ethical superstructures that underlie the
science of ethics, with its various norms and precepts vying to regulate human
comportment, he does not consider the cultural and religious momentum behind his
own distinctly ethical reductions.
Is Levinas not guilty of allowing the transmissions of tradition to infect the
field of (pure) ethics he expounds? Has Levinas' presentation of the face-to-face
relation (Levinas' figuration of the 'face') not, through the transit of tradition,
delivered itself over to the comfort of self-evidence without fully excavating the
sources (Quellen) from which it is brought forth? Indeed, might the field of 'pure'
ethics not itself benefit from a process of mundification - a cleansing of those
concepts that delineate the range of this field and circumscribe, a priori, the extensio
of ethical space20 - a purification of sense commensurable with the 'purification' of
'descriptive-psychological' terms, such as 'consciousness,' 'experience,' and
'content,' which, Husserl believes, is paramount in order that the 'science' of
phenomenology become 'purely phenomenologicaf (LU II.5 §5)? How radical is the
dis-structure (destructure) of the face-to-face if the de-structuration it effects fails to
break through the topsoil of acculturation and fails to declare its dogmatic origins? Is
the destructuration Levinas oversees (assuredly modelled on the Heideggerian
Destruktion), a de-structuration, what is more, that sanctions the 'destruction of the
phenomenology of appearance and knowledge' (TA1 153), thorough enough to
achieve its aim of reconstructing the tradition, supposedly de-constructed by
Heidegger, according to the aegis of the face? It would appear that a certain 'radical
suspicion' is demanded here (Heidegger, 1998, 26), suspicion, that is, regarding the
context of concepts and formulations that arise from the preconceptions to which
Levinas submits himself.
To be sure, the exergues that preface Otherwise than Being or Beyond
Essence, correct any thought that would attempt to dissociate Levinas' philosophy
from the factical realities of human life and death. Levinas' dedication of that work to
'the six million assassinated' during the Nazi Holocaust, and furthermore, to all
'victims of the same hatred of the other man,' the same 'anti-semitism,' as he terms it,
confirms the principal orientation of his thinking to be unequivocally humanistic
(Levinas' philosophy is a humanism of the other human being). As Bernhard
20 In the essay 'Assimilation and Culture,' Levinas adverts to the 'conception of concepts whose roots
go right to the depths of the Jewish soul' (AC 201). One must accept, I think, that Levinas revaluation
of philosophical terms is likewise 'rooted' in the teachings of Judaism. This is unproblematic. What is
problematic is that the provocation of the face, a face which signifies Ka0' ocuto, signifies as such
according to these teachings and thus compromises the phenomenological tenor of Levinas project.
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Waldenfels observes, the 'polar air of violent death penetrates' Otherwise than Being
(Waldenfels, 2002, 73). The dedicatees of this 'work' are not simply those whose
faces have been effaced in heinous acts of murder and torture. The work is itself
proleptic, its exergual dedications are put to work for all those who may fall foul of
similar acts of genocide (one thinks of Bosnia and Rwanda, for example).
Responsibility extends beyond the margins of the 'text' and outside the parallelepiped
within which it is framed. Indeed, responsibility extends beyond the context of 'my'
life. As such, it is truly fecund.
Yet the poignancy of these remarks, and the obvious legitimacy of Levinas'
philosophical itinerary, ought not to distract critical attention from its task of probing
the margins of Levinas' thought and questioning the authority of the deductions he
implements. Confronted by the 'tradition' it 'challenges' or 'claims for itself,'
Levinas' thought, as Janicaud adverts, 'must also answer for its own coherence'
(Janicaud, 2000, 39). The conflux of 'Talmudic' and 'philosophical' thought is, in
itself, not sufficient grounds for vexation. However, Levinas' 'phenomenology of the
noumenon' (FC 21) is remiss to the extent that it does not scrutinize the preconditions
of its own natality. To be sure, a philosopher ought not to be assailed for what he or
she did not say. Clearly, there are limits to the remit of any project. One should not,
for example, censure Heidegger for the recalcitrance of his thought to (ontically)
'ethical' issues (where it is, of course, permissible to question the actions of
Heidegger the 'man'). Thinkers as diverse as Frederick Olafson, Jean-Luc Nancy,
David Wood and Graham Parkes have explored the theme of an originary ethos
(q0oa) in Heidegger and underscored its centrality within his philosophy.21 Similarly,
one might argue, Levinas ought not to be castigated for omitting to attend to the
particular home-worlds from which his thought is sourced. However, a thought that
would think through the upsurge of that which signifies kcc0 ' auTO, a thought,
moreover, which recognizes an injunction in the 'face' of 'him' who signifies as such,
and yet restricts the range of who or what expresses as a face, is a thought sourced
somewhere, despite Levinas' claim to the contrary, that the face stems precisely from
'elsewhere' (ailleurs). The 'true life of spirit' may be 'elsewhere' (USFG 2), but the
face can only signify as such, and remain identical with itself, in contradistinction to
21
See, for example, Frederick Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground ofEthics: A Study ofMitsein
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. R.
Richardson and A. O'Byrne (Standford: Standford University Press, 2000); Graham Parkes, 'Thoughts
on the Way: Being and Time via Lao-Chuang' in Heidegger and Asian Thought, ed. Graham Parkes
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987); Michel Haar, Heidegger and the Essence ofMan, trans.
William NcNeill (Albany, SUNY Press, 1993).
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that against which it signifies, if it is designated to be of axiological primacy. Our task
is thus to interrogate the explicata Levinas deploys to characterize the face, and to
further clarify the hermeneutical framework (sppr|veueiv) to which he appeals, and
within which his thought unfolds; a task that warrants the drawing up of a
'transcendental inventory' (MS 56) in order to account for the sources from which this
lore of proto-ethical jurisprudence derives its authority.
The infrastructure of Levinas' thought is complex, although its JewxGreek
heredity cannot be denied. Rather than extenuating Levinas' insights this admission
reinforces the efficacy of his arguments for the (a)priority of the face-to-face
relation.22 Instead of merely deriding or applauding Levinas' thought (depending
upon where one's philosophical loyalties lie) as a 'Jewish phenomenology' or a
phenomenology of Jewish experience - an affront to Levinas' own conceptualization
of his project - it is more germane, I believe, to categorize his philosophy as a
thinking of the inaugural. A thinking of the inaugural that is both an enactment, or
inauguration, of a new way of practising phenomenology (and putting
phenomenology to work), and a thought that would think itself back (a radical
Nachdenken) to the moment of its interruption from the 'outside;' a thinking of the
preliminary, therefore, outside the origin, or apxp', of egoic consciousness. A thought,
one might also designate by the word palaeontology (for it probes 'unsuspected
horizons' and 'forgotten experiences' overlooked by Husserlian phenomenology (77
28)), were this term not already deployed by the science of the same name.23
Perhaps, a remnant of augury can still be found at the heart of this
inauguratory thought - a most 'sober' (degrise) thought that prides itself upon its
having 'sobered up from the ecstasy of intentionality' (GP 140) - an augurship, or
form of divination, given to reading 'traces' of the divine (0e7ov) into the 'face' of the
human. Levinas' thought, at once a phenomenology of the face (albeit a
phenomenology of the face compromised by its own omissions) and an explication of
creaturality (creaturalite), does institute the opening of a new dimension, as Levinas
himself maintains, however this dimension, so apt for phenomenological excavation,
is the dimension of heritability and transmission (literally tradition), which is not
22
'My' proximity to the neighbour, a modality of distance irreducible to the 'contiguity' Levinas
believes to characterize the relationship between 'things,' is an 'assignation' older than the 'a priori'
and 'prior' to any act that would 'effect it' (OBBE 101).
23
Critchley's remarks are instructive here and suggest that such a designation (as broached above) is
far from pleonastic. Critchley notes that Levinas' language 'forms a series ofpalaeonymic
displacements' where 'the ancient words of the tradition are repeated and in that repetition semantically
transformed' (Critchley, 1996,43).
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posterior to the ethical as Levinas conceives it, but contemporaneous and coterminous
with it. In this sense, phenomenology is, as Derrida intimates, 'respect itself,' that is
to say, it is 'the development and becoming-language of respect itself (Derrida, 1978,
121; emphasis added).
It might appear somewhat anachronous (given the peculiar 'logic' of
diachrony and the posteriority de I'anterieur) to confer the status of contemporaneity
upon that which precedes sequential and synchronic time and thus precedes the order
of comparability. Yet the ethical dis-structure (destructure) - a destructure because it
'no longer forms a structure with consciousness' (NGTT 127) - is evidenced in the
disparate phenomena of 'fecundity' (fecondite), 'filiality' (filialite), 'teaching'
(enseignement), 'persecution' {persecution), and 'creation' {creation), all of which are
generative in determination. Therefore, it is not the case that the fundaments of
Levinas' thought are irremissibly flawed, nor found lacking in their basic premises,
rather the decidedly nuanced account of ethicality Levinas presents presupposes the
very phenomena of which he writes. The ethical destructure is primary, but the form
in which Levinas articulates it, is not. Form and face remain disjunct, as Levinas
contends (yet they are interlaced in their disunity), but the nature of this disjunction is
perhaps more complex than even Levinas is willing to admit.24
If philosophy consists, as Plato declares, in not pu0ov Tiva 5ir|ys'ia0ai
{Sophist 242c), that is, as Heidegger reminds us, in 'not telling a story' {BT 6), then
surely Levinas is guilty of a lapse of philosophical vigilance. Levinas' account of the
face is just a little too fabulous to satisfy the demands of phenomenological
explication, even if phenomenology assumes a form distinct from the rigorous science
{strenge Wissenschaft) commissioned by Husserl. Can 'manifestation xa0' auxo'
really consist in a being 'telling itself' to us independently of 'every position we
would have taken in its regard' (77 65)? In Levinas' defence, one might argue that it is
precisely the fillip of factical life, in its undeniable concretion, which excites the
analyses he undertakes. It is thus because Levinas believes the 'Western'
philosophical tradition to be itself decisively 'storied' (and the thinking of Being it
assays to deaden the sensation for the concretion of the face beneath the miribilia of
24 Derrida is acutely aware of the problematic raised here. In 'En ce moment meme dans cet ouvrage
me voici,' he will speak of the 'tissue' of Levinas' 'text' that interlaces both 'texture and atexture
without uniting them.' The Other comes to 'tear' the 'continuum' of this tissue which still tends to 'sew
itself back up again' and 'resume its tears.' One might argue, therefore, that the ethical destructure
requires 'de-stricturation.' See op. cit., translated as, 'At This Very Moment in This Work Here I Am'
by Ruben Berezdivin, in Re-Reading Levinas, (eds.) Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (London:
The Athlone Press, 1991, 26).
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the phainaesthetic) that his thought is conducted in the register of the hyperbolic and
the superlative. Does philosophy (4>iAoaocj)ia) not, in fact, attain its 'superlative,' as
Levinas contends, as the 'incessant restlessness' (OBBE 82) of the ethical subject; an
agitation which cannot be wrested from its course, nor come to rest (repos) securely,
in the site of the philosophical logos (Aoyos)? This may be the case. However, the
analysis of the face Levinas provides still appears, it seems, to fall back upon what
Heidegger would call the 'allurements' (Verlockungen) of the ways in which that
which faces, and what may signify as a face, have been 'ordinarily understood' (BT
§74 [387]), understood, that is, within a predominantly humanocentric philosophical
(and theological) tradition. Again, it may be, as Levinas argues, that the 'appearing'
of the 'phenomenon is already a discourse' (OBBE 104; emphasis added).
Phenomenology, as such, is the identification - or proclamation - of the same, across
a multitude of Abschattungen, within an economy of immanence. But, and according
to the selfsame line of reasoning advanced above, does it not also follow that the
manifestation of the face, Ka0' auro, is itself already a fablel Can the Aoyos to
which Levinas adheres (despite his attempts to repeatedly efface it (OBBE 20))
extricate itself from the myth (pG0oc) of its own making? Is myth (pG0oc) not the
exordium of the Aoyos (rationality) that would, according to legend (that is,
according to a certain venerable tradition extending from Aristotle, through Hegel and
Husserl, to Levinas) bring about its demise? And furthermore, does pG0oc not survive
into the 0ecop(a that would deign to supersede it (and in Levinas' case to
'demythicize' it (TS 53)), such that the history of Western philosophy might attest
unwittingly to the perdurance of pG0oc and the continuing significance of
wonderment (0aupa^Etu) purportedly suppressed along with it?25
Of course, it may be, as Husserl reminds us, that 'phantasy' (Phantasie), or
what we might term more broadly, imagination, is central to any phenomenological
undertaking.26 Thus, 'feigning,' or 'Fiktion,' as Husserl insists, 'makes up the vital
element of phenomenology as of every other eidetic science,' so much so that,
'feigning is the source from which the cognition of "eternal truths" is fed' (Id §70).
Leaving aside the 'eternization' broached by Husserl here (a notion one might replace
with that of transhistoricity), are we not led to conclude, perhaps, that a certain bardic
imperative is inscribed at the heart of phenomenological endeavour? Might
phenomenology not precisely involve the telling of tales, a telling and retelling of the
25 It is to such an 'attestation' that we turn in part three of this work.
26 In Time and the Other, does Levinas not himself ask us to 'imagine all things, beings and persons,
returning to nothingness' so as to exhibit the il y a in its 'indeterminacy' (TO 46)?
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Sachen Selbst, where the 'things' concerned might 'teach' one how to regard
(regarder) them and not to simply view them circumspectly with an eye to their use
{Being and Time), or to the pleasure (plaisir) they may or may not induce in their
human claimants {Totality and Infinity)? Indeed, one might learn from the 'things
themselves' that one's 'place in the sun' {place an soleil) is a place shared by many
whose emergence into the 'clearing' {die Lichtung) has been denied them, or whose
faces have been defaced {devisage), because they are deemed to be either wordless
{sans parole) or worldless {sans monde).
One can then, in response to the question Levinas ventures in the preface to
the first edition of Totality and Infinity, never 'undo the inevitable dogmatism that
gathers up and gauges an exposition in pursuit of its theme' (77 29).27 However, one is
required to efface the presentation in which those themes are exposed, and expose
them recurrently to their ethical source. The body of the 'text' is simply another layer
of the derma (behind which one is mal dans sa peau) that must be turned toward the
Other and exposed to the outrance of the 'face,' an outrance that inverts the order of
the 'near-sphere' {Nahsphdre) centred upon the pure Ego {reines Ich). The face
Levinas deduces serves as a phenomenological Leitfaden, or clue, to a face that resists
the complicity of discourse (even a discourse as seemingly vigilant as Levinas'
{OBBE 20)). Thus, it will prove requisite to efface the face in its Levinasian
configuration (and by all accounts any discourse on the face is a configuration,
namely a conjunction or assembly of face and form) in order to permit the 'infinite,'
in its considerable effulgence, an 'infinite' whose positive determination has yet to be
fixed, to highlight the limitations of the form(at) in which it is exhibited.
The policy of effacement adverted to here is thus raised to the level of a
methodological procedure. Levinas himself intimates as much, of course, throughout
his career, and nowhere more explicitly than in Otherwise than Being or Beyond
Essence. Levinas does not provide the authoritative account of the face, any more
than Being and Time, which culminates in the posing of a series of questions, provides
the authoritative answer to the question of Being. Just as Being and Time is exergual,
that is, it performs its work outside the determinate space delimited by the borders of
its covers (the reader is urged to take up the task of philosophy and not to simply
assimilate the teachings of the tradition unquestioningly - a tradition in which Being
and Time itself features), so too does Levinas' 'philosophy' incite its readers to
27 After all, as Levinas insists, the beyond being does not allow itself to be 'walled up in the conditions
of its own enunciation' {OBBE 156). In point of fact, 'transcendence owes it to itself to interrupt its
own demonstration' {GP 148).
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perform, or practise, the 'reductions' it proposes. As such, Levinas' philosophy is less
a method (although it is, as we have seen, bound by stringent regulae) than a way, or
o5os, through which to approach the face. Nonetheless, Levinas himself does remain
committed to certain rudimentary principles from which he repeatedly takes his
conceptual bearings. These principles govern the composition of his thought and
manage the staging of the face-to-face relation he details. The 'tableau' of the face-to-
face relation is, therefore, set forth in consonance with these principles. As our
analysis proceeds it will prove necessary to interrogate this ideational montage
further. Before an examination of the 'orientation' of Levinas' thought can be




§ 6. The dimensions of responsibility
The vectors of the face-to-face relation are well known, although prone to serious
misunderstanding. It appears customary to simply rehearse Levinas' pronouncements
as if, stated with complete assurance and pellucidity, they required no further
justification. Levinas' reception and subsequent critique of the thought of Martin
Buber, for example, meets with general approval within the secondary literature on
Levinas, as if the disputations between these two thinkers, principally concerning the
'sphere of the between' (Zwischenmenschliche), had been settled. In truth, Buber's
work is often depreciated by scholars keen to elide those aspects of his thought
which undermine the cogency of Levinas' critiques of him. Correspondingly, there
are, as we shall see, areas of significant congruity between the two thinkers such that
a robust comparative study of Levinas and Buber would be entirely warranted. Such
disputations do, however, alert us to the governing problematic in both thinker's
work, namely that of orientation.
The 'dimension' of ethics (also described by Levinas as the 'field sketched
out by the paradox of an infinite in relation' {WE 200)) opens in the 'sensible
appearance' of the face (77 198). This opening - less an aperture exposing a
subjacent base than a breaching of the panopticon of vision - delineates 'a distance
in depth' (77 39), a 'depth' (profondeur) which punctuates the horizonal structure of
perceptual experience - it infringes upon the perceptual fringe - because it recedes
beyond the horizons of consciousness and the relations of laterality accommodated
by it. Furthermore, Levinas cautions, it is preferable not to describe 'the face as an
opening,' for this would be to render it 'relative to an environing plenitude' {OF 10).
Contrary to the recession that characterises the elemental {I'element), and the abyssal
depths into which the existent can descend - a 'descent toward the ever more
profound abyss' of the il y a {TI 93) - the profundity opened in the face of the other
person recedes ad infinitum. Rather than dissolving the identity of the ego it
commands (the ego's involution in the elemental blurs the boundaries of its selfhood,
Levinas argues) the depth opened in the face singularizes the subject. The subject is
singularized precisely as the one who responds to the invocation of the Other, and it
achieves its 'unicity qua I' by virtue of its 'position before the other as a face' {TI
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214). The depth Levinas charts is eventmental (it is an evenement), therefore,
marking the incessant withdrawal of the Other from the prearticulated structures of
experience. This withdrawal engenders the space within which the ethical relation is
dramatized. Again, the 'depth' conferred here differs from the 'depth,' or
perspective, displayed by physical objects and likewise by that depth which sets the
phenomenon (^aivopevov) against the internal horizons of its innumerable
Abschattungen, or profiles. For although, as Levinas argues, the 'perception of a
thing is an infinite process,' our accession to the thing being 'through the infinite
aspects it presents' to us (WED 65), the 'infmition' with which we are confronted
here is that of a 'horizon' against which disclosure is possible. The infinity
appertinent to perceptual acts opens a space within which empty intuitions are
capable of fulfilment. However, the infinition - the maniere d'etre, or effectuation,
of infinity (77 26) - revealed in the face of the Other, and produced as the 'positing
of its idea in me' (77 26), overflows the horizons of possibility appropriate to
perceptual acts by virtue of its essential non-adequation.
The 'depth' (profondeur) in which the dimension of ethics unfolds is
unfathomable to the extent that it cannot be adequately appraised by cognition. Yet,
the limit it imposes upon thought simultaneously inhibits and obligates the existent.
The existent, qua responsible subject, is produced in the encounter with the Other (a
production rethought as the second hypostasis of the existent in Otherwise than
Being or Beyond Essence). The Levinasian subject is individuated by the Other, such
that the exigency of the Other's supplication attests at once to the subject's
convocation (it is called together and unified as such) and its vocation as 'one' who
is for-the-other. The identity of the existent is thus deepened and drawn out, in
unison with the with-drawal of the Other, and its metier as 'creature' confirmed
(where in Existence and Existents hypostasis is very much an affirmation, or signing
on to Being, defined by the instantiation of the ego). This metier, one might argue,
metes out and establishes the parameters for the subject's being, ex-spatiating it
according to the dicta of ethicality and interrupting the 'imperialism' of the conatus
in its espace vital (PII55). The living space (Lebensraum) of nutrimental existence is
reoriented in the encounter with the face. The trophic, as Levinas would have it, is
exceeded in the encounter with the face, and the reign of the element {Velement)
suspended.
63
Ethical space is marked by a curious admixture of 'depth' and 'height.' The
intersection of these two vectors opens what Levinas describes as 'the very
dimension of elevation' (777 17). Depth is troped as 'humility' because the Other is
needful and summons my response (lest one forget that seasoned troupe of
Levinasian players, the 'widow' {veuve), the 'orphan' (orphelin(e)), and the
'stranger' (etranger), all of whom petition my assistance1), yet it converts into
'height' because I am 'under an obligation' (ET 41) to respond to the other person
who faces me. The straightforwardness (droiture) of the face-to-face is, therefore,
inclined vertically and surmounts the lateral dimension in which objects and things
are positioned alongside one another in relations of commensurability and
compossibilty. The 'stranger,' the 'orphan,' and the 'widow' (all metonyms for the
'neighbour' {prochain(e)) who faces me, i.e., the Other in situs, as it were) venture
their appeal to me from 'on high' and from 'below.' The binary pair 'above-below,'
which Levinas characterizes as an 'above-below disposition' (77 297), or ethical
Stimmung, once again accentuating the break with the phenomenological attitude,
establishes the coordinates of ethical space, and this collocation of terms, indicated
by the hyphen that conjoins them, attests to the disruption of normal spatial
transaction.
Where the phenomenological reduction, as previously noted, brings space to
light as a product of kinaesthesis and the corporeity of the lived-body (where the
expatiation of the lived body {Leib) literally ex-spatiates the environment (Umwelt)
in which it perambulates (Husserl, 1981, 246)), the ethical reduction Levinas
performs uncovers a 'curved space' anterior to the sphere of owness
(.Eigenheitssphdre) from which the ego holds sway {walten) in its immediate
environment. 'Curved,' 'asymmetrical' space, Levinas insists, subtends rectilinear,
planiform space - the raiimliche Ausdehnung of geometry. For geometrization is a
1
Although Levinas will invoke such 'figures' of alterity, it is the 'stranger,' according to Robert
Bernasconi, that 'creates the distance or "separation" that introduces the ethical' (Bernasconi, 2000,
63). And, indeed, Levinas does intimate that the 'strangeness of the Other' is 'accomplished as a
calling into question of my spontaneity,' that is, 'as ethics' (77 43).
2 As Adam Newton notes, the approach of the Other 'from on high' mimics the mi-elyon of the
Biblical 'God.' Similarly the Levinasian triumvirate of the 'stranger,' the 'orphaned,' and the
'widowed,' have clear antecedents in the Torah's 'ger,' 'yatom,' and 'v'almanah.' It is clearly
debatable as to what extent Levinas' humanism of the other human being (a universalism of
'particularity') replicates the kind of exclusivism that often attends the Judaic designation of the
'neighbour,' especially in its Halakhic form. All manner of regulatory edicts govern the treatment of
one's 'neighbour,' and delimit, with staggering precision, just who and who is not to be accorded this
most privileged of epithets. See (Newton, 2001, 15).
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product of mathesis and first philosophy (philosophie premiere), in its Levinasian
determination, describes the ethical dis-structure (destructure) underlying theory
(Sscopta). The traditional opposition between 'theory' and 'practice' is thus
destructured in the relationship with the 'absolutely other,' Levinas contends (77 29).
Intersubjective space is curved, Levinas will argue, because in it 'distance'
is inflected into 'elevation' (77 291). Levinas contests the account of the spatiality of
Dasein Heidegger presents in the First Division of Being and Time. There, we recall,
Heidegger identifies 'de-severance' (Ent-fernung) and 'directionality' (Ausrichtung)
as 'constitutive characteristics' of Being-in-the-world, and as 'determinate for
Dasein's spatiality' (BT §23 [110]). De-severance, an existentiale, consists in
'making the remoteness of something disappear,' and 'bringing it close' (BT §23
[105]). Through de-severing (Entfernen), Dasein permits a being to be 'encountered
close by' as 'the entity which it is (BT §23 [105]). Distance, in an objective,
quantifiable and metric sense, presupposes the de-severant being of Dasein, orienting
itself according to the 'remoteness' and 'closeness' of that which is ready-to-hand
within the world (BT §23 [106]). Directionality, simply underscores the fact that any
act of Ndherung or 'bringing close,' is always already directed towards a
predelineated region of circumspection 'out of which what is de-severed brings itself
close' (BT §23 [108]). It is therefore because Dasein is primordially spatial that
ready-to-hand entities can in turn be 'encountered' as spatial. The interplay, or
Spielraum, between the 'here' (Hier) of de-severant Dasein, and the 'yonder' (Dort)
of ready-to-hand entities toward which Dasein comports itself in the world, regulates
the distantiation that Heidegger discerns to be the 'phenomenal basis' upon which
scientific accounts of space and spatiality are founded (BT §24 [112]). Here
Heidegger appropriates and adapts Husserl's insight that the homogeneous space
surveyed by the mathematical sciences is itself the result of an Erweiterung, or
'apperceptive expansion,' of the immediate lived space proximate to the ego in its
'core-world' (Kernwelt).
Ethical space, however, inflects the distance of de-severant Dasein into
elevation because the Other I encounter is not an entity with which I have dealings
(or a thing given to manipulability (Handlichkeit)), nor one whom I dwell 'alongside'
(bei) as a Heimgenosse in a Heimland. The Other person, qua stranger (etranger),
turns toward me from a foreign sphere (a sphere out with the remit of my
kinaesthetically constituted Nahsphare, and immune to the rays of intentional regard
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(Ichstrahlen) emanating from it), prescinding the lateral dimension Levinas believes
to dominate the Daseinsanalytik and reversing the centrifugal orientation of Dasein's
turning toward things into the Other's turning toward the existent. The relation with
the Other is a 'relation with a certain depth' {OF 10), rather than a relation with a
horizon of disclosure, or an equipmental region. I am encountered by the Other (who
does not reside in a preordained Gegend of manageability) in whom 'humility is
joined with height' {MS 54). Of course, Heidegger himself recognises that 'Being
toward others is ontologically different from Being toward things,' {BT §26 [124])
and, indeed, that Mitsein or Being-with, is equiprimordial with the Being that Dasein
'is.' However, others 'show themselves in the world in their special environmental
Being,' their 'disclosedness' having been 'constituted' beforehand (along with ready-
to-hand entities) against the horizon of the 'worldhood' (Weltlichkeit) of the 'world'
{BT §26 [123]). Others show themselves, therefore, in terms of what is ready-to-hand
in that world {BT §26 [123]), Levinas believes.
Levinas censures Heidegger for his failure to account for the vertical
dimension of ethicality in the presentation of solicitude he advances in Being and
Time (an aporia Levinas believes to characterize all of Heidegger's subsequent work,
despite the fact that his reading of 'later' Heidegger is cursory at the best of times).
Heidegger's purported analyses of factical life (faktischesleben) obviate the question
of how Dasein comes to be encountered by the Other, and do not consider the
imperative force with which Dasein is confronted upon meeting the other person
amidst the general commerce of quotidian life in the world. Despite (in his early
opuscula) reproaching Husserl for his 'intellectualism,' and for favouring the ataraxy
of 'theoretical contemplation' as the 'attitude' in which the 'world' is 'given' {TIHP
119) - even though Husserl attained the 'profound idea' that in the ontological
domain 'the world of science is posterior to and depends on the vague and concrete
world of perception' {TIHP 119) - and despite (in those same early works)
commending the pratognostic approach of Heidegger in which the world is presented
as a 'center of action' and as a 'field of activity' {TIHP 119), Levinas finds
Heidegger's explication of spatiality inadequate to the situation of ethics. The
Heideggerian account of the 'other' cannot do justice to the 'radical heterogeneity'
{heterogeneite radicale) of beings, for it remains committed to the 'primacy of the
panoramic' {primat du panoramique): the conciliation between beings Heidegger
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proposes is thus a product of their horizontality, Levinas will contend (77 294; Tel
327-8).
In the order of Levinas' thinking, the 'space' of the face-to-face relation
(ethical space as such) exhibits a certain anteriority with respect to the region of pure
consciousness adumbrated by Husserl, and to the totality of Dasein's structural
whole, or 'care' (Sorge), enunciated by Heidegger. Ethical space is primordial, or,
rather, it is anarchic. As Derrida observes, with his customary perspicuity, the height
of the one who approaches from mi-elyon, or from on high, 'does not belong to
space' (which, Derrida suggests, is why the trope of height deconstructs the idiom in
which it is protracted), not simply because 'it is foreign to space,' but rather because
'within space it is the origin of space, orienting space through speech and glance,'
through that is, the face (le visage) that 'commands body and space from above'
(Derrida, 1978, 101).
The space revealed to the ethical aptitude substructs the perceptual space
that is the emprise of eidetic science. Space can, no doubt, be studied, with Husserl,
in its essence; the 'descriptive science of space is not geometry' after all, for, as
remarked, 'the space studied by geometry is already idealized' (TIHP 118; emphasis
added). But is the non-Euclidean space of concrete life, to which Husserl directs his
critical attention in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology, not itself already oriented by the norms of phenomenological
science? Levinas believes this to be the case. As I will attempt to demonstrate,
however, Levinas' own series of ethical reductions inadvertently commit a similar
act of delimitation, predicated upon the normativity of the face. Perhaps Levinas is
himself, in the words of Husserl, 'incapable of bringing' that which occupies 'his
field of intuition' into his own 'field of judgment' (Id §22). If and why Levinas
might be either unwilling, or unable, to think the face from the hither side of his own
'teaching' of the face, and thus perform a critical move at the threshold of his own
critique of critical philosophy, must be assessed. It may be that Levinas is too
'loaded down with tradition' to extricate himself from the encumbrance of its effects
upon him. One need not, of course, interpret the effects of tradition as entirely
'pernicious,' as, indeed, Heidegger is apt to do in an early essay on Karl Jasper's
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Psychologie des Weltanschauungen, to recognise its tendency, on occasion, to dull
phenomenological acumen.3
Concrete, lived space (Leibesraum) cannot, Husserl maintains, be subjected
to the exacting analyses of the physical sciences without undergoing a severe
deformation. The inexact data of perceptual acts refuse to submit to the exactitude of
scientific scrutiny. Scientific concepts place a veritable Ideenkleid over the
Lebenswelt in which the kinaesthetically functioning lived body (Leib) holds sway
(Crisis §51). Yet, this admission in no way depreciates the authority of perceptual
giveness. It simply indicates that such giveness must, as Levinas correctly notes, 'be
described by means of morphological notions' (TIHP 118). The inexact data of
perceptual acts are structured correlatively by concatenations of inexact eide or
essences.
In Being and Time such phenomenological 'morphology' is articulated
relative to the kinds of deseverances in which Dasein comports itself. Thus,
seemingly inaccurate appraisals of distance, such as something being a 'good walk,'
or a 'stone's throw' away (BT §23 [105]), obtain a descriptive authority in the region
of Dasein's circumspective concern. Arguably, Levinas appropriates the insights of
Heidegger's deconstructive reading of Husserl, translating them into his own ethical
register, and subsequently deploys these very insights, in adapted form, to sanction
his ongoing polemic against Heidegger. A perfidious move, one might argue, were it
not for the concessions of indebtedness to Heidegger that accompany Levinas' early,
pre-war writings. The ensemble of terms Levinas employs to explicate the inflection
of ethical space ('height' (hauteur), 'depth' (profondeur), 'curvature' (courbure)),
which, he claims, belies variously, geometric space, kinaesthetic space and the
pratognostic space of de-severant Dasein, are likewise descriptively 'vague' and
imprecise. Yet the very space, or spacing (espacement), they are undertaken to
describe is pre-objective, proto-logical and, indeed, proto-phenomenological. All
scientificity, therefore, buckles before the face and the dimension of depth in which it
opens. The face is precisely beyond measure (demesure) (77 62), the exactitude of
the calculative sciences ceding to the exacting demands made upon the subject by the
Other.
3 See Martin Heidegger, 'Comments on Karl Jasper's Psychology ofWorldviews,' in Pathmarks,
edited by W. McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 29).
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Yet, Levinas' presentation of the face is measured, I would argue. The
signification he defends is (s)elective. The immeasurable (incommensurable) does
not grace the face of the nonhuman. The conventionally inanimate is not, apropos of
Levinas, inordinate (demesure), for, as he maintains, the face of the human other
alone 'signifies' as such. An ethically bound sublimity - a sublimity bound by the
limits (uspaTa) of the face and thus, as such, boundless (although, arguably, it is a
boundlessness set within limits) - attends the encounter with the face. A sublimity
which is neither occasioned by the magnitude of natural phenomena, nor announced
in the super-sensible destiny of the mind, but which rather marks the humility of the
ethical subject before the other it serves. A limit is drawn here in the work of
Levinas, therefore, and a breach opened, a limit we may need to transgress.
Heidegger proposes 'seeing' and 'hearing' as 'distance-senses' (Fernsinne),
arguing that it is in them that 'Dasein as deseverant mainly dwells' (BT §23 [107]).
Clearly, aurality and sight are entirely pertinent to the analysis of deseverance
Heidegger presents in Being and Time, and Dasein's being-toward that which is
ready-to-hand is, no doubt, largely conducted in these modalities of sense,
particularly that of 'sight' (Sicht) {BT §§15-36). Tactility, and moreover, tactuality, is
something of an aporia in Being and Time, however (and throughout the
Heideggerian corpus) and this thematic lacuna informs Levinas' own analyses of the
'distantiation' characteristic of ethical space. Although, in Totality and Infinity,
Levinas describes the relation with the Other (Autrui) as a 'relation with the non-
touchable' (77 172), it remains one of 'contact,' albeit 'across a distance' (77 172), an
ethically reconfigured mode of contact 'that does not compromise the integrity of
what is touched,' a veritable 'contact with the intangible,' as it were (Tl 50). Such
'contact,' rather like the Kantian 'reverence' (Ehrfurcht), or 'feeling' (gefiihl), for the
moral law, is different in kind from that which defines the correspondence between
the hand and the surfaces of things.
Unlike Kant, for whom reverence (Ehrfurcht) 'is a feeling,' but 'not a
feeling received through outside influences' (i.e., mere inclination), the ethical
contact Levinas details is an exposure to the outside itself, vis-a-vis the exteriority of
the face. Kantian reverence is, moreover, 'self-produced' through the mediation of
the 'rational concept,' and attests to the moral agent's immediate awareness of the
determination of its will by the law. Reverence is regarded as 'the effect of the law
on the subject,' an affect that 'demolishes' self-love (Kant, 1991, 66-67). While
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Levinas certainly concurs with the 'demolition' of self-love Kant describes -
Levinas' ongoing diatribe against the conatus essendi is entirely in keeping with the
thought of Kant here - exposure to the face is not mediated through a third term
(although the intensity of the encounter is interrupted by the mediation of the third
party, as we shall discover). Furthermore, 'contact' is a being put into contact with
the face in its 'exteriority,' a hetero-affection that one undergoes.
Despite declaring his own thought to be 'particularly close' to 'the practical
philosophy of Kant' (OF 10), a thought in which Levinas discerns a 'meaning in the
human' not measured by 'ontology' (HA 138), the humanism of the other 'man'
Levinas promulgates situates the categorical imperative in the face of the Other.
Sensibility is immediately rational, rationality is immediately sensible. The a priori
forms of sensibility, set forth by Kant in the Transcendental Aesthetic, are de¬
formalized in the relation with the face. I 'universalize myself,' Levinas asserts,
rather than execute a law through an adherence to maxims (OBBE 126). The law
does not mediate this relation sans relation, Levinas argues, because the face
signifies Ka0' auro. Kant will, of course, acknowledge that the law I recognize, the
law 'I recognize with reverence' - indeed, the law is the sole 'object' of reverence as
such - subordinates my will to it without appealing to the sensibilia occasioned by
the 'mediation of external influences' upon my senses (Kant, 1991, 66). The
exteriority of the moral law obligates ex mero motu. I respect others, qua rational
beings, because they are capable of observing the moral law within them, and self-
legislating their conduct accordingly.
But, can the ethical intuition (Anschauung) Levinas advocates lay any
greater claim to being the intuitus originarius than the feeling for the moral law
espoused by Kant? To be sure, Levinas will maintain that sensation, which is at the
'basis of sensible experience and intuition,' is not 'reducible to the clarity or the idea'
derived from it (OBBE 63). Furthermore, sensation is defined by its radical
'vulnerability,' a vulnerability purged of the legislative spontaneity that characterizes
Kantian Ehrfurcht. Of course, the An-schauung Levinas defends (an ethically
inspired intuition that is the counterpart to the ethical Sinngebung he prizes) is
diametrically opposed to the kind of 'clear' and 'distinct' 'self-evidence' Husserl
(and Kant) nominate under this heading. If 'intuition' is characterized by degrees of
fulfilment (Erfiillung) - namely, the degree to which an intentional act is fulfilled
evidentially - and is, likewise, the presence, 'in person' (selbstgegeben), of an object
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before consciousness, then, clearly, the susceptibility Levinas details cannot be
awarded this designation. Principally, then, Levinas rejects the actional component of
intuition. Even as pure receptivity, what is given intuitively is proportionate to
intentional fulfilment (Erfilllung). The figure of the given is cut to the cloth of
intentionality, as it were. But the face, we recall, is quite beyond measure. In fact, the
face is that which 'measures me' (PII57).
Arguably, therefore, Levinasian intuition is best understood as in-tuition, for
the Other 'introduces into me' (non-maieutically, Levinas assures us) 'what was not
in me' (Tl 203). Although, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas will liken this 'incessant
teaching' to a 'reception' (Tl 204), in Otherwise than Being the notion of susception
comes to dominate his analysis of subjectivity. However, despite insisting, in this
latter work, that the 'saying' signifies 'without stopping' or coming to rest in the
'said,' and, as such, does not revert 'to disclosure in a consciousness,' or go back to
the 'holding pen' of intentionality (OBBE 190n.34), Levinas does, it seems, retain
the privilege of a certain constitutive licence. The face that summons me is always
the 'face' of the human other. Thus, one might argue, that where Kantian philosophy
is critical (or Critique), Levinasian first philosophy (philosophie premiere) is
epicritical (or Epicritique). This appears to be the case, because the subject-hostage is
able to discriminate between different forms of sensation. Proto-ethical sensibility
entails, it seems, a complex haptic science. Moreover, while one might agree with
Levinas that the self is not primarily receptive, it is not wholly susceptible either, but
is rather perhaps a chiastic blend of susception and proprioception, 'host' and
'hostage.'
The 'transcendent,' as Levinas states, may well 'cut across sensibility' (Tl
193), cutting conation to the quick. However, such decussation is regulated by an
epicritical faculty of (the) 'understanding' which ultimately limits the latitude of my
susceptibility and presides over the administration of pneumatological space. The in¬
tuition of the face is limited by the concept of the human, which, according to
Levinas, finds its fulfilment in the face. Now, phenomenology, as Husserl maintains,
circumscribes a field of 'painfully achieved findings' (Id §87). This is incontestable,
I think. Yet, despite inverting the field of pure consciousness (and subverting the
ego-advertence that governs it) and reconceiving the phenomenological 'field' as a
field of exposedness (i.e., me void), Levinas palliates the severity, and the extent, of
71
the 'pain' the ethical subject endures, by controlling the variables, or, let us say, the
dosage, of faciality.
Contact is, of course, an integral moment of the erotic relation, as evidenced
by the analyses of voluptuosity presented in Totality and Infinity, and is therefore, at
least according to the strictures of Levinas' own account, beyond the ambit of what
may properly be taken to signify as ethical. However, in this very work, Levinas will
also repeatedly emphasize the centrality of sensibility in his explication of the proto-
ethical relation. The existent is mise en question and this being put into question -
which Levinas identifies as the essential movement of 'ethics' (77 43) - is not a
'theoretical' proposition, or an instance of quizzical badinage, but rather the holding
in contention (or suspension) of the 'being' of the existent. Its being, which remains,
as Heidegger would say, an 'issue' for it (BT §4 [12]), is now doubly irksome. For
this very being is held to account (held to ransom as the 'metaphor' of the otage
would suggest) by the Other, and 'nothing is more burdensome than a neighbor,'
Levinas confirms (OBBE 88). The being that is a 'burden' for me is my being for-
the-other. Being is materiality, and the existent is substantial to the degree that it
shoulders, qua responsible subject, the responsibility for others with which it is
assigned. Yet how does one distinguish between these two modalities of contact;
how is each apportioned its range and fixed in its determination by Levinas? The
tension adduced above is partly eased in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence,
as we will discover proximately, where contact is ethically reconstructed as
vulnerability and exposedness, materiality being recast as martyriality (OBBE 146)
and, indeed, as materiality. It is subject to debate whether Levinas successfully
resolves the tension between the 'erotic' and the 'ethical,' however. Perhaps the
torsion (OBBE 107), which defines his attempts to twist free from, and
simultaneously uphold, the schism that troubles his account of the contactual, is itself
more indicative of the 'enigma' he struggles to describe under the rubric of the face
than the accounts of the face he himself assays. One could argue, of course, that this
is precisely Levinas' intention, and that the dead time (temps mort) between the
Other and myself is the 'place' where ethical filiation and disaffiliation are crossed
(X), like lovers whose paths cross only to disunite before they consummate their
relation with a 'child,' a child through which, according to Levinas, their congress
takes on meaning, or makes sense (sens).
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§ 7. Gradient and inflection
Intersubjective space is 'asymmetrical' (EE 95) and the 'curvature' (courbure) in
which this inflection is inscribed is the very 'gradient' (denivellement) of
transcendence itself, Levinas proclaims (77 86). This 'curvature of being' quite
literally severs the de-severant being of Dasein and reorients it vertically.
Significantly, the relation with the Other (this relation sans relation (77 80; Tel 79),
or rapport sans rapport (77 295; Tel 329)) takes place 'across a void,' a void (vide)
('77 172) in which the 'proximity' of the Other and the 'distance' between 'him' and
'me' is 'wholly maintained' (EE 95). The separation (separation) between the 'same'
and the 'other' is the site of holiness (saintete) itself, therefore. However, it often
appears as if the obsecrations of the Other, entreating me to answer for my place au
soleil, are 'holy' orders only to the extent that they issue from this space of
'conjuncture' (77 215), and not from any valency they themselves might possess, a
suggestion to which we will attend further in part three of this study.
As Levinas adverts, 'alterity starts from me' (77 40). The face-to-face
relation is primordial (and we recall from chapter one that Levinas, Husserl and
Heidegger are engaged in a philosophical altercation regarding the status of
primordiality) and yet, clearly, it cannot arise without the 'terms that are placed in it'
(77 215). It is in this interspace, engendered by the seeming discordance between the
'proximity' and the 'duality' of beings, that Levinas locates the pathos (TTaSos) of
philosophy (EE 95). Philosophy begins in the wonder of the face-to-face (face-a-
face) relation, and the astonishment (etonnement), in which it is inaugurated, is a
product of this originary espacement of being. The ethical destructure is thus
primary, and its 'primacy' is that of 'an irreducible structure upon which all other
structures rest' (Tl 79). Arguably, this 'structure' - transcendence is the 'ethical
structure,' Levinas argues (GP 147) - assumes the importance within Levinas'
project that the concept of intentionality holds within that of Husserl. If, as Levinas
himself concedes, the 'fundamental property of consciousness' is intentionality, and
Husserl's 'great originality' stems from his recognition that 'it is the relation to the
object that is the primitive phenomenon and not a subject and an object that would
supposedly move toward one another' (01 13), then it would appear to be entirely
apposite to construe the ethical destructure in similarly irreducible terms; apposite
because the relationship between the thought of Levinas and Husserl is arguably one
of apposition, I would contend.
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This is not to claim, however, that the ethical relation, or 'unrelating
relation' (27 295), is intentional, despite Levinas' propensity (up to and including the
publication of Totality and Infinity in 1961) to frame the relation with the Other
(.Autrui) in the language of intentionality and presence. Perhaps one may discern
something approximating to a Levinasian Kehre, or turn, in this regard, around the
time of the essay 'Intentionality and Sensation' (1965). For here, Levinas begins to
employ the concept of 'diachrony' (diachronie) to describe a relation with that which
does not coincide with the origin of the Ego and its transcendental work. He will
speak, thus, of 'a diachrony stronger than structural synchronism' (IS 148), and a
movement that demolishes 'the predelineated limits of structure' (IS 149). Certainly,
by the publication of Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1974), Levinas will
have rethought subjectivity as the relation to the Other (much the way in which
Dasein is exposedness). This 'relation' is dramatized across the surface of the flesh.
The body, or corps ethique, as I will refer to it, is thus the site of ethical
performativity. 'Here' (the hie in question being the Hier of Hiersein, or me voici)
the 'good' is 'accomplished' as a bearing of the Other. Intentionality is ultimately
consummated in the act of ethical portage (less perhaps an 'act,' subject to the
directives of volition, than the 'uprightness,' or Temimut, of an ethically transcribed
'integrity' (TOT 48) in which my ludic existence is put out of play by the Other and
'my' contra-natural identity, qua one who bears, is awoken). The structuration of
ethics is concretized through the very embodiment of its performance. This
structuration, I maintain, is the ethical body (corps ethique) itself, the subject in its
susceptibility. This ethical soma (ocopa) is the significancy of nonindifference, an
exposedness that cannot be fixed structurally as a correlative of consciousness
(OBBE 70), but which submits the 'biological' and the 'natural' to a 'higher
structure' (OBBE 109), a pre-structural structure, or anarchic cxpxq, as it were.
The 'relationship' with the Other is not 'spatial,' Levinas insists, if 'space'
is taken to be the product of geometrization. Rather, the relationship with the Other
(Autrui) institutes a 'return to exterior being' (77 183). The distance extended by
exteriority 'immediately extends to height' (77 297), thus the exteriority (the
dimension of depth) in which the face opens is an 'original form of exteriority' (EE
95), which, Levinas advises, 'takes us beyond the categories of unity and multiplicity
which are valid for things' (EE 95). The relationship with the Other 'alone'
introduces the 'dimension of transcendence' (77 193), Levinas will maintain.
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Exteriority does not 'terminate the drawing out of a form in it,' (GP 133) and its
apparent vacuity - exteriority is space par excellence or the excellence of space -
does not congeal into the noematic correlate of a mental act. Exteriority is
'uncontained' (GP 133), it is inordinate and quite beyond measure. In point of fact, it
is that by which 'I measure myself (PII 55), taking my bearings, as one who bears,
from the directive of the face. The face is 'preeminently the presence of exteriority,'
(Tl 66) Levinas argues, because the modality of height, from which it signifies Ka0'
auTO, is extended in discourse and not, as we have previously noted, through the
medium of 'vision.' For 'vision,' Levinas urges, 'is essentially an adequation of
exteriority and interiority' (TI 295). Discourse, then, cannot be 'converted into
interiority,' because the face 'overflows' the 'sphere of the same' (TI 195) from
which the spection (arguably a form of introspection) basic to phenomenological
science, performs its scansion of the world.
Significantly, as Levinas will argue throughout Otherwise than Being or
Beyond Essence, the exposure to the openness of the face effects the 'opening up'
(.de-claustration) of the 'oneself in such a way that this opening up is not a 'being-
in-the-world' (OBBE 180). Again, the 'distance' extended by 'exteriority' - a
distance altogether more 'radical' than 'every distance in the world' (TI 209) -
constitutes the 'elementary fact of morality' (77 297). This distance, moreover, is
more archaic than the 'distance' (hypostatic space) at which the existent, in its
separated being, finds itself from itself. The 'conjuncture' between self and Other, a
conjuncture that orients and separates the dyads that take form within it, is, Levinas
will maintain, and contra Durkheim (a figure who along with thinkers such as Ernst
Cassirer and Lucien Levy-Bruhl haunts the pages of Totality and Infinity), the
elementary 'form' of religious life, a form, or rather destructure, that is at once the
substratum of quotidian life because in and through it the 'sincerity' (the 'purity') of
everyday life is revealed.
Granted that philosophia prote (TrpcoTq (jnAoaocJua) is in contention here,
and that Levinas will strive to eradicate all designations of 'first philosophy' as
theory (06copta), it is perhaps hardly surprising that his work is interspersed (one
might say it is interspaced) with references to the rudimental and the archontic. The
reiteration of these leitmotifs (motifs of primordiality which accompany his ethical
reworking of wonder as the apxq of philosophy, the requisite tottos of wonder
being the face of the other person) serves to reinforce the appeal of Levinas' own
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claim that 'morality is not a branch of philosophy, but first philosophy' (77 304;
emphasis added). However, if philosophy is ramiform, and if, broadly speaking, its
composition is dendritical, that is, tree like, then Levinasian first philosophy
(philosophie premiere), in keeping with its claims to radicality, asserts itself as the
radix of this 'tree.'4 But in what soil do the roots of this tree take hold? The
following question, broached by Heidegger in relation to metaphysics (tcx petcx to;
4>uoikcx) applies equally to the discipline of 'ethical metaphysics,' I would suggest.
Heidegger inquires: 'out of what ground do the roots, and thereby the whole tree'
(namely the tree of metaphysics) 'receive their nourishing juices and strength?' He
continues: 'what element, concealed in the ground and soil' of this tree, 'enters and
lives in the roots that support and nourish the tree?' (Heidegger, 1996 [1949], 277).
Evidently, and in response to Heidegger's line of inquiry, Levinas' work is
sourced in two 'cultures,' the Jewish and the Greek, and both afford his thought
sustenance. (Although, this may be something of an oversimplification to which
scholars of Levinas' philosophy have given undue credence. For Levinas' thought is
a miscegenation of some pedigree, a complex mixture of Lithuania, Russian, French,
and German influences that do not lend themselves easily to such simple
classification.) Heidegger's question must be supplemented by another, therefore,
since the crux of the issue at stake here concerns the nature of the balance between
these two discrete sources, and the stability with which their confluence provides
'philosophy.' The very sense of 'philosophy' is thus under scrutiny, and Levinas'
whole ceuvre works to negotiate (and works by negotiating) a settlement between
these two cultural sites, a settlement that is ultimately atopic, or rather eutopic,
because it is construed, in processual terms, as an ongoing advertence to the 'Good.'
The cogency of Levinas' philosophical claims, very much depends upon the extent to
which one is prepared to entertain the plausibility of the cultural cross-fertilization he
commends.5 Yet, does philosophy really require a Jewish Midrash, one may ask? Are
4 Descartes' comments, taken from a letter he wrote to Picot (who translated the Principia
Philosophiae into French) are illustrative of this conceptualization of philosophy: 'Thus the whole of
philosophy is like a tree: the roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches that issue
from the trunk are all the other sciences.' See Martin Heidegger, Introduction to "What is
Metaphysics?" (Fifth edition, 1949), p. 277, in Martin Heidegger: Pathmarks.
5 Levinas' (an)archaeology of language is poietic therefore. Rather than introduce a coterie of new
terms, through which to communicate his thought (he does, needless to say produce a number of
neologisms during the course of his career) he reinvests 'traditional' philosophical (and theological)
concepts with significance, remoulding them in accordance with the ethical imperative that regulates
his project. The concept, or Begrijf, is thus the site of philosophical aycovta, a tension, or torsion,
between the Jewish and Greek registers in which Levinas' thought is advanced.
76
we to exclude the wisdom of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, for example, from the
philosophical 'pact' affirmed by Levinas here? If, as Levinas intimates in Beyond the
Verse, 'everything' falling outside the particular settlement he envisages is
tantamount to nothing more than 'local colour' (AC 198) - 'Judaism teaches us a real
transcendence' (RFA 16), he opines - then are we not obligated to challenge the
provincialism of the philosophical accord he himself broaches? Can such an accord
really do justice to the concrete particularity (and locality) of the Other? And is the
spirit of a somewhat degenerate (and de-generative) triumphalism not alive and well
in Levinas' thought? Have 'all men of goodwill,' as Levinas asserts, really
'consented' to the 'history of Israel,' one may wonder (/77V 31)?
In The Genealogy ofMorals (1887), Nietzsche champions the notion that, as
he puts it, 'our thoughts should grow out of our values with the same necessity as the
fruit out of the tree.' Should one find these 'fruits unpalatable,' he declares, then so
be it, for such disgust does not trouble the 'tree,' nor should it concern the
'philosopher' (Nietzsche, 1956, 150). Accordingly, and issuing, it seems, from a
similar necessity, Levinas' phenomenology stems from the Sitz-im-Leben of Jewish
facticity, and 'bears testimony,' as Nietzsche would have it, to the soil of Jewish
axiological life. And what of it, one may justifiably ask. One has reason to impugn
Levinas not because he blends Jewish and Greek registers of thought, but because he
presents Judaism as philosophy's wet nurse (nourrice), as if (specifically) Jewish
wisdom were indispensable for the parturition, birth, and subsequent maturation of
philosophical ({ipovqais. How opportune, then, that the Hebrew word 'Torah' should
derive from an etymological root meaning to 'shoot forth,' or 'permeate' (aptly
rhizomatic, one notes), and come to connote 'teaching,' or 'instruction' (Newton,
2001, 70). For arguably, apropos of Levinas, the Torah is to instruct philosophy in its
practice and dispel the nescience to which it has succumb. Once again, one is left
perplexed. Does philosophy (<j>iAoao<})ia) really require the 'authoritative educational
intervention' of the Jewish community, as Levinas advocates (ORLFG 97)? How is
such a claim to be corroborated, and by what logic is it confirmed? Indeed, were such
a claim to be verified, one would need to provide a quite extraordinary
Bildungsgeschichte to account for philosophy's educational ancestry. If the
philosophical Aoyos is undercut by the 'wisdom of love [sagesse de 1'amour]'
(OBBE 161; AE 253), as Levinas argues, and love, precisely as an-archic, disrupts
the sovereignty of the apyij, then how can one possibly identify the reign of love
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with the constraints of a particular historico-cultural tradition? Is not to argue thus
tantamount to bunkum, or non-sense?
Some critics would maintain that the strength of Levinas' arguments
regarding the face, and the injunction it levies, is predicated upon the frequency and
force of his iterative pronouncements. Since prolixity, and the various terminological
refrains to which Levinas has recourse, do not guarantee proficiency in philosophical
argumentation, Levinas' ethical proposal is (perhaps) left resting on terra infirma.
Indeed, is Levinas' particular brand of ethical metaphysics not guilty of drawing
philosophy into that very 'rarefied atmosphere' (MBCJ 18) in which Levinas himself
locates the thought of Buber? Does the ethical, pace Levinas, not at times resemble a
kind of geometry of the ethereal? Do the words which greeted the prospective
student upon arrival at Plato's Academy, ouSeis ayecopetpqtos e'icmtco, not apply
equally well to the school of Levinasian first philosophy? Thus, must one not be
lwell versed in geometry to enter' the space of ethical operation, well versed in, and
therefore heedful of, the face of the other person as Levinas describes it?
It may be, as Levinas suggests, that 'only the face in its morality is exterior'
(77 262), and that the analyses of Totality and Infinity (a book which purports, lest
we forget, to be an 'essay on exteriority') endeavour to give such exteriority
(.exteriorite) its proper due. However, if Levinas' proposal that the 'other's entire
being is constituted by its exteriority' (TO 75) is to be taken seriously alongside his
conviction that the Other, qua interlocutor, is 'forever outside' (77 295) the sphere of
constitutional activity, does the prospective reader of Levinas' work not find him or
herself mired in an exegetical quandary? Even if Levinas contests Husserl's
declaration that 'transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense,' and
that, accordingly, 'an outside is precisely - nonsense,' how can he circumvent
Husserl's proviso that 'nonsense' itself 'is always a mode of sense and has its
nonsensicalness within the sphere of possible insight' (CM §41 [117])?
Certainly, in his early critique of Levinas, Derrida questions the legitimacy
of this basic Levinasian move, underscoring 'space' as the 'wound and finitude of
birth without which one could not even open' the language in which Levinas situates
morality; and, moreover, without which 'one could not even have a true or false
exteriority to speak of (Derrida, 1978, 112). Surely, as Derrida opines, the very
distinction found to be operative in Levinas' philosophy here, between a crude
'spatial' exteriority, and the 'true' exteriority of ethical space, adverts to the fact that
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there can be no philosophical logos (Aoyos) which must not 'first let itself be
expatriated' into the inside-outside structure appertinent to phenomenological
science (Derrida, 1978, 112).
If space is the cradle of natality, as such, and the guarantor of the
primogeniture of the face, that is, the origin of sense (sens), then how can the alterity
that is, after all, the preserve of Levinas' thinking, resist the contagion of Being?6
The constant emphasis Levinas places upon the purity of the ethical face-a-face and
the 'inviolability of the Other' (77 195), is surely undermined by the contamination
deduced here. Indeed, one may legitimately question the requirement for 'purity' that
informs Levinas' project. Why does Levinas insist upon the purity (purete) of the
face and the unadulterated nature of the encounter with the Other? The motif of
purity, as is well known, is conceptually basic to the programme of phenomenology
instituted by Husserl. 'Pure consciousness' determines the 'field of phenomenology'
(Id §39) and the 'being' that Husserl strives to explicate is designated as the 'pure
Ego' (reines Ich) or transcendental bearer of 'pure mental processes' (Id §33),
processes which, through scrupulous eidetic analysis, disclose the 'pure ownness' (Id
§34) of the cogitations that concatenate to compose them. By reiterating the purity of
the field excavated by phenomenological science (a policy common to all of
Husserl's major works) Husserl reinforces the primacy of the 'originary' and the
'original' within phenomenological research. In point of fact, the Husserlian ceuvre
works precisely as a work, lending itself to performance (although in a manner
altogether less dramatic than that of Levinas), through the systematic application,
emphasis and reiteration of these basic terms. It is by way of such performance,
Husserl concludes, that phenomenology is able to transform its 'radicalness' into an
'actual deed' (CM §3 [50]).
Levinas' contestation of the primordiality of the field of pure consciousness,
adverts at once to his revaluation of philosophy as ethics - philosophy works through
its very unworking, the vicissitudes of language must be undone, the said continually
unsaid - and the sense in which the 'astonishing adventure' (OBBE 44) of ethical life
astonishes precisely because the event, whose advent it 'works' to honour, interrupts
the adventure of Western thought. Such adventures, 'adventures traversed as by
6 Levinas will ultimately maintain, contra Derrida, that 'signification as proximity,' that is,
signification construed as contactual space, attests to the 'latent birth of the subject [naissance latente
du sujetY (OBBE 139; AE 218).
79
Ulysses' (77 27), that is, regressions back to domiciliary life, and exemplified,
Levinas believes, in the thought of Husserl and Heidegger, are antithetical to
Levinas' own project, despite his admission that phenomenology makes possible the
'passage' from 'ethics' to 'metaphysical exteriority' (77 29). Phenomenology may
grant Tropos to ethical metaphysics, but its findings are undermined by the
reductions performed by Levinas, to employ, once again, the analogy with
archaeology; and Western philosophy is, Levinas suggests, 'essentially archaeology'
(.NGTT 126). The field of ethics (champs ethique) Levinas 'excavates' surpasses the
limen of pure consciousness, and the limes of rigorous science (strenge
Wissenschaft). The ethical destructure is thus preliminary (OBBE 44), and it is pure
because the interval it delimits (the separation (separation) intrinsic to ethical space)
preserves the alterity of the 'Other' from profanation by the 'Same,' thereby
protecting the other person from the monstrations of thematization. The 'adventure'
of 'holiness,' Levinas declares, interrupts the 'obstinacy of being' (OUJ 231).
§ 8. Behind the face
The ethical, one might contend, is the arsis (apois), the retraction or de-positing, of
the thesis (0sais), the stating or positing, of phenomenology.7 The alternance of
Beats and apats, reflected in the high scepticism of Otherwise than Being, with its
vacillation between credo and dubito, opens the field of ethical metaphysics.
Phenomenology, which might endeavour to penetrate the dark continent of conscious
life, illuminating the 'dark corners' of philosophical inquiry (Husserl, 1969, 95), fails
to overcome the impasse of its own methodological restrictions and thus remains
confined to the miasma of its Urtatsache or fundamental fact- the I. As such,
phenomenology remains committed to the 'dark designs of inwardness' (OBBE 180).
In limiting itself, first and foremost, to egology, Levinas argues, phenomenology
misses the 'terrain of disinterestedness' (OBBE 45) revealed in the reduction to
'signification' he implements (disinterestedness here meaning the elevation of the
'ego' to 'me' (OBBE 126)). The philosopher assumes an 'unnatural position' (OBBE
44), therefore, not merely because the discipline he or she practices breaks with the
7 If every 'thesis,' above all the 0eois that is phenomenology, is a 'welcome of presence,' as Levinas
opines (OBBE 179), then the ethical, or, as I designate it above, the apais of phenomenology, is a
'passivity more passive than the receptivity of knowledge' (GP 148). The alternance of 0eois and
dpois mirrors the oscillation between scepticism, and the refutation of scepticism, that sets the
'methodological' tone for Otherwise than Being.
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naivete of 'natural' science (the purity of consciousness, for Husserl, testifies to its
primacy), but because the love, whose 'wisdom' philosophy pursues, attests to an
inversion of the natural, conative drive (and we will have recourse to scrutinize
Levinas' conceptualization of (jmois in chapter four above). The Other is no longer
'naturalized' by the Same (although Levinas does, to some extent, domesticate
alterity by confining it to the face of the human other). Wisdom is ethically
reconfigured as the work of love, and the wonder (0aupd^Eiv) in which, according to
Aristotle,8 philosophy begins by putting an end to myth (pu0oc), is rethought by
Levinas as the wonder of substitution, a wonder that suspends the reign of the
Uberrcitionalismus that governs the Husserlian enterprise of phenomenology.
Philosophy, qua ethical portage, is not the labour of thematization (although thought
is called to work by the Other). It is, rather, a 'labor of the heart' (JK 129), its work,
a diacony without servility. First philosophy, so Levinas will argue, is therefore not
egology, but ethics.
But is this work (spyov), a 'work' that works so hard to avoid complacency,
and to avoid the abyss into which the ethical might descend should it affiliate itself
too closely with ilyaity, not subservient to its own principle of regulation, that is, to
its own ergonomosl How and why is the face pure in a way the pelt of an animal is
not? Why is the face inverted and disfigured by 'feminine' being? Why is the
'chastity' and 'decency' of the face sullied by the 'non-signifyingness' of 'erotic
nudity' (77 263), where the congress of the erotic might well be an occasion for its
accomplishment? The 'night' into which the 'expression' of the face descends here -
the night of ardour and voluptuosity - and the 'equivocation of silence' into which it
fades (77 263), suggest that Levinas' ethic of ethics operates within clearly defined
parameters. The limes of rigorous science are replaced by those of ethical
metaphysics, and the boundary stones of phenomenology are shifted to accord with
the precinct of the 'Holy' (i.e., the face that stands in the trace of illeity) - that space
of spaces - toward which philosophy is oriented (one could also argue, as Levinas
does in Beyond the Verse, that the subject itself 'must become' this 'sanctuary,' or
'place of all holiness,' and thus become 'responsible for all holiness' (IGRHV 159)).
Levinas' philosophy girds itself before the face, yet it is already bound, and hence
limited, by the face it posits, a face which itself arguably profanes the enigma
8 See Aristotle, Metaphysics (982b 12-13).
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(a'iviypa) it pledges to serve because it delimits alterity according to the custom to
which it defers.
Does this alliance not follow, perhaps, from the fact that Levinas' work is a
curious hybrid of rigorous and rabbinical science? Does a Halakhic zeal for fences
and partitions (here manifest as the demarcation between that which faces and that
which does not) not compromise the otherwise aggadic largesse that characterises the
ethical relation Levinas presents? To be sure, Levinas likens the epiphany of the face
to the 'nudity of the principle,' a principle, resplendent in its 'purity,' behind which
'there is nothing further' (77 262). However, is the purity of this principium not
dashed by the drash Levinas undertakes? It would seem that a complex ideational
montage undergirds the expression of the face after all. Did Levinas forget to append
a fifth section to Totality and Infinity - a section that might profitably have been
entitled 'Behind the Face' - so formative a role does this Hebraic proscenium play in
the ethical mise-en-scene he describes?
The face is menaced by the nonhuman creature, and tormented by the night
of the erotic, akin to the way in which the parchments of the Torah (according to
Levinas) are 'menaced' by an 'impudence of spirit' that would appropriate them
without 'preparation' (FPB 24) and depredate their wisdom. Is the face defiled
through its propinquity to the animal and the erotic (and thus rendered impure)
because the relation with the animal and the erotic encounter are faceless and
impersonal? Or, is the face rendered as such, and literally rent, because the 'busy
hand' that would delimit the ethical (perhaps according to the four cubits of halakhic
law) fails to respect the 'breath that lives within' (FPB 24) the sexualised body and
the animal form, a breath arguably as holy as that which suffuses and empowers the
interpretative enterprise of exegesis itself? Is the hand that would limit the compass
of the ethical, not itself impure, rather than the faceless faces whose sanctity it would
disclaim? Is Levinas' ethic not itself guilty of 'disequilibrium' in this regard (FPB
24), therefore, buoyed up, as it is to some degree, by the bombast of hyperbole?
Indeed, it begins to look as if the face Levinas details may be intuited (in-tuited) if
and only one undergoes the correct preparation, as he himself intimates. Levinas'
face does not, it seems, signify Ka0' auro', so much as as the result of tutelage. The
face may teach itself, but this teaching is mediate.
Phenomenologically speaking, the approach to the 'thing' is, we recall, part
of the meaning of the thing. The animal and the erotic are profane, therefore, only to
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the extent that the approach through which they are given is profanatory. The hand
that approaches the nonhuman creature, or that which caresses the naked body, is
impure, and not that which it approaches. The profane is profane, because it is
designated to be so as a 'product' of co-constitutive endeavour (Mitkonstitution), and
not by divine fiat. As Heidegger states, 'meaning is an existentiale of Dasein not a
property attaching to entities, lying 'behind' them, or floating somewhere as an
'indeterminate domain' (BT §32 [151]). Levinas must face up to the fact that his
account of the face is as much profectitious, as it is a description of the manifestation
of the face in its exteriority.
One can argue, of course, that Levinas' account of the face is predicated
upon the very sense of heritability deduced here, in which case the historical
contingency of his analysis itself attests to the radical passivity of the subject qua
inheritor of communally mediated teachings and concepts.9 There is clearly much at
stake here, however. And, as I will hope to demonstrate, while Levinas' presentation
of the face is far from facile, his explication of the 'phenomenological
"circumstances" ["circonstances" phenomenologiqueY surrounding its facing me, is
not altogether thorough (GCM xi; DVI 7). It may be, that the deductions he executes
are the products (the 'productions') of a procedural apodeixis, deductions, that is,
founded upon self-evidences that cannot be demonstrated phenomenologically, even
if an ethically reduced subjectivity permits the description of phenomena
((JjcuvopEva) typically withheld from the field of pure consciousness. The particular
'tropes of ethical language' Levinas employs to express the seemingly paradoxical
situation in which phenomenology finds itself before the 'face,' are, he concedes,
simply 'found to be adequate for certain structures' of the descriptions he ventures
(OBBE 120). The terms he deploys are, as it were, requisite to the task in hand
because they suggest themselves as fitting. At best they are fortuitous, therefore. One
might equally employ alternative tropes to communicate the 'drama' toward which
Levinas' descriptions gesture, tropes that might very well change the nature of the
performance that unfolds within the space Levinas calls ethics.
The beyond, 'from which the face solicits us,' is not '"another world"
behind the world' (MS 59), Levinas will argue. The ETTEKEiva t% ouaias is 'foreign
9 Levinas will argue, however, that 'in valuing there arises a susceptibility that makes itself
responsible in spite of itself. In its original influence, prior to any intentional movement, without the
possibility of a free attitude towards it, value renders things "pure" or "impure"' (BPW 183n.4).
Levinas account of susceptibility will be subject to close scrutiny in part two of this study.
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to definition and limit' (TRA 347). It would be flippant to interpret the 'beyond' (au-
dela) of absolute exteriority in this way. However, as we have indicated, there is a
'world' behind the account of the face Levinas assays. As 'thrown,' Dasein is always
already 'submitted to a world' (BT §74 [383]). A hermeneutical alliance pertains
between the factical experience of the face and the conceptual orientation that is
engendered from it, and remains within it. That which one is in a position to undergo
as a face (the face is suffered by the subject), is bound up with one's historico-
cultural predicament. One may submit to the aegis of the face. However, the face to
which one submits oneself, submits itself to its own other, i.e., the cultural, religious,
and historical forms in and through which it is constituted. The face, and the forms
through which it is rendered and engendered, are interlaced down to the very radix of
sense (sens), no matter how immemorial the fixture of signification purports to be.
Ultimately, Levinas cannot eradicate this root. For, the concord adduced here
provides the basic tension necessary to set his work to work. Arguably, any claim to
sense such 'immemoriality' possesses draws its meaning from the binding of face
and form in illo tempore and not, pace Levinas, from the passing of the absent One,
per se. Indeed, can the spacing (espacement) constitutive of ethics signify otherwise
than as a translation of the ontico-phenomenological categories of being? And does
Levinas' continual recourse to the language of intentionality (the analyses of Totality
and Infinity are stratified in consonance with the basic principles of Husserlian
phenomenology) not quite literally fly in the face of the face he protracts?10
The import of Derrida's early critique of Levinas in 'Violence and
Metaphysics,' to which we have alluded at intervals, is sound. However, the critique
advanced by Derrida is directed, primarily, against the analyses of Totality and
Infinity and the cluster of essays immediately predating this work. Otherwise than
Being or Beyond Essence, partly in response to the Derridean critique (although
Derrida's influence must not be exaggerated), breaks decisively with the language of
presence. The face is no longer epitomized by its exorbitance. The figures of excess
(exces) and superfluity (debordement) no longer render it intelligible. The face is
10 The 'principal' thesis of Totality and Infinity 'is that the noesis-noema structure is not the
primordial structure of intentionality' (77 294). Levinas, as noted, is engaged in a re-enactment of the
'primordial' vis-a-vis the signification of the 'face.' However, the structuration of the relation with the
face continues to be framed in terms of intentionality, albeit modified ethically as 'Desire.' This
policy is revised in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, although, as I will argue, the 'face'
Levinas describes is still delimited by concepts and figures that limit the range of what may
legitimately signify as a face.
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now defined in altogether more ambiguous terms, terms consonant with the
amphibological subject 'created' through exposure to it. The face signifies as 'a
failing of all presence' (defaillance. de toute presence) and is 'less than a
phenomenon [moins qu'un phenomenef (OBBE 90; AE 145). The excess of presence
that had marked the 'appearance' of the face in Totality and Infinity is rethought in
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence under the heading of desertion. The advent
of the Other is a withdrawal from the space of the world rather than a visitation. The
face is thus a 'poverty that hides its wretchedness' (OBBE 90) and not a
praeternatural epiphany manifesting itself superabundantly.
Derrida's pronouncement (somewhat vaticinal in tone, perhaps) that 'no
philosophical language will ever be able to reduce the naturality of a spatial praxis in
language' (Derrida, 1978, 113) is thus only partly vindicated. For Levinas does
indeed reduce the 'said' (Dit) of systematicity and exposition to the 'saying' {Dire)
of exposure and expropriation, an event (evenement), or veritable Enteignis, in
contradistinction to the appropriative event, or Ereignis, propounded by Heidegger.
The ethical reductions Levinas performs in Otherwise than Being, for he implements
a series of such reductions, deflect critical attention from the face, in its
plenitudinous 'presence,' to the nudity (nudite) of the face. This move - a recantation
of Levinas' position in Totality and Infinity, or rather a deepening of it - re-frames
the encounter with the face as an encounter with the 'trace' (qua irretrievable
absence) of one who has already passed by. The rectitude (droiture), or
'uprightness,' of the face is re-envisaged as the 'unrightness' of the trace 'which
undoes absolutely' any correlation between the signified and its signification (TRA
335). The naturality of language, as highlighted by Derrida, no longer ossifies the
Other, who presents 'himself' to the phenomenological regard in propria persona, or
in 'flesh and bone' (leibhaft gegeben), because the distantiation characteristic of
conversant beings interrupts the grammar of spatialisation as it is conventionally
understood. Levinas thus transposes the locus of encounter from the site of the
philosophical Aoyos to the tottos of the 'ethical body' (corps ethique). An ethical
body which one might also term the corps impropre (in opposition to the corps
propre defended by Merleau-Ponty); a 'body' whose propriety Levinas has cause to
question for he discovers the remnants of an 'I think' in the 'I can' of corporeity.
The 'naturality' vaunted above by Derrida in 'Violence and Metaphysics,' is
itself pre-articulated by the naturalism (or rather the contra-naturalism (AB 43)) of
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susception. The body, ethically rethought as the pathethical body - the human qua
homo expositus - is thus itself the 'organ of transcendence' (IS 149). Language is
enfleshed as 'saying.' However, incarnation is not the 'primary fact of language,'
Levinas will insist. Language cannot be 'assimilated to activity' - it is not a
'prolongation of thought in corporeity' (77 205) - because the exposedness Levinas
describes is defined by its extreme passivity. Thus, matter itself 'conceals a
materiality more material than all matter' (OBBE 108), he argues. The dimension of
depth (viz., exteriorite) in which the face opens in Totality and Infinity is thus
concretised, further radicalizing the 'radical empiricism [empirisme radical],'
Levinas practices (Tel 213; 77 196), as the 'dimension' of 'susceptibility' in which
matter is embodied (OBBE 108). The phenomenal field, centred upon the
kinaesthetic body and radiating outward from an axial Ichpol, is subtended by the
more primordial field of ethics (champs ethique), in which the subject does not so
much 'hold sway' constitutionally, as support the others for whom it is uniquely
responsible.
Although exteriority is 'produced' in a 'subjective field' for the separated
being' (77 299), such production admits of volitional activity. In Otherwise than
Being or Beyond Essence, therefore, Levinas strives to emphasize the fact that the
'separate' being of the existent is itself engendered through exposure to the Other.
The field within which this relation sans relation is produced is an-archic. It
substructs the apxq and the autarky of the pure Ego (reines Ich). Thus, it appears, as
Howard Caygill observes, that it is 'the movement of orientation rather than the
relation of the I and the Other that is the locus of transcendence' in Levinas' thought
(Caygill, 2002, 101). The field in which the difficult frisson between the self and the
Other is dramatized attains a 'methodological' primacy in Levinas' work. Ethical
space is diachronic, therefore, for the ego(s) appraised by phenomenology arise
within it. Ethical space is diatopical, for the discrete tottoi of 'self and 'Other' are
the terms between which the 'happening' (evenement) it details transpires. This
spacing (espacement) is effectuated, in concreto, as the susceptibility of the flesh.
The body is the site where the other person is borne (as indicated it is the site of
ethical portage) and the place where I am created. It is, thus, not so much that the
Other and the I arise within this space, rather the Other and the 'I' are born(e) there.
The face, qua ethically reconfigured Urimpression, is already in 'me' - it is
borne by 'me' (as I am born through exposure to it) - so much so that the motif of
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interpenetration, somewhat implicit in Totality and Infinity, is rendered explicit (i.e.,
as animation) in Other-wise than Being or Beyond Essence, forming the centrepiece
of Levinas' account of sensibility. It is as if, Levinas professes, 'the face of the other,
although invisible, continued my own face' (,AGCW 168). The flesh is the site of
confusion (not fusion, Levinas will hasten to add), the rational and the sensible are
immediately bound to one another. The one who commands is already in me. My
near-sphere (Nahsphdre) is, as it were, occupied by another, another who takes up
residence at the heart of my being, coring me out, or everting me, and connecting me
to a 'plot' outside the privileged order of truth and being - the preferred terms,
Levinas believes, in phenomenological and ontological explications of subjectivity.
Thus, the inside-outside structuration of space, already depreciated somewhat in
Totality and Infinity (the existent, we recall, is 'simultaneously without and within
the world,' going forth 'outside from an inwardness' (77 152)), becomes altogether
otiose in Otherwise than Being, where space is concretized as place, and place, at
once 'locus and non-lieu' (OBBE 45), is rethought, and literally reanimated qua
body, as the susception of matter. Quite how, and indeed if, such 'transcendental
sensualism,' as Drabinski terms it (Drabinski, 2001, 126), coheres with the
'ultramateriality' (77 256) in which the 'voluptuous' is announced in Totality and
Infinity, is debatable. Certainly, for Levinas, my exposure to myself, auto-affectivity
as such, is, one might say, simply my being affected by the spacing (Kedousha) of
ethical space itself, the distance that separates me from the Other I bear. To some
extent, then, for Levinas auto-affectivity is separation (separation).
§ 9. The facile itinerary of theological thought
The natural (or contra-natural) supernaturalism of the face-to-face relation, which we
have begun to detail above, is revealed as the idea of the infinite in me, such
revelation abrogating all natural religion, Levinas contends (77 62). Yet the religion
of ligation Levinas expounds is a religion seemingly bereft of the lineaments of ritual
and superstition (although not itself without dogmatism, I would maintain) and
therefore arguably very much a natural 'religion,' a religion of gestation, natality,
and maternity, but one devoid of any theology drawn from the Liber naturae, a book
toward which me void apparently pays little heed; although, according to Levinas,
the human being is zum-Buch-Sein, that is, 'being-toward-the-book,' the ambiance of
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the Bible and its 'inspired Word' being as basic to human existence as 'houses' and
'clothing,' he avers (PJL 109).
The 'stench of the numinous,' Levinas will argue, lingers about any
'religion' that aspires to represent the 'infinite' in the form of an 'object' amenable to
cognition (Tl 195). (Can Levinas be certain that the 'God' he invokes is not equally
odiferous one may wonder?) The 'distance of transcendence,' however, the distance
that separates the idea of infinity from its ideatum, 'constitutes' the very 'content' of
this ideatum itself (77 49). Transcendence here, is not commensurable with the
transcendency that separates the object of a noetic act from the act in which it is
given. Such objectity, and the process of distantiation through which it is given, are
contingent upon the suspension of the ontic validity of the object under surveillance.
Such 'suspension,' Levinas argues, already predisposes the 'object' to possession
and hence containment within thought (Tl 49). The properly transcendent 'cannot be
encompassed,' however (Tl 293). Precisely how the transcendent is managed by
Levinas, and the propriety of its transcendence shielded from those forces, and
entities, that might sully it, is something to which we must be attentive as our
analysis proceeds. Levinas' phenomenology of religion, if, indeed, his assault on the
religious can be classified as phenomenological, is highly problematic. It will be the
task of part three of the present work to evaluate this aspect of Levinas' thought.
The 'ethical plane' (Tl 201) 'pre-exists' the field of pure consciousness,
extending the phenomenological excavation of sense, and the archaeological
imperative which impels the discipline, a stage (etape) below that explicated by
Husserl (some would regard this very manoeuvre as an evacuation rather than an
excavation of 'sense'). For Husserl, the 'exclusion of Nature' was the 'methodic
means' for 'initially making possible the turning of regard to transcendentally pure
consciousness' (Id §56). All 'axiological and practical functionings of
consciousness,' Husserl proposes, 'undergo exclusion' together with 'all natural
sciences and cultural sciences,' for these scientific domains are infected with a
desperate methodological naivety that requires refinement. The science of origins
championed by Husserl restricts itself to the field of pure consciousness 'where sense
is bestowed.' This 'sphere of being of absolute origins' (Id §55), this post reduction
11 As Levinas makes clear in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence this movement vers le concrete
is best thought of as an an-archaeological imperative (OBBE 7) to avoid lapsing back into the
idioticon of 'constitution' and 'intentionality.'
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residuum, is the locus of meaning for Husserl. In concert with this basic Husserlian
operation Levinas parenthesizes 'natural' religion, deeming it nai've and dogmatic, in
a way not dissimilar to Husserl's exclusion of the sciences of the natural attitude
from the remit of phenomenological consideration. Ultimately, all positive religions
- and not merely pantheistic expressions of religiosity and Naturphilosophie - are to
be suspended (77 23; OBBE 147). Levinas reduces 'dogmatic' religion (so the story
goes) in order to probe its proto-ethical substratum. Religiosity is 'naive' to the
extent that it remains preoccupied with the externalia of liturgy, ritual and cult,
failing to divine its true orientation as ethics. Such an orientation is revealed, to what
one can only describe as an ethical intuition (.Anschauung), within the 'field'
'magnetized' by the 'particular and the personal,' in which, Levinas claims, the
'production of infinity is enacted' (77 26).
Despite such indictments, which would appear to be in broad concinnity
with the methodological criteria to which phenomenology subscribes (except that
Levinas does not suspend his own Voraussetzungslos regarding the status of positive
religions other than Judaism), Levinas refuses to 'parenthesize' what Husserl calls
the 'transcendency pertaining to God' (Id §58). Where Husserl avails himself of
12
nothing (so the story goes ~) that cannot be rendered 'essentially evident' (Id §59),
the 'existence' of 'God' being precisely countersensical to phenomenological inquiry
(the question of 'God' thus remains excluded from the 'field of research' conducted
by Husserl, limiting itself, as it does, to the 'field of pure consciousness' (Id §58)),
Levinas retains the term, employing it liberally (much to the chagrin of many
commentators) throughout his work. Levinas cannot suspend this term because the
programme of suspension executed by phenomenology is itself suspended, he will
claim, by the disruptive event marked (qua trace) by the withdrawal of the Other
from the sphere of noetic activity. The 'interested effort of brute being persevering in
being' is thereby 'suspended' he claims (OUJ 229).
But why retain the word 'God,' especially given the term's dubious
semantic history, and granted that the orientation of sense is purportedly an
orientation devoid of theological impedimenta? Why indeed, unless one either
wishes to revive philosophical conceptualizations of 'God' (vis-a-vis Plato,
12
Arguably, such an interpretation of Husserl (together with the aforementioned 'claim' that Levinas
performs a reduction of 'religion' in its more doctrinaire manifestations), is nothing more, perhaps,
than what Heidegger would call, a 'nursery story' one finds in the annals of the 'usual histories of
philosophy' (Heidegger, 1984, 76).
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Descartes, and Kant) reanimating them with the interpretative 'breath' of an
exegetical method honed through earnest study of the Talmud. Or, unless one is
intent upon arguing that the 'God' announced by theology does not name a divine
being (nor a 'God' beyond being), so much as it directs attention to the only locus
that might genuinely warrant such an appellation, namely the face of the other
person. However, why, if 'divinity keeps its distances' (77 297), as Levinas himself
commends, does Levinas not keep his distance from 'God' and all things divine
(0e)ov)? Could it be that Levinas himself succumbs to what he himself would call the
'facile itinerary' (itineraire facile) of 'pious thought' (pensee pieuse), deducing
'theological realities' (realites theologiques) where there are, in fact, none (LP 124;
LEP 234)?
The status of 'God' within Levinas' 'philosophy' is moot. Certainly, the
word itself is no abraxas (although Levinas will refer to it variously, as the 'apex of
vocabulary' (OBBE 156), and the absolute 'value,' or 'saying,' prior to the
apophantic Aoyos (HA 136)). Levinas famously abhors mysticism and derides
ecstatic forms of religious experience, disclaiming them as the mere juvenilia of
human development. For a thinker so resolutely anti-Hegelian as Levinas such
denouncements, as I hope to demonstrate proximately, are problematic. If, during the
course of his writings, Levinas' presentation of the proto-ethical structuration of
sense degenerates into some kind of appraisal of religious topoi in which this
structuration either is, or is not, evidenced, then his credentials as phenomenologist
suffer further defamation. It is flagrantly anti-phenomenological, I would argue, to
evaluate modalities of 'religious' consciousness in this rather derogatory way.
Levinas does not engage in a comparative study of religion, nor does he conduct his
passing surveys of religious phenomena with anything like the rigour of scholars
n
such as Brede Kristensen and Geraardus Van der Leeuw. It may be, as Levinas
notes, that in the thought of Heidegger 'the monotheist revelation is always expedited
in a few unnuanced theological formulas,' and, as such, does not merit the 'subtle
hermeneutics' Heidegger reserves for the truths of Hellenism (PV 138). However, is
Levinas' treatment of the 'pagan' not equally unnuanced, one may wonder? Ought
one, then, to take seriously Levinas' own use of the word 'God'? Are we to presume
13 See for example Van der Leeuw's Religion in Essence and Manifestation: A Study in
Phenomenology, trans. J. Turner (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1938); and Kristensen's The
Meaning ofReligion: Lectures in the Phenomenology ofReligion, trans. J. Carman (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1968).
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that the derogation of the 'pagan,' the 'numinous,' and the 'mystical' within Levinas'
work - which after all encompass myriad phenomena within innumerable religious
traditions - is simply some form of coded rhetoric conducted post ethical reduction?
Are we to presume that these designata name distinct structural forms of religion,
and that the monotheism, Levinas defends, is ethically derived and not onto-
theological? How radical is the empiricism Levinas practises given the ease with
which he dismisses such variegated and disparate phenomena?
The approbation with which Levinas' thought is greeted within certain
quarters of the academic community is due in part, I would argue, to its amenability
to theological exploitation. Janicaud's critique of Levinas, as much an admonishment
of certain strands within contemporary phenomenology as a critique of Levinas'
work, remains pertinent, therefore, despite Janicaud's own somewhat cursory reading
of Levinas' texts. Levinas' thought is often harnessed to ill effect by Jewish and
Christian apologists alike. His work is appropriated, and its insights culled, in order,
it appears, to justify the theological primacy of 'positive' religious traditions. A
second breed of apologist, engaged in a more covert theological operation, praises
Levinas as the pioneer of post-theological religiosity. This curious religion without
religion bears all the hallmarks of an ethically modified Protestantism, channelled for
good measure, through a hearty dose of Danish morosity, apropos of Kierkegaard.
In themselves these currents of thought are innocuous. But their progenitors
adopt, typically quite naively (this term is intended here in its full phenomenological
determination) Levinas' own highly idiosyncratic understanding of God, an
understanding undoubtedly coloured by Judaic, and more specifically Mitnagdic,
conceptualizations of the divine. The result being, that much of what passes for the
burgeoning discipline of 'continental' philosophy, certainly within the context of the
United Kingdom and parts of North America, is hindered by the same prejudicial
modes of thought that arguably impede Levinas' own thinking. Can one really
engage with phenomenology, engaging with it on its own terms, and allow the
radicality of its method to grip one, and yet fail to interrogate the posita of
theological commitment?
For Purcell, the (d)alliance between phenomenology and theology has been
naively understood. More often than not, commentators on Levinas' work operate
with an 'undifferentiated understanding of theology,' Purcell suggests (Purcell, 2003,
472). This inevitably leads such commentators to exaggerate the 'phenomenological-
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theological smudge' that characterizes Levinas' thinking. By failing to distinguish
between 'fundamental,' 'dogmatic,' and 'systematic' forms of theology, critics of
Levinas' (as well as apologists) have conflated the latter's 'philosophy of religion'
with more overtly 'confessional' theological thought (Pureed, 2003, 470).
Arguably it is a theology that hones in upon the 'method, the structure, and
the dynamic of theological response,' that is the 'initial point of theological
engagement with Levinas' thought,' Pureed urges. However, if Levinas' work, as
Pureed intimates, contributes the possibility of a 'new theological Denkform' a
theology that remains attentive to the 'changing dynamic of the human situation,'
that is, a 'responsible and responsive' form of theological thinking, then is theology
not called upon to evaluate the probity of its kerygma and the doctrinal Ideenkleid in
which it is set forth? Indeed, as Pureed notes, theology is 'relative to the summons
and challenge of the ethical encounter,' relative, one might say, to 'human
experience,' particularly those experiences 'at the limits of ecstasy and misery.'
Theology is then, one might say, stationed in limine, on the threshold of liminal
experiences, and, as such, Pureed maintains, 'betokens a certain openness to what is
other' (Pureed, 2003, 470).
But what, one may ask, and here we rejoin Levinas, is the relationship
between the theology accented by Pureed here, and its more dogmatic counterpart?
What kind of transit takes place between these two modalities of theological
thought? Is the openness to 'what is other,' that is, after all, integral to theology, one
would think, sufficiently commodious to accommodate articulations of liminality and
ultimacy in human experience that do not conform to its determinations of
meaningfulness? Does theology purport to be universal in extent, in which case it
seeks to advance a theology of 'religion,' or does it restrict its activity to elucidating
the fundaments of the human existential predicament? Should the latter be the case,
then theology can claim to be nothing more than a species of 'regional'
anthropology.
If theology is to take its ideational bearings from the thought of Levinas,
however, and endeavour to describe the proto-theological substrates of experience,
then the principia to which it must duly adhere are the face of the other person and
the mandate of justice demanded by the third party. These principia, in turn, do not
guarantee theology safe passage, nor promise it return to the 'hearth' of doctrinal
repose. A thought homeward or regressive in orientation is inimical, one must
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suppose, to the spirit of Levinasian philosophy. If theology is to remain true to the
peregrinate character of Levinasian thought (a thought that promises to both describe
and enact the 'movement of the Same toward the Other which never returns to the
Same' (MS 49)), then it must risk the dissolution of its allegiance with dogmatic
theology. It must risk, therefore, its traditional comportment as theology and open
itself, qua discipline or science, to constant renewal under the ordinance of the
principles it serves, namely justice and the face. Thus, one must either reconfigure
theology (whether it be 'Christian' or 'Jewish') in accordance with Levinasian
directives, in which case one must be careful not to accept uncritically the positings
Levinas freely grants himself (the determinants of 'justice' and the 'face' are
indigenous to a certain context: what commands as face, and what discloses itself as
just, cannot be divorced from the conceptual and axiological horizons against which
they signify. It is this context that gives rise to, or creates a place for (donne lieu),
notions of this sort). Or, one must be prepared to render theology innominate, a
science awaiting its designation; in which case what has traditionally passed for
theological thought is in need of destructuration by the ethical imperative that
regulates Levinas' work. Theology is thereby de-theologized in the name of justice, a
process of de-theologization that continues the work of 'demythicization' initiated by
Levinas' programme of philosophy. A process, what is more, in which theology qua
0ecopia - theology as a codified system of beliefs behind which one can retrench - is
suspended, and superseded genealogically, by the discipline of ethical deaconship
(<diaconie). First philosophy is therefore not theology (©soAoyixq) - how could it be,
given that what Levinas calls 'theological recuperation' proceeds the 'order of
holiness, which is primary' (GCM ix) - but ethics (r|0iKrj).
If, as Purcell argues, Levinas' provides a 'prolegomena or propaedeutic to
any proper understanding of religion on the basis of phenomenological analysis'
(Purcell, 2003, 475), then surely one must inquire as to who, or what, determines the
propriety according to which such 'understanding' is measured. Might such propriety
not, in fact, turn out to be solecistic? For it is neither self-evident nor, furthermore,
unproblematic, as to what exactly constitutes 'religion' or defines 'religiosity.' Do
readers of Levinas' work not, to adapt Purcell's own observation concerning
theology, operate with an undifferentiated understanding of religion? Might one not
need, therefore, to speak of the plural fold of religion, in a manner not entirely
dissimilar to the way in which Levinas will allude to 'theologies,' in the plural, to
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limit the 'dogmatic pretension,' within his thought, which the word 'theology' might
harbour (BV xiv)? Moreover, even if one accepts Levinas' (post-reduction)
designation of religion as 'liturgy' or 'work' (MS 50), it is still not clear why a
phenomenological analysis of religion ought to arrive at the same conclusions as
Levinas. Unless, that is, it is a phenomenology guided by directives in consonance
with the principia (apxat) to which Levinas subscribes, a phenomenology bound,
therefore, to the fundaments of a certain Hebraism. By 'positive' religion, as we will
discover in due course, Levinas means principally the religions of the 'Book.' One's
being-toward-the-Book, or zum-Buch-sein (PJL 109), an 'orientation,' for Levinas,
as basic as any we will recall, is therefore not, as one might have hoped, simply a
reference to the innate textuality of experience, or the narratival character of
interpretative acts, but a direct accession to the scriptures comprising the Bible.
If, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, phenomenology strives 'to give a direct
description of our experience as it is' (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, vii), then such
concessions are highly suspect. The reader of Levinas is thus, I believe, forced to
decide between one of two plausible interpretations of his work. Either, one agrees
that Levinas' thought is an amalgam of Jewish (and more pointedly Mitnagdic)
wisdom and phenomenological philosophy. His deductions are, therefore, adequate
to his 'experience' (they are local to his topological situation) serving as powerful
indictments against barbarism of all kinds, yet they do not cohere with the descripta
of phenomenology in its 'classical' Husserlian form. Or, one reads Levinas work as a
challenge to the autarky and imperious nature of philosophical, and hence
phenomenological, thinking. A thinking, as Levinas would have it, that is sufficient
unto itself - a thinking that thinks what is outside itself while remaining immanent to
itself - a thinking that would make of what is other and exterior to it the possession
and property of thought (D 138). On this reading, phenomenology permits itself the
self-evidence of its own universality, a freedom Levinas contests, and fails to
acknowledge its place among the wisdom of the 'Nations.' However, if
phenomenology is a method or style of thinking, as Levinas contends, is it not suited
as much to excavating the ground of the kinds of 'experiences' illuminated in the
Bible, as it is to fortifying the standing of philosophical science against the onslaught
of naturalistic interpretations of the world? Perhaps it is a question of attestation, of
witness, or testimony, therefore?
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Further consideration of the themata engaged above must be postponed until
part three. In order for the criticism I have begun to advance here to be substantiated
appropriately, Levinas reconstitution of the 'settings' within which 'God' is 'staged'
for consciousness, or within which God 'comes to mind' (vient a I'idee)) require
closer examination (GCM xiv; emphasis added). I will suggest that the stage to
which Levinas repeatedly alludes, the stage, or staging, that is set for the upsurge of
'God,' is a product of generative constitution, that is, of heritability (and is thus
relative to a certain ysvos and a certain uoAiTeia). What 'arises' within
symbological space as 'God,' cannot be exempted from the compass of constitution.
The encounter with the Other, and, consequently, the encounter with that other who
alights across the face of the human other in the figure of an irretrievable absence,
takes place on the cusp of such constitutional activity; and it is there that reflection
must position itself if it is to grasp the significance of this 'term' in its determination
as that which orients sense (sens) within the work of Levinas.
To return to our consideration of height (hauteur), Levinas will argue,
against Husserl, that the dimension of height from which the invocation of the face
proceeds, 'introduces sense into being' (MS 57). This sense places 'constitutive
freedom' into question (77 206) and dislodges the ego from its position of pre¬
eminence. As Levinas explains, 'height':
Is already lived across the experience of the human body. It leads human
societies to raise up altars. It is not because men, through their bodies, have
an experience of the vertical that the human is placed under the sign of
height; because being is ordained to height, the human body is placed in a
space in which the high and the low are distinguished and the sky is
discovered...(MS 57)
The juxtaposition of liturgy and ethics is purposeful here. Levinas contrasts the two
in order to evidence the sublation of the former within the latter. Liturgy
(AeiTOupyla), ethically transfigured and awarded its proper designation, is the
'putting out of funds at a loss' (MS 50), Levinas opines, what we might call pure
largition. Morality may or may not be first philosophy. It seems, however, that
'religion,' in its ceremonial and ritualistic manifestations, is subordinate to the face-
to-face relation. Furthermore, 'religion,' accomplished concretely as morality, is 'the
ultimate structure' (7/ 80), for it is produced as the intrigue of the interhuman. The
lived body (Leib) takes its bearings from the face of the Other, and not primarily
from the calibrations of the kinaestheses and the sensory fields they orient. The
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kinaestheses are themselves susceptible to ethical animation. However, might this
structure, as it is presented by Levinas, not require de-structuration? Does the
'ceremonial,' in which the 'said' of Levinas' own philosophy delights (77 30), do
justice to the phenomenon and phenomena of 'religion' itself? And is this thought,
which prides itself upon its apparent sobriety, not guilty of concealing a corybantic
enthusiasm for regulation and law, even if the legality of the face is underwritten by
the egality of the third party?
If, as Levinas confers above, being is 'ordained' to height, it becomes a
matter of some importance to ascertain whether the ordination in question issues
from a 'divine' source and whether, as Jean-Luc Nancy confers, one can avoid the
'dual temptation' to either 'baptize with the name "god" all the obscure confines of
our experience (or our thought),' or 'on the contrary to denounce such baptism as
superstitious metaphor' (Nancy, 1991, 142). Now, 'being,' Levinas argues, 'is
surpassed' in the relation with the Other (77 302). Let us be clear, according to a
conception of the 'world' in which the world is that which is secured for thought -
the point of an accord between the concept (Begriff) and what it grasps - the Other is
transmundane, rather than extra-terrestrial. Moreover, the 'primordial production of
being' (77 305; emphasis added) is generated in the face-to-face encounter. Surely
then, 'God' is superfluous to such dramatization? Is 'God' not literally surpassed, or
passed over, in the recto verso of the face-to-face relation? The Other, Levinas will
insist, 'is not the incarnation of God,' although through his 'face,' a face in which the
Other is himself 'disincarnate,' the dimension of height in which 'God' is 'revealed'
is opened (77 79). Is 'God' not, perhaps, a metonym for what Levinas calls the
'marvel of exteriority' (77 292)? A marvel (merveille) before which one does not
genuflect in adoration, for one already finds oneself addressed from on high (mi-
elyon), much in the way Dasein finds itself to be thrown into the world, nor recoil
tremulously as if before a hierophany, but a marvel toward which one turns to offer
up one's very self? It may be precisely this merveille that summons one to reveiller,
or awaken, to God's passing, a passing not itself without ambiguity. For 'God' may
simply have passed, in which case the 'wakefulness' (veille) of moral conscience is
at once a 'wake' marking God's demise (or the trail of Dasein's Geschichtlichkeit),
or 'God' may have passed by into immemoriality, thus indicating that the face is less
the vestige of one who has expired, than the 'trace' of one who may be ("ehyeh
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"asher ^ehyeh),14 or rather one who might have been, so utterly does this 'God'
transcend the present time of representation and synthesis. Of course, one could
argue that the face surpasses God as it surpasses Being. The face, thereby,
commemorates God's passing (the inscription it bears is thus an epitaph to mark the
death of a 'certain God' (OBBE 185), a God as much behind the ethical mise-en-
scene Levinas describes, I would argue, as the god (0e6s) he discerns skulking in the
shadows of Western Philosophy) as an ethically reworked Passover or Pesach. The
suffering of the stranger who faces me testifies to the suffering of all strangers (and
not simply those exiled in Egypt under the Pharaoh). The matzah of the Seder meal is
thus transposed out with its traditional ritual confines - akin to the way in which the
Jewish 'daily prayer replaces the sacrifices in the Temple according to Jewish
theology' (WSNP 226) - and reconfigured as the bread from one's mouth freely
given to the Other (OBBE 64); a Levinasian trope for the hard materialism of
economic charity (charite) and the even harder martyrdom of substitution, a gesture,
what is more, that does not merely indicate the 'coring out' of sensory enjoyment,
but the coring out (denucleation) of 'religion' itself. A denucleation that is at once
the coring out of the 'mythological' and 'theological' pulp (pulpe) of religion. This
may, of course, be an optimistic reading of Levinas and the matters raised above
warrant further consideration.
In judging the dimension of elevation to be anterior to the performances of
cult, the history of religion to which Levinas gives voice is at once both
extraordinary and preposterous. It is extraordinary, because one cannot but be
astounded by the hideous generality to which it commits itself (it fails to evidence its
claims phenomenologically, falling back on stereotype rather than developing any
rigorous typology of religion) and because the marvel of the interhuman dominates
its focus. It is preposterous, because the primal scene it elucidates - the encounter
with the face in its exteriority - breaks with the chronometry of linear time (whether
this unfolds as so called 'secular' or 'Holy' history) and institutes the diachronic
order of the pre-posterous - the anterieure posterieurement. Levinas promulgates a
diachronic history of religion (a history of ligation he believes to fall outside the
remit of the 'fundamental historicity' Merleau-Ponty proposes (OBBE 167)) insofar
14 This alternative rendering of Exodus 3:13 is suggested by Richard Kearney. See Kearney's The God
Who May Be (Kearney, 2001) for an attempt to develop this reading of Exodus further in relation to
the thought of Levinas, Derrida and Heidegger.
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as the involvement of God in that history (a history dedicated to enunciating the 'pre¬
history of the ego' (OBBE 117), thus the history of dedication itself (GCM xiv)) is
not so much one of providence or teleological propulsion, as one of God's being
proved - put to the proof or epreuve - as the very suffering of those in exile from the
world, hence those exiled from, and by, the form that would shelter them. Certainly,
what Levinas terms the religiosity of the self (religiosite de soi), is the self's putting
itself at stake for-the-other, a movement older than the game of phenomenology and
the principles it keeps endlessly in play. It appears, as Llewelyn intimates, that the
very being of God in Levinas thought, is the 'history' of such suffering itself
(Llewelyn, 1995, 210). Levinas does, to be sure, indicate as much when he suggests
that it is as if 'the history of Israel were the 'divine comedy' or the 'divine ontology
itself,' as if, he continues, 'the trials of the just' were 'a lived experience stronger
than the death which denies it, a concrete experience or even the event of the divine
eternity, belonging to the semiotics of the word God' (DJ 6). This 'suffering of
suffering' (souffrance de la soujfrance), as Levinas will call it, is a suffering 'for
God' who 'suffers from my suffering' (OBBE 196n.21; AE 186n.l; emphasis added).
For Levinas, then, God is quite literally implicated at the heart of ethics.
The 'above-below' disposition (77 297) - an aptitude which, Levinas
asserts, is pre-eminently ethical in contradistinction to the ethical reserve he believes
to characterize phenomenology - starts from the me and moves toward the Other.
This movement towards the Other effects a transition between the interiority of
domiciliary life and the exteriority of the ethical encounter. It is the 'priority' of this
'orientation,' rather than the dyadic terms between which it is engendered, that
'summarizes' the theses of Totality and Infinity (Tl 215). The 'between' (Zwischen)
of intersubjective 'space' is an orientation and not a structural component of
consciousness. This orientation, which arises between the subject and the other (more
precisely between the Other and me), is irreversible. Hence, the intervalic space of
the face-to-face relation is, as Levinas repeatedly emphasizes, asymmetrical. As
noted, it is the precise dimensions of this relational 'space' (I'entre-les-deux) that
informs the critical debate between Levinas and his many interlocutors. I have
engaged this debate, albeit only tangentially, in order to clarify the nature of the
distinctly ethical space Levinas deduces. I wish now to indicate how the advent of
the third party (le tiers) interrupts the 'privacy' of the face-to-face, adding a
dimension of 'breadth' to that of the 'verticality' which marks the space of ethical
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'dramatization,' and to examine why Levinas excludes the nonhuman creature from
proto-ethical consideration.
§ 10. The formative role ofMitnagdic Judaism
Levinas' disputation with Buber is perhaps summarized by the following statement
from the essay 'Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge' (1958). Here, Levinas
admonishes Buber for not taking 'separation seriously' (.BTK 35). Buber, Levinas
balks, 'does not give expression to the movement, distinct from distancing and the
relation, in which the I emerges from the self {BTK 35). The motive force behind
such an omission, Levinas confers, is Buber's 'religious liberalism' (Buber 'never
says the Torah but the teaching,' Levinas laments (MBCJ 12)), which stands opposed
to 'religion' in its dogmatic forms {BTK 29). The somewhat castigatory tone of these
remarks indicates, I would argue, that the disputation between Buber and Levinas
arises as much on 'religious' as it does on 'philosophical' grounds. Moreover, the
contrariety of their two positions may be accounted for by intra-religious (or inter¬
denominational) differences within Judaism. Levinas' Mitnagdic proclivities are in
evidence once again here.
Indeed, Levinas' Mitnagdic 'orientation' determines the thinking behind his
own philosophy of orientation. So much so, that prephilosophical (confessional)
experience regulates the metre of philosophical form in this instance. Regulation, in
some measure, is operative, to a greater or lesser extent, in all philosophical activity
that qualifies as such. Levinas' Mitnagdism conditions his thought. This is no glib
biographical aside. For Mitnagdic Judaism - a movement within Judaism given to
strenuous study of the Talmud and characterised by its aversion to (literally its
opposition to) Hasidism, itself a devotional strain of Judaism defined by its stress
upon religious hitlahawoet, or enthusiasm - clearly informs his basic trust in the
'rationality' ofWestern intellectualism (77 xvii). The awakening to the Other is, after
all, 'a rationality of the spirit' {CW 158) not to be confused, Levinas urges us, with
any kind of enthusiasm (EvSouaiaapos) or unbridled 'spiritual' excess.15
15 Levinas himself provides a potted account of the origins and central tenets of Mitnagdism in his
essay, ' "In the Image of God", according to Rabbi Hayyim Volozhiner' (1978). Rabbi Elijah (1720-
1797), the Gaon of Vilna, considered the popular movement of Hasidism (spreading throughout
Eastern Europe during the eighteenth century) to be one that demanded 'more fervour than
knowledge,' and that 'denied Talmudic science and dialectic their primary place in Jewish religious
life.' Moreover, 'by grouping communities around spiritual personalities with charismatic power' the
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The Mitnagedim, of Levinas' homeland Lithuania, promoted a 'sober' and
'intellectual Judaism' sustained by the discipline of study. Indeed, Talmudic study
was lauded by them to such a degree that, as Roger Burggraeve notes, 'Jewish life'
was itself experienced as 'study' (Burggraeve, 2002, 23). Combine this propensity
for studiousness with a general antipathy toward 'mystical' experience and
'enthusiasm,' and one begins to appreciate the religious influences guiding and
informing Levinas' thought. Levinas is ultimately disinclined toward Buber's
thought because it is altogether too Hasidic for his own Mitnagdic sensibility. Buber
is, of course, no tsaddikim (despite publishing numerous authoritative texts on
Hasidism) and he consistently disqualifies 'mystical experience' as an impediment to
the 'binding business of a life on the hard earth [verbindliches Lebensgeschcift auf
der harten Erde\ (Buber, 1965, 27 [1947, 170]). Buber himself defines his
dialogical philosophy as a 'raptureless perseverance in concreteness,' a 'situation,'
he adds, 'mightier and truer than all ecstasies' (Buber, 1965, 25). So explicit is this
dedication to 'concrete life' throughout Buber's work, that Levinas' reproof of Buber
for promulgating a kind of 'angelic spiritualism' is far from apposite, if not entirely
inapt. Can the 'genuine common life [Gemeinschaft weisen\ advocated by Buber
and revealed to the 'situation' of 'anguish' (Bangnis) and 'expectation' (Erwartung),
really be the 'pure spiritualism of friendship' (BTK 33) Levinas denounces it as?
Clearly, Levinas contests both the 'genuineness' of this life in common, and the
alleged concreteness (Konkretheit) of the 'life' Buber describes. In fact, this
disagreement between Buber and Levinas concerning the nature and sense of
concretion, must be understood in the light of Levinas' ongoing disputations with
Husserl and Heidegger regarding the status of the 'primordial' and its constitution.
Levinas reproaches Buber for his 'formalism' {BTK 32), for the latter fails,
he believes, to isolate the 'ethical elements of the I-Thou' relation from those
pertaining to 'things' {BTK 29). Despite the 'twofold attitude' in which, according to
Buber, human beings are disposed toward the world (the 'basic word' pairs 'I-Thou'
and 'I-It' define these attitudes respectively (Buber, 1970, 53)), Levinas censures
Buber for being 'too much the artiste in his relation to people' {BTK 33). In Buber,
Tsadikim or 'miraculous Rabbis,' who 'did not refuse the adoration of the faithful,' changed 'the true
relations between disciple and master,' which the Gaon believed to lie at the heart of Judaic life. The
Gaon, Levinas continues, 'was the soul and the leader of these opponents - these Mitnagedim.' The
Mitnagedim 'were suspicious of the sentimental mysticism of the new doctrine,' believing study of
the Talmud to be the very 'life of the Torah itself,' the 'principle of creation,' the 'object of
contemplative life' and the 'participation in the highest form of life' (IGRH 151-152).
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Levinas asserts, the 'difference of level between the I and the Thou' is not
sufficiently demarked (BTK 32). The dimension of height is absent from Buber's
thought, thus the 'meeting' described by him is characterised by a reciprocity or
symmetry between terms. Buber cannot account for the 'ethical inequality' in which
the 'original diacony' (AB 44) of the face-to-face is conducted because, Levinas
insists, he begins his philosophical programme by attending to the basic word
(Grundwort) 'instead of reflecting on the cogito' in its separation (AB 41). Buber is
unable to accord primacy to the 'Thou' (Levinas questions the familiarity of the I-
Thou form (AB 44)), and hence subordinate the Same to the Other, because he
postulates an ontological parity between dyads. The 'Between' (Zwischen), remains a
'mode of being,' or 'co-presence,' therefore, and does not break decisively with
'Totality' (BMP 23). In failing to break with 'Totality,' Buber's thought (or so
Levinas opines) remains committed to the economy of the 'Same,' and thus remains
committed to the ecology of the domicile (the Aoyos of the o'ikos). Between the T
and the 'Thou' Levinas will insert a 'He.' The third-personal pronominal liT of
illeite presides over the encounter between the self and the Other. The other person
stands in the trace of illeity. Illeity thus disturbs the intimacy of the I-Thou concord.
Between 'us,' an 'unimpeachable' and 'severe witness' inserts himself, 'making
public' our 'private clandestinity,.' Levinas suggests (ET 33).
Buber's unabashed 'dendrophilia' perturbs Levinas, and is a far cry from the
temperate (and more 'classically' phenomenological) description of a tree Husserl
sets forth in the first volume of his Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology (Id
§§88-89 [181-185]):
The tree rather than serving me or dissolving into representation, can face me
in person, speak to me and elicit a response [...] For Buber, the presentation
of the thing as person breaks away from representation, and binds me (BTK
30).16
To include the tree within the ambit of what may face one, to include the plant (or
animal) within the ligature of religion, is a move Levinas resists. Like Socrates, who
in the Phaedrus, laments that 'trees will not teach me anything' (Plato, 1900, 230),
the tree, according to Levinas, does not instruct one ethically, nor summon one with
16 Buber is, one must add, no panpsychist. The 'tree' with which Buber is 'drawn into a relation,' the
'tree' which 'ceases to be an It' and which 'confronts' Buber 'bodily,' is no 'dryad'. Buber concedes
that he neither 'experiences' the tree as 'conscious,' nor as in possession of a 'soul.' Such admissions
do not prohibit the tree from being encountered as a tree, however (Buber, 1970, 58).
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the force of an imperative. The height, or difference in 'level' (niveau), that extends
between the 'Same' and the 'Other' similarly demarcates, it seems, the domain of the
human from that of the nonhuman creature. Buber's presentation of the I-Thou
relation is inadequate, therefore, because the structure he deduces is, broadly
speaking, 'animistic' (BTK 33) and, as such, is commensurate with the pre-logical
structure of 'participation' Levy-Bruhl discerns amongst so called 'primitive'
peoples. The ethical destructure, by contrast, is ethical because it separates the terms
it defines in no uncertain manner, one from the other. Such separation (separation) is
at once a form of 'desacralization,' that is, an attempt to 'separate the true from
appearance,' to 'separate the true from the appearance essentially mixed with the
true' (DD 141). Ethical space, unlike the 'relation' described by Buber, is thus pure,
for it is untainted by the admixture of species-being, and liberated from the
stipulations of ra^is (or so Levinas will have his readers believe).
The role of desacralization in Levinas' thought, and his recurrent
deployment of the themes of 'demythicization' and 'demythologization,' is central to
an understanding of his work, and these notions are typically overlooked by Levinas'
readers for reasons we will need to consider. Arguably, the work of Levinasian first
philosophy (philosophie premiere) is disenchantment, I would contend. In part three
we will examine these themes in some detail and assess their impact upon the
philosophy of history and the history of philosophy, Levinas recounts. It is clear,
however, that elements of Buber's thought appear almost infantile to Levinas,
advanced, as they are, in what Levinas calls, an 'intermittently spiritualist and
edifying language' (BTK 33). Moreover, these aspects of Buber's thought represent
the 'most dated elements of a work otherwise so rich' (BTK 33), Levinas bemoans.
But why is Buber's work deemed to be retrograde in some respects? Levinas does,
after all, praise Buber for not conflating the 'sacred' with the 'divine' (MBCJ 18), a
distinction upon which Levinas will repeatedly insist and upon which his project is
founded - Levinas' idee fixe par excellence.
Principally, then, Buber is at fault, one might say, because his 'thou saying'
remains an 'aim,' rather than an 'allegiance to the invisible' (BMP 34), and because
the between (Zwischen) he details is made manifest in consciousness (BTK 33). The
face is invisible where the thing presents itself in simpliciter, qua facade, to the gaze.
This 'allegiance' accomplishes the ligature that binds the terms of Levinas'
'religion.' Buber's 'Thou' has 'no borders' (Du grenzt nicht) (Buber, 1970, 55 [1947,
102
16]), however, and while Levinas welcomes the primacy accorded to transcendence
in Briber's philosophical anthropology, he will not condone its unqualified
presentation. Transcendence must be 'qualified by the dimension of height or
lowliness' (BTK 29), he confirms, and this pertains, furthermore, without
transcendence 'becoming a relation with a content and dogmas' (BTK 29). Of course,
as I have, I hope, demonstrated, Levinas' management of the field of ethics (champs
ethique), and his fastidious regulation of the circumstances of its production, are
themselves peremptory. The qualification of ethical space as 'height,' and the
invariable consignment of 'height' to the dimension of the interhuman alone, impose
a predetermined form upon the vicissitudes of the drama permitted to unfold there.
This indicates, once again, that the governing logic of ethical space adheres to the
law of confluence in which the complex lineage of Levinas' philosophical heredity
culminates.
Buber concedes that 'things' can belong to the I-Thou relation. Yet the
'interhuman relation,' Levinas notes, once a 'Thou has a face,' is not only
'privileged' but 'conditions' all other relations (BTK 31). Now, Levinas' appraisal of
Buber is undoubtedly correct on this occasion. One must inquire, therefore, as to why
Levinas is himself unwilling to grant the face a wider application, or, minimally, to
consider the nonhuman under the heading of the 'third party' (le tiers). Why is the
human being the 'only being that one can be tempted to kill [le seul etre qu'on peut
etre tente de tuer],' one may legitimately wonder (ES 8; EtES 21). This question is
clearly topical in an age blighted by the despoliation of its natural environments, and
confronted by the predicament of countless species of animals and plants dwindling
on the brink of extinction. The status of the nonhuman in Levinas' work is
confounded further by his conflation of the Biblical edicts 'Thou shalt not commit
murder' and 'Thou shalt not kill.' Levinas employs both indiscriminately, frequently
interchanging between meurtrir and tuer, despite the fact that Deuteronomic law
typically restricts the application of murder to the human other, whereas the
injunction not to kill would appear to admit of wider application, thus extending to
encompass whatever might perish or die, hence animals, plants, fish, etc. (Llewelyn,
1991,245).
Now, by vacillating between such dicta, Levinas undermines the authority
of his claim for the heteronomy of the human face because he treats murder and
killing as synonymous. The former, needless to say, exhibits a quasi-juridical or
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legalistic sense, that the latter typically does not, a sense, moreover, enforced through
the framework of the law (and upheld by crown and Sanhedrin alike) and legislated
for constitutionally. The Hebrew word rasah, which connotes 'murder,' has a much
more precise jurisdiction than the equivalent Hebrew words for killing, harag and
hemit, Llewelyn informs us (Llewelyn, 1991, 61). Murder is confined to cases of
homicide. It does not apply, more generally, to biocide, therefore - a legal distinction
to which prosecutors of both religious and secular law are likely to consent.17
To be sure, qua phenomenologist Levinas does not commit to adhere to the
juridical constraints of Deuteronomic legalism. His conflation of murder and killing,
and consequent failure to differentiate sufficiently between them, might thus be seen
as an attempt to reinforce his basic conviction that my being for-the-other is proto-
juridical, extra-territorial and therefore quite beyond the State. Responsibility
precedes (the) law, and obligation precedes the event of Sinai (Derrida, 1999, 65).
Certainly, qua meforesh, or expounder, of religious and philosophical texts, Levinas
is not afraid to read against the grain of orthodox interpretation. Levinas' Talmudic
readings are notable in that they are not characterized by exegetical reserve (with the
exception, perhaps, of his pronouncements regarding the status of women in
Judaism, where he simply recycles traditional Jewish gender roles, and his deplorable
treatment of the 'pagan'). This exegetical bravura only serves to frustrate matters
further, however. For Levinas' standing as meforesh, and his subsequent relaxation
of the distinction between rasah and harag (a relaxation ultimately condoned
because it enables Levinas to underscore the injunctive authority of the face as that
which signifies prior to and beyond the law) ought, or so one might have hoped, to
have rendered him less likely to have perpetuated the distinction between rasah and
harag his confounding of these terms permits him to overcome. Instead, Levinas
simply reinstates this distinction, heightening the charge of its polarity, and
reintroduces it as the difference between 'face' and 'form,' or 'face' and 'facade,'
upon which his programme of demythologization is based. Clearly Levinas is
prepared to radicalise the prohibition against murderxkilling however, and he readily
17
As Derrida comments in ' "Eating Well," or the Calculation of the Subject,' in a sentiment which
echoes our own here, the "Thou shalt not kill' is addressed to the other and presupposes him. It is
destined to the very thing it institutes, the other as man.. .The "Thou shalt not kill" - with all its
consequences, which are limitless - has never been understood within the Judeo-Christian tradition,
nor apparently by Levinas, as a "Thou shalt not put to death the living in general." The other, such as
this can be thought according to the imperative of ethical transcendence, is indeed the other man: man
as other, the other as man' (Derrida, 1991, 112-113).
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cites the Hebrew tractate Baba Metsia (58b) in support of this initiative. Thus,
'whoever causes the face of his neighbor to go pale with shame in public is compared
to an assassin,' he avers (C77 63). If my 'assassination' of the Other can take the
form of my embarrassing them, or forcing them to lose face (somewhat modest
transgressions, one must agree), then why not also extend the outreach of the ethical
to include the nonhuman creature? Why not indeed. Does Levinas' failure to do so
not, therefore, expose his own pudency in the face of this restriction? After all, a face
differs 'from an animal's head,' in its 'brutish dumbness,' Levinas implores, because
it 'attends to its expression' (PI1 55). 'Things give,' they do not 'offer a face,' for
they are 'beings without a face' (ES 8).
Primarily, for a face to qualify as a face, the one who bears it (and who is
borne by it) must speak. Only linguistic beings (i.e., human beings) are capable of
facing me, therefore, because 'speaking' is a 'way of coming from behind one's
appearance,' that is, from behind one's 'form' (MS 53). Speaking interrupts and de¬
formalizes form, one might say. However, given that Levinas operates, in later
works, with a conception of language as 'saying,' or pre-diction (where 'saying'
designates pre-verbal exposedness and vulnerability), his attempt to identify
'faciality,' that is, the capacity of the face to face one, with linguistic ability is
problematic. Matters are complicated further by Levinas' admission, in an interview
with Richard Kearney, that the human is characterized as human (and thus as face)
not only because he or she 'is a being that can speak,' but also because he or she 'is a
being who can lie,' one who can 'live in the dual possibility of exposure and
deception' (Cohen, 1986, 29). Human beings are duplicitous. One is apt to be duped
by the face (or at least by the physiognomy), as much as one is to be 'duped by
morality,' it seems (77 21). Indeed, many have been duped by Levinas' account of
the face, one might argue, so willing are they to suspend critical judgment in the light
of the analyses he protracts. The 'dual possibility,' Levinas outlines here, reflects the
oscillation between creaturality and conation that defines the amphibological subject.
But, in order to bind the face (exclusively) to the human being, Levinas must
concede that the face is itself capable of duplicity. Now, we have noted previously
that a certain perfidiousness does in fact trouble the manifestation of the face. Yet,
for the face to remain 'destitute' and 'homeless' it must present itself without guile;
it is exposed and naked because it is refused the shelter (or concealment) duplicity
would provide. Certainly, the putative withdrawal of the face from the horizons of
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constitution, could be construed as a form of duplicity; the face is hidden from 'view'
- it is invisible - and exceeds the limits of constation and discourse. But does such
(im)modesty not also suggest that qua face, the face is precisely that which
withdraws from the governance of the concept 'man,' and evades the tcx^is 'homo
sapiens'? Indeed, the face's duplicity may reside in its very abnegation of form. One
is deceived by the face into disassociating it from the material attachments to which
it is undeniably bound. Levinas thus wishes to uphold the 'nudity' (nudite) of the
face, with all that this entails, and maintain that the face-to-face (face-a-face) relation
is exclusively human. Such requirements conflict, however, and, once again, one has
cause to question the saliency of Levinas' position here (and perhaps, to some extent,
the legitimacy of his whole project (Derrida, 1978, 94)).
If the human introduces the 'Good' into being - the human is one who acts
in spite of him or herself - and that which faces is human, then it follows that that
which faces me, is that which is capable of both recognizing that the life of an other
takes precedence over its own life, and acting in accordance with this recognition or
law. A symmetry obtains, therefore, between the Other and myself to the extent that
the one who faces me is, like me, a dedicant, that is, one who acknowledges (through
word and deed) that their being is their being-for-others (that their time, like mine,
begins with the Other), and where I, in fact, am one of those others toward whom
they are obligated. At least two conclusions may be draw from this logic of
symmetry. Firstly, Levinas' failure to include the nonhuman within the order of what
signifies as a face, commits him to the economy of a transcendental symmetry
(Derrida, 1978, 126), at odds with the structural asymmetry he believes to epitomize
the face-to-face relation. For, if the Other's facing me is predicated upon their being
able to recognize an injunction in the face of their human counterparts, and act with
suitable dis-interest, then the face is itself lodged within an economy of parity. That
which faces is, that which, like me, is morally susceptible, such argumentation being
ashamedly circular. Secondly, if my response to the summons of the face entails the
'generosity of sacrifice outside the known and the unknown,' such 'sacrifice' being
'without calculation,' as it were (EP 76; emphasis added), then one must either
concede that anonymity is central to the encounter with the face (the face is
henceforth extra-taxonomical), or, one must limit the scope of the sacrificial within
ethics and delimit the extent of its dramatization more exactly, thereby introducing a
certain 'measure' and metrologic into the field of proto-ethics. Jean-Luc Marion's
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comments are germane here. To 'find myself summoned,' he suggests, 'would lack
all rigor if surprise did not deprive me, at least for a while and sometimes definitely,
of knowing, in the instant of the summons, by what and by whom the call is
exercised.' Anonymity, Marion asserts, 'therefore belongs strictly to the conditions
for the possibility' of my being summoned, because it defines the 'unconditional
poverty' of the face as such (Marion, 2002, 299). Now, anonymity may, as Marion
indicates, characterize the immediacy of the encounter with the other qua face,
initiating my response. However, ascertaining who or what the other is, is paramount
if I am to act appropriately toward them (such propriety being less a question of
etiquette than of respect for the concrete particularity of the one who faces me).
Again, therefore, the alternance, or coruscation, of the facexcountenance threatens to
destabilize Levinas' project and indicates that moral life is marked by a basic tension
between the demands of empirico-phenomenological concretion, and the injunctive
force of an-archic responsibility. An overemphasis upon anonymity corrodes the
difference that is fundamental to ethicality, while the elision of anonymity restricts
the range of alterity unnecessarily.
Despite his admission that the 'ethical extends to all living beings' (PM
172), the compass of the proto-ethical most certainly does not. Any obligation one
might have toward the nonhuman creature 'arises from the transference to animals of
the idea of suffering,' Levinas maintains. It is because 'we, as human, know what
suffering is,' he continues, that 'we can have this obligation' (PM 172; emphasis
added). Levinas' use of the term 'transference' is significant on this occasion, I
would argue. The concepts of 'mirroring' (Spiegelung) and 'pairing' (Paarung) form
the centrepiece of the analysis of the 'alter-ego' Husserl sets forth in the fifth of his
Cartesian Meditations. There, Husserl endeavours to present a phenomenological
account of the constitution of the alter-ego, based upon the notion of what he calls an
apperceptive transfer, or analogising apperception, in which the 'sense' I have of
myself, qua ego, is transferred to another, qua alter-ego (CM §48-54 [136-149]).
Levinas reproaches Husserl for what he deems, perhaps unfairly, to be the latter's
'gnoseology' (CW 165). The ego may grasp the other through an extension of its
primordial sphere (Eigensphdre), however, the primacy and primordiality of the
ego's originary experience remains intact, Levinas argues. The 'transference'
(ultimately a form of empathy (Einfiihlung)) upon which Husserl's presentation of
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the other is based, is decidedly egological, Levinas maintains, and thus cannot do
justice to the deposition effectuated in the encounter with the face.
To suggest, therefore, that the nonhuman creature possesses the ethical
status it does due to a similar act of analogization, is to locate the nonhuman outside
the fellowship of the face. To be sure, phenomenologically there are numerous
differences between 'human,' 'animal,' and 'plant' physiologies. It would be foolish
to argue otherwise. However, when Levinas intimates that the 'human face is
completely different' from that of the animal, and that 'only afterwards do we
discover the face of an animal' (PM 172), does he not confound his own case for the
authority of the face as an ethical signifier? The face is not the countenance, we
recall. Moreover, the face is not a substance in which attributes or qualities inhere.
As pure 'expression,' or 'gaze,' the face transcends the 'form' through which it
signifies. Yet this very transcendence prevents one from identifying the face as either
human, or nonhuman: the face is thus not susceptible to explication. For, according
to the strictures of Levinas' own presentation of the face, the face can be neither
human nor nonhuman as it 'involves a signifyingness of its own' entirely
'independent of the meaning received from the world' {MS 53). The face of the
Other, qua hapax, is the face of the one who confronts me hie et nunc, but, qua face,
this ethical cipher belongs to no one in particular because its 'manifestation,' xaB'
auTO, is free from all de facto particularity.
The face, it seems, is 'nobody's' (like the 'nobody,' or 'they,' perhaps, to
which Dasein surrenders itself in its 'Being-among-one-another [Untereinanderseinf
{BT §27 [128])), set adrift, as it is, across the space of encounter between beings. Is it
not this very lack of attachment, then, that renders the Other disconsolate and
dejected? Furthermore, Levinas' exclusion of the nonhuman from the sodality of the
face-to-face relation, undermines the cogency of his arguments for the supra-cultural
status of the face. Levinas is, thereby, forced to grant either that his insistence upon
the uniqueness of the human face is a product of his own historico-cultural legacy
(hence cultures that acknowledge an ethical imperative toward the nonhuman and the
elemental do so in consonance with axiological criteria that have come to regulate
comportment within their respective home-worlds). Or, Levinas must permit greater
phenomenological access to the face so as to enable analysis to clarify, more
precisely, just how the face of the human differs from the facexphysiognomy of the
animal, plant or mineral. Of course, the face is no phenomenon (<|)aiv6psvov).
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Therefore, detailed phenomenological appraisal is ruled out. Likewise, the face does
not admit of quiddity. Thus attempts to categorize its 'properties' are misguided. On
both counts, one is forced to conclude, I believe, that the 'absolutism,' with which
Levinas credits the face, is always already contextually absolute, that is, it is
absolute, or binding, within limits. Even Levinas recognizes this, albeit indirectly,
when he confers that the third party 'is of itself the limit of responsibility' (OBBE
157). Otherwise, the whole account of the face risks degenerating into what
Heidegger would call, a 'fanciful idealization [ein phantastisch idealisiertes]' (EST
§44 [229]), which is, even according to the motif of 'risk' deployed in Otherwise
than Being, certainly a fine risk to be run.
Ultimately, then, Levinas ought to resign himself to taking up residence at
the limit of his own home-world, where 'values' indigenous to one home-world
(.Heimwelt) come into contact, or proximity, with those local to another and mutually
fecundate one another. For it is here, in the interspace between home-worlds, as it
were, that the peculiar exchange between 'signification,' its 'constitution,' and
subsequent and ongoing 'exegesis,' takes place. (Indeed, does philosophy not
consist, as Merleau-Ponty reminds us, 'in installing itself on the edge of being,' at
'the joints where the multiple entries of the world cross' (Merleau-Ponty, 1968,
260)?) This event may not give rise to the stability or 'foundation of a site,' as such
(77 77). Yet emplacement (being emplaced or 'dwelling' at the inter-face of home-
worlds) is integral to its heuristic character. And while Levinas certainly
acknowledges the conflux of 'Jewish' and 'Greek' culture within his thought, he
remains committed to the belief that the face 'jostles' and 'disturbs' all 'mundane
meaning' (MS 53). Quite how it achieves this feat concurrently with the fact that its
'transcendence' is 'not enacted outside the world,' is unclear (77 172). Although,
Levinas will submit to the notion that the 'Other is present in a cultural whole' and is
'illuminated by this whole' (MS 52), the 'face' of the Other, is, he crows, that 'which
escapes comprehension' (OF 9). Yet, surely one cannot be expected to concur with
the suggestion that the face is, as Husserl would say, 'simply there.' For 'this "simply
being there'" always consists of certain mental and kinaesthetic 'processes of
specific and changing structure' (IP 9). What is more, these processes are themselves
constituted 'generatively,' such that it is not possible to specify 'where' or 'when'
the constitution of particular 'objects' (or, in this instance, ethical injunctions)
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'begins' or 'ends.' As Husserl surmises, 'are there any actual limits' to constitutive
activity (IP 57)?
If the constitution of the face passes me by and interrupts the governance of
my primordial sphere, it does so because it passes into the recesses of tradition and
not because it breaches the limits of constitutional structure. Perhaps Levinas comes
close to acknowledging this situation when he considers the possibility that a face
might 'abide both in representation and in proximity,' that is in 'community and
difference' (OBBE 154). Ultimately, however, Levinas fails to develop this insight
beyond the rather recondite suggestion mooted above.
Crucially, I believe that the intra-textual 'spacing' (espacement) of Levinas'
work conceals 'enclaves' or 'ghettos' in which certain identities are cast, and certain
alliances forged. Nonhuman creatures are ultimately consigned to one of these
enclaves, destined to remain 'forever faceless' (77 160) within the confines of their
gaol, akin to those outcasts (zarim) driven from the Temple precincts throughout the
history of Judaism. Among other such identities cast by Levinas, one may number:
the 'pagan,' the 'mystic,' the 'primitive,' the 'artist,' the 'psychoanalyst,' and, most
notable of all, 'woman.' A coterie of improper names, one might say, amidst the
'names of persons whose saying signifies a face' (PN 4), an onomasticon of dubious
standing, quite out of place (cxtottos) in a work otherwise so sensitive to treating
alterity in its various forms.
§ 11. A genealogy of things
In Levinas' thought, nonhuman beings (including that most nebulous of concepts,
'nature') possess what meaning they do as adjuncts to human interaction. Things
'have a price,' their 'rootedness in the elemental' confirms their status as possessions
(77 140). One thus approaches the Other across the 'world of possessed things,'
rearranging one's homestead (demeure) appropriately, so as to cordially 'welcome'
them (77 76). Qua furnishings (muebles), things occupy no place of their own, but are
rather movable goods, merchandise to be exchanged with others. Were it not for the
fact that Levinas' phenomenological descriptions of domiciliary life are at once
prescriptive, his disquisition of 'things' would reflect, quite accurately, the dominant
attitude in and from which one is oriented toward 'things,' and in which one seizes,
appropriates and expropriates them correspondingly. However, Levinas espouses this
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policy toward the nonhuman (and ultimately remains loyal to Heidegger's
conceptions of Zuhandenheit and Zeughaftigheit, despite altering their nuances
slightly), a stance perhaps explained by his concession that 'Nature,' when 'it does
not attest to the glory of God,' is 'only understandable as such on the plane of the
human world of property' (ET 28). And when do elemental nature and nonhuman
creatures 'attest' to the 'glory' (Kabod) of 'God,' one may ask? They do so, Levinas
affirms, when they are raised to the level of 'consecrated Goods' (NPI 108), that is,
when they are freely circulated and gifted to others; when that which is possessed
becomes, through a process of ethical exchange, that which is given. It may be that
such reasoning is justified within the theological framework of Mitnagdic Judaism.
However, as a 'phenomenological' account of the presentation of nonhuman nature
to 'sense' (sens), Levinas' descriptions are inadequate and saturated with positings
that require further explication.
To many of Levinas' readers, the invocation of 'God' at critical junctures
during the course of Levinas' explication of phenomena, will, no doubt, prove
irksome (particularly if 'God' is invoked to legitimate what would otherwise be
shortcomings in phenomenological description). If ethics is first philosophy (TtpcoTq
4>iAoao(j)ia), and it appears that ethics is always crossed with theology (BeoAoyiKq)
in Levinas' thought, then things, by proxy, are to be treated as donanda. Donanda,
qua 'consecrated goods,' occupy the highest echelon in Levinas' genealogy of things.
They occupy this stratum because Levinas recognizes the centrality of material
provision in ethical life. One does not approach the Other empty handed: things are
thus not simply ready-to-hand, or handy, but in demand and demanded by others.
Things compose an integral part of the liturgy, or 'work,' of substitution. Sensible
things are incised in the 'living flesh of my own substance,' that is, my 'home' (77
76), and are consequently offered up to the Other as part of my very corporeal being.
Arguably, things are prostheses that extend the range of the ethical body (corps
ethique), permitting me to give of myself more abundantly and meet others needs
more directly.
Levinas' genealogy of things is stratified in concert with the general
scheme, and developmental progression, of his thought. Hitherto, in our analysis of
Levinas' work, we have encountered variously: 'objects' (objets), 'tools' (outils),
'toys' (jouets), and 'furnishings' (muebles), each depicting, as it were, a 'stage' en
route toward the accomplishment of ethical life. 'Things,' as such, are
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polymorphous, they are what one might term, polymorphs, endlessly malleable in
accordance with the desiderations of their possessors, manipulanda to satisfy human
need. The constitution of the thing admits of genealogical layers, therefore. The
consecrated 'good,' given to the Other, reveals layers of constitution (despite
Levinas' pronouncement that the 'revelation of matter is essentially superficial' (77
192)), each disclosing some particular sedimentation of meaning, and reflecting a
18
specific genealogico-generative stratum, in the ethical sedation Levinas enunciates.
In the essay 'Language and Proximity' (1967), things are presented, first
and foremost, as contactual. Perceptual experience is itself a certain relation of
proximity to things. Thus, a thing's being 'present' is not characterized by its
'manifestation,' but by its 'proximity' {LP 118). Things brush against one,
stimulating and motivating conduct by invading one's perceptual field and
commanding one's senses in their orchestration of the given. Indeed, the 'visible
caresses the eye,' Levinas confesses {LP 118), in a manner unaccounted for by
(thetic) intentional analysis, and lending an erotic quality to our relationship with
things. To be sure, Husserl is well aware of the lure of the sensible. In a somewhat
comical passage from his Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Husserl
describes the pull exerted upon a subject by the thing. In 'every moment of
perceiving,' Husserl suggests, the 'perceived,' as it were, 'calls out to us':
"There is still more to see here, turn me so you can see all my sides, let your
gaze run through me, draw closer to me, open me up, divide me up; keep on
looking me over again and again, turning me to see all sides. You will get to
know me like this, all that I am, all my surface qualities, all my inner sensible
qualities" (Husserl, 2001, 41).
A phenomenology of the voluptuous, such as that broached in Totality and Infinity
{TI 265-266), would need to consider the implications of Husserl's proposal in detail,
and augment its findings to accommodate the insights gleaned by him. (Contra
Husserl, one would need to question the viability of attaining intimate and exhaustive
'knowledge' of things, for this would appear to suppress the 'wonder' occasioned by
their quoddity, beneath the drive to master their quiddity.) Levinas, of course, does
not provide his reader with such an addendum. The erotic orientation, whether this
obtains between human subjects, or between human and nonhuman beings (and let us
be clear, we are not treating of bestiality here, although, with Merleau-Ponty, one
18 One might append the fetish to this genealogy of things since 'to a certain extent things exist as
fetishes,' Levinas confirms (LB 46).
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might speak of 'a coition of our body with things' (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 320)) is
sublimated, and intentionality held back, or so Levinas will maintain, in the ethical
encounter.
Things may administer sensory delight, beckoning and luring their suitors to
participate in the folly of their manifestive-cum-proximal being. However, the
'thing' is awarded its 'final reality' (77 178) - it achieves its teAeiov - as that which
is given, and not as that which incites conative or libidinal interest. Yes, the thing
caresses. But it does so, Levinas urges, because it bears the trace(s) of human others
across its surfaces. Hence, things 'caress,' or 'obsess' one, because they attest to the
other person to whom they belong. Or, alternatively, they excite a dual movement of
appropriationxexpropriation by reminding one of the indigence of others. In neither
case, therefore, does the 'thing' bear witness to its own requirements (for example, to
be safeguarded, left alone, respected, or appreciated). Thus, the thing does not face
me, rather the Other faces me through the thing; the face takes a detour through the
things, one might say. The thing is a vehicle or conduit for the face, a means through
which it may signify. As Levinas explains, in a telling footnote from Otherwise than
Being'.
It is as possessed by a neighbor, as relics, and not as clothed with cultural
attributes, that things first obsess. Beyond the "mineral" surface of things,
contact is an obsession by the trace of a skin, the trace of an invisible face,
which things bear and which only reproduction fixes as an idol. The purely
mineral contact is privative. Obsession breaks with the rectitude of
consumption and cognition. But caresses are dormant in all contact, and
contact in all sensible experience: the thematized disappears in the caress, in
which the thematization becomes a proximity. There is indeed a part of
metaphor in that, and the things are taken to be true and illusory before being
near. But is not the poetry of the world prior to the truth of things, and
inseparable from what is proximity par excellence, that of the neighbor, or of
the proximity of the neighbor par excellence (OBBE 191 n. 10).
Tenderness extends to things because they are tendered, that is, because they are part
of an economy of donation and provision. Arguably, therefore, the thing, in Levinas'
thinking, never quite exceeds its status as 'stock,' or 'merchandise,' and remains
enmeshed within an economic system largely inimical to the suggestion that the
thing might signify in any other way than as that which is given. Levinas simply
shifts this economy from the market place (ayopaj to the precincts of the temple
(TEpevos), an act of relocation he sanctions to justify the genealogic to which he
submits himself throughout his work.
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As Heidegger indicates, however, there are various ways in which
phenomena (^aiuopsua) can be 'covered up' (verdeckt) and 'buried over'
(verschUttet) during the course of an analysis, thereby losing their 'indigenous
character' (Bodenstandigkeit) (BT §7 [36]). Levinas, is, I believe, guilty of such
covering up (Verdeckung) in relation to things, despite his notable insights (albeit
elaborations of Husserl) into the contactual nature of perceptual acts, a subject to
which we will attend, in more detail, in part two of the present study. Does the face
of the nonhuman not get 'buried over' in the ethical enthusiasm (svSoucnaapos), and
donative fervour, to which Levinas succumbs? Despite his insistence that such
'enthusiasm' (enthousiasme) - the same inspired by the other - 'is not intoxication
[n'est pas ivresse],' but rather a 'sobering' (degrissement), does Levinas' thought not
itself require, as he would put it, 'ever still to be sobered [toujours encore a
degriserY (CW 166; CV 57)? Mere objects, after all, 'knock' at the 'door of
consciousness,' Husserl informs us, summoning us to them 'until finally the object is
noticed.' If an object can 'intrude upon' a subject, and 'exercise stimulation' over it
(Id II §55), might an animal, bird, fish, or plant, not similarly summon one to
responsibility, or even regard one (on regardent), in a proto-ethical sense? Might the
thing not give me to myself in various ways; do I not become manifest to myself
through the things? What then regulates the distribution of sense (sens) in Levinas'
work, if not the apparent conservatism of dicta ill suited to addressing the destitution
of the things themselves (Sachen Selbst) in their concretion. Indeed do the needs of
the nonhuman not become 'veiled' through their being taken as manipulanda, much
in the way that what is ready-to-hand is, apropos of Heidegger, 'veiled' by being
made the object of an assertion (BT §33 [158])?
There are inconsistencies and notable lacunae in Levinas' account of things.
Plainly, Levinas breaks with his restrictive policy toward things in the privileged
treatment he accords to 'Scripture.' Scripture, he beseeches, must be saved from
'being turned into a mere book,' that is to say, 'just a thing,' by 'allowing it to
resonate with the great and living voice of teaching' (SIRI 220). (We notice here that
'Scripture' is to be let be, where the thing is to be appropriated and given). Likewise,
scriptural verses, he notes, 'cry out spontaneously' to be 'interpreted' (TS 51).
Somehow, within the genealogic to which Levinas subscribes, 'Scripture' has
managed to accede the station of 'thing' and overcome the impediments of its
bookish form. 'Scripture,' like the 'face,' breaks through its form (pop^qj. The
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sacra pagina is no thing, it seems. How fortuitous! The 'Holy Scriptures' (Saintes
Ecritures), Levinas argues, differ from 'purely literary texts' because they disclose
'another secret [autre secret]' such works of 'literature' have lost (SB 171; PS 204).
While both textual genres are characterized by 'polysemy' and promote a certain
hermeneutic 'pluralism' (SB 171), the scriptures purportedly set in motion an
exegetical programme that allows the 'meaning' of the 'texts' to 'mean fully,' and to
'be renewed' generatively. This 'continuous Revelation [Revelation continue],' or
hermeneutic event, takes place in the 'distance that separates the text from the
reader,' and is the 'space' in which the 'evolution of the spirit [devenir meme de
I'espiritY is 'lodged' (SB 170; PS 203), an epochal space that supports the edification
of the textual community.
The difference between literary and scriptural texts appears to be found,
according to Levinas, in the kind of space they engender and make available to those
who consult them, therefore. The scriptural economy is a more commodious setting
within which to stage and sustain the human adventure, Levinas will aver. It is
capacious enough to accommodate diverse interpretation - indeed this very diversity
is instrumental in establishing its spatial dimensions - yet sufficiently delimited to
organize such polyvalence around a common source (Quelle), or core. Accordingly,
'Scripture' is both origin and production, less a site than the dramatization of space
itself. As Levinas notes, 'the volume of the book' is 'a form of living space,' and
'reading' is a 'way of inhabiting' (RIJT 130), a mode of occupancy somehow more
dignified, Levinas will maintain, than the attachment to 'place' found among 'pagan'
peoples. Moreover, 'Scripture' evinces a 'mode of being' distinct from that of the
'pure matter available to the grammarian's analysis,' for it is the 'place' where 'all
the harmonics of the said resonate' and 'an entire life is breathed into the letters of
the text, inspiring it' (SAW 127).
One cannot help but note the rapturous tone of Levinas' remarks concerning
scripture, and while each reader must asses the merits of such remarks for him or
herself (for clearly it is not a matter of judging the probity of one man's enthusiasm
for the scriptural tradition of his faith), one can question the saliency of the basic
opposition, or polarization, that underpins Levinas' comments. Despite the
pertinence of Levinas' observations, he overlooks, I believe, an issue central to the
decipherability of what one might call, textual difference. For, by differentiating
between scriptural and literary economies on the basis of the kind of space they
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produce, whether, that is, they are suitably fecund and maintain a clear separation
between 'letter' and 'spirit,' and whether the distantiation they support is pure or not
(this requirement for separation (separation) is, as we have seen, reiterated endlessly
throughout the Levinasian corpus), Levinas fails to consider the role of attention in
the classification of textual type. Surely, as Colin Davis affirms, the 'real' difference
between so called 'sacred' and 'secular' texts 'lies in the kind of attention they
receive rather than any inherent quality' that may or may not be attributed to them
(Davis, 1996, 118).
One is disposed toward a text, or, as Levinas would say, one is zum-Buch-
sein, in myriad ways (all susceptible to phenomenological explication), and these
routings, or points of orientation, determine the status of the text toward which one
comports oneself. One's orientation, qua exegete, is a product of the home-world
(.Heimwelt) from whence one originates (and to which one is attached) and the
embodied disciplines that one has learnt there, and to which one is committed. What
prevents scripture from becoming a mere artefact (Troioupeua), or from being
encountered as a kind of cultural 'heirloom' (i.e., as belonging to a world, or an
equipmental context, that 'is no longer' (BT §73 [380])), is to be largely accounted
for in terms of the attentional regard such texts elicit. Thus, among a people, Volk, or
peuple, a tree, an animal, or a natural landmark, such as a hillock or boulder (as is
well attested to, for example, by scholars such as Mircea Eliade19), may function, qua
symbol (oup(3oAov), as a focal point for the repetition and renewal of meaning
within a given community, in a manner not entirely dissimilar (although clear
differences are to be noted) to that of the 'Scriptures' whose 'uniqueness' Levinas
defends. The thing assumes its status through the attentional regard it receives and
provokes and not because it is intrinsically 'holy' in a supra-attentional sense. Is not
to argue thus to court idiocy, such non-sense deserving no place in phenomenology
nor, one might add, in a religion of adults (religion d'adultes), such as that
commended by Levinas?
An obvious objection to the line of reasoning ventured here must, I believe,
be entertained at this juncture, for no doubt our argument risks unfair dismissal if it
can not be shown why objects and things ought to be included within the fold of
proto-ethical consideration. Can one seriously be expected to accept the proposition
19
See, for example, Mircea Eliade's, The Sacred and the profane: The Nature ofReligion, trans. W.
Trask (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1987, 116-159).
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that all manner of animate, as well as inanimate, things face one and summon one to
act responsibly toward them? Surely the mise-en-scene of ethics is no Disney like
'Fantasia'? Scullery objects and the furnishings of one's home, do not, under normal
circumstances 'persecute' one, do they? The obsessive compulsive may find, of
course, that she is assailed by the sight of dirt, or the thought that appliances might
not be switched off (and arguably responsibility, as Levinas describes it, is a
compulsion of sorts, I believe), but that can be put down to an 'aberrance' of
comportment, can it not? If only matters were that simple.
Do the conventionally inanimate 'animate' one ethically? Can one, as it
20
were, be be-souled (Beseelt) by the nonhuman other? I am not claiming that ethical
consideration ought to extend to kitchen appliances, nor that the toys in the child's
bedroom demand justice (while those who made them, sudating in the heat of third
world 'sweat shops,' clearly do). As Derrida reminds us, Levinas does not 'seek to
propose laws,' or specific 'moral rules' - he does not 'seek to determine a morality'
- but rather an 'Ethics of Ethics' (Derrida, 1978, 111). It seems to this reader, that
resistance to the suggestion that things might face one issues, once again, from an
inability to distinguish between the 'ethical' and the 'proto-ethical' orders of
description. Such equivocation is pardonable, however. For, as we have seen,
Levinas himself taunts his readers repeatedly by failing to demark these respective
regions precisely. While the 'ethical' and the 'proto-ethical' invariably dovetail into
one another (the latter accomplishes the former), proto-ethical responsibility
expresses an orientation rather than a determinate programme of ethical precepts.
(The fact that Levinasian proto-ethics gives rise to neither a 'determined ethics' nor
'determined laws' without 'negating or forgetting itself' is, as Derrida confers, a
serious cause for concern, however (Derrida, 1978, 111).) Thus, one can argue with
Husserl, that our being directed toward a thing, our bearing toward it as such, is itself
a 'heeding' of that 'thing.' Valuation is implicated in directedness. Therefore, in 'any
act' some 'mode of heedfulness dominates,' Husserl adverts (Id §37). If one were to
take the further (Levinasian) step of reducing, or tracing, this heedfulness back to the
'susceptibility' (susceptibilite) of the subject, a move in which the 'passivity'
inherent in all directedness would be underscored, then the 'evidence' for the
20 In the Phenomenology ofPerception, Merleau-Ponty will state that 'the significance of a thing
inhabits that thing as the soul inhabits the body' (Medeau-Ponty, 1962, 319-320). Might one not
argue, then, that one is also animated by the thing and inspired to act by its appeal?
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inclusion of things within the fold of the proto-ethical, begins to appear
incontrovertible. But, heedfulness need not entail ethical obligation, nor does it
sanction the application of rights to things, nor foster the idea that one has a duty
toward them in a Kantian sense. Such notions are the products of second order
categorial acts, which proceed the encounter with the face, and testify to the
involvement, and mediation, of the third party (le tiers) in deliberations of ethical
conduct. (Although, as we have argued, the very 'faciality' of the face arises against
a socio-cultural horizon.) But does Levinas not contend both that I am susceptible
before the face of the other person, and that susceptibility is accomplished as my
bearing of them? Susceptibility is thus not simply the event of corporeity (qua
exposedness), but the conversion of my vulnerability into my being vulnerable for-
the-other, and, moreover, the sufferance of my flesh for them. Has Levinas not
allowed the proto-ethical to slide back into the ethical?
Now, one can argue, quite convincingly, that 'encounter' is, in the language
of Totality and Infinity, deposition and displacement, and, indeed, that I am
susceptible to the incursions of others into the domiciliary space of my Kernwelt.
Yet, the claim that my being susceptible (which can be substantiated
phenomenologically) demands that I am obligated to give of myself to-the-point-of-
expiration (OBBE 182), cannot be evidenced phenomenologically; unless, that is, one
bestows a generative sense upon the Sinngebung accomplished in the face-to-face
relation; unless, that is, one concedes that the face-to-face is always already
intersected by the third party, and hence that socially generated values and practices
substruct the authority of the face, and are its aetiological condition. The immediacy
of the encounter with the face, and the interruption of this encounter by the third
party, are, it seems, coetaneous, therefore. Thus, when Levinas claims that the 'for'
of my being-for-the-other (etre-pour-Tautre), culminates in the act of ethical
portage, and hence in my being deiparous, a bearer of 'God,' as it were (portage
remains an 'act,' despite breaking with the logical opposition between activity and
passivity, although my will is now thine), does he not already defer to the mandates
of his Jewish heritage, mandates which exceed the 'space' of proto-ethical proximity
as he outlines it?
In effect, what this means, I think, is as follows. One is susceptible, and
one's being susceptible is one's being here, exposed to others. Susceptibility is not
however, at least initially, a stance one takes in the face of the Other (one is proto-
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active, rather than pro-active, in this regard), but rather the conditio sine qua non of
the flesh. Ethical ordinances proceed susceptibility, unless, that is, one maintains that
the schema of the body is immediately ethical, immediately attuned to the face of the
'human' other, ab initio. Such ordinances are instituted culturally - they attest to
one's submission to a world - and are the products of acts of co-constitution and co-
historization. How I respond to who, or what, faces me, is the result of a complex
and ongoing process of instruction, habituation, intuition, and instinct. The ethical
body (ocopa) bears the inscriptions of countless teachers, one might say, as the
corpus of Levinas' work bears the (d)rash of his teacher Chouchani, the 'prestigious
master' (maitre prestigieux) under whose 'firm rule' (ferule) Levinas was tutored in
the subtle art of Talmudic study and exegesis, an art he subsequently applied to
'philosophical' as well as 'Talmudic' texts (NGTT 117; AQTT 144). The body is the
first text, the first place where injunctions are inscribed and edicts installed, and the
human other is not the only scribe - there are others, one might contend.
But wait. To argue thus is to argue with Levinas, is it not? The ethical body
(corps ethique) is radically passive, he will maintain, formed through innumerable
encounters, more an archive, or record of susceptibility, than an origin or ctpXB- The
ethical body subtends the corps propre and thus undercuts the volitional activity
upon which its exercise is based. Me voici is animated by the Other (the 'psyche' in
the same) - susceptibility is motivated by the other person. With all this one may
concur heartily. Yet, this reader is troubled by the procedure such susceptibility
undergoes, and the form into which the goylem of the body is moulded. The body
begins to assume the prospect of something occult, of something 'created' as if by
sorcery, rather than that which is recovered (apres coup) through sober
phenomenological reflection. It is one thing to describe the subject as a 'hostage'
(otage), yet quite another to pronounce the subject 'responsible for the universe'
(AGCW 170), as if this responsibility (responsabilite) were the 'teaching,' or primal
datum, of the face. In order to retain something of the ethical sense (sens ethique) for
which Levinas argues, I believe one is compelled to defend the proposition that
tertiality is the horizon (opiapos), or should one say, the proto-horizon, of the face
qua ethical signifier (much in the way, perhaps, that the 'call of conscience,' in Being
and Time, ultimately depends for its 'sense' upon the account of 'historicality'
(Geschichtlichkeit) Heidegger presents toward the close of that work (BT §§72-77)).
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Thus, while the face may be, according to Levinas, the veritable lux mundi,
it arises against a social horizon vulnerable to the librations of co-constitutional
activity. Levinas does not analyse this collaborative endeavour in sufficient depth,
despite conceding that it is 'because my position as an I is effectuated already in
fraternity' that 'the face can present itself to me as a face' (77 280). Furthermore, I
would aver, the 'manifestation' of the face presents itself against the obscurity of the
earth 'Ark' that patiently bears it, together with the subject, to whom the face reveals
itself. What shows itself from itself as a face (within a particular era or epoch), does
so against a trans-historical geo-logical horizon. Needless to say, when Levinas
endorses, as he does above, Rabbi Hayyim of Volozhin's (Lurianic) Kabbalism, to
claim that one's responsibility is universal in extent, the universum both he and
Hayyim Volozhiner have in mind, is one circumscribed by the teachings of the Torah
(and not that composite of dimensions appraised by the science of 'Physics'). The
topography of ethical obligation does not extend, for Levinas and Hayyim of
Volozhin, beyond the limes of human economic life, even if more detailed
phenomenological analysis reveals the 'world,' qua earth-Ark, to be the bearer of
untold micro-ecologies and mini-mundi neglected by the accounts of ethical life
these thinkers present.
It may be that the one who encounters me is un pen chameau, a bit of a
rascal, or a touch churlish. However, their being camelish presents no obstacle to
their being considered proto-ethically by me. A beastly mien is no excuse for proto-
ethical indolence, Levinas assures us. If the one who confronts me is quite literally
cameloid, however, as is the case in Genesis 24, where, as Levinas reminds us,
Rebekah 'waters the camels' of Abraham's servant who could not themselves 'ask to
drink' (BG 134), then such figurative play cedes to allegorization (in the best
tradition of the medieval bestiary), whereby Rebekah's service toward the nonhuman
simply 'prefigures' the responsibility enacted in the face-to-face relation. Thus, as
Levinas argues, the camel is merely a 'prefiguration' of the 'first person to come my
way' (BG 134). Nonhuman nature 'takes on meaning,' by deferral, in the service of
the 'mercy' (rachamim) accorded to one human being by another (BG 134). The
nonhuman, therefore, reminds us of the debt we owe to other humans (NDNR 152).
But why is personhood (incidentally, never defined by Levinas) the criterion ofxfor
responsibility? Might one not, in the spirit of Derrida's essay 'At this very moment in
this work here I am' (1980), and in the spirit of Rebekah's charitable gesture to her
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parched guests, not utter the word 'Bois' in the face of the nonhuman, and invite the
nonhuman creature to slake its thirst at one's expense, and at the expense of principia
(apxcu) that restrict the face to the human being? Might the speciesism inherent in
ethical metaphysics not need to be reviewed, and the criterion of 'personhood,' be
either adapted or abandoned,21 in order to respond to the summons of 'who,' or
'whatever,' may come our way? The boundaries of ethical space ought to be flexible
if the space into which the Other is welcomed (and within which their alterity is
honoured and upheld) is to be truly peaceable, a space opened under the mezuzah, or
sign, of welcome.
For the 'wild barbarian character of alterity' (7764 347) to be truly
respected, I believe Levinas' thought must subject itself to the barbarity of revision.
If the first word one utters upon meeting an other is 'peace' (VO 113), then one must
be prepared to say 'shalom' in the face of the nonhuman creature, and offer them a
place of accommodation (akhsaniah) in which to breathe and live (and, after all,
proto-ethics largely concerns the breathe and breathing (OBBE 181)). Here, the
offertory of lodging might simply entail letting the Other be in their natural habitat,
and letting that habitat itself be, and be itself, so as to be free of the unnecessary
hindrances of imposed suffering and exploitation.
To be sure, we will be reproached for continuing to conflate the orders of
animate and inanimate being, the artefactual and the natural. Levinas is himself no
less precise in this regard, one must note. The concept of the thing employed by
Levinas is perilously vague, and appears indiscriminate in its consignment of the
nonhuman to the plight of an exilic fate in a 'forth world [quart monde]' (DR 169)
quite beyond the order of proto-ethical concern. But if things are to face one, and if
their (initial) 'landing' is, as Marion confirms, 'unpredictable,' and defined by
'anonymity' (Marion, 2002, 132), then, at the level, or stratum, of proto-ethics, such
distinctions are altogether less binding, if not otiose. Husserl, who concedes that 'the
problem of non-human animality' requires 'thorough phenomenological explication,'
notes that animals, or 'Brutes,' are 'essentially constituted for me as abnormal
"variants" of my humanness,' despite the fact that among them 'normality and
abnormality' may in turn be differentiated (CM §55 [154]). For Levinas, the variance
21 In the essay 'Nom d'un chien ou le droit naturel' (1975), Levinas will employ the term 'person' to
describe the character of the dog, 'Bobby,' who befriended him, and those interned with him, during
the War. Bobby is a 'person' because he is a 'friend of man.' His 'dignity' (dignite), for Levinas,
remains defined wholly in terms of his relation to human beings, therefore (NDNR 152).
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adumbrated here is subordinate to the more primordial separation that disparts one
existent from the other (and let us be clear, the nonhuman does not 'ek-sist' for either
Levinas or Heidegger). Variation is thus construed principally in terms of
'strangeness.' One might assume, therefore, that the differentiation Husserl adduces
between 'species,' would only hold for Levinas a posteriori, that is to say, post
susception. This is resolutely not the case, however. Indeed, one is once again left
wondering what the exact nature of the relationship between susception and
reflection is. At what point (or stage) do second order evaluative judgments disrupt
the proximity of contact and transform its immediacy into the calculations of ethical
science? As Husserl observes, 'in infancy we had to learn to see physical things,'
such 'modes of consciousness of them' preceding all others 'genetically,' he proffers
(CM §38 [112]). Similarly, one might hasten to add, the ethical subject must be
instructed to recognize the face, and to differentiate between who, or what, does, and
does not, traumatize it. To 'receive the given,' is, after all, already to 'receive it as
taught' (77 92)? It may be, as Levinas avers, that 'Husserl does not raise the
metaphysical problem'' of the 'situation' of 'Homo philosophus' (TIHP 142).
However, Levinas himself arguably provides no account of what we might call the
pedagogical predicament of his own homo expositus, a severe oversight for a
phenomenology otherwise so attentive to locating phenomena (4>ouv6psva) against
the horizons of their constitution.
To be sure, the second order activity of describing who, or what, an existent
is, is, as Llewelyn indicates, 'part of what it is to behave responsibly to it qua
existent,' for it is 'part of what is called for if the existent is to be respected for its
own sake.' Such a response, Llewelyn argues, may only be solicited if
'acknowledgement' is first made of the 'prima-facie responsibility to support an
existent because it is, in abstraction from what it is' (Llewelyn, 2000, 225-226). I
believe Llewelyn to be shrewd in his assessment here. Moreover, the logic of
Levinas' own presentation of the face ultimately commits one to reasoning along
such lines, especially if one wishes to preserve the sense of the face as that which
signifies in spite of the form through which it reveals itself. Levinas deviates from
the letter of his own 'testimony' (he shuns the tutelage of the face) because he
awards the ethical teachings of his own generative tradition a normative function
within the domain of the proto-ethical. The third party does, of course, intersect the
axis of the face-to-face relation. However, the third party need not be a Mitnagdic
122
Jew, nor the social horizon of its intervention, that of Mitnagdic Judaism. These are
important provisos upon which one must, I fear, insist, if one is to continue to read
Levinas responsibly today.
Despite Levinas' own admission that a 'prophetism,' and a 'Talmudism,'
preceding 'theological considerations,' are revealed in the 'face of the other man'
(.ETE 112), he does not, I believe, recognize the full extent to which the theological
'considerations' to which he refers here - the theological montage supposedly de¬
constructed by the summons of the face - set the stage within which the drama he
describes takes place. Expressed phenomenologically, one might contend, then, that
the face is an interface between the susceptibility of the flesh and the instruction of
the third party, the 'place' where these two vectors coincide as portage. Certainly,
Levinas' claim that the face is a-historical (the one-for-the-other cannot be 'collected
into a history,' he states (OBBE 70)), and his insistence that 'ethics' is 'independent'
in relation to 'history' (5 295), cannot, I would argue, be sustained unless one
interpret what Levinas means by the 'face' in this way. The structure outlined here is
trans-historical, therefore (it is not relative to one historical period or epoch) and
heritable in nature. The face thus transcends history by virtue of being a trans-
historical, heritable phenomenon. For as long as Daseinx^e void has been, for as
long, therefore, as the human existent has ek-sistedxrecurred, and occupied the
(pre)originary topos of its therexhere (Daxici), a structural alliance has held between
what I am calling here, the susceptibility of the body, the instruction of the third
party, and the signifier (or dare one say, the symbol (oup[3oAov)) through which the
former are brought into alignment. Providing we do not delimit the sense of
susception, instruction and interdiction too strictly, we may accede to their being
trans-historical phenomena. The proto-ethical structuration of sense is, likewise,
trans-historical within the limits circumscribed by its heritable production. The face
is a 'noumenon' (FC 21), therefore, only to the extent that it exceeds the bounds of
epochal constitution, and not because it transcends epochality as such. In point of
fact, does Levinas not define 'liturgy' (.liturgie) precisely as a 'going beyond one's
epoch [cLepassement de son epoque],' thus lending direct support to such an
interpretation of his work (MS 50; SeS 46)?22
22 Let us not also forget Levinas' statement from Otherwise than Being, that responsibility 'comes
from before and goes beyond what abides in the suspense of an epoque' (OBBE 97).
123
§ 12. The interruption of the face-to-face
The status of the 'third party' (le tiers) in Levinas' work is ambiguous. Despite
Levinas' often rather gnomic statements concerning the role of the third party, the
tertial dimension of first philosophy {philosophic premiere) remains poorly
explicated. Although one might argue that Levinas' principal foci are the face-to-face
relation and the de-situation of the 'ego,' the third party arguably returns proto-ethics
to the jurisdiction of phenomenological accountability, reigning in on the excesses of
the face-to-face and restoring equity to an otherwise one-way, unilateral, movement
of sense constitution {MS 49). But how does the third party reorient and recalibrate
the work of proto-ethics? How is this reversion of contact into consciousness
accomplished positively by the third party; and at what juncture does the third party
intervene, on my behalf, to mitigate against the demands of ethical diacony? Clearly,
these are questions of some import. Levinas' response is, as one might expect,
cryptic. It is debatable whether the ballast of tertiality is sufficiently weighted to
ground the hyperbolism of wave after wave of Levinas' daunting, if not somewhat
fustian, pronouncements. Moral life is, it appears, uncompromising in its inordinacy.
However, by way of concretion, Levinas does affirm the relationship with the third
party to be an 'incessant correction' of (he 'asymmetry of proximity in which a face
is looked at' {OBBE 158). The spiritual 'optics' of the face-to-face are amplified, and
their focus enlarged, to embrace not only 'others' (my neighbour's contemporaries)
but me, myself, because, Levinas opines, 'my lot is important [mon sort importe]'
{OBBE 161; AE 250). The third party gives me back to myself as a member of
society. The 'incessancy' of this procedure indicates that what we might refer to as
the fades interrupta effectuated by the third party, eventuates 'in the midst of
proximity' itself, and not outside it {OBBE 159).
The limits of responsibility - the limits of substitution as such - are
therefore demarcated in the midst of {au sein de) the encounter with the face. As
Derrida notes, it is as if the 'unicity of the face,' the irreducible singularity upon
which Levinas repeatedly insists, were 'plural a priori' (Derrida, 1999, 110). The
face-to-face relation is thus itself the situation of a birth, the birth of 'justice' {justice)
that is 'nascent' in the very 'abnegation' before the face of the neighbour {OBBE
193n.29). A certain synchrony, it seems, perturbs the diachrony of two at the moment
of their contact, one might argue. The very moment of diachronic deferral and
suspension is riven, in the instant of its an-archy, by the intervention of the third
124
party. The alternation, determinative of diachrony, is complicated further by being
disrupted, in media res, by the third party and the demand for 'justice among
incomparable ones' they institute (OBBE 16). I am obsessed by the third party, who,
Levinas confides, 'looks at me in the eyes of the other' (77 213). With the arrival of
the third (an arrival marking at once a 'permanent entry [entree permanente\ into the
space of the face-a-face (OBBE 160; AE 249)), an arrival, moreover, scheduled to
coincide with the visitation of the Other, I may be summoned to postpone my
relations with the Other (Autrui) and submit myself to the wider appeal of 'society'
(ET 32). However, one must not take this as an indication that the face desists from
persecuting me, nor that a 'limitation' has been placed upon my 'anarchic
responsibility' (OBBE 159). Rather, in the name of justice I am obligated to 'go
beyond the straight line of justice' (7/ 245), and to attend to inequality in whatever
form it takes (unless, of course, the form such injustice assumes is that of the
nonhuman, in its innumerable forms).
Justice, as Jean-Luc Nancy suggests, 'designates what needs to be
rendered,' what needs to be given to 'each existing singular' (Nancy, 2000, 186),
where, in the case of the nonhuman creature, what needs to be attributed to them, I
have argued, is the space within which they might be what they are, granting them
the space within which to manifest themselves xa0 auxo. Justice is that which is
'circulated,' or shared, and this 'circulation' extends 'in all directions at once,'
Nancy argues (Nancy, 2000, 3), thus mollifying the intensity of the Other's gaze, and
re-plotting the coordinates of ethical space in alignment with this tertial axis. The
third party moderates my relationship with the Other (.Autrui) in order that my
resources might be shared more equitably. Proto-ethical portage is thus crossed with
ethical partage as I give of myself more judiciously (such giving, we recall, being
middle voiced for I givexam given byxto the Other because I am 'created' by them).
I am, accordingly, and in an ethical transliteration of the bacchanalian, 'animated'
multiply and inspired by a profusion of others - I am a host to many. One might say,
in keeping with Levinas' numerous references to Rimbaud, Baudelaire, and Verlaine
(hardly the most abstemious of poets), that I am proto-ethically profligate, a fool for
justice, one possessed (is the soul not, after all, a 'seed of folly,' as Levinas professes
0OBBE 142)?). Indeed, Levinas will argue that the 'foundation of consciousness is
justice,' and, similarly, that the apparition of the third party is the 'very origin of
appearing,' that is to say 'the very origin of an origin' (OBBE 160).
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Let us be clear. The advent of the 'third' presupposes both the 'cutting up'
(.decoupage) of ethical space into discrete terms (OBBE 157; AE 245) - the third thus
fissures the field of proto-ethical responsibility, effecting its very own de-
claustration of it - and the inauguration of an order of co-presence into which the
plot of ethical 'intrigue' is woven. Such co-presence, or placial contiguity
(■contiguite), marks the inception of consciousness qua conscience. The third
'appoints' me (where the Other' dis-appoints me) establishing a common place or
terrain commun (AE 250) between the Other, others and myself. This vacillation (the
alternation between disappointment and appointment) defines the amphibological
subject in its irreducible ambiguity. The strictures of Levinas' presentation of the
face are, one might say, both heightened and relaxed in Otherwise than Being,
therefore. For in Otherwise than Being, Levinas will concede that a face 'shows itself
between transcendence and visibility/invisibility' (OBBE 158). The interval of
'separation' nonetheless sanctifies this exchange, because the alternance of the face,
which sets the face 'in relationship' with other 'faces' (OBBE 158), draws its charge
from the signification of the 'one-for-the-other' (,l'un-pour-l'autre) accomplished in,
and through, the ordeal of proto-ethical subrogation. There can be no escaping the
fact that, for Levinas, then, phenomenality is produced in and as signification (OBBE
160).
The singularity of the face is betrayed (se trahit) by its very own plural
appeal. Hence, the 'event' of the third party is not 'empirical' (OBBE 158), in the
sense that its legitimacy does not depend upon there being someone, or something,
else present before, or between, myself and the one who faces me. Rather, it is as if
the ethical dis-structure (destructure) were complicit in its own de-structuration.
Ethical space dismantles and reassembles itself recurrently, it appears. Furthermore,
this structural 'ambivalence' is the proper theme of philosophical enquiry. It is as
such that philosophy is 'called upon' to conceive the situation of its birth in 'several,'
and not just two, 'times' (plusieurs temps) (OBBE 162; AE 252). Philosophy is born
from the attempt to do justice to the exigencies and complexities that typify this
extraordinary commerce between the an-archy of proximity, and the pursuit of
principia, or apxou, by which justice might itself be served. Philosophy, Levinas
asserts, is this very 'measure' (mesure) brought to bear on the 'infinity of the being-
for-the-other of proximity' (OBBE 161; AE 251).
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That the face is, as one might say, singularly plural, is once again confirmed
by Levinas in the essay 'Peace and Proximity' (1984), where he acknowledges,
paying homage to Vassili Grossman's Vie et Destin, that the 'face is not exclusively
a human face,' because it may signify as 'families, wives, and parents' (PP 167). The
face is thereby both the neighbour and the 'face of faces,' both 'visage' and 'visible,'
the condition, or very 'fact of seeing' (OBBE 160-161), and an opacity impervious to
sight. However, this alternance in several times (plusieurs temps) - an alternance
susceptible to phenomenological disquisition - is unsettled by what I will call
Levinas' lapsed theology, a commitment to theological thinking, despite Levinas'
repudiation of such charges, out-of-phase with itself, its time, and its work, and as
such both anachronous and atopic. The distribution of justice, and the ethical
'anamnesis' which permits me to 'recall' my status as a 'citizen' among citizens, are
delivered, Levinas argues, "'with the help of God'" (OBBE 160) and ' "thanks to
God'" (OBBE 158). God, it seems, equilibrates the ethical for-structure
(Fiirstruktur), ensuring that the 'plot hatched in proximity' (OBBE 162), and the
distance it delimits, remain uncontaminated by the lateral transit to which they are
subjected by the third party.
What Levinas will call, the 'angelic order of justice' (OBBE 161), irrupts
into Being, by the grace of God (grace a Dieu). God assumes the elusive form within
Levinas' work of a 'trace' {trace), t'xv0S> or cleft, which striates thought, preventing
thought from ever finally being adequate to the comprehension of the other person.
As such, Levinas' work appears somewhat rarefied and lofty, perhaps lacking a
sufficient 'foothold' in being {pied dans I'etre), or a fuss in <j)uois, to be eligible to
qualify as a phenomenology of terrene life. But does such a lapsed theology not attest
to a certain lapsus at the heart of the vigilance upon which philosophy, according to
Levinas, is supposedly founded (it is God, Levinas insists, that founds the eminence
of visitation' {MS 61; emphasis added)). Is God, even if conceived under the
illustrious sign of 'illeity,' not an unnecessary pleonasm in philosophical thought, a
mere flatus vocis\ and is Levinas' thought not left, as it were, coasting on the eddies
of its own flatus? Moreover, when Levinas confers that, in the interest of justice, the
dis-inter-estedness of the 'saying' is 'fixed in a said,' a said which becomes, he adds,
a 'book' (livre), a 'law' {droit), and a 'science' {science) {OBBE 159; AE 247), is he
not minimizing the slippage between the an-archic, and the subsequent apxcu of its
delivery, by fixing the format of the 'said' in a remarkably Jewish, or Talmudic,
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constellation of terms? Certainly, Levinas' 'mission statement' is unequivocal on this
point: 'my concern everywhere is precisely to translate the non-Hellenism of the
Bible into Hellenic terms,' he insists (QA 85). Such 'translation' invariably
encroaches upon the prestigious site of the philosophical Aoyos, although it cannot
quite oust it from its residency, because philosophy, Levinas will argue, is 'spoken in
Greek' (QA 85). But is this peculiarly JewyGreek admixture, or Kpaais, not skewed
in favour of its Jewish phylogeny? Can philosophy (cj)iAoao(J)la) preserve its
commitment to the phenomena (^cuvopeva), and honour them in their manifestative
being, if its dignity is compromised by theological missives? Must philosophy not,
by its very nature as 'measure [mesureY (AE 251), eschew all things divine (Oslov),
unless, that is, all things are somehow divine? Levinas, of course, famously defines
philosophy as 'the wisdom of love at the service of love [sagesse de I'amour au
service de I'amour}' (OBBE 162; AE 253), love, here, being the (Jewish) salve
remedial for (Greek) thought. To be sure, the positive religion of Judaism does not
own the deeds to 'love,' nor guarantee love safe passage through the turbulence of so
called 'secular' history. But what one can say with Levinas, is that philosophy, so
conceived as the measured application of love, exceeds its own 'origin' (dpyq) in
and through a continuous and effusive movement of generation. Philosophy thus
'arouses a drama between philosophers' (drame entre philosophes), a drama
'sketched out' (dessine) concretely as the 'history of philosophy [histoire de la
philosophic]' (OBBE 20; AE 39), a certain history in which the interplay between
subject, Other, and others is structurally rudimentary, enlivening philosophy in its
interminable methodological adventure.
If philosophy, as Husserl intimates, is to 'exercise its function' as that which
is 'archontic' for European 'civilization' as a whole (Crisis, Appendix I, 289), if, that
is, philosophy is to fulfil it 'function' of 'putting itself,' and thereby 'a genuine
humanity,' on the royal 'road to realization' (Crisis, Appendix I, 291), then it must,
Levinas believes, entertain the infidel (that is, entertain the fremd) at the heart of its
enterprise. The 'crisis' to be allayed by philosophy, the 'crisis of European
existence,' as such (Crisis, Appendix I, 299), can only be addressed, pace Husserl, if
'Europe' recognizes the conflux of its Biblical and Greek heritage. This, in turn,
necessitates that philosophy welcome a Jewish interloper among its ranks. 'Europe,'
Levinas affirms, is the 'concreteness where theoretical and Biblical wisdom do better
than converge' (PP 168). The confluence of Biblical and Greek heritage begets the
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'drama' (drame) of philosophy as ethical deaconship. A drama which can only be
conceived against the social horizon, or tertial axis, of the third party (le tiers) whose
presence ensures that the conditions of justice are met, even if its accomplishment is,
de facto, impossible. Philosophy is, after all, an 'infinite task,' Husserl reminds us
(Crisis, Appendix I, 291).
To be sure, Levinas' depiction of 'our' European heritage is undeniably
simplistic, almost perversely so, and one wonders whether the 'Oriental thought'
(pensee orientcile) he banishes from his JewxGreek accord (77 102; Tel 104) has not
contributed more to 'our' philosophical heritage (and, what is more, to our very sense
of heritage (Sinnerbschaft)) than he is prepared to admit. Indeed, Levinas is not
always just in his dealings with heterodox philosophical traditions, and the model of
pluralism he espouses in Totality and Infinity often falters hopelessly before the letter
of its own teaching. Indeed, as Bernasconi notes, 'Levinas excludes the possibilities
of most cultures from contributing to philosophy' (Bernasconi, 1995, 84). The entire
project of ontologizing geographical topoi (tottoi) is, likewise, thwart with
difficulties, and attests to what Husserl might call, despite being implicated in this
very endeavour, a 'mathematization,' if not of 'Nature,' then certainly of natural and
cultural boundaries. Even though the 'spiritual shape,' or 'style-form' of 'Europe' is,
according to Husserl, 'supranational' (Crisis, Appendix I, 276), extending to parts of
the Americas and other 'civilized' colonies, the delimitation of such boundaries is, it
seems, a fairly arbitrary and unregulated affair, prone to trading in generalizations,
not to mention dubious colonial assumptions. (As the rubric of 'continental'
philosophy undoubtedly perpetuates an unhelpful rift between so called Anglo-
American 'analytic' philosophy, and the syndicate of proper names: Hegel, Husserl,
Heidegger, Levinas, Satre, Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, etc., by which the discipline
of philosophy is purportedly known in 'continental Europe.') At best, one derives a
flavour for regional and cultural difference from the descriptions of 'our' 'European'
heritage Husserl and Levinas promulgate, which is instructive, as we will discover in
part three, to the extent that it permits one to ascertain the nature of the 'self
evidences' that are operative in their thinking surrounding these issues, and to
critique them as appropriate.
Of course, if philosophy is characterized by its 'infinition,' or heritability,
its 'drama,' then the 'said' into which Levinas' thought inevitably congeals, is but
one figure in an ongoing historico-philosophical programme. However, Levinas'
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idiosyncratically Talmudic configuration of philosophy - his Yiddish
phenomenology, one might say (a term we deploy here to convey both the
disseminative nature of Levinas' thought, and its diasporic Sitz-im-Leben, and not to
denote anything at all derogatory in importation) - itself represents a 'reactivation,'
in a Husserlian sense (Crisis 361), and a 'repetition,' in a Heideggerian sense (BT
§74 [385]), of the very JewxGreek admixture (Kpaois) Levinas commends in his
work. What we elect to 'reactivate,' or 'renew,' from the store of wisdom Levinas
has handed down to us, very much depends upon our willingness, or unwillingness,
to condone his theological positings and to accept the philosophical miscegenation to
which he gives voice. Any reluctance we might feel, for example, about admitting
that most sanctified of Levinasian words, 'God,' into 'our' philosophical
deliberations, does not undermine the importance, or quality, of Levinas'
phenomenological analyses. Nor does it prevent us from acknowledging the quite
legitimate challenge to Greek autarky in philosophical thinking, posed by Levinas'
Yiddish methodological provocations.
The heritability of Levinasian thought, together with Levinas' emphasis
upon the iterance, iterability, and irritability of philosophical practice (OBBE 143),
enable him to argue, with some degree of persuasion, that the ambit of my
responsibility extends beyond the here-and-now (hie et nunc) of my time to include
future generations. The Other, as we recall, makes such a 'passage' possible (MS 50),
'filiation' being the name Levinas gives to the relation I have with what lies beyond
the confines of my death (in Levinas' terms my 'son' (fils)). Unlike Dasein, for
whom death is principally the 'possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there [Nicht-
mehr-dasein-konnensY and before which 'all its relations to any other Dasein have
been undone [alle Beziige zu anderem Dasein geldstY (BT §50 [250]), me void is
always underway (Unterwegs): there is no scene a faire to the production of ethical
life. In the wake of the third party, the concept of filiation is broadened to incorporate
a more generous distribution of responsibility; the ethical body is at once a liturgical
body shared generatively with others - the seed-bed (semis), or bed-rock
(soubassement), for the disseminative campaign of proto-ethics. The 'for,' of my
being for-the-other, obligates me 'to be for a time that would be without me,' for a
'time after my time' (MS 50). In the face of the Other (Autrui), I am summoned by
others (autres) whose time has not yet come, yet whose gaze 'persecutes' me from
beyond the order of my life. One may need, in this instance, to speak of inter-
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finitude, then. Since finitude, properly conceived under the jurisdiction of infinition,
is, a fortiori, shared. There is, indeed, a 'prophetism' to be glimpsed here (ETE 112),
one whose truth is free from the hokum of the supernatural and the psychical, a
'prophetism' that attests to the very temporality of time as a passage to the time of
others. Time is achieved as dissemination, and what is disseminated is my self. Qua
responsal, I am quite prodigious, therefore. Dedication, as such, is a trans-epochal
phenomenon, truly heritable in scope. Indeed, the third party circumscribes the space
of proto-ethical encounter, extending the contours of its range, because in the face of
the Other (the singularly-plural 'one') the 'history of humanity,' in which 'I have
never participated,' obsesses me. I am, henceforth, responsible for 'the past of the
other' (PJL 176). The source-point of internal time consciousness is betrayed by a
past that is not its own and which is immune to recuperation, a past which lies
beyond the specious frozen present to which Husserl ultimately reduces
consciousness and with it time (at least in so far as Husserl is content to settle for a
genetic phenomenology, which he is arguably loathe to do, if the analyses of The
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Lectures
on Intersubjectivity are anything to go by).
Yet, despite this heritability (defined, one could say, in terms of the three
'ecstases' of responsibility), Levinas will persist in his attempt to locate a
transcendental signifrer amidst the flux of historico-cultural ephemera. This
'transcendental,' needless to say, is encoded within and by the phrase, the Good {le
Bein), and set to work throughout Levinas' various opera. But how can such a notion
be substantiated, and, what is more, drawn down from its unlikely resting place in
some eikonic (viz., Platonic) realm of ideality? Can one really defend a notion of the
'Good' that transcends the horizons of heritability? If the 'Good' is the 'most
profound teaching [enseignement le plus profound]' - the most 'definitive teaching
[enseignement definitivef - of 'philosophy' (77 1 03; Tel 106), and if the 'Good' is
quite beyond Being, then can philosophy maintain its separation from theology and
keep its distance from the kind of opinion (5o^a) it sought to overcome (and seeks to
overcome to this day) in its inauguratory (Greek) phase? To be sure, the 'Good' may
be readily characterized as an orientation, a denotation to which we may submit with
ease. However, as an orientation, or bearing within being, the 'Good' remains bound
to the horizons of its constitution and indebted to the transference of sense (transfert
du sense) or Sinniibertragung, through which it is accomplished. In order to argue
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otherwise (autrement), Levinas will be forced to transgress the limits of both finite
being (Dasein), and inter-finite being (filiation), and install within his thought a sense
of the 'Infinite' that exceeds the remits of phenomenological explication. Clearly this
is a perilous move, and it is at this point that many of Levinas' readers will lose heart
and falter in their approval of his work.
But wait, perhaps we are overly hasty in our assessment of Levinas. Is our
argument not itself fallacious? Do we not commit the fallacy of conflating the 'Good
beyond Being' with some 'ideal' transposed to a world behind the world, to some
'unepoupavtos tottos? Surely by the 'Good,' Levinas wishes to alert us to that
which transcends impulse, drive, and will, in short, to that which surpasses conation.
The 'Good' is both the name for that which summons, or awakens, me from my life
of self-interest, and my taking upon myself the 'whole suffering of the world' (MT
89). The 'Good' is the good beyond being (tj)uais), where being, as we will discover
proximately, is deemed by Levinas to be defined principally by its inter-ewement.
The 'Good' is 'nothing more than this apogee in being [n'est que cet apogee dans
I'etre],' Levinas avers (MT 90; TM 130). The 'Good' is at the furthest remove from
4>ucns; as the apogee of a star, or planet, describes the point at which it is furthest
from the earth. The 'Good' is thus that by which one orientates oneself in being, as a
mariner might orient him or herself by the stars. Of course, it is precisely this sense
of orientation that we have sought to elucidate in the present chapter, taking our own
bearings from Levinas' account of the staging (mise-en-scene) of ethical space.
Just as the stars were once thought to be fixed in a solid sphere surrounding
the earth (a theory later disproved), Levinas believes the 'Good' to be equally
firmamental, conceiving it as a 'fixed point exterior to society' (ET 32). It is this
fixity, and the intractability by which it is characterized, that ultimately prevents the
'world' (monde) from plunging headlong into the abyssal depths of the il y a.
However, what sense are we to make of such a claim? Again, unless we broach the
possibility of a trans-epochal, inter-cultural, interpretation of the 'Good' (a sound
phenomenological proposal), Levinas' 'fixed point' begins to appear more and more
susceptible to dis-aster (des-astre), and less and less capable of charting 'ethical' life
in its unceasing complexity. If what is at issue is 'an order where the very notion of
the Good first takes on meaning;' thus, if what is at issue is broadly speaking
'society' (77 103), how can Levinas attribute fixity to his principle of the 'Good'
without abrogating his commitment to social life? To be sure, the detour through the
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third party, whether conceived as a third individual or raised to the level of culture,
entails that one construe the 'Good' as the product of an ongoing, inter-societal, act
of meaning bestowal. Phenomenologically considered, the 'Good' is only a 'fixed
point' relative to where one stands, bearing in mind that where one stands is merely a
temporary pied a terre on a collaborative journey of ascent toward the 'Good.'
Paradoxically then, qua transcendental, the 'Good' distributes sense, yet its sense is
distributed by those who assent to it, renewing, repeating and regenerating its
'meaning' through the embodiment of various levels of socio-cultural practice.
Perhaps, then, as Jean-Luc Nancy affirms, 'community' is itself 'transcendence'
(community represents a 'resistance to immanence') because it is an 'infinite task at
the heart of finitude' (Nancy, 1991, 35), and not because it is the bearer of divinely
revealed teachings. The torsion, or 'twisting back on itself of the Self [la torsion sur
soi - du MoiY (MT 90; TM 130), which, Levinas believes, epitomizes the
'messianicity' of the responsible subject, therefore not only designates the subject's
'power to bear the suffering of all' (MT 90), as Levinas suggests, but also accents an
irrepressible tension between the orders of ethical and proto-ethical being. We turn
now to consider this tension in more detail.
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Part II
The Regulation of Ethical Space:
The provocation of the face and the limits of
signification
3. DELIMITATION
In an early essay, 'Quelques reflexions sur la philosophic de l'hitlerisme' (1934), an
essay in many ways portentous of world-historical events to come, Levinas proffers
an analysis of Hitlerian anthropology, probing the genesis of its leading concepts and
problematizing the logic of race upon which the regime, to which it gave rise, is
founded. Of particular interest to Levinas is the role ascribed to the body in Hitlerian
thought, for the corporeal dimension of human being assumes a foundational
significance within Hitlerian ideology. Notably, the Hitlerian doctrine of 'Man'
places emphasis upon man's adherence to himself, an adherence, moreover which
'one does not escape' {on n'eschappe) (RPH 68; QRPH 18). 'Man's essence,'
Levinas observes, 'no longer lies in freedom,' as the reigning idealisms would
contend, but rather 'in a kind of bondage' {dans une espece d'enchainement). Thus,
Levinas continues:
The importance attributed to this feeling for the body, with which the
Western Spirit has never wished to content itself, is at the basis of a new
conception of man. The biological, with the notion of inevitability it entails,
becomes more than an object of spiritual life. It becomes its heart. The
mysterious urgings of the blood, the appeals of heredity and the past for
which the body serves as an enigmatic vehicle, lose the character of being
problems [...] From this point on, every social structure that announces an
emancipation with respect to the body, without being committed to it, is
suspected of being a repudiation or a betrayal {RPH 69).
To attain one's true or authentic 'self thus means to become cognisant of the
'ineluctable original chain that is unique to our bodies; and above all else to accept
this chaining' {I'enchainement original ineluctable, unique a notre corps) as basic to
one's being {RPH 69; QRPH 19).
In my reading of Levinas I have sought to highlight the generative dimension
of the latter's thought and have deliberately accentuated the themes of 'filiation,'
'fraternity,' 'fecundity,' and 'teaching,' adapting them beyond the strictures of their
presentation in Levinas' work, in order to question the legitimacy of Levinas'
delimitation of ethical space. The account of phenomenological heredity outlined in
part one, differs markedly from the kind of heredity based on consanguinity
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promulgated by Hitler and subsequently condemned by Levinas above. No doubt,
Levinas would be wary of a number of the proposals I have ventured and perhaps,
above all, of the terms in which they are dispatched. However, I believe I have
remained loyal to the spirit of Levinas' own thinking, if not always to the letter,
despite contesting his management of the field ethics and undermining the cogency
of his method in places.
In part one, my aim was to bring the face into relief against the horizons of its
institution and to set forth, in a preparatory fashion, the conditions under which it
might signify as a face. This aim led to my exhibiting the face upon the ground of its
heritability. In part two, through an elaboration of the themata under scrutiny, the
injunctive environment of the face-to-face relation will be brought to light and the
terms of its assembly further clarified. The susceptibility of the subject, it will be
maintained, is primed pedagogically. One is initiated into an appreciation to and for
the face (a predicament in which one comes to accept the face, and its mandate, as
morally binding) through the acquisition of a schema (axqpa), by and according to
which one regulates one's comportment vis-a-vis others. In the disquisition that
follows, I shall attempt to trace the face back to the situation of its birth (the genesis
of signification) with a view to problematizing the figure in which it is instantiated
within the work of Levinas. The foregoing examination of the face has compelled me
to question the determination of the subject (le sujet) within Levinasian thought and
it is to a consideration of the subject in its susception that I now turn.
§ 13. The vestiges of volition
The various analyses of the body Levinas presents throughout his work, most notably
to be found in Otherwise than Being, take as their point of departure themes
adumbrated in the early essay on Hitlerism: principally, the notion of identity as an
encumbrance or enchainment to oneself. To be sure, the early opuscula, Of Evasion
and Existence and Existents, dedicate themselves to an explication of the problems of
being riveted or held fast by being and the related 'need' for excendence issuing
from this initial stance. Indeed, the motif of 'enchainment' is basal to Levinas'
project and is deployed in various guises throughout his career, culminating in the
situation of ethical claustrophobia detailed at length in Otherwise than Being.
Hitler's biologism, of course, subjects the human to the sovereignty of race and the
136
finality of mythico-nationalistic determinations of heritage, determinations, needless
to say, wholly at odds with the ethical seriation Levinas describes under the heading
of what Derrida will call, Levinas' 'family schema' (Derrida, 1997, viii). Although
both the 'philosophy' of Hitlerism and Levinasian philosophie premiere share a
concern for 'propagation' (propagation), and harbour a suspicion of 'freedom,' the
universality concomitant with racism strives to exert itself through expansion and the
application of force (RFH 70), while it is the responsibilities of the ethical subject
that increase and the compass of its obligation that expands. Let us be clear: the
genealogy to which Levinas submits himself is, like the fundamental ontology of
Heidegger, for whom the 'existential analytic comes before any biological account of
human 'life" (BT §9 [45]), ethical and phenomenological, and not biological.
In Levinas' thought the 'biological' is repeatedly reduced to its ethical
signification. Indeed, so much so that the status of the body in Levinas' work is often
unclear. The precise nature of the accord between bios ([3(oc) and psyche (^Xb) is
therefore moot, as we shall discover. Certainly, in Existence and Existents, the
localization of consciousness in the body is tantamount to the very 'subjectivization
of the subject' (EE 69). Furthermore, the body is conceived there as the very 'advent
of consciousness' (EE 71), a veritable event rather than the mere expression or
simulacrum of one. In Totality and Infinity, the body is the site of a fundamental
ambiguity or ambivalence. It is both that by which one establishes oneself in being
and from which one enjoys the nourritures of elemental life, and that in which one is
mired or steeped in what is other - the density of the element that envelops one (77
164). Hence the body is at once a 'sector of elemental reality,' and also that which
enables one to grasp the world around one and enjoy the fruits of one's 'labour' (77
165). These insights allow Levinas to advance the thesis that thought is breached at
its source (apxp) by sensibility. The sensible is not simply that upon which sense is
bestowed, but that which conditions and sustains thought; a situation that attests to a
reversal in the priority of constitutional activity.
During the period of Totality and Infinity, Levinas' understanding of the body
and its significance is illustrated by the following series of remarks: 'consciousness,'
Levinas asserts, 'does not fall into a body - is not incarnate, it is a disincarnation -
or, more exactly, a postponing of the corporeity of the body' (77 165-166). In the
order of Levinas' phenomenology, 'consciousness,' as we have seen, is not
primordial. One is first exposed and subsequently then conscious. The 'I' arrives late
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for the rendez-vous with the Other and is disbarred from rejoining itself in identity or
auto-identification. The 'field' of exposedness, the (non) lieu of pre-originary
trauma, subtends the region of pure consciousness in Levinas' thinking. The body is
thus designated by Levinas as the 'very regime in which separation holds sway [le
regime meme sous le quell s'exerce la separation]' (77 163; Tel 176). The 'how'
(icomment) of separation is construed adverbially rather than substantively, since
'sensibility enacts the very separation of being' (7/ 138).
Now, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas cautions his readers against conflating
his deductions with the teachings of dualism. The ego does not, therefore, 'hold
sway' in the body qua constituting Ichpol, for the body is first and foremost the event
(evenement) where 'separation' comes to pass. I am, henceforth, most immediately
present to myself in the sensuous experience I have of myself as an embodied
subject. In Totality and Infinity, the 'plane of the inner life' is understood by Levinas
as an 'apology' (7/ 240). The being of signification amounts, thus, to a contestation
of one's very place in the sun. One quits the order of interiority by offering oneself to
the Other. The self is offerable, one might say.
Yet, this account retains a sense in which I am confirmed in my singularity
precisely to the extent that I 'purge' myself of my position in being. I 'am' through
my 'effort' to purge myself of myself (7/ 245). My abnegation of my self is the most
rudimentary form of self-experience I have. Auto-affection is auto-ejection, one
might suggest. I am given (or revealed) to myself as I give myself away. However,
such 'purgation,' also termed 'goodness' (bonte) by Levinas, invariably depends
upon my willingness to subordinate my 'will' or 'desire' to persist in the enjoyment
of my being to the ethically motivated 'Desire' to be for the Other person. Volition,
albeit 'inspired' by the Other, survives into the responsibility by which I am affirmed
in my apologetic position, therefore. This is problematic for Levinas to the degree
that the primacy of volitional activity is left (virtually) intact in his early presentation
of moral life. Thus it appears that although it is 'through morality alone' that 'I and
the Others are produced in the universe,' the production in question is itself the
product of volitional activity (7/ 245); 'activity,' which, even according to the
sublation of the distinction between 'activity' and passivity' broached by Levinas in
his later work, must itself be purged (se vide) from the description of ethically
reduced subjectivity. The analyses of Totality and Infinity do not probe deep enough
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in their excavation of the field of subjective being, a further 'disqualification' of
apology is required, it would appear (OBBE 121).
The trope of 'passivity' is, one might say, the literal sense of the body for
Levinas, and this reflects a shift in the denotation of the concept of 'welcome'
(accueil) between the periods of Levinas' two major works, Totality and Infinity and
Otherwise than Being. In Totality and Infinity, a certain virility defines the notion of
welcome despite the association of accueil with 'feminine' being (although, let us
take heed, a non-biologically determined femininity intended to designate an
ontological 'domain' rather than to suggest 'woman' or 'women' in their concrete
and gendered particularity). Evidently, the will to receive the Other into the
domiciliary space of one's 'home,' differs from the will (voulois) understood as
potens or power. To host is to act and to assume, but such assumption does not
involve a will to dominate the Other, but instead to accommodate them in their
indigence.
However, in Otherwise than Being, Levinas is resolved to expedite the last
remnants of receptivity from his account of sensibility. Sensibility is immediately
subjection, a pure undergoing or pur subir. I do not, therefore, assume the Other, as
if I occupied a 'position' I was only too happy to concede, and subsequently to
relinquish, because I am always already under accusation. My 'position' is always
already under erasure:
A neighbour concerns me outside of any a priori. But perhaps before every a
priori, or from an earlier moment than that of the a priori. This is the notion
all our inquiry means to bring out, so as to reach the concept of an absolute
passivity. Receptivity with regard to the given, a modality of cognition, is not
adequate for it, for precisely the a priori that cannot be excluded from it lets
all the weight of the given be welcomed. This would still be an act (OBBE
192n.20).
Despite being in many ways prior to both volition and activity, the conception of
donation operative throughout Totality and Infinity does not break decisively with the
potency of pouvoir. I remain capable of assuming the Other and it is this capacity by
which my uniqueness qua 'me' is affirmed. Perhaps the transition between what we
might call the active-passivity of Totality and Infinity, and the passive-passivity
(beyond the apriority of the receptivity characteristic of the doctrine of the
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Schematism in Kant) of Otherwise than Being, is reflected in the matrifocal logic
that dominates the latter work. The fil of filiation, in Totality and Infinity, is the
'thread' of my loins qua pater. Even if the son (le fils) who issues from my loins is
separated from me, and thus remains forever loin or faraway, 'he' is nonetheless
'my' son and I inhere in 'him,' despite maintaining my difference from him. The
paternity (paternite) discussed in the fourth section of Totality and Infinity under the
title 'Beyond the face' (Au-Dela du Visage), is a little too robust (like the
'quasimuscular "I think'" in which Levinas believes Husserl's analyses of the lived
body culminate (IS 148)), and a little too secure in its status as progenitrix to
accommodate the Other in ventre. Paternity, it seems, at least according to the
phenomenology of production advanced in Totality and Infinity, engenders, it does
not bear. As such, the Other's 'pain' is kept at bay, or at arms length, something I
might endure were I appropriately motivated, because 'he' proceeds me (even if 'he'
is a 'she' and filiation, being non-gender specific, Levinas urges, is also what we
might call filleation).
If signification is sensibility (OBBE 67), then being-for-the-Other entails
more than the simple forbearance (or active restraint) of 'fatherhood,' but involves,
simultaneously, the patience of motherhood, where the patience in question is the
patience of portage conceived, as it were, immaculately (sans pere), or at least before
the father. Perhaps, then, one ought to read the sections on sensibility, to be found in
chapter three of Otherwise than Being, concurrently with section four of Totality and
Infinity, in order to grasp the apriority of 'maternity' with respect to 'paternity,' in
order, that is, to grasp the fact that the account of paternity contained in the earlier
work is itself matroclinous, depending for its sense upon the prior (although
chronologically posterior) matrix of the 'concept' of maternity to nurture and sustain
it. Hence Levinas will declare 'maternity,' in the complete 'being for the other,' to be
the 'ultimate sense' of ethics (OBBE 108). Lirst philosophy is, one might hasten to
conclude, matronymic. The 'father' is always hisxher mother's sonxdaughter. The
ettekeivcx Trjs ouch a? may father the face but it is the matrix of the sensible that
bears it, a point to which we will return in the conclusion to our study of Levinas.
Prior, thus, to the bipolarity of activity and passivity, free will and
determinism, the passivity of supporting by which the subject is confirmed in its
being places the event of subjectivation outside the order of presence and beyond the
reach of recuperation. As noted earlier, auto-affection is hetero-affection. The
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condition, or as Levinas would say, the uncondition, of my presence to myself has its
origin in my being obsessed by another. I am out of phase (out of joint) with myself
and as such 'senescent' (OBBE 52). I age because time lags. I do not coincide with
myself in the present, but recur on the hither side of my point of departure.
The 'Good' chose me first before I was 'in a position to choose' or 'welcome
its choice,' such electability attesting to my 'pre-originary susceptiveness [ma
susception pre-originaire],' Levinas insists (OBBE 122; AE 195). The 'Good'
assigns me to myself to the extent that I am 'obliged without this obligation having
begun in me' (OBBE 12; emphasis added). The element of consciousness is thereby
not the 'setting' or mise-en-scene for the encounter with the Other. The movement
back from the synchrony of the said to the anachronical saying that precedes it,
effects a reduction beyond consciousness to its hither side, the (non)lieu and (a)topos
of the properly human. Consciousness no longer returns to itself, for the
consolidation guaranteed by such a regressive movement is denied it. 'Homelife' will
never be the same again (and again), one must conclude, since the reduction to the
saying beyond perseverance in being breaks up the identity of ego, de-posing it and
exposing it to the trauma of the 'outside' (OBBE 182). The noematic core of
intentional activity is, Levinas maintains, turned inside out 'like a cloak' (comme une
veste) (OBBE 48; AE 82). My being turned to another is my being turned inside out,
as if the papered walls of my 'home' already faced outwards to the clamour of the
street, rendering me vulnerable to the inclemency of weather and passers by alike.
The dwelling secured against the elemental does not protect one from the Other.
Rather, with Derrida we might say that 'the dwelling opens itself to itself (Derrida,
1999, 41): The alien is already in one's midst, the home a 'concave without a convex
[envers sans endroitf (OBBE 49; AE 83). I am at once both 'host,' and 'hostage,'
therefore, providing, that is, one recognises that the simultaneity which marks this
conjunction of terms is itself freighted diachronically; a middle voiced diffusion of
tense on the hither side {en deqa) of the distinction between activity and passivity. As
Levinas explains:
The reverting of the ego into a self...is the very modality of dis¬
interestedness. It has the form of a corporeal life devoted to expression and to
giving. It is devoted, and does not devote itself (vouee et non pas se vouant):
it is a self despite itself (un soi malgre soi), in incarnation, where it is the
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possibility of offering, suffering and trauma (OBBE 50; AE 86; emphasis
added)
Sensibility defines the subject in its subjectivity and attests to its pre-originary
exposedness; pre-originary because prior to the initiative of the ego and prior to what
might be assembled by representational or recollective acts. Corporeality is thus to be
understood in terms of patience, and not in terms of that by and through which I can
negotiate the complexities of my environment (Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger) and fulfil
the empty intuitions of intentional life (Husserl).
Of course, Levinas' account of the body is not figurative (although the figura
of the face modifies the corporeal schema) because, as he puts it, 'being is ordained
to height' (MS 57). The body, as such, conceals a dimension 'more material than all
matter' (OBBE 109). But what does Levinas mean here? Surely such remarks require
elucidation. After all, the proposal that the Good 'chooses me' prior to my choosing
it, does not offer itself easily to understanding. We must interrogate these
suggestions further, therefore, not least because Levinas provides his readers with a
dearth of concrete examples with which to grasp his excruciatingly complex
arguments. If 'no one is good voluntarily' (ED 117), as Levinas adverts, then is
'ethics' not at base reduced to a form of quietism? In short, one must answer 'no.'
But, one might be forgiven for thinking so from the descriptions Levinas assays. We
must examine this issue more closely, then, in order to guard against the possible
misunderstanding which so readily confronts us here.
§14. Susceptibility
In the essay 'Substitution' (1968), and with a view to fixing the sense (sens) of
freedom in its determination as transcendence, Levinas will advance the following by
way of clarification. 'Let us suppose for a moment that the ego is free and capable of
deciding in favour of solidarity with others,' he suggests, 'at least it will be
recognised that this freedom has no time to assume this urgent weight and that,
consequently, it appears collapsed and defeated under its suffering' (S 95). Central to
appreciating the import of Levinas' comments here is the notion that the time of
deliberation and debate, the time which would permit the ego to retain a certain
amount of composure before the choices that assail it, is itself temporised by the
surfeit of responsibilities to which the ego is subjected, ab origine. There is, Levinas
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will have us believe, no time in which to accept this burden, for the time internal to
consciousness, and characterized by the unceasing play of protensions and
retensions, is interrupted by that which precedes the reflective gaze of consciousness
upon its own contents (reflection takes time) and exceeds the sphere of absolute
origins Husserl deems to be accessible to 'insightful inquiry [schauenden
ForschungY (Id §55 [107]). If the cogito, qua site, is the place where the mind exists
as cxpxti that is as a beginning, then the situation to which Levinas alerts us is an¬
archic, since the events it recounts threaten the tenure of consciousness by preventing
it from retaining, modifying and constituting that which afflicts it.
If, according to the stipulations of Husserl in Ideas I, 'every positing begins
with a point of initiation,' a 'positional point of origin' (Id §122 [253]), as it were,
then responsibility, apropos of Levinas, is not posited, but instead suffered. The self-
initiating spontaneity, sua sponte, enjoyed by the pure Ego (reines Ich), is denied the
Levinasian subject. The T does not rejoin itself in synchrony: positional
consciousness is desituated. Rather than being an apxq, the 'sphere' or 'field' of
consciousness is disturbed by that which punctuates the fringes of its intentional life.
Phenomenology may well be the 'maternal ground' (Mutterboden) of philosophical
method (Husserl, Ideas III, §15 [80]), however, the matrix to which Levinas leads his
readers back is that sense of 'maternity' (maternite) that defines the subject in its pre-
originary susceptibility. The oneself is a late-comer, one might say, a laggard who
arrives late to, and subsequently misses, her own 'beginning,' only to discover the
echo of the neighbour's cries already ringing her ears (of the maladies endured by me
void, to which we will return proximately, one may perhaps number tinnitus as
among the most acute).
As intimated, one of the problems that besets explication of such issues is the
lack of concretion accorded them in Levinas' writings. Efforts to concretize Levinas'
arguments meet with a certain amount of resistance, since the arguments he
promulgates refuse to lend themselves to commonplace exempla and spum
elucidation. Holding the door open for someone and muttering 'Apres-vous' as one
does so (an oft quoted Levinas attempt at concretion) hardly clarifies matters, nor
translates in concreto hundreds of pages of dense and often protracted prose.
Furthermore, the examples one might cite to derive some sense from the 'anarchic'
proposals outlined by Levinas, would no doubt be rejected by him for being inimical
to the 'plot' of ethics.
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If the non-intentional, non-conscious trace of the 'immemorial' striates
consciousness, and yet as such undoes the 'categories of mechanism' (BPW
183n.42), we cannot, in so far as we wish to adhere to Levinas' own 'teaching,'
proffer an interpretation of susceptibility based upon the subject following a rule of
conduct instituted for it in conformity with socially generated axiological norms.
After all, morality precedes culture, Levinas avers (MS 57). Moreover, such a
reading leaves the subject free to follow or ignore the imperatives that govern the
social relationships within the home-world (Heimwelt) to which is submitted.
Susceptibility is not algorithmic, therefore. One cannot argue that a subject cedes to
another, in this instance, that a subject opens a door for another, simply because they
are acting in accordance with established societal mores that arbitrate proper conduct
on such occasions. Susceptibility, Levinas will maintain, is anterior to the
sedimentation of 'values' within a subject's field of comportment. Hence, as
Waldenfels observes, Levinas arguably invites us to treat 'our whole sensorium as a
responsorium' (Waldenfels, 2002, 77). The phenomenal field is a field of
exposedness.
The descriptions of susception Levinas sets forth represent, in many ways,
what we might term the overdetermination (surdetermination) of concrete situations
and encounters. Day-to-day charity and kindness, the small mercy (la petite bonte) of
letting the other person pass first through a crowded street despite one's own haste,
accomplishes, concretely, the proto-ethical (dis)structure Levinas endeavours to
isolate under the heading of 'susceptibility.'
In book three of The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes
between actions that are 'intended' or 'voluntary' (ekouoiov) and those that are
'unintended' or 'involuntary (aKoucnov). A subject acts voluntarily if 'the principle
that moves the instrumental parts of the body in such actions' resides in the subject,
and the 'things of which the moving principle is in' a subject, are in that subject's
'power to do or not to do' (Aristotle, 1925, 1110a 10). An involuntary action is one
that takes place owing to ignorance or as a result of compulsion. Significantly, both
the terms voluntary (SKOuaiov) and involuntary (axouaiov), Aristotle insists, 'must
be used with reference to the moment of action' itself (Aristotle, 1925, 1110a 10).
Similarly, 'choice' (upocupsaic), which is likewise voluntary, relates to the
predicament of deliberation preceding an action and circumscribes that class of
things that may be brought about by one's own effort: 'we deliberate about things
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that are in our power and can be done,' he contends (Aristotle, 1925, 1112a 11).
upoaipsaic thus entails the subjugation of appetitive drives (opaxis) to the
principles of rationality and thought, which accounts for the fact, or so Aristotle
believes, that 'choice is not common to irrational creatures' such as nonhuman
animals (Aristotle, 1925, 1111b 1).
According to Aristotle, it is 'choice' that foreshadows the moment of action
and predisposes the agent to act in consonance with rational, deliberative principles.
Such apxcu are, however, subjected to critique by Levinas for they afford the moral
agent respite in the midst of the situation that confronts him, or her. Ethicality,
Levinas will urge, is characterized by its 'restlessness' (agitation), rather than the
sort of ataraxy (aTapa^ia) commended by Aristotle. Furthermore, the 'moment' of
action upon which Aristotle bases his account of the voluntary (ekouoiov) and the
involuntary (aKouoiov) is structured diachronically in the Levinasian presentation of
susceptibility. The 'moment' is fissured, it no longer coincides with itself but is
postponed indefinitely (infinitely deferred), demarcating the passage of that which
has always already withdrawn from the clearing of the present. Of course, Aristotle
deftly underscores what is at stake in any action that may be qualified as ekouoiov,
namely that the 'body' (acopa) of the one who acts voluntarily and by choice is
animated by a series of rational principles to which that agent subscribes, such
subscription taking place in the interval of deliberation that precedes all preferential
activity. It is the nature of this animation that perturbs Levinas. For while he will
maintain that sensibility is immediately rational (a proposition we have yet to
corroborate), it is the other person who 'animates' the subject and not some abstract
principle or law with which it aligns itself. Responsibility is, Levinas proffers,
'without deliberation' (OBBE 120).
In the first volume of his Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology, Husserl
claims that the 'Ego' does not dwell passively in its positings but rather generates
them, the latter radiating from the Ego which functions as their 'primal source.'
Positing, as such, is the Ego's 'free spontaneity and activity.'' Moreover, Husserl
continues, 'every act of no matter what species can begin in the mode of spontaneity
pertaining, so to speak, to its creative beginning in which the pure Ego makes its
appearance as the subject of the spontaneity' (Id §122 [253]). To be sure, Levinas
contests the putative spontaneity underlined by Husserl here. The Ego, for Levinas, is
not the initiating point of action and volition since qua origin it is deposed by the
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other person. However, Husserl's analysis of the actional is instructive because it
confirms that all positional activity or positing undergoes what he calls a 'modal
alteration.' Every positional point of origination or initiation radiating out from the
pure Ego is, Husserl argues, immediately 'converted into another mode.' For
example, perceptual seizing upon, taking hold of, are immediately and without a
break changed into the 'having in one's grip' (Id §122 [253]).
Now, we have hitherto noted that a similar and equally immediate (if not
somewhat arcane) alteration obtains at the heart of susceptibility. Exposedness
converts immediately into a being-exposed-for. One's being responsorial, to employ
Waldenfels term, converts into one's being responsible for others. It is this modal
alteration or conversion that has caused us to question the phenomenological
viability of Levinas' project. Husserl's proposal is far easier to substantiate, of
course, and although Levinas consistently disputes the tenancy of the pure Ego
(,reines Ich), undermining its dominant position as apxq, his own account of
susception is far from convincing. By what sophistical act, or according to what
licentia rabbinica, is proto-ethical vulnerability, which, let us be clear, is purportedly
proto 'ethical,' reprised as ethical responsibility? Certainly, the language deployed
throughout Levinas' later works, language which Levinas deems to be defined by its
'over emphasis' (OBBE 119), struggles to resist the modal 'rehabilitation' accented
here. As Levinas himself explains:
The ethical language we have resorted to does not arise out of a special moral
experience, independent of the descriptions hitherto elaborated. The ethical
situation of responsibility is not comprehensible on the basis of ethics (OBBE
120).
Be this as it may, 'ethical' language (by which I mean the language of agency,
comportment, and regulation) does insinuate itself into the proto-ethical descriptions
Levinas ventures. We thus more effortlessly from a salutary account of corporeality,
and a considered disquisition of egology, to a (phenomenologically) unwarranted
designation of vulnerability as responsibility. The reversion of 'thematization into
anarchy' (OBBE 121) in the description of proximity Levinas assays (the reversion to
the eversion or turning inside-out of the subject), is at once predicated upon the
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'evidence' sanctioned by the modal conversion adumbrated above. But can this
conversion be justified as such?
It is not entirely clear why, or indeed how, the 'modification of maternity
[modification de la maternitef (OBBE 75; AE 121) is accomplished as persecution,
not to mention why (or how) maternity, which is 'bearing par excellence' (le porter
par excellence) ought to commit one to bear responsibility for being 'persecuted by
the persecutor [du persecuteurf (OBBE 75; AE 121). One can accommodate
Levinas' suggestions that subjectivity is sensibility, and that sensibility, qua
exposure, involves a 'wounding' of the kind of theoretical receptivity ascribed to the
pure Ego by Husserl. One may even excuse the rhetorical excesses of Levinas' prose,
and the blustering descriptions he offers of susception as an expulsion from the site
of oneself and a restlessness without hope of reprieve. However, to argue beyond the
phenomenological lucidity of these descriptions, and endorse the flagrantly
'religious' proposition that as Levinas expresses it, 'my basic posture is 'the for-the-
other' (SaS 158), is to test the allegiance of readers perhaps otherwise sympathetic to
the trajectory of Levinas' thought, and to transport one, as Janicaud would say, 'into
the country of the ideal' (Janicaud, 2000, 41).
It may be, of course, that me voici is subjected to the other, qua 'persecuteur,'
much in the way that Dasein, according to Heidegger, is subjected to its 'there' (Da),
and to thereby having to make sense of its Being and the Being of beings; a
predicament upon which Dasein must continually project itself if it is realize its
ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This possibility for being 'authentic' (released, in
however transitory a sense, from the 'publicness' of the 'They' (das Man)) is
something Dasein must continually choose: 'Because Dasein is in each case
essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself'
(BT §9 [42]). However, the choice whether to have to make such choices, and here
we rejoin Levinas, is not a liberty granted Dasein, and Dasein therefore finds that its
freedom is necessarily grounded (or ungrounded) in its dereliction (BT §53 [74]).
Choice is radically contingent. One is submitted to a world. Dasein, we will recall, is
delivered over to its 'Being free for the freedom of choosing itself' and 'taking hold
of itself' qua Da-sein (BT §40 [188]). Moreover, Dasein is individuated as Being-in-
the-world through anxiety, anxiety disclosing Dasein in its 'uncanniness' as one who
is 'not-at-home' (one might say that Dasein is 'animated' by anxiety). Approached
from an 'existential-ontological point of view,' Heidegger avers, 'the 'not-at-home'
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must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon,' more primordial that is,
than the state of being-at-home with oneself (BT §40 [189]).
Dasein, like me void it would appear, is an exilic being, one whose de-
centrement or displacement is constitutive of its very being. But does such congruity,
although at best arguably superficial, enable us to deepen our understanding of
susception and fix it in its determination more precisely? Regretably not, Levinas
would maintain. For ultimately Heidegger will conceive 'selfhood' as 'free
responsibility,' freedom thus (Freiheit) obligating Dasein 'in the ground of its
essence' to be 'responsible (verbindlich) to itself' as thrown being-in-the-world
(Heidegger, 1992, 192). Furthermore, 'freedom 'is' and understands itself as the
origin of responsibility,' in so far, Heidegger insists, as freedom 'constitutes the
essence of Dasein' (Heidegger, 1992, 214-215). Despite qualifying his remarks by
admitting that Dasein remains 'metaphysically powerless' in the face of the
'actuality' of extant, worldly beings (because Dasein is pre-eminently
'transcendence,' namely possibility), Heidegger's confidence in the grounding of
existence in freedom galls Levinas. Nonetheless, me void is delivered over to itself
to the extent that qua 'support' it is backed up and 'accused in its skin' by the other
person (OBBE 106). Dasein's being delivered over (iiberantwortet) to itself,
however, entails its being delivered over to its ownmost possibility for death, a
luxury not afforded me void for whom death signifies by way of the death of others.
Although both beings (Dasein and me void) are unashamedly eccentric and
incontestably exposed, it is the death of another for whom, according to Levinas, I
am uniquely responsible and not my ownmost being. As Levinas notes, 'in this being
that we are, do 'things' not come to pass in which our being does not count as first?'
(RQ 58). And again, in responsibility is accomplished 'the future of death in the
present of love' (EN 217). In Otherwise than Being, Levinas states that 'contrary to
the ontology of death this self opens an order in which death can be not recognized
[peut ne pas etre reconnueY (OBBE 115; AE 182). Levinas subordinates the Dasein
in 'me' to the 'soul' (ame) in me (the soul of my soul being precisely the other-in-me
(OBBE 191n. 3)), a bold move, to be sure, given Heidegger's repudiation of the
concept of 'soul' (Seele), together with other outmoded explicata, for being
altogether inadequate to the task of interpreting the human subject ontologically (BT
§§6,10). As we will discover proximately, Levinas rescues this palaeologism from
the margins of deconstruction (and Heideggerian Destruktion), altering its
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'traditional' determination considerably, and crediting the concept with a distinctly
proto-ethical importation (OBBE 103).1
Of course, as Levinas observes, death for Heidegger, as that which
individualizes Dasein, is 'untransferable [incessible]' (BTDOT 44). One's death is
one's own, after all. But it is precisely this sense of 'untransferability' (in consonance
with the 'mineness' (Jemeinigkeit) it promotes) to which Levinas objects. Although
he will concede that 'it is as my own that substitution for the neighbour is produced'
(OBBE 126), and likewise, that the ultimate meaning of my 'mineness' is revealed in
the wrenching of the ego from its hypostasis (PA 177). For although, qua me voici,
no one can take my place as 'bearer of the world,' in becoming responsible for the
other person, I am substituted for them. The relationship with the other obsesses
'me,' assigning me to myself, in as much as the oneself to which I am assigned is
'irreplaceable in responsibility [irremplaqable dans la responsabilitef (OBBE 103;
AE 163). The subject is hypostasized as the other in the same (OBBE 111), that is to
say, as an inversion and subversion of essence, where the identity of the I is no
longer reducible to the for-itself (poir soi) of consciousness (as a persistent presence
to self) but is rather bound to the anarchic 'plot' of responsibility, having been torn
from, and divested of, the 'site' of itself.
Now, Heidegger does indicate, for example in The Metaphysical Foundations
of Logic, that in 'choosing itself Dasein really chooses precisely its being-with others
and precisely its being among beings of a different character' (Heidegger, 1995,190).
Being-with (Mitsein), lest we forget, is constitutive of Dasein's Being. The term Da¬
sein is intended, after all, to overcome egological determinations of being. Being-
with is to be 'understood existentially' (BT §26 [118]) and as such situates
Heidegger's Daseinsanalytik beyond the schema of intersubjective relations. Dasein
is not an ego and thus does not confront an alter-ego. To suppose, as Heidegger puts
it, that 'one human being would first have to empathize their way into the other in
order to reach them' fails to grasp Dasein in its essential constitution as exposedness.
Moreover, philosophy (and Heidegger's critique of Husserl is hardly covert here) has
'reinforced this illusion even further by propounding the dogma that the individual
1 Levinas is well aware of this Destruktion of sense, as is attested by the following series of remarks.
The notion of the soul,' Levinas states, 'has been purified over the course of the history of philosophy
of any connotation other than that which evokes consciousness or thematizing contemplation' (TDTT
100-101).
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human being exists for him or herself as an individual and that it is the individual ego
with its ego-sphere which is initially and primarily given to itself as what is most
certain.' Consequently, for Heidegger.it is insofar as human beings exist that they
find themselves always already 'transposed in their existence into other human
beings,' even if there are no other human beings factually present (Heidegger, 1995,
206).
§ 15. The charge ofsense
The apodicticity Husserl secures from the evidence (Evident) of my holding sway
bodily in my primordial sphere founds the constitution of the alter-ego. Despite
sharing Heidegger's reservations concerning the Husserlian enterprise of
analogization, and remaining loyal to Heidegger's basic insight that Da-sein is
openness - subjectivity, Levinas will argue, is 'incapable of shutting itself up' (NI
151) - Levinas distances himself repeatedly from Heideggerian Mitsein (as he does
from the Buberian 'we') because he believes, quite mistakenly I would contend, that
this third term smudges the distinction between the 'Same' and the 'Other' upon
which 'morality' is founded. Levinas' departure from Heidegger here is therefore
largely a question of disagreement regarding the status of origination. The positional
point of origin, for Husserl, is the pure Ego. Heidegger ultimately places this origin
outside the opposition between an ego and an alter-ego in an impersonal 'Open' (das
Offene) or clearing (die Lichtung). The impersonal nature of this lighted region
disturbs Levinas. He reads in Heidegger's (non-humanocentric) description of
unconcealedness (aAq0sia) a refusal on the latter's part to accord adequate
significance to the relationship between human beings.
Yet crucially, I believe that Levinas arguably, and quite understandably, for
psycho-biographical reasons, conflates Heidegger's 'philosophy' with the latter's
involvement in the politics of National Socialism during the 1930's, and thus refuses
to engage the subtle nuances of the Heideggerian oeuvre post Sein und Zeit. Levinas'
persistent excoriation of Heidegger is problematic. Having left the 'climate' of
Heidegger's thought so early in his philosophical career (EE 19), Levinas resigns
himself to calumny, rather than to the serious exegesis of Heidegger's work. For not
only does Levinas fail to appreciate Heidegger's constant proviso that his
presentation of the Being of Dasein moves beyond egology (thus Dasein's 'choosing
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itself cannot be interpreted ontically as an act of selfishness, nor, indeed, ought
Dasein's 'being for-the-sake-of-itself' to be conflated with an egoistic struggle for
existence, both of which Levinas attributes to Dasein, and both of which Heidegger
repudiates), but he also reproaches Heidegger for what he deems to be the complicity
between the latter's ontological (and subsequently metontological) analyses, and the
ontico-empirical commitments to which they give rise and from which they are
derived.
However, Levinas himself, as intimated in chapters one and two, sullies the
boundaries between the proto-ethical and ethical regions of description in his own
writings, and regularly deduces 'ethical' consequences from proto-ethical principles
or apxcu, awarding ethical importation to proto-ethical structuration. This often
imperceptible slippage or glissement de sens, which proves detrimental to the overall
cogency of Levinas' project, but which may be accounted for because of the
constraint imposed upon Levinas' thought by the concrete (pre-philosophical)
situation of human suffering, is not so readily discerned in Heidegger's thought
which is compromised instead (particularly in its later phases) by its dalliance with
the crypto-mythological. Therefore when Levinas argues that 'persecution is not
something added to the subjectivity of the subject,' but is rather the 'ultimate secret
of incarnation [I'ultime secret de I'incarnation]' (OBBE 111; AE 175), he thus
intends the designation in question to describe both the 'trauma' of the subject in her
vulnerability and the impossibility of evading another's assignation (proto-ethics),
and the empirical situation of being responsible for another person, that is, in
suffering for them (ethics). The empirical accomplishes the proto-ethical and yet the
terms of the ethical recur (like subjectivity itself) on the hither side of their own
instantiation in the concrete. Quite a feat it would seem! Indeed this 'secret' of
incarnation is so clandestine, and the modal conversion upon which it depends so
furtively accomplished, that the operation(s) by which it is installed conceal their
traces absolutely (awarding new meaning to the phrase, Deus ex absconditus,
perhaps).
'Substitution' may well be central to Levinas' mature account of subjectivity,
however its productionxapplication is rent by a scission which undermines its
presentation. Furthermore, if the ontology of being-with is an ontology of
embodiment (to be sure an implicit if underdeveloped theme in Heidegger) then one
may, with Jean-Luc Nancy, be justified in identifying the origin (apxq) Husserl
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situates at the heart of positional consciousness, as the 'discrete spacing between us\'
a spacing, what is more, extending 'between all beings' and not simply between
those of the species homo sapiens. (Nancy, 2000, 19), thus correcting the
anthropocentrism of Levinasian first philosophy.
As factical Being-in-the-world, Dasein is thrown into a body and subjected to
'moods' (albeit not 'psychological' (BT §29 [134])) which arise on a definite bodily
basis. 'Embodiment,' Heidegger will announce in The Metaphysical Foundations of
Logic, 'presents an organizing factor' and is that in which Dasein is 'dispersed ' and
'disunited in a particular sexuality.' Dasein's essence 'contains a primordial
bestrewal,' Heidegger adds, 'a dissemination' in the flesh. Such 'bestrewal'
(.Streuung) and 'dissemination' (Zerstreuung) (Heidegger, 1984, 137-8) are
primordial features of Dasein and bind it forcibly to its 'there' (Da), subjecting it to
the existence it must take up and, quite literally, body forth. Being-with is bodily
through and through, therefore, and Dasein is individuated or 'dispersed' bodily in-
the-world. One emerges outside, into the 'Open' (das OJfene), through one's body.
The body is that by which Dasein pervades its environment and that upon which the
disclosive operations of disposition are founded.
Certainly Dasein, for whom its Being is, we will remember, an issue for it, is
charged with making sense of Being, I would contend. Dasein is obliged to make
sense of its existential predicament, such making sense being precisely, as Heidegger
intimates in the 'Letter on "Humanism,"' a matter of comportment (or thinking as
conduct) (Heidegger, 1947, 220). This requirement to make sense of its existential
situation, impels Dasein in its engagement with Being, and is not imposed or
enforced upon it from without, but motivates Dasein in its very essence, since Being
ultimately ek-sists Dasein. Being set-forth bodily into the 'Open' (or 'clearing') that
Being is, entails that Dasein lets beings be (Heidegger, 1947, 220); by which
Heidegger no doubt means that Dasein lets Being accomplish (or achieve) itself
according to its own determination, in and through the beings that are. Bodily
'dispersal,' while obviously not 'ethical' in the customary sense awarded this term,
does permit Heidegger to think the 'there' of Da-sein as the originary 'abode' of
152
ethics (Heidegger, 1947, 256), the place (tottoc) where sense is enacted or practised,
and the place from which axiological significations derive their meaning.2
To Levinas, of course, this Heideggerian ethos (f]0oo) completely elides the
dimension of the interhuman (despite highlighting the importance of the body) and
suppresses the dignity of the other 'human' being, favouring instead the dignity
(Wiirde) of Being in its self-disclosure. Moreover, Dasein's 'conduct' is moderated
(one might say it is affected) by Being, such that Being affects itself through Dasein.
Auto-affection is affection ofxby Being affecting itself.
For Levinas, as we have seen, responsibility is hetero-affectively inspired,
and while it could be maintained that metontologically speaking Dasein is the self-
affection of Being, ontologically such motivation, like the 'call of conscience' itself,
nonetheless appears to come from me and yet from beyond me' {BT §57 [275]). The
status of this 'beyond' in Heidegger's thought is undeniably complex and despite the
fact that it is arguably through the miasma of 'Uncanniness' (Unheimlichkeit), itself
the most basic kind of Being-in-the-world, that Dasein is summoned to its
potentiality-for-Being, Levinas will persist in disclaiming the 'Da' of Dasein to be a
reposeful 'attachment to Place' (attachement au Lieu) characterized by its
'enrootedness' (enracinement) (HGU 232; HGN 325). While Heidegger will concede
in Being and Time that Dasein does 'repose in the weight of its existing' {BT §57
[284]), in the Basic Questions ofPhilosophy he will argue that the Grundbestimmung
of 'wonder,' or Er-staunen as he terms it, 'displaces man into and before beings as
such,' this displacement thereby delivering Dasein to its 'basic disposition'
(Heidegger, 1994, 147). Granted that this very displacement compels Dasein to make
'sense' of beings, and to 'suffer' and 'accept' Being as that which 'overgrows' and
'transforms' it, this 'suffering,' moreover, being 'beyond activity and passivity as
commonly understood' (Heidegger, 1994, 151), do Levinas' pronouncements not
trivialize Heidegger's thinking unfairly?
Indeed, even Levinas himself appears to acknowledge the possibility that
despite Heidegger's prioritization of the thinking of Being, the displacement
effectuated in 'anxiety,' by which Dasein is exposed to the 'bare 'that-it-is' of its
2 This is a proposal already prefigured in Being and Time. There Heidegger argues that 'Dasein itself,
as in each case my Dasein and this Dasein, must be; and in the same way the truth, as Dasein's
disclosedness, must be. This belongs to Dasein's essential throwness into the world' (BT §44 [228]).
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'there' (BT §57 [227]), permits one to catch sight of 'the original significance of
ethics' (EN 168). Furthermore, when reduced, Levinas confers, consciousness
reveals itself to be possessed 'by the non-ego, by the other [and] by "facticity"' (IS
150), an admission that could be hardly more Heideggerian. It may be then, that the
'anxiety' which individuates and isolates Dasein, exposing it to the trauma of its
being not-at-home as a mere place-holder (Platzhalter) of the 'nothing,' exposes it,
and opens it in a new way, to the incursions of others. Phenomenologically, in the
wake of the uncanny (das Unheimlich), in whose wake, unbeknownst to das Man,
Dasein always already finds itself 'dispersed,' Being-with (Mitsein) may be an
altogether more traumatic affair than one might first have thought; particularly if,
like me voici, who recurs on the hither side of itself, Dasein can 'never come back
behind its throwness' (BT §58 [284]), nor elude the originary trauma of its
exposedness (and is Dasein in its resoluteness not, as Heidegger informs us, 'pushed'
into 'solicitous Being with Others' (BT §60 [298])?). To be sure, the 'emphasis of
sense' (OBBE 50) Levinas identifies as the modality of dis-interestedness, obligates
one to be for-the-other corporeally, since signification has meaning 'only among
beings of flesh and blood' (OBBE 74). Notwithstanding Dasein's bodily 'bestrewal'
- Dasein's being Streuung out corporeally - the fact that Dasein goads itself, qua
conscience, from dispersion in the 'they,' the fact, therefore, that Being goads itself
through Dasein (Heidegger, 1947, 235), convinces Levinas that the logic of the
Daseinsanalytik (and the subsequent Holzwege along which Heidegger's thinking
digressed) entrenches Heidegger's thought of Mitdasein within the confines of a
circulus vitiosus, from which Levinas will feel it necessary to depart. Yes, one is
under a directive to make sense of Being, but such 'sense,' Levinas will charge, is
first glimpsed in the face of the Other, even if spection, per se, is not the via regia by
which one approaches the face.
Sense signifies, one might say, through the patience and pain of contact.
Susception is separation-in-proximity, and it is the body through which the subject is
susceptible. Again, with Heidegger, and against Husserl (although Levinas will retain
and develop Husserl's emphasis on the lived body (Leib) as central to the
'relationship' with the Other), Levinas rejects the role of empathy (Einfiihlung) in the
encounter with the Other insisting that, 'substitution is not the psychological event of
compassion or intropathy in general, but makes possible the paradoxical
psychological possibilities of putting oneself in the place of another' (OBBE 146).
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Now, if substitution conditions the possibility of empathy, are we to presume
likewise that qua proto-ethical destructive, substitution establishes the formal
conditions for empirical ethical encounters?
Arguably, while Levinas will maintain that 'substitution 'precedes the
empirical order' (OBBE 116) and expresses the absolute passivity of the self, it is
only accomplished in concreto in and through my relationship to the other human
being. It is because something like 'sacrifice' occurs that Levinas is able to deduce
responsibility as its ultimate term. By reducing such concrete instances of charity to
the substrata that belie them Levinas reveals, and subsequently describes, the
transcendental conditions of such actions. But these conditions do not give rise to
their instantiation in the concrete, they rather take shape there, and the figure or
figures they assume is that of a 'face that is weighed down with a skin' and a skin,
(my skin behind which I am ill at ease, so much like a 'Nessus tunic' is it (OBBE
109)) 'which is always a modification of [and by] a face' (OBBE 85; translation
attested). Of course, the deduction Levinas pursues here is something of a
JewxGreek contrivance (if not connivance) and the slippage previously accented,
between the proto-ethical and the ethical orders of description, remains no less
oleaginous. Levinas may well retort that his deductions are 'necessary and yet non-
analytical' (Tl 28) for they attempt to retrace the 'trace' of that which withdraws
from thematization in the present. The 'moment' of 'ethical' impact, he will argue, is
(dis)structured diachronically and therefore resists the strictures of an exacting
chronometry. Perhaps we will be prepared to waive our criticism of Levinas on this
count, therefore? Before we recant our earlier remarks in undue haste, however, let
us examine the accord between 'enjoyment' (jouissance) and 'substitution'
(,substitution) in order to elucidate the stages through which the deduction Levinas
oversees must pass en route to its accomplishment as ethical deliverance.
§16. Modification
We will recall that jouissance (functioning in many ways as a Levinasian
existentiale) conveys a far wider denotation of meaning than its common usage in
either English or French would suggest. Jouissance is not restricted in signification
to necessarily positive, or broadly speaking hedonic, states-of-mind, but
encapsulates, under the auspices of Levinas' deployment of the term, what might
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otherwise be regarded as negative determinations of meaning, as well as the kind of
contemplative activity commended, as we have seen, by Aristotle. Enjoyment is en-
joinment. I cleave to myself, and assume my position in Being on the 'basis' of my
body which is 'nourished' by the elemental, in which, qua existent, I am bathed. Of
course alimentation need not be a genial affair (although arguably the earth 'Ark'
that subtends the 'base' of my body is genial in a familial-cum-generative sense,
being the 'source' of all generation, where generation must not be limited to
production but includes manifestation, as we will discover in our concluding chapter,
and where we would be rash to dismiss the insight that perhaps Deus sive natura)
and the 'sinking of one's teeth into things' (77 129), which ultimately serves as
Levinas' trope for enjoyment (OBBE 125), similarly entails that things sink their
'teeth' into me, so much so that the joy of en-joinment is also a paining one must
endure. As Bachelard notes in The Poetics of Reverie, a suggestion with which
Levinas would agree, 'what a grasp of the world is a bite' (Bachelard, 1971, 178).
The upsurge of the subject thus begins in enjoyment (77 119) and enjoyment is won
through the achievement of separation.
In later works, of which Otherwise than Being is, of course, exemplary,
enjoyment features decisively as an 'ineluctable moment of sensibility' (OBBE 72),
the very pulsation of the I. Enjoyment enjoys 'its own appetite' (OBBE 73), Levinas
opines and thus thrives upon the conative drive that both motivates and sustains it.
Again, the pre-philosophical experience of 'biting' is instructive for Levinas in this
regard. He writes:
To bite on the bread is the very meaning of tasting. The taste is the way a
sensible subject becomes a volume, or the irreducible event in which the
spatial phenomenon of biting becomes the identification called me, in which
it becomes me through the life that lives from its very life in a fueri vivendi
(OBBE 73; emphasis added).
The invocation of space here is critical. As we have seen, Dasein's spatiality
(Rdumlichkeit), at least during the period of Being and Time, is a product of its de-
severances and the way it 'makes room' for entities within an equipmental region.
Space is pre-eminently pragmatic, therefore - organized in accordance with the
npaypcxTa with which Dasein deals: 'Dasein can be spatial only as care,' we recall
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(.BT §70 [367]). The Levinasian existent, by contrast, accomplishes its separation
concretely in the immediacy of sensibility. The bite is a 'spatial phenomenon
[phenomene spatial]' (OBBE 73: AE 118) because it discloses the world immanently
as 'savor' (saveur).
Like Dasein, who takes space in (einnehmt) (BT §70 [368]), making space its
own and thereby providing for its existential leeway or Spielraum, the existent
assimilates that which nourishes it and coils in upon itself. This 'coiling in over itself
[s'enroulant sur lui-memeY (OBBE 73; AE 118) is crucial for it quite literally fleshes
the ego out, granting it a savorous space (very much akin to the 'leeway' of Dasein)
within which to 'enjoy' itself. This inwardness, and the coiling of the ego back upon
itself, which Levinas likens to the 'winding of a skein' (OBBE 73), is hollowed out in
and by enjoyment, a felicitous space which is subsequently cored out by the Other
(although according to the diachronic logic of 'creation' such subsequence is always
already underwritten by the an-archic 'event' that precedes it) and everted so that the
ego, in its immanence, is confounded and exposed to the 'outside' from whence its
identity is constituted and to which it is oriented.
The 'dominant signification [signification dominanteY (OBBE 63; AE 104) of
the sensible to which Levinas is led back from the phenomenon of 'biting' (broadly
representative of enjoyment) is to be found in vulnerability, therefore. Enjoyment
feeds upon itself and is never sated. At the heart of sensibility dissatisfaction stirs;
the subject is unsettled in its immanence and its coincidence with itself is disturbed.
Sensible experience is pervaded by restlessness and it is this restlessness (inquietude)
that ultimately marks the 'passing,' qua trace, of the Other and is indicative of the
subject being, as it were, caught up {prise en) in proximity. The relationship with the
other person ante cedes consciousness in its enjoyment, although the restlessness that
troubles such enjoyment of oneself provides the phenomenological Leitfaden, or
clue, to the subject's pre-originary susceptibility. In the midst of sensation then, the
ego is torn from itself and its enjoyment is frustrated.
In the midst of sensation? If sensibility is characterized principally by a
'taking care of the other's need,' that is, as 'giving' (OBBE 74), then does one find
oneself 'in proximity' only insofar as one is approached by an other? To interpret
Levinas thus would be to miss the point, I fear. The openness of sensibility (an
openness not to be confused with the intentionality of consciousness aiming at
objects) attests immediately to my being exposed to the other. Perceptual acts already
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harbour (the) ethical (signification) since in any act of perception, or cuoSqcnc, I am
seized by an other (an object or 'thing') 'from whom I suffer' (NI146). I am affected,
and my being affected reveals my passivity. Where objects encroach upon me, the
Other person persecutes me, and as we have hitherto seen, the Other need not be
present 'bodily' before me (of course, the other is (n)ever truly 'present' before me)
for me to be obsessed by her, for the 'mineral surfaces of things' (OBBE 191 n.10)
already obsess, and they do so, Levinas insists, because they bear the traces of human
others across their surfaces.
When reduced, therefore, the sensibility determinate of gustatory, olfactory
or tactile sensation reveals as its basis the one-for-the-other of signification. The
body qua base may, as the analyses of Totality and Infinity make clear, be based in
the elemental other (Vautre), but the format of the element is itself revealed, in later
works, to be the material substrate through which 'signification signifies
[signification signifieY (OBBE 68; AE 111). Matter 'materializes' in the satisfaction
of enjoyment (OBBE 73), but it is accomplished ethically in and through donative
acts. As Levinas concludes, matter is 'altered by the immediacy of contact' (OBBE
74), modified, or dare one say it (and no doubt Levinas intends a designation of this
sort), matter is 'redeemed' through being given. Signification thus entails:
the passivity of being-for-another, which is possible only in the form of
giving the very bread I eat. But for this one has to first enjoy one's bread, not
in order to have the merit of giving it, but in order to give it with one's heart,
to give one's self in giving it. Enjoyment, is an ineluctable moment of
sensibility (OBBE 72).
Of course, the 'bread' I eat, masticate and swallow bites back as remorse, gnawing
away at the stony core of my identity like indigestion and reminding me, through the
galling pain of heartburn, of the famished and the destitute who I deprive with every
mouthful I ingest (OBBE 114). In the concrete situation of charity, therefore, 'I'
recur qua 'me' on the hither side of my 'enjoyment' of my self. I am, as Levinas
states, held hostage by the other person who 'animates' me, 'loosening up' and
'unclamping' my identity (OBBE 68). It is in this sense, then, that one is to
understand what Levinas means by substitution, namely the 'reversal' whereby the
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'other inspires the same' (OBBE 64). Substitution is the panification and distribution
of the self, one might conclude (were one perhaps theologically inclined).
Clearly, the modification of the ego in its substantiality that is characteristic
of substitution, differs markedly from the 'intentional modification (intentionale
Modifikation) of my Ego by which, according to Husserl, the other becomes
constituted appresentatively (apprdsentativ) for me in my primordial sphere (CM §52
[144]). For while both Levinas and Husserl agree that the 'animate organism' (Leib)
plays a pivotal role in the constitution of, and/or the relationship to, the 'other,'
Husserl, or so Levinas will advert, remains entrenched in the belief that the reduction
effects a passage 'from a less perfect to a more perfect knowledge' {PA 178). Thus,
the intersubjective reduction Husserl implements, despite to some extent liberating
the alter ego from the compass of the ego's sphere of owness, terminates in an
equivalence or reciprocity between dyads (albeit, as Derrida confers, that of a
transcendental symmetry between two empirical asymmetries (Derrida, 1978,126)).
The cardinal points of space (or more pointedly, kinaesthetic space) - the hie and the
illic - are interchangeable to the degree that the sense I derive of the other's body in
the 'mode there' {Modus Dorf) results from an apperceptive transfer from my body
in the 'mode here [Modus Hierf {CM §54 [147]). The 'motivational basis'
{Motivations fundament) for the analogising apprehension of the other, then, is my
animate organism. I am located here, 'somatically' {leiblich), and as such occupy the
'center of a primordial "world" oriented around me [Zentrun einer um mich
orientierten primordinalen Welt]' {CM §54 [148]). This primordial sphere of owness,
appurtenant to the ego in its position of prominence, has 'the content of the Here'
{Gehalt des Hier) and thus corresponds, within Levinasian thought, to the sphere of
the 'Same': the ego in its immanence and enjoyment. To be sure, Husserl is not
claiming that the other person is 'given' to the ego 'originally' {urspriinglicher). The
other is not merely 'a moment of my essence' {Moment meines Eigenwesens). Nor is
the other's body simply a 'product' of my 'sensuousness.' Rather a certain 'mediacy
of intentionality' {Mittelbarkeit der Intentionalitat) governs the operations of
appresentation {Apprdsentation) and association (.Assoziation) because the sense
{Sinn) I appropriate of the other qua animate organism, cannot become 'actualized'
originarily in my 'primordial sphere of owness [primordinalen Spharef {CM §§50-
51 [139 -143]). The explosion toward the outside (the alter-ego) from the heart of
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one's sphere of owness (the inherence of the other qua other in my primordial
sphere) is treated by Husserl under the heading of empathy (Einfiihlung).
The other, for Husserl, is appresented (apprdsentiert) by way of her body,
which is that which is presented (prdsentiert) in my Eigensphdre. There is a
concordance (Paarung), or complicity, between my body 'here' (hie), and the body
of the other, 'there' (illic), a concordance that while unquestionably instructive,
misses, or so Levinas will opine, the matrix of susception that belies it.
Levinas discerns great merit in Husserl's account of intersubjectivity (to
which we have paid only cursory attention here), however he will castigate Husserl
for being overly preoccupied with the lucidity of self-evidence and, moreover, for
failing to execute the reduction far enough (Husserl misses its 'deeper modalities
[,modalites plus profundes],' Levinas surmises (CW 161; CV 56)). Husserl, Levinas
will suggest, overlooks the defection of identity that is definitive of susception. The
exposure to the other cannot be interpreted as a state, since the very foundations of
egoity are de-structured in the encounter with the other person. Yes, the animate
organism or Leib is the mode of access to another; but the 'I' which, according to
Husserl, holds sway (walten) constitutionally in the lived body, is 'unseated by the
Other [desargonnee par AutruiY in the analysis Levinas assays (CW 168; CV 60).
One must speak, therefore, of inspiration rather than appresentation. The seizure of
the subject pertinent to susceptibility is 'prior to every position of the subject' (PA
179) and thereby substructs the sway of the Ego in its primordial sphere. As Levinas
comments in 'From Consciousness to Wakefulness' (1974):
The spatial interchangeability of the here and the there do not only constitute
the homogeneity of space. Through the interchangeability of the here and the
there, the Ego, despite its being so obviously primordial and hegemenous in
its hie et nunc and in its identification, becomes secondary, sees itself as
other, exposes itself to the other, already has to give an account of itself (CW
164).
The intersubjective reduction confers the possibility of a relationship with the other
person not founded upon the promise of 'knowledge' and immune to the
dissimulations of egological science. Husserl's presentation of analogising
apperception reveals lacunae in the ego's constitution of the world. In seeing itself as
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another the ego entertains the thought (albeit kinaesthetically enlivened) of a placial
relocation. The egological hie cedes temporarily to the alter-egological illic and an
empathic exchange takes place. Such an exchange of place is decidedly
gnoseological however, since the 'ultimate figure of the meaningful [Ultime figure
du sense]' remains inscribed in the field of consciousness, with the pure Ego
stationed at its centre (CW 165; CV 56). And this despite the 'terrestrial weight'
(poids terrestre) of the body which presents itself as the zero point of all experience
(CW 165; CV 55), and the fact that hyletic data are to be found at the base of
intentional acts. Of course, this zero point (Nullpunkt) of subjectivity is, as Levinas
concedes, 'already a conjunction of Kinaestheses and movements' (IM 126), so much
so that the 'activity of holding still' (Aktivitat des Stillhaltens), by which the ego
governs its primordial sphere, is itself constituted kinaesthetically. Reposefulness is
motivated kinaesthetically and thus remains an activity behind which Husserl will
secrete an intentional aim. Ultimately, one might say, the Leib is 'a basis without
mobility' (Husserl, 1981a, 226).
In contrast, ethical animation divests the ego of its autarky rendering the
subject radically passive as one who is 'accused' in its ipseity. Arguably Levinas
inverts and adapts Husserl's assertion that the Leib is the 'bearer of the Ego [Trager
des Ich]' (Husserl, 1997, 162). We are thus informed, through recourse to the
Biblical formula of Numbers 11:12, and in a reversal of the logic of alimentation that
governs section two of Totality and Infinity, that the subject 'bears' the other person
'as the nurse bears the nursling' (OBBE 91). The pure Ego is disturbed in its
recumbency and 'awoken' to the fact that it is incumbent upon it (or rather that it is
incumbent upon 'me,' since the 'I' is driven from the generality of its concept) to
bear the Other. I am, by my 'very position,' 'responsibility through and through' (77/
17), Levinas contends, because I am constrained to give of myself fully as, indeed, I
am constrained to bear the burden of my being and the lassitude which invariably
accompanies it (EE 35).
§ 17. Holding sway ethically
For Husserl, space is constituted as a product of the kinaesthetically functioning lived
body (Leiblichkeit), which is positioned at the centre of the perception field that
revolves around it. The lived body subtends space because it is not merely in space,
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but rather pervades space and moves through it, such movement playing a pivotal
role in the apperceptive expansion (Erweiterung) of the near-sphere (Nahsphdre) of
immediate constitutional activity into the system of fixed places (Ortssystem) that
settle and co-ordinate what Husserl will term, the core-world (Kernwelt) appurtenant
to the incarnate Ego.
The constitution of homogeneous, geometric space (the 'endlessly open
world of space' (Husserl, 1981b, 249)) may thus be traced back to the absolute hie et
nunc of the Ichzentrum, a decidedly corporeal, positional point of origin. As Husserl
intimates in a late manuscript from 1931, 'The World of the Living Present and the
Constitution of the Surrounding World external to the Organism,' from the beginning
'the animate organism has constitutively an exceptional position' (Husserl, 1981b,
249). This 'exceptional position' (Ausnahmestellung), is arguably best exemplified
by the animate organism taken at rest (Levinas' analysis of 'sleep' and the founding
significance of the body as a 'base' clearly build upon these Husserlian
observations). The body is a pivot about which the world turns, even if the body is in
motion, as it is when walking or moving between places. Indeed, and somewhat akin
to the peripateticism of Aristotelian thought, for which perambulation is salutary and
instructive philosophically, Husserl believes walking to be integral both to the
constitution and orientation of the 'original core-sphere' of intentional activity
(Husserl, 1981b, 249). The 'inaction' of what he terms 'walking kinaesthetics' - I
remain stationary despite walking because the perspectival changes phenomena
undergo as I walk to, around, and past them continue to be oriented about my
animate organism - functions as the 'firm zero of orientation' (Husserl, 1981b, 250).
The Leib is consequently experienced as 'my total Organ,' an 'Organ' articulated
into different organs, each in turn governed by the 'functioning ego' that holds sway
in them (Husserl, 1981b, 249), wielding them according to their distinct modalities of
sense.
The ethically reduced subject of responsibility (a subject who, Levinas
insists, is quite literally 'made of responsibilities' (N1 140), as the 'substance' of
Dasein for Heidegger is 'existence' (BT §43 [212])) is not motivated kinaesthetically,
so much as kinaes-ethically. The kinaesthetic activity by and through which space is
constituted and on the basis of which the evidence (Evidenz) of the alter-ego is
secured for cognition, is itself animated kinas-ethically: the schema (axfjpa) of the
lived body (Leib) is undergirded by an ethical body (corps ethique) which submits
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the Husserlian presentation of space to destructuration and subsequent ethical
redaction. The Husserlian Ego may well remain, as Levinas adverts, 'untarnished'
(,impassible) in its commerce with the Other (OS 155; HS 211), however, the ethical
subject is wounded by the others it bears, and its identity qua I is undone by them.
Substitution thus 'operates in the entrails of the self, rending its inwardness,' Levinas
will maintain (OBBE 196n.22). Space, in turn:
belongs to the sense ofmy responsibility for the other. The everywhere of
space is the from everywhere of faces that concern me and put me into
question, despite the indifference that seems to present itself to justice. Being
will have a meaning as a universe, and the unity of the universe will be in me
as subject to being. That means that the space of the universe will manifest
itself as the dwelling of the others. It is inasmuch as it is inhabited by the
others that look at me that the pre-geometrical eidos of space is described. I
support the universe (OBBE 196-7n.22).
The nodal points of ethical space are not, pace Heidegger, pragmatic - they are not
made apparent to me upon my misplacing a piece of equipment, or a tool (BT §22
[104]). Nor are they strictly speaking poietic - qua 'things' the fourfold constellation
of earth, sky, mortals and divinities (das Geviert) does not 'stay' in them (Heidegger,
1996 [1947], 156) - nor again are such loci (Stelle) the termini of the motions of
bodies, as Husserl will argue throughout the 'Foundational Investigations of the
Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature' (Husserl, 1981a, 225). Rather it
is the plural fold of the face that, to employ explicata familiar to us from Being and
Time, 'regionalizes' space and 'makes room' (einraumt) for the dissemination and
discernment of proto-ethical sense (sens).
One might say, in consequence, that the Levinasian subject is de-severed by
the face, and therefore that that 'for-the-sake-of which' (Worum-willen) me void is
concerned, needless to say, non-instrumentally, is the other person, and other
persons, in their singular-plural need. The circumstance of the 'face,' I would like to
suggest, is the 'whither' (das Wohin) toward which the 'hither' and the 'thither' of
ethical life are oriented, a proposal to which we will return in the conclusion to this
work. Levinas' presentation of space is characterized, then, by its unremitting
materialism (a foil, no doubt, to correct the henology of father Parmenides; the
oneself lacks a 'fatherland,' after all (OBBE 195n. 12)), since space, ethically
reduced, is accomplished concretely as the labour of substitution, itself a dual
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movement of eversion and gestation (maternity is the 'gestation of the other in the
same,' Levinas confirms (OBBE 75)). It follows that for Levinas, space is configured
positively both as the product or production of supererogation and kinas-ethical
activity (albeit middle voiced proto-activity in the guise of portage), and the matrix
in which the manifold of faces to which the subject is exposed is embedded, and from
which they signify Ka0 auxo.
The sense of space is therefore not restricted for Levinas to the representation
of an entity, nor is it merely a subjective 'form in which something can be an object
of empirical intuition for our sense' (Kant, 1993, 160). Unlike Kant, for whom space
ultimately has its seat in 'the subjective constitution of mind' (CPR A23/B38) as the
a priori condition of possibility for spatial representation, Levinas endeavours to
'avoid the schema of an intentional subject (OBBE 178) and thus defines space
principally as an 'openness of the self to the other' (ouverture de soi a I'autre) in
response to 'the openness of a face' (I'ouverture du visage) that confronts it (OBBE
180-181; AE 277-278). It is qua support that the subject is 'here' (and this of course
presupposes the subject's being susceptible) and not as the point of origination for
intentional acts. It is as such that Levinas will describe the oneself as an 'excession
of the here [excession de l'ici\ (OBBE 193n. 31; AE 14) and as a 'panting' (un
haletement) on the 'hither side of the here [en deqa de I'ici]' (OBBE 180; AE 276),
the hie exceeded being the egoic hie, or Ichzentrum, that Husserl deems to be
stationary (and thus at rest) even during motion. Me voici, one might hasten to add,
is, or rather goes, 'without rest' (sans repos) (OBBE 180; AE 276), since it is by
virtue of its sufferance for others, and is thus an Archimedean point of a wholly
different order to the Nullpunkt around which, according to Husserl, the concrete
world of life (Lebenswelt) pivots and 'achieves' its sense (Sinn) for an ego.
The body by which the oneself is susceptible is the point of intersection
between the other and myself, the situation or situs, according to Rabbi Hayyim
Volozhiner (1749-1821), whom Levinas cites approvingly, of a tension, or torsion,
between 'worlds,' the place of the 'incatenation of worlds [I'incatenation des
mondesY (IGREi 158; IDD 189). The human being is composed of the 'residues'
(residues) of these countless worlds (where 'world' may be interpreted broadly in
terms of 'spiritual collectivities, people and structures [les collectivites, les
personnes, les structures spirituellesY (1GRHV 161; IDD 194)) and thus bears the
traces of encounters with innumerable others (although both Hayyim of Volozhin
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and Levinas restrict such encounters to the sphere of the interhuman). Indeed,
commenting upon the Kabbalistic cosmology of Hayyim Volozhiner, to which he
gives his assent, Levinas notes that the aforementioned 'worlds' are connected with
the various organs of the human body, each one subject to the Torah's
commandments, in such a way that 'the whole of the worlds constitutes a human
stature.' Moreover, and here perhaps one observes the origin of a motif so prominent
in Otherwise than Being, the human being 'feeds' (L'homme nourrit) the 'worlds'
through his or her body, thereby establishing a relation 'between the human body and
the Temple of Jerusalem, which for its part is an exact replica of the heavenly
Temple, the order of absolute holiness' (IGRHV 158; IDD 190). Of course, it is only
through nourishing others that the Torah's commandments are kept (the 'tearing
away of bread from the mouth that tastes it [I'arrachement du pain a la bouche qui le
savoureY (OBBE 64; AE 105); where bread, we recall, already refers to the incarnate
subject {OBBE 191n.7)).
The understanding of the body Levinas inherits from Hayyim of Volozhin, is
irrepressibly Jewish and, what is more, Kabbalistic in outlook. Despite tempering the
speculative excesses of Rabbi Hayyim's cosmography, Levinas retains the moral
imperative that arguably impels it, adapting it to his own metaphysical ends and
incorporating it into his phenomenological analyses. The responsible subject bears
the 'widow' in her Heimwelt, supports the orphan in his Nahsphare, and attends the
stranger in his Kernwelt, nourishing each (and therefore being 'animated' by each
accordingly) with the 'substance' of its flesh. Hence, in the essay 'Transcendence
and Height,' Levinas will note that 'it is as if the substance of the 'I' were 'made of
saintliness' (777 23), since in its being it is 'created' for-the-other (pour-Eautre).
Furthermore, it is as such that the description of proximity outlined in Otherwise
than Being may be designated 'as a hagiography of the-one-to-the-other [comme
hagiographie de I'un-pour I'autre],' Levinas asserts, because the subjectivity of the
3 Given that, 'in spite of everything,' Levinas claims to be doing 'phenomenology' (QA 87), he might
have related the Kabbalism of Hayyim of Volozhin more closely to the phenomenology of Husserl. As
the following passage from Ideas makes clear, there are resources within Husserl to counter the
speculative aspects of Rabbi Hayyim's thought. Certainly, the notion of 'incatenation' need not be
interpreted cosmologically: 'the eidetically singular essence [eidetisch Singulare] thus implies
collectively the universals lying above it and which, for their part, level by level, "lie one inside the
other," the higher always lying inside the lower' (Id §12 [26]). A more daring proposal, and one
consonant with the developmental themes accented in this chapter, would be to see in the phenomenon
of 'incatenation' the intrication of child, adolescent and adult worlds.
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subject is ultimately accomplished as a substitution for another (OBBE 193n.33; AE
146). The universe of possible sense for Levinas is, when rerouted through the
thought of Hayyim of Volozhin, the multiverse of possible susception. The limits of
susceptibility are the limits, then, of the Mitnagdic imagination.
§ 18. Haptic science
We have hitherto problematized the move by which Levinas seeks to convert this
pre-originary susceptibility into a sufferance 'for' the other and found his attempts to
justify this 'reversal' (renversement) (OBBE 64; AE 105) inadequate to the situation
under scrutiny. But perhaps we have been unnecessarily callow in our disquisition of
Levinas and failed to grasp the audacity of his proposals. In the interest of fairness let
us review the status of this conversion in the light of our ongoing explication of
ethical space.
It is indeed true that Levinas likens the oneself to a 'fulcrum [point d'appui]'
{OBBE 106; AE 168), a denotation in consonance with the Husserlian presentation of
the incarnate Ego as the 'pivot' around which the phenomenological field rotates.
However, qua fulcrum the oneself {le soi-meme) is the 'locus of support' for the Ego
to which Husserl returns again and again in his various Meditationen. Ipseity is
consequently not an 'abstract point' (un point abstrait), nor 'the center of a rotation'
(icentre d'une rotation). It is not 'identifiable on the basis of the trajectory traced by
the movement of consciousness,' but rather 'a point already identified from the
outside,' a point 'already older than the time of consciousness [deja plus vieux que le
temps de la conscience]' {OBBE 107; AE 169; translation modified). I would contend
that in order to understand the import of Levinas' suggestion here, one must refrain
from fixing this 'fulcrum' in its signification too narrowly, and hence limiting the
purchase of its phenomenological application, by identifying it exclusively with the
recurrence of ipseity and the 'turning of being back on itself' {OBBE 106). For the
'transference from the 'by the other' into the 'for the other' {OBBE 118) determinate
of substitution - the reversal by which sensibility becomes sense {OBBE 64) - is
accomplished across the interstices that dispart pre-philosophical life from its
philosophical articulation.
Levinas' reduction of the 'saying' (the very 'liveliness of life' {le vivre de la
vie) which ruptures the terms in which it would be set forth {CW 166; CV 56)) to the
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'said' of apophatic discourse, inevitably betrays the 'experience' it endeavours to
reduce, which, as a Levinas reminds us is 'the beyond of experience' itself (L'au-
delci de I'experience) (OBBE 148; AE 232). Nevertheless, it is insofar as the sheer
'gratuity' of sacrificial acts happen (from the simple deference before another,
exemplified in the 'apres-vous' of common courtesy, to the supreme gesture of
supererogation epitomized by the giving of one's life for another) that Levinas feels
compelled to account for their incidence phenomenologically and to de-duce, or lead
analysis back, to the ethical circumstances that belie them. The oneself is the point of
leverage between the subject (me void, ecce hie, hineni) extraditing its self before
the neighbour in concrete situations, albeit situations reduced under the auspices of a
radical empiricism, and the Ego of philosophical research, dissected painstakingly by
the likes of Husserl and Satre.
To be sure, one cannot deduce the 'for' of substitution phenomenologically
without recourse to the concrete situation of its accomplishment, and it is this
passage to and from the concrete that ultimately legitimates the proto-ethical
proposals Levinas ventures. Levinas does not 'reduce an entity that would be the ego
to the act of substituting itself that would be the being of this entity,' for 'substitution
is not an act' (OBBE 117). Consequently, the oneself is 'older than the time of
consciousness,' not only because the event by which it is constitutedxereated exceeds
its capacities qua 'I,' but because the hour of its birth (proximity is 'the latent birth of
the subject [la naissance latente du sujet]' (OBBE 139; AE 218)) disturbs the
organization of philosophical thought, and the possibility of thematization, by
exposing the labour of cognition to the work of substitution to which it defers; a
predicament lying out with the bounds of the Aoyoc (and thus rupturing the
'container' of the 'work' (CW 166)), yet orienting the work toward its proper term.
The 'work' thus replicates (or rather reproduces) the gestatorial feat of bearing the
other within the same, according to which the subject, apropos of Levinas, is most
accurately described. The 'overemphasis of openness' (I'emphase de I'ouverture)
that characterizes responsibility, an overemphasis which epitomizes 'the thesis of
the present work' (la these du present ouvrage), the work in question being both the
treatise entitled 'Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence' and the work of
substitution the latter endeavours to express, reflects the openness of the work
(oeuvre) to what lies beyond its ken, namely the kenosis of one-for-the-other that
'guides discourse beyond being [elle guide le discours au dela d'etre]' (OBBE 136;
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AE 213). Again, we repeat our earlier assertion. The work of proto-ethics is at once
the thesisxarsis of the situation to which it gives witness, the positing and deposition
of the subject it treats, an evacuation of sense (an 'overflowing of sense by nonsense'
(OBBE 164)) that signifies both the subject in its passivity and the work that would
aspire to describe it. The concrete encounter with the Other denucleates its textual
expression, hollowing it out and investing it with the sens it would claim for itself
were such claims not already dashed by the figure of passivity through which they
are conveyed.
Notwithstanding such remarks, the fact that Levinas will concede that 'my
being faced with everything that is,' is to be accounted for because 'I am by regard
for all that is' (je suis par egard pour tout ce qui est) (OBBE 118; AE 188), and yet
maintain that 'I' am faced only by the human, continues to undermine the cogency of
his conclusions and indicates, once again, that the inner horizon of the work of ethics
is far less accommodating than it might well be were the vopoi that regulate its
production more compliant to the 'liveliness of life' in its myriad forms. If, as
Merleau-Ponty affirms in the Phenomenology of Perception, 'an excitation is not
perceived when it strikes a sensory organ which is not 'attuned' to it' (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962, 75), and thus that the significance of sensuous data is a function or by¬
product of anticipation, then does Levinas' refusal to accord the nonhuman a place in
(his) 'ethics' not betoken the fact that susceptibility is always already attuned to the
'faces' that 'traumatize' it, and attuned, what is more, in decidedly nuanced ways?
To clarify. Our principal objective here is not to advance a 'green'
philosophy, nor to ecologize Levinas (a move he would no doubt resist), although
both aims have their relative merits. At best our findings might serve as something of
a propaedeutic to an ecologically sensitive phenomenology, a phenomenology
cognizant of its telluric roots (a directive pursued by such luminaries as Michel Haar,
John Sallis and John Llewelyn). Rather, Levinas' reluctance to accede to the
inclusion of the nonhuman creature within the fold of proto-ethics permits one to call
into question his claim that susception does not revert into an assumption (OBBE
113), since the accusation that weighs upon the subject is limited to and by the figure
or axfjMa of the human face. Indeed, Levinas himself wonders whether the passivity
of the self does 'not presuppose an activity behind the absolutely anarchical passivity
of obsession' and conceal a 'dissimulated freedom' (OBBE 113). Qua conatus, 'I'
may deprive the other person, figuratively or literally (and Levinas' use of the trope,
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and reliance upon hyperbole, purposefully confuse the literal and the figurative
within his work) of their 'place in the sun' {place au soleil). However, does Levinas
not systematically4 expel the nonhuman from the 'lighted region' or 'field' of ethics
(a region in many ways comparable to the 'clearing' {die Lichtung) assayed by
Heidegger, with the notable exception, perhaps, that the 'field' Levinas deduces is
unashamedly corporeal) their 'faces' failing to materialize in the light cast by the
'good beyond Being' (ETTEKEiva Trjs ouaias) which illuminates the 'field' {champs
ethique) Levinas details?
If categorial activity presupposes susceptibility, and susceptibility entails the
encounter between bodies, viz., contact, does susceptibility itself not presuppose
recognition? Either, one must conclude that the subject, in its susceptibility, is
stricken with a severe case of prosopagnosia, that is, an inability to recognise certain
faces (for example, those of the nonhuman), or, one must presume that susceptibility
is always already organized according to the directives of a certain cultural
programming. Unless one is willing to pronounce the flesh immediately and
immanently casuistic, thereby granting it the 'ability' to discriminate between, in this
instance, the ethical weight of what does and does not 'face' it (as a support the
subject thus calibrates the freight it bears), one must, I would contend, concede that
susception and assumption are equiprimordial (although the time in which they are
conjoint is structured diachronically).
To be sure, the ethical soma (ocSpa) is incontestably exteroceptive, receiving
impressions from 'outside' itself. But is it not also epicritical and therefore
discriminating in its discernment, discriminating, that is, of those images, faces, or,
let us say, figures, that follow upon and proceed the initial and traumatic wounding it
endures? If sensibility is truly alvine (a veritable groaning of the entrails {OBBE 75))
as Levinas argues, then must one not submit to the notion that the subject has a 'gut
feeling' {sent instinctivement) for the face of the human other? Is facial recognition
pre-cognitive and, as it were, stomachic? After all, Merleau-Ponty will maintain that
'the passing of sensory givens before our eyes or under our hands is a language
which teaches itself and in which the meaning is secreted by the very structure of the
4
As Levinas suggests in '"In The Image ofGod," According to Rabbi Hayyim Volzhiner,' the
thought of Hayyim of Volozhin provides a 'learned exposition' of the 'system of Judaism and of
Judaism as a system' (IGRHV 153; emphasis added). Evidently such a system, at least in its Mitnagdic
form, prohibits the application of what Levinas will call the, 'face,' to the nonhuman creature.
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signs' (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 319; emphasis added). He will similarly insist that
there is an 'autochthonous significance of the world which is constituted in the
dealings which our incarnate consciousness has with it,' a significance or sens,
moreover, which 'provides the basis of every deliberate Sinngebung' (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962, 44). Despite the fact that for Merleau-Ponty such dealings are
articulated by modes of possible comportment founded on, or rather in, a bodily 'I
can,' and thus remaining at base actional (a point on which Levinas and Merleau-
Ponty will disagree), are Levinas' descriptions of susceptibility any more outre, so to
speak, than the suggestions broached by Merleau-Ponty here?
Surely though, as Heidegger reminds us (and here I believe Heidegger's
remarks apply equally to the 'assumption' of the face that is the praesuppositum of
and for my being susceptible to the face), 'hearkening' (Horchen) to something 'has
the kind of Being' which 'understands.' That is to say, Dasein, 'as essentially
understanding,' is 'proximally alongside what is understood.' Thus, for example,
what we 'first' hear upon hearing something is 'never noises or complexes of sounds,
but the creaking wagon, the motor-cycle,' or 'the woodpecker tapping.' Because we
hearken to entities and not mere sensations we can be said to dwell alongside what is
ready-to-hand within-the-world (BT §34 [163-164]).
Levinas notably, and quite rightly, contends that the other person does not
belong to an instrumental complex (the other person transcends, absolutely, the
referential totality (Verweisungsganzheit) of equipmental relations), and challenges
the kind of dwelling (Aufenthalt) to which Heidegger alludes here. However,
Levinas' aversion to the suggestion that the encounter with the Other is grounded in
what Heidegger would call a certain 'fore-having' (Vorhabe) is less readily
sustained. For how else, other than by a way of some kind of 'fore-sight' (Vorsicht)
(.BT §32 [150]), which, as it were, 'takes the first cut' (anschneidet) or, in the
mordacious terms favoured by Levinas, the first bite, out of what has been
encountered and permits it to be encountered as something definite, are we to explain
why me void is susceptible to the facesxphysiognomies of human beings alone, and
susceptible to these in ways that are deliberate and pronounced. As Heidegger
explains, 'the world which has already been disclosed beforehand permits what is
within-the-world to be encountered.' Letting something 'be encountered is primarily
drcumspedive.'' It is not just 'sensing something,' or 'staring at it' for it implies
'circumspective concern, and has the character of becoming affected in some way.'
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Furthermore, 'to be affected' is possible ontologically 'only insofar as Being-in as
such has been determined existentially beforehand in such a manner that what it
encounters within-the-world can "matter" to it in this way' (BT §29 [137]). Just as
'understanding' (Verstehen) and 'interpretation' (Auslegung) are basic to the
existential constitution of Dasein in its 'there' (Da), so to, it seems, is discernment
rudimentary to the delimitation of proto-ethical space and thus operative
subcutaneously, let us say (to indulge the Levinasian figure of the subject ill at ease
in its own skin - its skin being, contra Heidegger, precisely not its 'ownmost'
(ieigenst)) at the heart of susceptibility itself. It is not simply the Other (Autrui),
therefore, but the others (les Autres), who are under my skin (ont dans ma peau), and
they are therexhere as the historico-structural horizon of tertiality against which I
encounter the face as a 'face.'
Levinas may replace the Heideggerian Als-Struktur with his own ethical Fiir-
Struktur (the-one-for-the-other), but this for-structure nonetheless retains aspects of
the Vor-Struktur Heidegger so convincingly sets forth in the first division of Being
and Time. Perhaps this is what Levinas means when he confers that the phenomenon
of obsession is 'known but is not a knowing [qui est sue mais n'est pas un savoir]'
(OBBE 88; AE 140). The 'neighbor strikes me before striking me,' because, to ape
and modify the idiom of the Daseinsanalytik, qua responsal I arise out of a prior
matrix of exposedness; a 'plot' (intrigue) to which I am bound (je suis noue) before
being tied to the body by which I am susceptible to this or that person in this or that
given situation (OBBE 76; AE 123). This matrix is, as I have intimated previously, an
ethical transliteration of the Husserlian Mutterboden, which conditions the possibility
of one's encountering anyone, or indeed anything, at all. To be sure, the structural
totality of 'Care' (Sorge) which, according to Heidegger, lies before every factical
'attitude' and 'situation' of Dasein is 'ontologically 'earlier" (ist ontologisch friiher)
than the phenomena of 'theory' (Theorie) and 'practice' (Praxis), 'Willing' (Wollen)
and wishing' (Wiinschen), which are exhibited in Dasein upon the prior ground of
Care (BT §41 [193-194]). Care is also more originary than ethics understood as
principia of conduct. Levinas contests the primordiality of this structural whole,
however, and thus pronounces ethical signification to be pre-originary and an-archic,
by which, among other things, he means prior to the 'Care' structure outlined by
Heidegger.
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Such claims are apposite of course, but obviate the problem of how me void
comes to accord meaning to the trauma which afflicts it pre-originarily and how
sense is 'made' of the proto-ethical sens that commands its attention. With Heidegger
we may concur that 'mood' (Stimrnung) is disclosive of the Being that Dasein 'is,'
and that 'states-of-mind' (Befindlichkeit) disclose Dasein in its throwness in a way
that is more ontologically instructive than the phenomena of cognition and volition.
Something need not be present-at-hand (Vorhanden), or admit of apodicticity, to be
evident, Heidegger will assure us (BT §29 [136]). Likewise, we can accede to the
suggestion that beyond any mere 'psychology of moods' (Psychologie der
Stimmungen), Levinasian Stimmungen (or what Levinas would perhaps call manieres
d'etre) such as remorse, shame and horror reveal the proto-ethical basis of one's
being to be a being-for-the-other. Thus, the 'torsion of a complex [la torsion du
complexe]' (OBBE 87; AE 138), revealed in the phenomena of fault and remorse,
permits Levinas to execute a reduction beyond Being (and beyond the Seinsweise
championed by Heidegger), to the situation of susception he believes to subtend
them: a reduction to 'a susception in which meaning transpires [susception oil
ajfleure le sens]' (CW 168; CV 61). However, while susceptibility may be an-archic,
the modification which the 'by' of my being affected 'by' another undergoes to
become the 'for' of my suffering 'for' another is not, and already gestures to my
submission to a 'world,' a world, moreover, in which the existential Vor-Struktur is
undeniably operative, despite Levinas' protestations to the contrary.
Facial recognition (by which we do not mean that of the countenance), and
the requisite modes of conduct that accompany it, are won through acquisition. They
are heritable phenomena or strategies developed by the subject, or into which it
develops, to enable it to 'cope,' in this instance charitably, with those it encounters.
Such strategies are learnt, and while commonalities of approach obtain between
individuals of the same 'community,' and 'ethical' norms fluctuate within a basic
range of values and responses that are shared, differences between cultures, and
indeed between members of the same community, remain and reinforce the validity
of Heidegger's basic conviction that 'circumspective interpretation' (der umsichtigen
Auslegung) is structurally fundamental to Being-in-the-world. Of course, Heidegger
himself acknowledges that the Als-Struktur of interpretation may be instantiated in
two ways, each corresponding, broadly speaking, to whether the 'as' of interpretation
understands the entity it treats circumspectively and thus as ready-to-hand, or
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discovers it to be present-at-hand, and thus the subject of assertortic statements. The
'as' of an act of interpretation that understands circumspectively, Heidegger terms
the 'existential-hermeneutical "as"' (das existential- hermeneutische 'Als') defining
it in contrast to the 'apophantical 'as" (apophantischen 'Als') of an 'assertion'
(.Aussage) (BT §33 [158]), the former being the more obviously primordial
phenomenon.
Perhaps, in order to clarify Levinas' position, one must supplement
Heidegger's twofold exhibition of the 'as' with a third modality of interpretation,
which we might invariably term the 'ethical 'as" of susceptibility. Thus, just as
assertion arises from circumspective interpretation by way of certain 'existential-
ontological modifications [existenzial-ontologischen Modifikationen]' (BT §33
[157]) so too, one might argue, at the risk of exceeding the express intention of
Levinas, does the existential-hermeneutical 'as' of the Daseinsanalytik issue from the
ethical 'as' of susception (and it does so, moreover, as its modification). 'We are in
the world,' according to which the Heideggerian Als-Struktur is adequate, yet 'the
true life is absent' from this world (77 33), and hence an alternative 'structure' is
required to account for its occurrence: the for-the-other of proto-ethical obligation.
As Levinas avers, 'the modification of sensibility into intentionality is motivated by
the very signification of sensing as a for-the-other' (OBBE 71; emphasis added).
Being-in-the-world corresponds, in the order of Levinas' ethical sedation, to the situs
of the home or 'dwelling' (la demeure) from which the ego is displaced by the face
of the Other (interiority, we recall, 'is accomplished concretely by the home' (Tl
154), such concretion exhibited not only in the equipmental relations highlighted by
Heidegger in Being and Time, but also by the nutrimental acts in which the ego
engages, as set forth by Levinas in Totality and Infinity). The 'feminine' presence
which, Levinas maintains, welcomes one 'there,' a feminine presence that need not
be equated with the presence of a woman in the home, since the 'home' is the extra¬
territorial mise-en-scene where the self establishes itself in Being (77 158), 'teaches'
the self a lesson in home economics, thereby 'instructing' it in the ways of the world,
such worldly Weise, or manieres d'etre, being correlative with the rudimentary
structures of Dasein's Being adduced by Heidegger in Being and Time.
One must leave the familial 'home' in due course, however, for one's coming
of age (and it is precisely the ethical maturation of the self that Levinas intends to
adumbrate with the phrase a 'Religion for Adults [une religion d'adultes]' (DF 11))
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requires that one take the decidedly Abrahamic step of departing from the
domiciliary environment of the homestead and venture toward the 'openness of
space:' the 'outside.' Thus, 'to transcend oneself,' Levinas will assert, is 'to leave
one's home to the point of leaving oneself,' to 'substitute oneself to another [Se
transcender, sortir de chez soi au point de sortir de soi, c'est se substituer a I'autre]'
(OBBE 182; AE 279). The 'voice' (la voix) that calls me forth from the 'shelter' of
my self comes from another shore (vient de 1'autre rive), Levinas insists, rather than
from the hearth (OBBE 182; AE 280). First philosophy, pace Heidegger, is not
hestiological. Even if one were to identify the 'field of intimacy [le champ de
I'intimiteY (TI155; Tel 166) extended by feminine being, with Ecma, this would not
preclude Levinas from situating the region of ethics outside what he terms 'the
subterranean digs [la fouille souterraine]' of the self (OBBE 195n.ll; AE 172n.l).
Although, significantly, Levinas will argue that the positive religion of 'Judaism' is
'the flaming hearth of all humanity' (1TN 30), a proposition seemly at odds with the
aforementioned claims and not a little Janiform given Levinas' sustained invective
against Heidegger.
§ 19. Pedagogical predicament
One learns from the facexknee of one's 'parents' to recognise the summons of those
who are not one's next-of-kin and with whom one is not consanguineous.5 Although,
as Levinas makes clear in Beyond the Verse, 'it should not be forgotten that my
family and my people' are 'my "others'" since 'those near to me are also my
neighbours' (BV xvii). Levinas is not, we must be clear, suggesting that one's
'familiarity' with the 'face' is the result of 'habits acquired in this world' (TI 154).
Nor will he sanction the idea that ethics is in anyway instinctual or 'natural' (the
proto-ethical structure Levinas describes is 'beyond instinct and beneath reason,' he
confers (TI 138)), thus coming to heed the authority of the face is in no wise
commensurate with the way 'maternal milk' is able to 'inscribe the movements of
sucking in the instincts of the newly born' (OBBE 88; AE 140).6 If the breast is to
5 This is a 'face,' or 'knee' (genou) (a rib can signify as a face thus why not a knee?), from which, as
Llewelyn notes, 'one learns one's mother tongue' (Llewelyn, 1995, 94).
6 This is unquestionably an allusion to a late, as of yet unpublished, manuscript by Husserl in which
the latter, attempting to elucidate the nature of what he calls 'primal' intentionality, has recourse to
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signify as a 'face,' and if for a moment we entertain the thought that our being might
plausibly be zum-Brust-sein, at least, that is, until we are weaned from the ethico-
genealogical stage of the domicile, then the breast in question signifies beyond ipcoc
and otherwise than (Jntoic. If the teat teaches, it does so ethically, both as a figure for
the manner in which, qua 'nurse' {OBBE 91), I support the Other, and as a trope for
the concrete fixture of the domicile. Sensibility, in its 'signification to the maternal,'
is 'prenatural' (pre-naturelle), we are to assume (OBBE 68; AE 111). Yet one's
recognition of the 'face' already presupposes 'an intimacy with someone' (TI 155).
Even if the face disturbs the intimacy of familiarity status quo ante, one must
postulate an initial situation of familism in order to account for its latency.
One is taught of and by the face before one is in a position to receive it qua
face. The ethical 'as' of susception is thus 'older' than the existential-hermeneutical
'as' of interpretation. One only 'sees' or 'grasps' this anteriority, however, after the
fact (apres-coup). Levinas will argue therefore, that the '"vision" of the face as face
is a certain mode of sojourning in a home' (77 172; emphasis added). The domicile,
the 'first concretisation [concretisation premiere]' (77 153; Tel 163) doubles, one
might say, as a place of learning, a school (ecole) from which the responsible subject
must graduate or from which it is forcibly 'expelled' (OBBE 48). As Bloechl
observes:
If separated subjectivity sustains itself in "dwelling," the face of the other, as
the apparition of a stranger, says not only "thou shall not kill," but also "thou
shall not dwell." Why? Because it now turns out that individual existence is
defined first and most deeply not by any ground or principle, but instead by a
relation of proximity with his or her neighbor (Bloechl, 2000b, 243).
Arguing for a recovery of the strata of incomplete development that constitute our
Dasein, David Wood notes that in Heidegger 'Dasein for the most part, seems to
mean adult Dasein' (Wood, 2002, 225). Similarly, I would contend, in Levinas the
ethical subject is no less 'adult' (the 'idea of being overflowing history makes
illustrate his remarks through reference to the 'direction toward drinking' of the newborn. See, for
example (Smith, 2003, 150).
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possible existents both involved in being and personal,' Levinas confirms, existents
who are 'called upon to answer at their trial and consequently already adult' (77 23;
emphasis added)). Might the transition between domiciliary life and the eu-topianism
of exile not reflect the developmental progression of human maturation, and might
this transitional phase not be appraised phenomenologically? Each phase of
development possesses its own distinct ways of Being-in-the-world or 'dwelling,' the
child and adolescent phases corresponding roughly to the ethico-genealogical stage
of 'habitation' through which one must pass if one is to attain one's 'final reality'
(.realite derniere) as an ethical subject (77 178; Tel 194), yet upon which one depends
qua base. Is ethical 'animation' not, after all, 'expressed by the metaphor of
habitation,' as Levinas himself opines (OBBE 71)?
Arguably, Levinas fails to provide a credible account of the pedagogical
predicament of his own homo expositus and despite treating the themes of filiation,
fraternity, paternity, and maternity (and the domiciliary logic they either disrupt or
presuppose) such themata do not attend sufficiently to the related problemata of how
one develops proto-ethical sense and how one is initiated into (or, to employ a
meteorological motif, of which there are many in Levinas' work, acclimatized to)
one's condition of being susceptible to and for the face. Lor if the approach of the
neighbour is 'a fission of the subject beyond lungs' (fission du sujet au-dela du
poumon), then surely one must learn to breathe at 'ethical' elevation (OBBE 180; AE
277), and to assume the role of a pupil (eleve); a process of assumption (assomption)
inherently linked to the way in which one is reared (elevage), or to what we have
called, heritability. Tropes aside, a hard and honest look at the spectacle of human
life is enough to assure one that however gratuitous sacrificial acts may be, their
apparent spontaneity is nourished aetiologically and such conditioning warrants
careful analysis. If Levinas' ethic of ethics is to have any 'practical' application
beyond the lectern, then the pedagogical infrastructure that belies and nourishes the
kind of concrete ethical gestures it reduces must be explicated and assessed. The
teaching 'methods' of the yeshiva are perhaps outmoded and their generality
questionable.7
7 The yeshiva is a form of Talmudic college; a place of study. Indeed, the Hebrew word means
'sitting, dwelling, meeting' (ITN xii). Levinas will endorse the pedagogy of the yeshiva and laud its
rigor. It is clear from Levinas' 'Talmudic' writings that the yeshiva occupies a central place in his
understanding of Judaism; above all the yeshiva exemplifies 'faithfulness to the Torah as culture'
(IGRHV 153; emphasis added). As Levinas explains in 'The Pact,' the 'yeshiva is one of three places
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One may speak readily of a 'reverse conatus' (un conatus a I'envers) and
extol an 'inversion of essence [line inversion cle Vessence]' (OBBE 70; AE 114),
however the transition between conatus and votary (or conatus and 'saint') is
elucidated poorly by Levinas because he does not concretise his descriptions of
ethical life sufficiently, nor refer to the development of the human being and how
moral sense is intricate to this process. Had Levinas explored in greater depth the
'interval' between the two phases of hypostatic being he endorses (the hypostasis by
which the ego overcomes the anonymity of brute being (il y a) and masters itself (i);
and that by and through which the self is created qua responsal (ii)) he may have
spared his analysis the inconsistency it suffers through its failure to consider how the
susceptibility of the subject is pedagogically primed, that is, how susception, beyond
the initial exposedness of affectivity, is cultivated, how cult and lore regulate
susception in the dimension of its historically.8 Yes, as Levinas will say, 'in the
touch itself' there is 'the possibility of a helping hand' (SE 66). No doubt too the
'caress is dormant in sensorial or verbal contact' (LP 125). But, the child orphaned
during war and deprived of nurture may not recognize this, and while such cases of
'abnormality' in no way represent the whole spectrum of human affective responses,
the findings of psycho-sociological research indicate that our capacity to love and
show compassion, and our ability to tolerate and offer affection, are very much the
products of socialization. We subjugate these issues at our peril as, indeed, Levinas
does by dismissing the insights of psychoanalysis for perpetuating, as he puts it, the
'petrifying effects of myth' and degrading the dignity of the human subject (ET40).
Again, it may be the case that proto-ethical susceptibility 'designates the
depth of an undergoing that no capacity comprehends' (GP 139; emphasis added).
However, the modification of the 'by' of affection into the 'for' of substitution
(whether or not, as Levinas urges, substitution is the subjectivity of the subject)
requires that one possess, to employ the terminology of section two of Totality and
where the pact [with the Lord] is made.' The 'dignity of this place,' Levinas continues, 'equals that of
Sinai, where the Torah is revealed, and that of the plains of Moab, where it is repeated by Moses' (TP
79).
8 As Levinas himself avers, 'a true culture,' and the cult(ure) of the face is no exception to this rule, I
would maintain, 'cannot be summed up, for it resides in the very effort to cultivate it' (DF 252;
emphasis added). Of course, by 'true' culture Levinas means Jewish culture and, more pointedly,
Talmudic culture, a culture to be distinguished, at all costs, from its 'pagan' counterparts. It is a shame
Levinas does not grant the so called 'pagan' the same cultural privileges he accords to Judaism.
Needless to say, these are themes to which we will return proximately.
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Infinity, a developed capacity to be moved morally or animated ethically (that one be
of age ethically, that one be kinas-ethically agile). In instances where the conversion
of the 'by' into the 'for' does not transpire, one may have to speak of suspended
animation. If a being is, for whatever reason, not 'capable of receiving a revelation,'
or incapable of 'learning that it is created' (77 89), then its chances of 'accomplishing
its destiny' as a creature, begin to wane (VO 113). I cannot 'escape' the face of the
neighbour, Levinas affirms, 'without defaulting, incurring fault, or being caught up
in some complex' (GP 143; emphasis added). Yet Levinas will provide no indication
of what these complexes are, the nature of their complexification, nor under what
circumstances they impinge upon the 'productivity' of proto-ethics.
This is perhaps another reason why Levinas does not accord the nonhuman
proto-ethical signification: the nonhuman creature lacks any discernible 'capacity' to
accede to the status of creaturality. Even the dog 'Bobby,' of whom Levinas writes in
the essay 'The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights' (1975) - the dog who recognized,
with his attendant bark, the humanity of Levinas and his fellow prisoners of war
while they were held captive by the Nazis - lacked the 'brain' (NDNR 153), and
hence the capacity, for susceptibility, while clearly recognising the captives as
humans and enjoying their companionship (despite being, as Heidegger would say,
weltarm or poor in world (FCM §45 [274])). Although Levinas will urge that
'biological human brotherhood is not a sufficient reason for me to be responsible for
a separated being' (GP 142; emphasis added), it would appear, nevertheless, that
responsibility is predicated upon the 'I can' of species-being, upon likeness and like-
mindedness. Apparently then, there are no animals, domesticated or feral, in the
Levinasian 'home,' since proto-ethics is stubbornly humanocentric and prohibits the
application of the 'face' to the nonhuman creature. Surely an instance of domestic
abuse and an affront to the laws of the o'ikoc. We may all be the descendents of
Abraham, as Levinas avers (JR 99), but our terrene ancestry is elided by Levinas to
the point that the phylogeny of the face, to which he appeals, displays no earthly
precedent. And yet does Levinas himself not cite Dostoyevsky in support of the
suggestion that 'every one of us is guilty before all, for everyone and everything, and
I more than others...' (TDTT 102; emphasis added)? Might one not, indeed, be
responsible 'for everything,' including those beings for whom the attestation of
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Levinas (the attestation that is the work of Levinas' work (oeuvre)) does not bear
witness?9
§ 20. The discipline ofstudy
Totality and Infinity might have profited from a more rigorous phenomenological
appraisal of 'tuition' and the processes of inculcation and socialization (perhaps
pursued under the heading of 'Lore'), the way in which it considered the ontological
importation of the domicile. The passage from interiority to metaphysical exteriority
involves a rite of passage, a graded and graduated education. If the 'approach of the
other is an initiative I undergo,'' as Levinas states (OBBE xxiii; emphasis added), and
if, by default, I am an initiate, then my initiation is an ordeal which I must not only
endure repeatedly (which is the sense, I think, Levinas intends to convey with this
remark), but one that presupposes a period of naturalization in which I become
habituated to the injunctive environment of the face. This passage is not
accomplished spontaneously. The conversion in question must be traced back to the
horizons of its constitution, horizons apt for phenomenological disquisition. As
Husserl will stress in a late manuscript, 'proper schooling is required in order to stay
within the bounds of pure givenness' (Bernet, 1993, 60) (apparently Husserl was
something of a delinquent, one must assume, since he erred from the rigour of this
teaching), as it is, I would argue, for one to be rendered susceptible to the face and its
provocation.
Levinas, of course, would have been well qualified to have undertaken such
an analysis. In his role as Director of the Ecole Normale Israelite Orientale (ENIO) in
Paris, located at 59 rue d'Auteuil (and later on the rue Michel-Ange in the 16th
arrondisement) he was involved in the training of teachers for Jewish schools
(principally schools located in the Mediterranean basin). In the ENIO Levinas was
responsible for Talmudic studies and took a particular interest in the pedagogical
problems facing Jewish educators after the Shoah. It is hardly surprising (particularly
considering that Levinas did not take up a university position until 1964, when he
was in his fifties) that the thematic of teaching should feature, albeit somewhat
elliptically, in Totality and Infinity and preoccupy Levinas in his Hebraic writings,
9
Significantly, Levinas will again cite Dostoyevsky in Otherwise than Being. However on this
occasion he omits from his citation of the latter the phrase 'for everything' (OBBE 146)!
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especially the text Difficult Freedom (1963), which contains a number of important
essays on pedagogical themes.
Evidently the rabbinical model of learning haunts the pages of Totality and
Infinity, and Levinas will speak enthusiastically of the 'freedom of the master and
student' (77 181). It is clear from Levinas' Talmudic writings that this model is held
to be of paradigmatic value. The submission of the 'student' to the 'Master' upon
which this model is based is somewhat arcane though, and phenomenological
scrutiny might well be brought to bear upon the axiological, sociological and indeed
religious horizons that interlace to condition of the kind of 'teaching' (non-maieutic
or otherwise) to which Levinas refers here. Levinas may well repudiate such remarks
by stating that the face-to-face de-structure is instantiated in the pedagogical
relationship between Talmudic scholar and student (the latter, in many ways, serving
as the paragon of face-to-face relations), but does not reside there exclusively. Such
qualification does not prohibit Levinas from acclaiming the 'teacher-pupil
relationship' to be the 'first radiant sign of messianism itself' (MT 86), however, and
one may wonder whether this idealized relationship does justice to the genera that are
its purported heirs.10
Now, as Kosky reasons, the Levinasian articulation of responsibility is
possible only insofar as the Jewish tradition has 'endowed our historicity' with 'the
themes and "logic" necessary for its phenomenological discovery in the heart of the
self as such.' The 'phenomenology of responsibility and the historical fact of
Judaism are co-implicated,' therefore (Kosky, 2001, 169-170). This accord, which
Kosky adumbrates but does not probe, is sustained, I believe, by practices as well as
'themes,' and the 'logic' Kosky identifies here extends beyond the internal coherence
of thought, to embrace the comportment of knowledge and the discipline of study;
much in the way, I would argue, that the 'work-world' Heidegger describes in the
first division of Being and Time is the situation for our handling of concepts and
'tools' alike. To treat phenomena, in concreto, is to treat the concrete practices
through which they are presented and the manner in which they are given. The
'phenomenological way,' Levinas will himself insist, 'consists in recovering these
10
Interestingly, Levinas is not alone among phenomenologists in lauding the merits of the teacher-
pupil relationship. In What is Called Thinking?, Heidegger acknowledges a proto-ethical significance
in the relationship between teacher and student, clearly placing himself in the role of the former and
his readers in the position of the latter (Heidegger, 1968, 50)!
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access routes' (RPT 96). As Levinas explains in Beyond the Verse, according to the
Jewish tradition study of the Torah 'is the highest level of life where knowledge is no
longer distinguished from imperatives and practical impulses, where science and
conscience meet, where reality and justice no longer belong to two distinct orders. It
is as if the human were to rise to it by attaining a new condition, a new mode of the
spirituality of the spirit' (CR 47).
It is the study of the Torah, and the act of studying, that endow Levinas with
the exegetical resources to enable him to perform his drash of phenomenology.
Ultimately Levinas disparate works form a collection of Midrashim on philosophical
method (despite the fact that, as Levinas himself confers, 'transparency' in method is
not possible (QA 89)). Such methods are supplemented (and reappraised) by the
methodological procedure Levinas inherits from phenomenology. His re-
appropriation of both 'traditions' is critical, one must conclude.11
Levinas will call, then, for what, in In the time of the Nations, he will term a
'liturgy of study,' a 'liturgy of study as lofty as obedience to the precepts' that fulfil
that study. This study, moreover, is 'never ending' for it attests to the
'incompleteness that is the law of love,' the 'coming of a world that never ceases
coming' and the entering into 'covenant with a transcendent will' (C77 59). 'God' is
not incarnate therefore, so much is inscribed in the letters of the Torah (la Thora) and
'in the lines and between the lines and in the exchange of ideas between the readers
commenting upon them' (CTI 59). These 'lines' are trans-epochal (a further
instantiation of the phenomena of filiation and infrnition), and although Levinas is
speaking on this occasion in relation to the 'study' of the Torah, study being beyond
the Greek distinction between praxis (rrpa^tc) and thedria (Sscopta), something one
must 'observe' (lishmor), 'do' (la'asot), 'learn' (lilmod), and 'teach' (lelamed) (TP
76), his comments apply equally to the way in which he understands the
dissemination of philosophical sense. Hence, in Otherwise than Being he will
describe the practice of philosophy in which he participates as a 'drama between
philosophers' (un drame entre philosophes), a drama 'sketched out' (se dessine)
11 In the light of these remarks, Adam Newton's comments are again instructive. Levinas' approach to
the 'rabbinic tradition,' Newton suggests, 'is to see it as a certain kind ofphilosophy, and the Doctor's
of the Talmud as certain kinds ofphilosophers who practise a characteristic philosophical method, in
the midst of their performance of Talmud Torah as mitzvah...doing philosophy (enacting
it)...Jewishly' (Newton, 2001, 35).
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structurally as the 'history of philosophy' (OBBE 20; AE 39). To be sure, this
structure is generative and defined principally by its heritability: it is emergent rather
than static.12
We may conclude then, that what we have nominated under the heading of
the ethical Als-Struktur (a structure that brings to light one's pre-originary condition
of susceptibility) is, like the existential-hermeneutical 'as' elucidated by Heidegger, a
structure, furthermore, that is 'grounded in the ecstatico-horizonal unity of
temporality' (BT §69 [360]), engendered and renewed generatively. The ethical as-
structure, an as-structure 'inscribed,' one might say, in the body as elevation (Tl 117)
(and here let us recall our previous identification of 'height' with heritability), that is,
as the susceptibility that renders me vulnerable and open to others, produces the
schema of presentification (Schema der Gegenwartigung) through which one comes
to recognize the face as injunctive. This structure is installed through education and
reinforced through lore, processes in which Levinas, qua meforesh or expounder, is
actively engaged. As Husserl notes in 'The Vienna Lecture,' truth 'becomes an
absolute value through the movement of education and its constant effects in the
training of children.' The 'ideal norms' that govern cultural life (the ethical primacy
of the 'face' being no exception in this regard) issue from this movement, which in
turn occasions a transformed cultural 'praxis' (Crisis, Appendix I, 287).
Levinas' deductions are thus educative and instructive. His ethico-
metaphysical 'descriptions' blend the empirical and the transcendental and are
arguably a composite of four modes of utterance: prescription, proscription,
presentation and proclamation. One is chastened by the face, or at the very least,
forced to question the probity of a life of self-interest, through the descriptions of the
'face' Levinas offers. With Husserl we may concur that 'what is perceived is also
[and always] something meant:;' the 'act of meaning' thereby '"lives" in the act of
perceiving' {PIT §43 [90]; emphasis added). In Levinas' case, one must conclude
that the discipline of study informs the passivity of susception (no doubt a peculiarly
Talmudic brand of hylomorphism), Levinas' own work serving this pedagogical end
12 This is a point made to good effect by Husserl in the Crisis. There, Husserl describes the
embedment of philosophical practice in a tradition of thought and hermeneutical understanding. The
philosopher is one who has 'gone through [and is going through] a philosophical education' which
instructs his or her reception and subsequent interpretation of texts and 'philosophical' problems. See
Crisis, Appendix IX, p. 393.
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and calling philosophy to account before the 'face' it describes. A face the 'tradition'
in question more often than not ex-scribes from its margins.
In Of God who comes to Mind, Levinas provides the following reflection
(heavily indebted to Heidegger) upon the process of learning. Learning, he affirms,
'entails a grasping, a hold on what is learned and a possession.' The '"grasping" of
learning is not purely metaphorical,' he continues, 'even before technical
interestedness, this learning is already an outline of an incarnate practice, already
"hands on" (mainmise), main-tenance' (D 138). Susceptibility and teachability are
synonymous, I would thus contend. And since 'learning' is characterized by its
maintenance, the reactivation and repetition of 'what' is learnt, the non-site (non-
lieu) of subjectivity surely dissimulates a tenancy of sorts because the outline or
schema (oxqpa) of the face is grasped by the 'I,' a feat attested to by the fact that the
oneself, according to Levinas, is only susceptible to human provocation. Education is
in-finition, one might say, a proposal altogether consonant with Levinas' belief that
the 'transmission' (transmission) of 'spiritual' sense 'involves a teaching which is
already outlined in the very receptivity for learning it [se dessine dans la receptivite
meme de Tapprendref (TP 79; LeP 99). Sense is drawn forth (se dessine) or
draughted between generations, and admits of its own historicity. Therefore, where
Dasein 'takes space in' (BT §70 [368]), the Levinasian subject inherits the schema of
the 'face.' Me voici takes face in, or is taken in by the face, I would contend.
As I have suggested above, the face schematizes the understanding (which as
Heidegger makes clear is itself grounded in temporality) by which the subject abides.
The 'spatiality' of me voici, the amplitude and extent of its sense of responsibility for
the 'everywhere of faces' (OBBE 197n.22) that face it, is determined by the
generosity of the schemata it internalises, or let us say ingests (and might not the
phenomenon of 'remorse,' unbeknownst to Levinas, disclose the limitations of the
schema of the face he presents?), a procedure that is in no way passive since the
subject must repeat and constantly realign itself with what it has learnt in order to
'maintain' it in practice, even if 'what' it has learnt does not admit of quiddity as
such. In consonance with what Husserl terms the law of 'transcendental generation
[der transzendentalen Genesis]' (CM §32 [100]) the subject acquires the schema of
the face by which it regulates its comportment vis-a-vis others. The scope of my
ethical out-reach (invariably a form of spection) is proportionate with and to my
impressionability qua 'student' and whether or not, and here let us recall Levinas'
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endorsement of Rabbi Hayyim of Volozhin and the latter's contention that the organs
of the human body are subject to the norms of the Torah (IGRHV 158), one can
stomach what one has been taught about oneself.
Of course, we may ourselves have given the impression that ethical in-tuition
is simply a question of following a rule, that one's susceptibility to the face is
entirely a product of assumption. This is not our express intention. For if the face
teaches itself (this is to presume that there is a 'face,' the status of the copula being
moot, although as we have insisted, the face is itself a heritable phenomenon) then
susceptibility, albeit delimited by assumption, describes an a priori attunement to the
'face.' One is, apropos of Levinas, awakened to the face, after all, and sobered up
from self-interest. As Heidegger proffers in The Fundamental Concepts of
Metaphysics, a transformation of Dasein, which thereby involves a transformation in
the self-understanding of Dasein, does not occur:
through the apron strings of instruction but from out of a free ability to
hearken to things...True understanding never proves its mettle in repeating
something after someone, but only in its power to lead understanding into
genuine action (FCM §70 [299-300]).
Certainly, as we have seen, Levinas and Heidegger will disagree over the precise
form such propitious acts ought to take and the manner in which one is bound to and
by one's actions. But the hearkening (Horchen) Heidegger ascribes to Dasein here,
attributes Dasein with a freedom Levinas will in turn grant to the flesh in its
immediacy, a liberty beyond initiative to welcome the 'face' by which it is,
somewhat paradoxically, held hostage. Writing in the essay 'God and Philosophy,'
Levinas expresses this predicament thus, intimating that 'my responsibility in spite of
myself,' which is, he continues, the 'way the other's charge falls upon me,' simply
'is the hearing or understanding of their cry' (GP 143; emphasis added). Moreover,
this obedience, Levinas states, 'precedes any hearkening unto the commandment' to
be for-the-other (TDTT 105).
The 'new condition' (la nouvelle condition), or 'new mode of the spirituality
of the spirit' (le mode nouveau de la spiritualite de I'esprit), Levinas identifies as the
boon of Torah study (CR 47; VR 65), is called forth in the 'student' by the 'Master.'
However, as Levinas adverts in 'On the Jewish Reading of Scriptures,' if 'the human
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begins when the apparently innocent but virtually murderous vitality is brought under
control by interdicts,'' and furthermore, 'authentic civilization consists in holding
back the breath of naive life and remaining fully awake in this way, "for generations
and generations to come, to the end of all generations'" (JR 106; emphasis added),
then are we compelled to accept the accord between education and civilization
Levinas broaches here? Indeed, this mooting of an 'authentic' civilization is
problematic, not least because it mires Levinas' thought in the same logic of
accession that troubles the Heideggerian Daseinsanalytik. For how does 'one' (let
alone an entire civilization) traverse the straits of 'inauthenticity' to accede to the
status of 'authenticity,' and what form might such a collective act of resoluteness
assume, given Dasein's propensity for dispersion in the 'They' (das Man)! Such an
alliance as that to which Levinas consents here, may be deleterious, and prompt one,
in a kind of cultural Jemeinigkeit, to identify so called civility with one's own
customs and traditions, and, moreover, to disclaim the cultural difference of others -
a danger all too apparent in Levinas' own critique of 'pagan' religiosity. Ethical
signification is undoubtedly heritable, a schema (axqua) secured through acquisition
and confirmed as normative through the reiteration of its performance, a performance
inscribed in and by bodily practices, among which one may number the phenomenon
of 'study' Levinas approves.
Both the sens of ethics and the compass of obligation are trans-epochal
phenomena. Levinas' analysis of ethical susceptibility contributes to the way in
which the de-structure he explicates develops historically. As Llewelyn observes,
Levinas, like Hegel before him, 'writes a drama of the education of the psyche,' a
performance in many acts (Llewelyn, 1995, 3). Yet, the 'face' Levinas deduces, a
face whose imperative force draws upon the weight of Jewish traditional teachings, is
morally probative only within the limits of its heritability. In Levinas' work these
limits are delineated and regulated by the confluence between the Jewish and
philosophical orders of inquiry to which he adheres. Levinas' 'phenomenology' is a
phenomenology of miscegenation, therefore, and as the product of such
dissemination or 'bestrewal' (Streuung) it must, at least insofar as it seeks to remain
true to its generative origins, maintain its openness to heterodox perspectives.
Against the inter-cultural, trans-epochal horizon(s) of 'faciality,' new phenomena
may arise for which the Levinasian articulation of the 'face' is inadequate. The
discipline of phenomenology is indebted to Levinas for drawing its attention to such
185
vistas. However it risks dissolution if it does not pursue the importation of Levinas'
thinking beyond the form of its presentation.
It is my belief that Levinas' thought hastens to reach 'adulthood' too soon.
By which I mean, it fails to consider the transitional fora through which the existent
must pass en route to ethical maturity. One may thus deem Levinas' philosophy
precocious, as the thought of Nietzsche, by the latter's own admission, is premature
(Nietzsche, 1974, 182 [125]). To be sure, the condition of creaturality (la
creaturalite) set forth by Levinas in later works such as Otherwise than Being, is not
a phase through which one passes, nor the term of volitional activity, but rather the
situation of pre-originary exposedness by which the subject (le sujet) is defined.
However, since the susceptibility to which Levinas assents is epicritical, as I hope to
have demonstrated, it is henceforth phasic, even if susceptibility is not.
'Adolescence' names a phenomenon or developmental epoch, which, like the
phenomena of filiation and paternity, must not be restricted to its empirical or
biological manifestation, a truly climacteric phase in the formation of the subject
Levinas describes. (And let us not forget that the term itself is derived from the Latin
word adolescere, meaning to grow up or develop, which is suggestive both of the
hypostatisation of the ego Levinas outlines in Existence and Existents, and
subsequently reprises in Otherwise than Being, and the heritability of the face, as we
have understood it. And this despite the fact that, as Kosky contends, Levinas' use of
the term 'recurrence' often 'implies that the responsible self does not develop or
grow beyond itselfbut repeats itself' (Kosky, 2001, 92; emphasis added).)
How one is initiated into holding beliefs and assuming practices is a stage
(.etape) in phenomenological explication to which we must attend, a stage (to be sure,
anything but stative) to which the account of domiciliation assayed in Totality and
Infinity does not do justice. The key to understanding the provenance and
sedimentation of religiosity, or what Levinas will term 'orientation' (orientation), or
'sense' (sens), arguably lies here. The 'adult's God' may be 'revealed' through the
'void of the child's heaven,' as Levinas avers (LTMG 143), but the mise-en-abime of
what I have termed 'adolescence,' must be negotiated first. Did Levinas himself,
bearing witness to the teaching of Isaiah 6:8, not identify the 'oneself' (and thus
himself) with the formulation 'Here I am! Send me' (OBBE 199n.ll), an obedience
to the law of generation, a law I have sought to adumbrate in this chapter, in which
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the trace of what Levinas will call, a 'wandering cause' (cause errante), is glimpsed
(■OBBE 150; AE 235)?
It is to the further consideration of the heritable status of sense (sens) that we
now turn, with a view to bringing into relief the figure of the subject in whom the
schema (axrjpa) of the face is 'outlined.' Might the 'plot' (intrigue) of ethics not
require management if one is not, as Levinas puts it, 'to abandon oneself to violence
[s'abandonner a la violence]' (OBBE 193n.33; AE 146n.l)?
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4. EDUCATION
Levinas will contend that the subject is 'produced' or 'created' through exposure to
the other person. In Totality and Infinity, such production is construed in actional
terms, with the existent being called upon to 'seek' its 'final reality' (77 178) and to
'purge itself interminably' of itself (77 244). It is by way of this 'purgation' that the
existent 'surpasses' Being (77 302). By the publication of Otherwise than Being, these
actional components have been largely expunged from the 'field' of proto-ethics, and
in their wake notions of radical passivity, defection and creaturality have been
installed to accentuate the hetero-affection (Thetero-ajfection) which, Levinas
believes, characterizes the subjection of the oneself to another (OBBE 121; AE 193).
But why 'surpass' Being; and what does Levinas intend to convey with this directive?
We have hitherto intimated that the curved space of ethical transaction is located (qua
evenement) outside the nexus of instrumental relations outlined by Heidegger in Being
and Time. Ethical space substructs the pratognostic space of equipmentality ('the
cordon of totality' cannot accommodate the transcendence of the one-for-the-Other,
Levinas will insist (OBBE 95)). It may be that 'uncanniness' (Unheimlichkeit) is a
more primordial phenomenon that Being-at-home (Zuhause-sein) and that the anxiety
it generates is ontologically 'older' than the self-assurance the latter inspires. The
'nothingness' in the face of which Dasein flees (a tottos that haunts the interstices of
equipmentality and permeates the world of the 'everyday') is disclosive of the Being
that Dasein 'is,' and it is exhibited, Heidegger adverts, in the state-of-mind of anxiety
(Angst).
Levinas does not agree with Heidegger that anxiety is pre-eminent among
'moods,' nor, indeed, that is it the Grundbefindlichkeit, or basic state-of-mind (57 §40
[188]). For Levinas, the most 'revelatory' mood or maniere d'etre is arguably 'shame'
(la honte), and it is to a consideration of this 'mood' that we now turn our critical
attention. The foregoing investigation has led us to question Levinas' delimitation of
ethical space and to contest the 'spacing' (espacement) of its basic terms. In this
chapter, the situation of the subject will be exhibited and its ethical 'maturation'
brought into focus. How, it will be asked, does the subject (le sujet) manage the
'trauma' (le trauma) that afflicts it and moderate the excesses of diacony? To what
extent does Levinas modify the terms of the face-to-face relation in order to
accommodate the subject in its indigency? We enquire, therefore, after the care of the
'soul,' since the place, or rather the non-place of the soul is, according to Levinas, the
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tottos where ethics takes place, the site where the relationship with the Other is
dramatized.
§ 21. The torsion of identity
Shame, which as early as the 1935 work, De 1'Evasion, had come to denote the fact of
being 'riveted to oneself [rive a soi-meme]' (OE 66; DE 90), assumes a position of
prominence in Levinas' mature works. There it 'reveals' one's responsibility for
another through the 'scruple' (scrupule) or 'remorse' (remords) with which one is
stricken upon refusing to accept one's responsibility (OBBE 6). Again, let us be clear,
qua maniere-d'etre, shame, like anxiety, need not manifest itself as one's being
shameful about 'something' definite. One is shameful, principally, about the Being
that one is. Thus, what Heidegger says of anxiety remains pertinent to shame, namely
that 'the disclosure and the disclosed are existentially self same' (BT §40 [ 188]). JLike
fatigue and indolence, shame is marked by reflexivity. As Levinas claims in Existence
and Existents, one exists oneself (on s'est) (££28; DEE 38) and so too with the
phenomenon of shame: one shames oneself (or one is ashamed of oneself). Shame,
contra anxiety, does not reveal our 'nothingness,' therefore, but rather 'the totality of
our existence' (OE 65).2 It is this ek-sistence of which the existent must take leave if
it is to divest itself of itself for the-sake-of-others. But again, why quit the order of
Being? What motivates this venture? The answer to these questions ought, by now, to
be apparent, but let us briefly recapitulate Levinas' position in an effort to elucidate
these points further.
The ego, in its natural state, is prone to gulosity. The life of enjoyment is
defined primarily by appropriation. One lives off and from the other (Vautre). One
enjoys oneself, taking up one's residence in Being at the Other's expense. The ego is
edacious and given to the satisfaction of its desires. This life of wanton self-interest is
homely, or, as Levinas will say, 'sedentary' (HGV 232), because it is preoccupied
with itself. It is this existence, this 'world,' which the Other calls into question, and he
or she does so, initially (Totality and Infinity), and ab-originally (Otherwise than
Being), by awakening in the 'I' what, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas will call 'the
consciousness of moral unworthiness [la conscience de I'indignite morale]' (77 83;
1 Levinas will concede that he has wondered 'whether the anxiety that the Other causes the Same is not
the meaning of reason, its very rationality: the anxiety of man caused by the Infinite of God.'
'Inspiration,' Levinas continues, 'is the originary mode of anxiety' (RIJT 147). Pace Heidegger, then,
anxiety is not animated by the nothing, but by the Other.
2 Let us recall, however, that for Heidegger ultimately 'Being: Nothing: Same' (Heidegger, 1969, 101),
a situation that undoubtedly complicates Levinas' rebuttal of Heidegger here.
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Tel 82), or what in Otherwise than Being, he will term 'the self-accusation of remorse
[1'auto-accusation clu remordsf (OBBE 125; AE 198-199). In both instances the Ego
is uprooted from itself, and the subject is invested with a newfound 'freedom,' a
freedom radically different from the 'spontaneity of freedom' (la spontaneite de la
liberte) (77 83; Tel 81) by which, qua Ego, it had been identified, a freedom that is in
no way the 'initiative' of an Ego closed in upon itself (OBBE 115). This freedom is
the freedom of humility and not power {MS 56), the freedom to either 'feel myself to
be the other of the other,' or not (Tl 84). I am presented to myself by the Other only to
discover that 'I am not innocent spontaneity but usurper and murderer \je ne suis pas
innocente spontaneite, mais usurpateur etmeurtrierf {TI 84; Tel 83).
It is as such that shame is 'produced,' and it draws its revelatory force from
the fact that in the midst of the reflexivity of (my) shame I am nonetheless oriented
toward the Other. As Levinas explains, the Other 'is desired in my shame' {Tl 84).
According to the logic of this deduction, I do not choose to feel ashamed. This is a
'state' with which I am afflicted, an affection into which I am thrown. 1 rather elect to
side either with the 'usurper' in me, or the 'votary' in me; an election based upon my
pre-originary electability. In one and the same moment (in one and the same breath), I
am both for myself (self-affected) and for-the-other (hetero-affected). This moment
is, of course, structured diachronically and reflects the amphibological nature of the
self, a self which according to Levinas is at once both under erasure (accused) and
under obligation (summoned) and thus very much a sub-ject (the self is a 'sub-
jectum,' Levinas will argue {OBBE 116)). Derrida summarizes Levinas' position as
follows:
Each time this interruption of self takes place or is produced, each time this
delimitation of self, which might also pass for an excess or transcendence of
self, is produced, a process of deconstruction is in progress, which is
no longer a teleological process or even a simple event in the course of
history (Derrida, 1999, 80).
One cannot determine the 'instant' the other wrenches me from self-sufficiency
because the ethical event of interruption takes place (it eventuates) on the hither side
of egoity and outside the time in which consciousness resides. To be sure, 'one can
uproot oneself from this responsibility' and 'deny the place where is incumbent upon
3 As Llewelyn confers, 'self-affection is affection by the distance kept in the approach of the other'
(Llewelyn, 2000, 164). I am affected by the interval of separation (Kedousha), the distance between the
Other and myself, therefore.
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one to do something' (PU 100; translation altered). To do so, Levinas assures us, is to
align oneself with 'evil,' however, and to disregard the Other in her plight. And what
if I am alone, one may ask? Do I persist with my usurpation in the absence of
another? Let us clarify. Being-with (Mitsein), as we have seen, is constitutive of the
Being Dasein is. Similarly, for Levinas, the subject is susceptible. 'The body,'
Levinas will confer, 'is the very susceptibility of the Self' (BPW 182n.27).
The affect of shame merely reveals my pre-originary condition of being-for-
the-other, an orientation I can either accept or decline. 'I am circumscribed and
concerned by the other' (OBBE 80), then, as the unitary phenomenon of 'Care'
pertains to the structural whole of Dasein, an inversion of the circumspection with
which Dasein attends its environing work-world. I am thus assigned before I am able
to recognise my assignation because I am caught up in the 'plot' of proximity; a
spatial field (akin to the phenomenal field but not centred upon the Ego as its point of
origination) in which I am bound to others irrespective of their 'physical' propinquity
to me. As Levinas argues in the essay 'Language and Proximity' (1967), 'the I is the
point that bears the gravity of the world' (LP 123). Arguably, this conceptualization
of space is already prefigured in Being and Time. There, for example, Heidegger
states that: 'in Dasein there lies an essential tendency towards closeness' (BT §23
[105]). To be in proximity, that is, to occupy a proximal space, is rudimentary to the
Being of Dasein. Moreover, space, Heidegger continues, adding an important proviso
to his analysis of deseverance and directionality, 'need not have the kind of Being
characteristic of something which is itself spatially ready-to-hand or present-at-hand.
Nor does the Being of space have the kind of Being which belongs to Dasein' (BT §24
[112]).4
Ethical space exhibits a magnitude that implicates 'me' in relations with others
across the 'dead time' (le temps mort) that separates me from those who precede and
proceed me in the sequential time of history. Ethical space is fecund, therefore,
because it is the 'field in which the production of infinity is enacted [le champ meme
oil cette production de I'infini se joueY (TI 26; Tel 11), the field in which the familial-
cum-generative relations of filiality, fraternity, paternity and maternity are effectuated
(and once again let us take heed: the 'biological structure of fecundity is not limited to
4 In fact, as Heidegger intimates in 'On the Essence of Ground' (1929), 'only being able to listen into
the distance awakens Dasein as a self to the response of other Dasein in whose company [Mitsein\ it
can surrender its I-ness, so as to attain itself as an authentic self...and so the human being, existing as a
transcendence that exceeds in the direction of possibilities, is a creature of distance' (Heidegger, 1998
[1929], 135). That Dasein should attain authenticity through surrendering itself to others is seemingly
lost on Levinas, at least in so far as he is willing to acknowledge the proto-ethical aspect of
Heidegger's thought.
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the biological fact' (77 306)). It is by way of the encounter with the face, and the
commerce with exteriority, that 'I' am revealed to myself qua conatus essendi,5 suffer
shame, and am thereby brought back to myself on the hither side of my 'I.' Dasein
may be in each case mine (Jemeinig), but the Levinasian subject is amphibological
because it embodies this alternance or torsion of identity and bears it as its own. The
Eigensphdre, one might say, is a sphere of conflict, a bellicose space in which one is
at war with oneself. If, for example, 'eating to take pleasure in eating,' that is, 'to take
pleasure in oneself,' is 'disgusting,' and thus that it is only insofar as eating and
drinking 'concern the other' that such activities 'become sacred' (1FP 46, 52), then
the sincerity with which, in Existence and Existents, Levinas awards 'life,' is in need
of qualification. Levinas will argue in the essay 'No Identity,' that the word
'sincerity' takes on its full meaning as deliverance (NI 146). Similarly, in 'God and
Philosophy,' he states that sincerity names the self in its 'extraversion' (GP 145).
Now, alimentation may be a figure for the appetitive drives or appertitus of
the self. However, trope or no trope, the existent will undoubtedly suffer the pain of
chronic, or perhaps rather, diachronic, pyrosis if its enjoyment of the element
{I'element) is, as Levinas contends, frustrated in its exercise by the immediacy of
remorse. A 'groaning of the entrails [gemissement des entraillesf (OBBE 75; AE 121)
besets the subject, it seems; a condition latent, yet undiagnosed, in Totality and
Infinity, where we are informed that the element in which we bathe presents us with
the reverse of reality 'as though we were in the bowels of being [dans les entrailles de
I'etref (7/ 132; Tel 139). Ribaldry aside, if the subject, qua corps ethique, is the
'regime of separation [le regime de la separation]' (7/ 168; Tel 182), the place where
'a separation is occurring' (TOT 49) and a reversal of essence is underway, if that is,
the field of animatological space (the space of the 'soul' or ame) is at once at
'crossroads of physical forces [un carrefour de forces physiques]' (7/ 164; Tel 111)
5 The conatus to which Levinas refers throughout his many opera is something of a philosophical
opinicus, drawing upon a disparate array of influences for its determination. To be sure, the conatus
essendi, or nisus toward self-preservation, detailed by Spinoza in his Ethics is foremost in Levinas'
mind here. Hence, the thesis set forth in Totality and Infinity is, Levinas states, 'at the antipodes of
Spinozism' (7/ 105). Spinoza had identified 'the striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its
being' as 'nothing but the actual essence of the thing' (Spinoza, 1996, 75 [III.7]). The movement
beyond essence to which Levinas gives voice is a move beyond the essence of this being. Needless to
say, the Heideggerian delineation of Dasein as 'ek-sistence' (Heidegger, 1996 [1947],'231) - the
'essence of Dasein lies in its existence' (BT §9 [42]) - is, no doubt, expedited under the heading of the
conatus together with Darwin's appropriation of the Spencerian apophthegm, 'the survival of the
fittest,' to describe the 'struggle for life' in which all living beings participate (Darwin, 1979 [1859],
66-74). Of course, for Levinas, the conatus essendi invariably comes to embody those attributes he
associates with the Hitlerian conception of 'Man' and thus the subtle nuances of the Darwinian,
Spinozist and Heideggerian designations are often lost on him. Once again, the 'presentiment and
memory' of Nazism pervades Levinas' explication of these important themes.
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and the 'non site' (non-lieu) of 'the force of an alterity in me' (OBBE 114), then the
'soul' is clearly the situation of strife. This is a situation from which there is
apparently no reprieve, since the 'concern for salvation,' Levinas will claim, 'stems
from the biological self' and 'the biological self cannot dispense with mythology and
war [le moi biologique ne puisse se passer de mythologie et de guerref (BW 48; EO
75).
It appears, however, that the oneself is equally incapable of extricating itself
from the belligerence within it, for it is the force of this turbulence that impels the
subject to breach its concern for itself. The (r)eversion of the self (simultaneously the
eversion of the self and its reversion to esse-, namely the vacillation of the two in their
simultaneity) is allergic, one must conclude. Is the 'allergy' symptomatic of 'egoisms
which are at war with one another,' the war that is 'the deed or drama of essence's
interest' (OBBE 4), not imported into the 'soul' from the arena of life; and does
Levinas not unwittingly internalize this 'drama' and situate it at the heart of ethics?
Indeed, in many ways this 'drama' (drame) replicates within the 'soul' (although the
status of this 'within' is ambiguous), the strife that marks the 'space of conflict'
(.Streitraum) between 'earth' (Erde) and 'world' {Welt) in Heidegger's essay, 'The
Origin of the Work of Art' (1936). Certainly, in 'essential striving,' earth and world,
like conatus and creature, 'raise each other into the self-assertion of their natures'
(Heidegger, 1996 [1936], 55). Lending support to such a seemingly implausible
suggestion is Derrida's remark that 'Totality and Infinity is a work of art and not a
treatise.' An observation we might equally apply to the Levinasian oeuvre as a whole
(Derrida, 1978, 312n.7). Both Levinas' 'work' (of which the creature is the
expression) and Heidegger's artwork, occupy a place between worlds, since both are,
broadly speaking, memorial and inaugural. Perhaps the optimism of Totality and
Infinity is misguided, then, as the 'relation with the other as face' does not 'heal
allergy,' after all, but merely masks its symptoms (77 197). To be sure, the
relationship with exteriority purports to 'bring to a halt' (elle arrete) the play of
ontology {OBBE 101; AE 160), and it is this 'interruption of essence' which,
according to Levinas, 'energizes the reduction [reduction qu'alimente de son energie
I'interruption (ethique) de I'essenceY {OBBE 44; AE 76), permitting the subject in its
susception to present itself to reflection. However, I would contend that it is the
interruption and the restitution of essence that 'energizes' (or 'magnetizes'
{magnetisent) {TI 26',Tel 11)) the field of ethics. One never quite sobers up, therefore,
a point Levinas concedes in later works where he acknowledges that the sobriety
appurtenant to diacony is processual rather than inveterate {PA 179).
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The creature and the miscreant must learn to coexist, to co-habit and share the
place they occupy, albeit a place sequestered through usurpation (to be sure an uneasy
alliance and a difficult freedom to oversee), and to do this they must be instructed,
such instruction requiring a deeper phenomenological explication (and excavation) of
the theme of 'teaching' (enseignement) than Levinas was able to provide. As the
conversion to creaturality is never complete, one must learn to 'dwell' in the
interspace between the twin poles that apportion the space of oneself, poles between
which something like the Ichpol defended by Husserl remains operative. This
interspace is at once an interval, and one must try to adjust to the contra-natural
rhythms of its puerperium, the time between the labour of supererogatory acts and the
reversion to the self in its enjoyment. Regulation by no means entails the suspension
of 'restlessness,' but merely its proper management, I would insist. After all, the
exhausted 'nurse' is a liability, and the profligate host, inhospitable.
If, as Levinas avers, in 'Desire there is no sinking one's teeth into being, no
satiety, but an uncharted future before one' (77 117; translation modified), Desire
being, as it were, edentate. If, indeed, a face is the 'flesh become word' (OBBE 94),
then one will have to re-educate one's palate to ensure that one's appetites do not
become, so to speak, omophagic. One will be required to practice brinkmanship on
the cusp of one's desirexDesire, to practice a peculiar ettoxp of sorts, to hold back
one's breath (as the trope of the pulmonary would have it (OBBE 180)), and to engage
in a form of ethical asana to guard against the conative drives that threaten to
destabilize the 'soul' and thwart its 'destiny' (VO 113). It is this 'relaxation of virility
without cowardice' that Levinas wishes to convey with the notion of an-archic
passivity (OBBE 185). He perhaps underestimates the complexity of this endeavour,
however, and provides the aspirant with little or no indication of how she should
manage the turmoil that 'rends her soul' (OBBE 182), nor, furthermore, of what a
phenomenological disquisition of such 'practices' might reveal about the subjects who
implement them and the optative of living a balanced life.
Balance is invariably an accomplishment of sorts, whose pursuit (and
phenomenological exhibition) appears to complicate Levinas' twofold division of life
into the 'categories' (or, let us say, 'regions') of interest and dis-interest: the
adventure of ethics cannot be schematized in this way. Perhaps the discipline of
philosophy, as 'the wisdom of love at the service of love' (OBBE 162), may be called
upon to cultivate such balance. As Pierre Hadot confers:
There is an equilibrium - almost impossible to achieve - between the inner
peace brought about by wisdom, and the passions to which the sight of the
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injustices, sufferings, and misery of mankind cannot help but give rise.
Wisdom, however, consists in precisely such an equilibrium, and inner peace
is indispensable for efficacious action (Hadot, 1995, 274).
How I cope with the 'discovery of corpses beside me and my horror of existing by
assassination' (PU 100), should be as much the concern of proto-ethics as the post¬
traumatic stress endured by military service personnel ought to be of concern to the
army that dispatches them into combat (and the comparison is not without poignancy,
I feel). To be sure, the world, as Catherine Chalier rightly notes, is in 'need of
reparation' (Chalier, 1998, 295). But ought this 'reparation' of the world, this
Tik.kun.shel ha-olam, not also to extend to the rift within the 'soul,' a soul in which,
contra Husserl, the world might not 'float,' but by which, according to Levinas, it is
nonetheless upheld. How the vjjuxfl bears up under the weight of its 'crushing charge'
(charge ecrasante) (OBBE 122; AE 194) is unclear, for the vpuxfl, apropos of Levinas,
is anything but ursine, constituted, as it is, by its vulnerability (vulnerabilte).
§ 22. Motivation
Throughout his career, but notably during its later phases, Husserl had recourse to
consider the extent to which intentional activity is motivated by the drive (Trieb) for
satisfaction. The 'Ego' strives to achieve increasing unity in its experience of the
world (a goal reflected in the nisus to fulfil empty intentions and extend the horizontal
limits of constitution) and this 'interest' or 'hunger' animates every level of
intentional life. If, as Husserl suggests at the close of the third of his Cartesian
Meditations, consciousness admits of a 'founding by levels' (eine Fundierung in
Stufen) (CM §29 [99]), each level in turn being a concatenation or shifting system of
intentionalities, then the most rudimentary form of activity that may be ascribed to the
Ego is 'drive,' and the most rudimentary forms of intentional operation, those of
'drive-intentionality' (Triebintentionalitdt) and 'instinct intentionality'
(Instinktintentionalitdt).6 Constitution is predetermined instinctively. The ego inherits
impulses, one might say, it did not institute, impulses whose point of origination
exceed the bounds of recuperation and cannot be retrieved by memory. Such
animation (.Beseelung) by 'instinct' disturbs Levinas, of course, but it also adverts to
the fact that intentional life is constituted from the outside. For, as we have seen,
one's response to the appeal of the other person cannot be converted into a 'natural
6 On the importance of the notion of 'drive' in Husserl, see, for example: A.D. Smith, Husserl and the
Cartesian Meditations (Smith, 2003, 149-154).
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tendency' {une tendence naturelle) {OBBE 53; AE 90) since it is inspired 'ethically'
and ethics is unnatural. However, the phenomena of 'election' and inspiration,'
structurally basic to the argumentation of Otherwise than Being, once again
demonstrate that a form of phenomenological heritability is central to Levinas'
project, which, while not strictly biological (the Husserlian designation of 'instinct'
and 'drive,' let us stress, is transcendental and phenomenological), is generative in
determination.
Levinas will reduce the 'drive' Husserl situates at the origin of consciousness
and deduce behind it an ethical motivation. The Other is implicated at the source of
the 'I,' intricate to its very emergence and hypostatisation (and let us recall that the
Hebrew word for face {panim) is cognate with that for fountain or source). In the
'work' of passive synthesis lies a 'clue' to the hetero-affectivity of the subject.
Husserl himself will even go so far as to suggest that it is 'drive' which, as Arthur
Smith observes, 'pushes forward one present into the next in that flowing life which a
conscious monad enjoys.' At base then, 'conscious life is the absolute flow which
temporises itself in a constant striving' (Smith, 2003, 156; emphasis added). Husserl
articulates the relation between the absolute flow of time and its constitution thus,
broaching the following question:
May or must we not, presuppose a universal instinctive intentionality which
unitarily constitutes every primal present as standing temporalization and
which presses on from present to present in such a way that all content is
content of the fulfilment of these drives and is intended prior to its
achievement? (Husserl, 1973, 595)
Prior to the awakening of consciousness to its contents, there exists, then, a pre-
reflective mode of intentional activity which is operative at the heart of the pre-egoic
flow of time. Along with this pre-egoic flow of flows, Husserl will therefore posit an
Instinktintentionalitdt to account for the fact that, as he puts in his lectures On the
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1905), 'consciousness
constitutes its own unity' {PIT §39 [80]).
Despite being affected from outside its recuperable fringes by an originary
sensation or Ur-impression (an Ur-impression that is not the sedimented by-product
of a previous activity), the 'absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness' {PIT
§34 [73]) to which Husserl reduces the living present, remains, according to Levinas,
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a matrix of intentional activity under the governance of constitutional law(s). In
Husserl, he proffers, 'the time structure of sensibility is the time of the recuperable'
(OBBE 34). As Husserl avers, 'the constituting and the constituted coincide' (PIT §39
[83]). Now, although Husserl will maintain that consciousness is the 'field' where
phenomena ((^aivopsva) appear, their very appearance being regulated by the
spontaneous operation o/consciousness, and that the screen of the present is extended
(one might say distended since the Ego, in its edacity, enjoys its past like the memory
of a good meal) through retentional activity so as to accommodate, by way of
modification, the fading impressions of each passing moment of duration, he will
nonetheless concede that the 'primal impression is the absolute beginning of this
production.' Such an admission would seem to deprive consciousness of its position
of primacy, since 'consciousness is nothing without impression,' Husserl continues
(PIT, Appendix I [100]). However, while the Ur-impression is not itself produced by
consciousness but arises through 'genesis spontanea' (it has, Husserl confesses, 'no
seed,' and is thus quite unlike the 'paternity' in which the filiation of 'ethics' begins,
being a veritable 'primal creation' (PIT, Appendix I, [100])), consciousness strives to
recover itself beyond the break in its recollective ability and to overcome the
restrictions imposed upon it by its foreign generation.
In the midst of the passivity of consciousness, Levinas will contend, Husserl
will attribute to 'drive' a unifying and teleological function. This is a function Levinas
seeks to expedite from his account of the responsible subject, rendering the subject, as
we have seen, radically passive. The 'prehistory of the ego' (OBBE 117), to which
Husserl defers through this appeal to the operations of Instiktintentionalitat,
Treibintentionalitat and UrStreben, ultimately gestures, Levinas believes, to the
'creation' of the subject on the hither side of the present. The living present is
decussated by the 'trace' of one who has passed by into immemoriality, yet the trace
left in the present points beyond itself to an un-representable past from whence the
subject is called forth.7 Hence, in the curious doubling of intentionality Husserl
discerns in the flow of absolute consciousness (whereby time constituting
consciousness constitutes itself in the midst of the fluxion of its flow (PIT §39 [83])),
Levinas will discover the original diachrony of time.
7
Merleau-Ponty expresses a similar point in the Phenomenology ofPerception. Writing of sensible
experience he states: 'hence reflection does not itself grasp its full significance unless it refers to the
unreflective fund of experience which it presupposes, upon which it draws, and which constitutes for it
a kind oforiginal past, a past which has never been a present (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 242; emphasis
added).
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The withdrawal of the 'Other,' qua 'trace,' cannot be retrieved for and by
consciousness through a modification of presence, but the break in presence, marked
by the disturbance of the present and the interruption of the 'I,' an interruption which,
according to Derrida, is never 'pure,' falling always under the logic of 'ab-solute de-
stricturation,' since unlike a 'cut' (coupure), it cannot be sutured to seal the wound it
inflicts upon consciousness (Derrida, 1980, 29), permits Levinas to bring to light the
'Being of the creature' {WO 6). A creature to be understood, in non-theological terms,
as composed of responsibility (a claim still to be substantiated), comparable to the
way that consciousness, apropos of Husserl, is stratified by layers and nexus of
intentional activity.
Where the Husserlian Ego augments itself with its habitualities, the Levinasian
subject ages and is encumbered with itself. At the time of creation, Levinas insists,
'there is no subject to assume the creative act' {LP 114). The subject is generated by
the Other. To be sure, we have questioned the saliency of this proposal and discovered
susceptibility to be casuistic in its immediacy. Levinas' account of susception draws
upon an intuitionism that is never made thematic as such, despite being announced
elliptically under the heading of 'teaching' {enseignement). The 'creature' may be
impressible, but this does not preclude it from yielding only to the materiality of the
human 'face.' Yet, the 'event' (evenement) of creaturality {la creaturalite) to which
Levinas reduces the 'absolute subjectivity' set forth by Husserl in his lectures on
time-consciousness {PIT §36 [75]), allows Levinas to modify the Husserlian
determination of consciousness as a pre-egoic subjection to the flow of time, and
deduce from this proto-actional subjection the matrix (matrice) of susceptibility he
believes substructs all positional activity. Thus Levinas remarks: 'the oneself is a
creature, but an orphan by birth or an atheist no doubt ignorant of its Creator, for if it
knew it, it would again be taking up its commencement' {OBBE 105).
Although the 'oneself Levinas presents throughout the course of his writings
is not, as we have seen, altogether 'ignorant' of its 'creator,' the situation Levinas
highlights here is crucial to the plot of proto-ethics he outlines, and further clarifies
the importance of the theme of 'recurrence' (recurrence) in his later work. Lor
'subjectivity is structured as 'the Other in the same' {OBBE 25), which means that the
oneself begins (or commences) in the passivity of exposure. One is oneself 'through
the others,' Levinas advises {OBBE 112). Adapting the motif of 'reverberation' so
prevalent in Husserl's lectures on time consciousness (for example, each 'now point'
stands before one, Husserl suggests, 'as the sound of a violin string that has been
struck' {PIT §31 [61])), Levinas likens the an-archy of subjectivity to the 'echo of a
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sound that would precede the resonance of this sound' (OBBE 111). The subject
recurs (late to itself) across the 'dead time' (le temps mort), or 'meanwhile' (Ventre-
temps), of the interval that separates it from itself. This entre-temps marks the
moment of its interruption from the outside, and is the place 'where' the 'trace' of the
Other disturbs the present.
The subject recurs as 'accused' and 'assigned' to itself before it is/was in a
position to freely posit itself as such. It is now the subject (rather than the Other) who
is an 'orphan' (OBBE 105) and a 'stranger' to itself (OBBE 92) because it has been
driven from the site of its complacency by the Other (Levinas discovers in Husserl's
UrStreben, the law of heteronomous generation, what he will term a 'will in my will'
(77 236)). But such experience of what is strange (Fremderfahrung) is fraught with
ambiguity, for that which is strange in me is both that I am a stranger to myself and
that I am estranged from myself. In both instances this estrangement may or may not
be produced by the other person, and one may have to look to other transversals of the
'face' (the third, the il y a, the element) to account for its incidence. The primal
sensation which impresses itself upon consciousness is ethically inspired, Levinas
argues, and Husserl's Ur-impression reconfigured as the Sur-impression of the face
animating the subject from within (OBBE 70). This face, let us emphasize once again,
need not be featous, nor the Other biddable, to solicit my regard, since I arise, qua
creature, at its behest and upon the basis of its interpellation.
The 'trace' of an immemorial past is intercalated between the ego and its self,
fissuring the auto-identification of the 'I' and dephasing it. The 'ultimate secret of the
incarnation of the subject [I'ultime secret de 1'incarnation du sujetf (OBBE 111; AE
175) is revealed in and by the lapse of time between the subject being affected by the
Sur-impression of the face (which engenders the present in which its trace is left) and
the present represented (or retained) by the subject, as a modification of the primal
impression that produces it. For Levinas then, the Sur-impression of the face remains
'non-modified [non modifiee]' (OBBE 33; AE 58) because the 'past' from whence it
issues is not thematizable, exceeding, as it does, the grasp of consciousness. However,
as Derrida makes clear in Of Grammotology, 'in the original temporalization and the
movement of relationship with the outside, as Husserl actually described them, non-
presentation or depresentation is as originary as presentation.' That is why, Derrida
continues 'a thought of the trace can no more break with a transcendental
phenomenology than be reduced to it' (Derrida, 1974, 62).
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To further elucidate the diachronic structure of sensibility, Levinas deploys the
figures of respiration and fibrillation. These tropes reinforce the fact that, according to
Levinas, the 'strange sort of nature [la nature d'etrange sorte\ (OBBE 109; AE 172)
definitive of subjectivity is contra-natural and supra-conative. The 'dead time' that
separates 'inspiration and expiration' and interrupts 'the diastole and systole of the
heart beating dully against the walls of one's skin' (OBBE 109), disturbs the body's
'natural' rhythms like a malady or 'delirium' (OBBE 101) which, as the popular
saying goes, puts one 'out of sorts' with oneself. Between heartbeats, 'I' am animated
by the Other; between breaths, 'I' am inspired by the Other. This recurrence, then, is
that by which one is incarnate. The subject is a cardio-pulmonary space opened up and
exposed to others. Levinas himself confirms that 'the subject could be a lung at the
bottom of its substance' (OBBE 180), and, similarly, that the 'subject becomes a
heard in its being-for-the-other, a proposition which, in his more kabbalistic
moments, Levinas deems compatible with the idea that 'God' acts through the subject
on these occasions (GP 144). As such, Levinas concludes, the subject is 'wholly a
supporting [toute entiere un supporter]' (OBBE 180; AE 276). In the quotidian
activity of breathing Levinas locates the extraordinary 'nobility' of a 'pure
supporting' (GP 140) worthy of provoking the 'wonder' (etonnement) in which the
enterprise of philosophy begins. A Grundbestimmung to rival 'shame' as the
attunement in which ethics, qua philosophia prote (TtpcoTq (jMAoacjua), opens, a
trauma (Tpaupa) rather than thauma (0aupa), however, as Levinas is quick to
caution (PA 111, OBBE 181), for ethics is quite distinct from the miribilia of magic.
Indeed, 'purely thaumaturgical miracles' are 'not miraculous enough,' Levinas will
opine (BVI 21 In.12), and the Other must be protected against invultuation, so
inviolable is the face (vultus) that its sanctity must be safeguarded against that which
would defile it.
The human Sonderstellung is thus not so much a 'place' (how could it be
when the subject is devastated of its site) as a role, and it is by this role that the self is
designated. Henceforth, one must construe the 'soul' not as Aoyoc, or a silent
discourse with itself, but as contactual: the very hypostasization of sensibility,
susceptibility itself. Pace Aristotle, the soul is not, therefore, merely the actuality of
the body, but what I would term its contactuality.s From one's first breath to one's
last and arguably beyond, for the dimension of ethics is undeniably generative ('the
8 See Aristotle De Anima, 413a (Aristotle, 1986, 158). Famously, of course, Aristotle will claim that
'the eye is the matter of sight, so that when sight leaves it it is no longer an eye' (De Anima, 413a). The
soul is the actuality (entelechia) of the body, therefore, since it is, as it were, sight hypostasized.
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tomb is not a refuge,' Levinas will maintain, since one's 'debt' to others outlives one
(.BPW 190n.25)), one is situated in relation to others. It is in this sense, then, that
'spirit' (purged, or so Levinas will claim, of its mythological connotations) is 'the
longest breath there is [souffle le plus long qui soitf (OBBE 182; AE 278), the depth
of the soul itself. Space and time are the a priori (posteriorly) forms of 'respiration,'
one might say, were one to follow Levinas in his suggestion here. But is Levinas'
confidence in the deposition of essance (the deployment of essence) justified? And is
his designation of Being as 'evil' warranted (TO 51)? Being is evil, Levinas will urge,
because like the apeiron (arrsipcov), it is unbounded. The 'law of evil' is the 'law of
being,' Levinas insists (POM 175), because the reign of conation is incessant. Is not
to depict Being thus an oversimplification?9
One might say that Levinas' 'work' is riven by a series of polarizations that
structure the field of proto-ethics in decisive ways.10 The displacement of the ego into
me void is achieved, it seems, without remainder; the 'purity' of the production
reported here being untainted by the spoils of conation (although the il y a haunts the
fold of face and form, it does not, according to Levinas, complicate their disunity, an
admission not a little dubious since the element, I would contend, is the format of the
face and extends, as Levinas himself suggests, into the il y a (77 142)). Perhaps
Levinas is too clinical in his treatment of conation, too much the anatomist held
enthralled by the workings of the 'lungs,' the 'heart,' and the 'stomach,' to accord the
subject much concern in her malaise. Conation is denounced unequivocally by
Levinas without due attention being paid to the ego personality in and through whom
such striving is unleashed. For with the haemorrhaging of the self is there anyone left
to suffer the Other; and have 'I' not been usurped by the 'total Organ' of the corps
ethiquel Levinas, no doubt under the influence of Husserl, presumes the 'I' (the ego
wrenched from its hypostasis by the Other) to be regnant in its sphere of owness,
without questioning the self-evidences upon which this supposition is based.
9 As Didier Franck contends, 'this interpretation of Being [Being as evil], while supporting all of
Levinas's work, is never justified.' Indeed, with Franck one may well wonder whether it might be
possible to 'accede to the there is otherwise than through horror,' the affect through which, according
to Levinas, one is exposed to the indeterminacy of the il y a (Franck, 2000, 15).
10 In what follows, John Milbank's remarks are instructive in this regard, although one need not
subscribe fully to the latter's somewhat depreciatory caricature of Levinas' thought. Milbank suggests
that: 'Levinas in fact produces a bizarre inverted egoism, which conserves a mode of Cartesian
dualism, and indeed perhaps accentuates it into a mode of manicheanism. Although it is now the other I
and not I myself which is the foundation of understanding, a gulf is fixed upon its basis between the il y
a of empty meaningless existence that cannot be redeemed, and which always engenders horror on the
one hand, and the ethical cosmos which establishes "the right" of the subject in the face of this horror,
on the other. On the ethical plane, the result is a reactive ethics which falsely identifies self-obliteration
with the final good, and requires the good to be predatory upon pre-existing suffering (Milbank, 2001,
342).
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Again, had Levinas not hurried the transition between 'childhood' and
'adulthood,' and had he scrutinized the process of (ethical) maturation more closely,
he may have found the phenomenon of 'adolescence' to be instructive in this regard.
For the conative drives are not so easily managed and certainly do not always support
the ego in its predation. The ego, to invert the Husserlian formulation, may be held
sway by its drives, drives which are arguably not its 'own,' or its ownmost, but which
threaten the economy of the ^uxv, and pulsate, more often than not, according to the
rhythms of destruction, rather than to those of enjoyment (a Destruktion of the spirit
quite distinct from that enterprise announced by Heidegger in Being and Time (BT §6
[19-27]). Levinas does not recognise that the conatus in 'me' is also the 'beast' in me
(although it need not be the blonde Bestie in me), and that the 'wild barbarian'
character of alterity (TRA 347) threatens the tenure of the self from within and from
without (although these topoi are, of course, confounded by Levinas). The locus of the
'strange' in me cannot be identified exclusively with my being 'animated' by the
other person. For, not only am I a stranger to myself (the basis, perhaps, for the
analogization commended by Husserl), but I may, to employ the Levinasian figure, be
'held hostage' by (my) drives, in which case one may be permitted to conclude that
'it' drives me - comme il pleut, comme il fait chaud, comme il y a - since 'I' do not
commandeer 'my' drives.
The logic of reflexivity, then, defines conation. The conatus imperils itself.
The marauder terrorizes itself The gourmand consumes itself. The other person may
awaken me (traumatically) from my acquiescence and challenge my satiety, however,
might I not be 'hunted down in my home' (OBBE 92) by the other that I am to
myself? Might the 'other in me' not betoken that in me which puts my very
perseverance in being at risk? Many of the habitualities the ego acquires do not
promote its growth or enhance the standing of its Kernwelt but instead lead to its
degeneration. To be sure, as Levinas notes, the en-joinment to oneself, constitutive of
jouissance, includes deficient forms of self-experience as well as those more typically
associated with enjoyment. However, the domicile Levinas presents, the home from
which 'I' am ejected by the other person, preserves its domesticity in his account
despite the Other's ingressions into the sanctity of my 'inwardness.' What if, we may
ask, to be at-home-with-oneself (etre chez soi) is to be at war with oneself; what if the
'feminine' presence that welcomes one there, where the 'there' in question is the 'Da'
that is put into question by the Other, is less than cordial, and Ecrna, the goddess of
the hearth (a hearth where according to Heraclitus even the gods 'dwell,' and in
Heidegger's estimation of the latter's saying, the 'unfamiliar' resides (Heidegger,
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1996 [1947]) perhaps, one might add, under the guise of ilyaity) were at once Epia,
the goddess of strife, or the tutelary goddess A0qva, a deeply ambiguous presence
being both the goddess of wisdom and war. Levinas would, of course, resist such a
reading, by insisting that 'the feminine will never take on the aspect of the Divine'
since 'the dimension of intimacy,' rather than 'the dimension of loftiness,' is 'opened
up by woman' (JF 37).
For all its subsequent trauma, the domestic scene Levinas describes is far too
peaceable a lodging to accommodate the 'conatus' whose struggle for self-
aggrandizement the other person purportedly interrupts. Perhaps his horror at the il y a
prohibited Levinas from exploring the 'basement' of his domicile, a 'site,' according
to the schema of Freudian topography, from which unconscious drives and urges
arise. Is it any wonder, then, that in the 'home,' whose ontological accomplishment
Levinas treats, the adolescent is most often at home (chez soi) in the basement (le
sous-sol) and secure in the reclusion it provides.
Pleasure, as Levinas observes in De 1'evasion, may exist 'wholly in the
enlargement of its own amplitude,' thriving upon its own 'swooning' (OE 61), but
conation, which arguably feeds upon itself, being what one might call, endophagous,
invariably consumes its 'host' such that, once again, it would be incorrect to identify
the ego personality too forcibly with the conatus essendi, as Levinas is wont to do.
The existent, one might say, irrespective of the logic of the anterieure
posterieurement (T1 170; Tel 184), issues from a broken home. One inhabits ruins, not
palatial quarters. The T no more coincides with the conatus than the ethically
inspired subject coincides with itself. Thus, the ego fulfilling itself intentionally,
which, as Husserl intimates, is 'the performer of all validities' (Crisis §50), is apt to
discover that its performance is impaired by unruly drives, drives which refuse to be
checked by higher order 'mental' activity, rendering them a threat to the prospects of
the 'I.' If the 'face' is to heal allergy (77 197), then must the 'master' not cure the
'student' of the disease that reigns within her? How is this 0£paiT£ta to be
administered and at what cost to proto-ethical prudence? These are questions Levinas
fails to entertain, although he will concede that 'the ego may be called in the name of
unlimited responsibility to concern itself about itself as well' (TOT 50; emphasis
added), or, as he puts it in Otherwise than Being, responsibility 'poses problems, if
one is not to abandon oneself to violence' (OBBE 193n.33; emphasis added). Again,
quite how this care for self alters the sense {sens) of proto-ethics remains unclear, as
do the circumstances under which one is to moderate the immoderacy of one's
responsibility in the interest of self-interest. Levinas does not elaborate further on
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these points. One can say, however, that the (pre)original primacy granted the 'Other'
in Levinas' thinking is not breached by this concern for self. At best we may be
permitted to speak of a qualified asymmetry in this regard.
Ricoeur acknowledges this aporia in Levinas' work and supplements, what he
considers to be the limitations of the latter's preoccupation with 'externality,' with an
insistence upon the 'profound unity of self-attestation and of injunction coming from
the Other' (Ricoeur, 1992, 354-355; translation altered). The subject is one who is
enjoined to be for others and to esteem itself as the bearer of this mandate. Echoing
Ricoeur's sentiments, Bernet defines ethical conscience as 'an immediate sensitivity
both for the call which comes from the other and for myself as the one who cannot
escape from this call (Bernet, 1996, 172). Now, despite Levinas' concession that a
modicum of self-love may be requisite if 'I' am to sustain my responsibility for others
('My lot is important,' he intimates (OBBE 161)), my duties are weighted
incontrovertibly in the Other's favour. As the other in the same, Levinas will urge,
subjectivity 'is the putting into question of all affirmation for-oneself' (OBBE I'll;
emphasis added). Moreover, the relationship with the Other 'empties me of myself'
such that 'I no longer have the right to keep anything for myself' (MS 52). And the
justification for this extreme view of ethical life is, apropos of Levinas, that 'sacrifice
is the norm and the criterion of the approach' to the face (EP 76).
§ 23. Selfacclaim
The policy of abasement we have found to be central to Levinas' presentation of
responsibility does not accord well with conceptions of the 'good' life that emphasize
communality, or a greater degree of reciprocity between what, in Levinas' estimation,
are competing egoisms. For example, the Aristotelian notion that 'the good man
should be a lover of self' since 'he will both himself profit by doing noble acts and
will benefit his fellows' (Aristotle, 1925, 1169a8), is diametrically opposed to the
kind of 'consummation' for the other in terms of which Levinas understands ethics
(OBBE 50), even if Levinas' ethic of ethics is doubly genitive, being both the proto¬
type and exemplum for what it accomplishes. But the EuSaipcov life lauded by
Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics, the life culminating in suScupovia, is one that
has not abrogated egoism, Levinas will contend, and thus persists on its imperious
way, a way in pursuit of the TtpcoTCU apxcu. Of course, responsibility itself has no
end since it is asymptotic, en ladavar soph, or 'never ending' (TP 85), and the
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teleological nisus toward accomplishment is extinguished in the properly ethical
'Desire' for the Other. Before the face, Levinas thus argues, 'any concern that the ego
would have for its existence and its destiny' is rendered 'senseless' (insense) (OBBE
128; AE 204). Nothing is 'more comical', he concludes, than 'the concern that a being
has for an existence it could not save from destruction' (OBBE 129).
Yet the self esteem which Aristotle, Ricoeur and Bernet, among others, situate
at the heart of ethics, is anything but comedic, and we may concur with Bloechl that
ethics entails both the limitation and management of a desire beyond being (the
Desire for the 'Other') with a desire for self worth (Bloechl, 2000a, 149). At the level
of proto-ethics Levinas will not sanction such regulation because the oneself, he
asserts, is immediately susceptible toxfor the face of the other person. The oneself
does not retain the time for deliberation (it ages, we recall, it cannot 'catch its breath'
(OBBE153)) but acts, dare we say, instinctively, such 'instincts' being honed through
'education' - although Levinas will insist contra-naturally - and laid down as its
sedimentum, in accordance with the heteronomy of the face. As we have seen,
however, the subject (formed in passivity), precisely as impressible, has been taught
to respond to the face qua face, whether this be by the grace of God (grace a-Dieu),
or thanks to a certain 'liturgy of study' into which it is initiated generatively. The two
are not, we note, incommensurable. To be sure, the oneself is undeniably exposed.
However, the 'conversion' of this openness into the extreme form of ethical portage
defended by Levinas (such that my responsibility no longer admits of 'limit or
measure' (OBBE 47)) is not so readily justified. For Levinas appears to deprive the
individual moral agent of choice in the matter and he does so because he believes the
subject to be everted by the 'Good' in the encounter with the face. One is consumed,
or cored out, by the 'Good.' It is therefore the 'Good' that acts in 'me' and not 'I' who
act on its behalf. Passivity is literally ab-solute, one might say. Indeed, so much so,
that I am absolved of my identity: an empty space.
The displacement of the ego into the 'creature' is so complete that Levinas
will even liken it to 'the consuming of a holocaust' (GP 143), an illusion not without
its obvious pathos. Sensibility, apropos of Levinas, is an 'unlimited undergoing,' then,
and not 'the generosity of offering oneself' (OBBE 75), since the corps ethique,
unlike the Leib in which the 'I' holds sway, is animated by the Other, supplanting the
ego from its position of primacy and ousting it from its origin. In its 'historizing'
(Geschehen) Dasein may well be bestrewn or 'stretched along.' As care, 'Dasein is
the 'between' that links the phenomena of birth and death, Heidegger suggests:
Being-in-the-world is at once a project unto death and a Being-towards-the-beginning
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(BT §72 [375]). The subject Levinas deduces, however, is born into the
'beginninglessness of an anarchy and in the endlessness of obligation' (OBBE 140).
Furthermore, the obligation with which the subject is encharged augments itself
incessantly the more the subject heeds the Other's call (OBBE 93). Infinity comes to
pass as the concrescence of responsibility, responsibility which grows steadily relative
to its accomplishment.
The infinity determinative of responsibility does not denote its 'actual
immensity' though, or so Levinas will confirm (77 244), because the Zwischen of
ethical negotiations is a non-geometric space that does not proffer itself to
measurement. Contra Jeremy Bentham, responsibility cannot be gauged by calculus,
nor, however, do the demands its exercise make upon one lenify proportionate to
one's capacity to bear them: no principle of utility legislates its extent. The 'march'
(la marche) of responsibility is both interminable and unforgiving in its severity, since
'culpability augments with saintliness' (TDTT 103). Dasein in Heidegger may not be
hungry, as Levinas opines (77 134), but me void, one might argue, is never satisfied.
Like the possibility of the impossibility of existence, the anticipation of which,
according to Heidegger, becomes 'greater and greater,' knowing 'no measure at all'
(BT §53 [262]), the compass of what one might 'accomplish' for others is continually
offset against the greater 'debt' of what one cannot 'achieve' (due to the constraints of
singularity, resources, localization, awareness, etc.). In Levinas, then, to adapt what
Heidegger says of the 'Open' (das Offene) in his essay, 'Conversation on a Country
Path,' the 'horizon' of what one might possibly bexdo for others is 'but the side
facing us of an Open that surrounds us' (Heidegger, 1966, 64); an openness that for
Heidegger is precisely 'impossible' for representational thinking (the 'Open' englobes
the various Abschattungen that concatenate to form objects for consciousness,
housing the manifold of pre-objective appearance(s)).
Levinas' use of hyperbole, and arguably hyperbole is the very en-ergy of the
Levinasian corpus (the subject divests itself of its substance, he will advert, 'even to
the mucous membrane of the lungs, continually splitting up' (OBBE 107)), which, we
have noted, he deploys repeatedly throughout his work, does not mitigate against the
austerity of his position here and we may wonder whether, in the midst of the
phlegmasia and expectoration to which he alludes, there is a place for the science of
hygienics in Levinas' thought.11 Might one not be called, as Nietzsche will have us
" As Levinas argues in OfGod Who Comes To Mind, 'exasperation' is 'a method of philosophy' (QA
89). Certainly such an admission accords well with Levinas' own thought and the punishing regime to
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believe of Goethe, to keep oneself 'in check' and have 'reverence' for oneself
(Nietzsche, 1990, 114)? Must the individual be sacrificed (reduced to cinders) in the
encounter with the face (GP 143)? Am 'I,' as Levinas suggests, never finished with
'emptying myself of myself' (GP 144)? Need (proto)ethics entail such losses?
To some extent Levinas' appraisal of proto-ethical obligation is accurate, and
his descriptions are germane. Taking the notion of 'maternity,' for example, as a
figure for the 'immensity' of responsibility is a deft move on Levinas' part. The ambit
of maternal love (a phenomenon not restricted to the human species) is indeed broad.
(Let us be clear, the proto-ethical translation of the 'empirical' draws upon an
idealized depiction of motherhood, deemed by Levinas to be both 'typical' and
'normative.' Furthermore, this reflects the conservatism of the gender politic he
inherits from Mitnagdic culture.) A mother's love for hisxher child is incalculable: as
a trope maternity is non-gender specific, Levinas assures us. One cannot tabulate its
depth or assign it, so Levinas will have us believe, a worldly valence as it transcends
quantification. Ethical portage is likewise boundless, Levinas will argue, because it
too exceeds the measure of the 'world.' Yet 'parents' do not love all children with
equal force (they are devoted to their own first and foremost), and if the trope of
maternity is to survive its ethical configuration then must it not also account for the
difference and divergency that attends the 'physiognomies' from which, among other
places, the face signifies? Maternal love is one of the most (s)elective instantiations of
love, and while the privacy of the face-a-face is certainly exclusive, the presence of
the third party interrupts the intimacy of this family 'bond' (lien) like an unwelcome
12
sibling (or the 'orphan' the childless couple did not adopt). " Of course, Levinas will
maintain, the singularity of the face is the guarantor of its individuality (Tl 245). But a
face bereft of form is ultimately nondescript, providing one with no sense of whether
the 'Desire' that 'consumes' one, or the love one 'bears' for the Other, is appropriate
or proper to that individual.
It is the third party that regulates the form of my devotion to the Other (Autrui)
and thus the horizon of the third party that delimits the field of proto-ethics. The
quasi-familial a-deux of the face-to-face is something of a menage-a-trois, then.
However, as we have seen, the role accorded the third in Levinas is ambiguous, and
which he submits it and to which it is submitted by the concrete situations whose proto-ethical
importation he treats.
12 As Stella Sandford has argued, and I believe her remarks here to be germane to the concept of
maternity in Levinas' thought: 'each time that fecundity is said to overflow its purely biological
signification, the biological origin of the concept is nevertheless affirmed' (Sandford, 2000, 69;
emphasis added).
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the 'law in the midst of proximity' (OBBE 159) instituted by the third is notoriously
difficult to decipher (as if it were written, 'for the most part,' in an ancient dialect,
perhaps even in square letters?). So much so, that apropos of Levinas one is unclear to
what extent the demand for justice modifies the terms of my responsibility for the
'one' who draws near en ce moment meme, even if this moment, distended
generatively beyond its instantiation in the present, commits me to a future always
already underway.
§ 24. Threat and limitation
Reasoning in a decidedly rabbinical manner (akin to those Doctors of the Talmud he
so admires), Levinas will propose that I 'myself' have always 'one responsibility
more than the other,' since 'I am still responsible for his responsibility.' It thus
follows, Levinas adds, that 'if he is responsible for my responsibility, I am still
responsible for the responsibility that he has for my responsibility' (TP 85). The final
onus of responsibility in this nexus of responsibility falls to me, therefore, because I
must be responsible for myself and in so being I mollify the other's burden and relieve
them (partly) of their ward of me. Although Levinas nowhere, to my mind at least,
speaks directly of self-responsibility (no doubt due to the fact that responsibility is
oriented toward the Other, and because this concern for 'self differs markedly from
the strain of 'personal responsibility' (personliche Verantwortung) advocated by
Husserl in 'the Crisis (Crisis §7)) one must presume he means something of this sort
when he writes, as we have seen, of one's responsibility 'manifesting itself by
limiting itself' (TOT 50).
I take charge of myself in order that I might serve the 'Good' more effectively:
self-responsibility is eutropic, one might say, directed principally toward the face of
the Other who calls it forth in 'me.' I may thus be summoned to be a 'mother' to
myself and to bear myself with care lest I present myself before the tribunal of the
face ill prepared for the tasks with which it assigns me (however, such 'motherhood'
should not be conflated with valetudinarianism or an obsession with one's own well
being). Of course, this stipulation to care for oneself requires that one readies oneself
for service, that one assumes a position ofpreparedness for diacony, stances taken in
anticipation of (and yet in the wake of) the face that obligates one. Such stances, or
postures, one might say (one's 'basic posture is the for-the-other' (SaS 158); in its
'basic posture' (son port de soi) the 'subject is expiation,' Levinas avers (SOR 186)),
strengthen the 'constitution' of the ethical subject, as the ambulation in which the Leib
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engages to flesh out its Nahsphdre, invariably, and unremarked by Husserl, fortifies
the body upon which constitution depends, awarding new meaning to the sense that
the philosopher might be uspi TTCXTqTiKOS" (and let us note, the Hebrew halakh, from
which is derived the word Halakhah, meaning law or rule of conduct, also means to
walk).
Needless to say, Levinas does not specify exactly how the excess of
responsibility I bear for others 'carries its own limit in its excess' (ERDO 182;
emphasis added), nor does he indicate in what ways one might manage the 'trauma'
one suffers through exposure to the Other. He does, however, refer to the
'incomparable strength' of Jewish ritual, whose 'antiquated gestures' release a
'mysterious energy' which prolongs and sustains the 'obedience to prescription' such
liturgical acts express (DJ 8). No doubt too, one might add, the aforementioned
ritualized behaviour provides a liturgical forum or space for catharsis (xaOapais),
and a discharge of tension from the service of daily life. Indeed, Levinas notes that
together with the 'study' of the Torah (which is, he declares, 'more important than
liturgy,' but which itself arguably involves strong elements of ritual (CR 51))
liturgical acts 'support' the universe and preserve its integrity (DF 9). Given that the
ethical subject is a 'pure support,' then, must we not conclude that its capacity qua
support (and hence the capaciousness of animatological space) is related directly to
the sustenance the subject draws from 'liturgy' and 'study,' these 'disciplines' thus
serving as the 'staging' or mise-en-scene for the ethical philosophy Levinas
propounds. The sub-textual exchange between Levinas' 'philosophical' and
'confessional' texts would appear to corroborate this proposal, as would Levinas'
promotion of an ontology of the book and his contention that one's being Zum-Buch-
sein is 'irreducible for the human condition' (BV xi).
Those of Levinas' readers repelled by the dogmatism of institutionalised
Religion and the self-evidences it so effortlessly grants itself will, if one is to take
seriously Levinas' endorsement of 'liturgy,' and its connection to 'ethics,' be required
to adopt 'practices' to ensure that the haleness of the vpuxq (since every psyche,
ethically inspired, is prone to 'psychosis' (GDT 188)) be preserved in spite of the
persecution it undergoes. Arguably, the vision of the moral 'life' that Levinas distils is
emboldened by the 'performance' of liturgy and the 'discipline' of study he defends
in his Talmudic writings.13 The 'teaching' Levinas imparts is inscribed in, and
13 For example, one clearly ascertains the direction such a life should take in Otherwise than Being,
where Levinas states: 'we find the agglomerations or dispersions of peoples in the deserts without
manna of this earth. But each individual of these peoples is virtually a chosen one, called to leave in his
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reiterated by, the ritualised gestures embodied in these practices, practices which have
functioned generatively throughout the history of Judaism to disseminate the kinds of
'knowledge' Levinas conveys in his work. It is against the horizon of such socially
mediated practices (the origins of which share many traits, and indeed a common
heritage, with those cultic practices Levinas believes to be specific to 'pagan' forms
of religiosity) that the symbolic order of the 'face,' and the authority it commandeers,
arises and is enshrined as normative. It is in this sense, I suggest, that we should
understand Levinas when he says that the 'way' that leads to ethical maturation
'draws us back to ritual discipline and self-education,' the 'greatness' of which 'lies in
its daily regularity' (RFA 18). Of course, this way requires 'tough discipline [dure
discipline]' (MH 227; SDH 317) and (a) sturdy constitution, just as, one might add,
the 'existential way' of 'laying bare' the ontological meaning of the Being of Dasein,
requires, according to Heidegger, 'unwavering discipline'' and focus (BT §65 [323]).
Levinas' vision of what he will call, the excellence of exteriority ('Height is
heaven,' he advises, 'the kingdom of heaven is ethical' (OBBE 183)), orients
comportment only insofar as the OXHM0^ he outlines is acknowledged by a subject as a
directive for action. This in turn, as we have seen, depends upon the subject in
question being 'susceptibile' to the incursions of the face, and therefore responsive to
its demands, in the ways Levinas asserts. But for those of us who have evaded the
'rule' (Mekhilta) of the Amoraim and loitered outside the yeshiva in the margins of
Jewish history, the imperative force with which the face greets us will be correlative
with our impressibility as students and regulated by the tutelage we have received.14
Yet one's being impressible, while obviously a reference to one's being, so to speak,
receptive (or as Bloechl aptly puts it, 'appealable' (Bloechl, 2000, 278)), might also
indicate that one is gullible before the 'face' and that the moral 'teaching' Levinas
prescribes is indeed a 'barter of the duped' (un troc de dupe) (OBBE 184; AE 282).
Not all teachers are trustworthy, after all. And while, as we noted earlier, the subject
takes face in, might one not argue equally that the subject is taken in by the face?
Must one not trust the face in its frankness? Must one not submit to instruction
(despite the rhetoric of susception to which Levinas subscribes), and thereby submit
both to the figura of the face and to the figure of oneself with which the Other
presents one? Must one not have a sense of/for oneself, qua 'creature,' which one
then accepts as binding?
turn, or without awaiting his turn, the concept of the ego, its extension in the people, to respond with
responsibility: me, that is, here I am for the others' (OBBE 185)).
14 The Amoraim are teachers of Talmud. See Levinas' glossary of Hebrew terms in In The Time Of The
Nations (JTN xii).
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It may be that the self-image in and by which I recognize myself, is abject, and
that the 'evil Genius' described by Descartes, haunts the interstices of the siSos" I
accept as my own (energising the specular site of abjection). In which case 'I' am at a
loss and quite literally desolate, but in an altogether less efficacious way than the
desolation lauded by Levinas for its moral probity. And, if Visker is to be believed,
the jurisdiction of the il y a may have to be broadened beyond that defined by Levinas
to include that in me which alienates me from myself (Visker, 1999, 388). To be sure,
self-image, whether this corresponds to one's condition qua 'creature' or 'conatus,' is
fashioned through passivity. However, Levinas is less willing to acknowledge the
'traumatism' that accompanies self-attestation, than he is to credit the 'trauma'
through which the creature is produced with near salvific qualities. Indeed, he will
even liken the 'teacher-pupil relationship [la relation de maitre a eleve\ (Levinas'
synonym for the face-to-face relation) to 'deliverance,' or a 'return from exile' (MT
86; TM 125), since the face, he believes, presents the self with the opportunity to
surpass itself. Nevertheless, this deliverance (delivrance), which Levinas would, no
doubt, see prefigured in Husserl ('we deliver ourselves from our footing' in the
natural attitude, Husserl surmises, 'by universal epoche' (CM §15 [72])), requires one
to accede to the notions that natural, conative life is something from which one needs
delivering (natural life is fallen), and that in one's natural state one is (a) conatus
essendi or libido dominandi.
The body dysmorphism of the anorexic, or the 'labour' of the teenage girl
struggling with her 'form,' certainly do complicate what I take to be Levinas' general
view that left to one's own devices the conatus in one will predominate and lead one
to pursue a life of wanton self-gratification in the interest of self-preservation. On the
contrary, human beings engage in many forms of behaviour that jeopardize this nisus
toward self-preservation, and from which they may require liberating. Dasein may be
bestrewn, but one's being, so to speak, Streuung out (on prescription drugs, perhaps)
is surely a cause for concern, whether or not the palliative one seeks is to take the
edge off the apeiron (aTTEipcov), famous, of course, for its lack of edges (oupot), or
to attenuate the demands of a limitless responsibility (and as Heidegger reminds us,
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'addiction and urge are possibilities rooted in the throwness of Dasein' (BT §41
[196])). No doubt Levinas would deem such behaviour to be a variety of narcissism.
He would be 'naive' (and here Levinasian first philosophy remains naive despite its
an-archaeological (an-archic) pretensions) to think that 'exposure' to the face is
sufficient to wrench one from the abject self-image to which one may have become
accustomed, and accustomed, in many instances, through pathological and often
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ritualized forms of behaviour (one thinks of the phenomena of self harm, scarification,
bulimia nervosa, anorexia, alcohol and drug addiction, for example), behaviour
altogether different from the 'ethical behaviour' (le comportement ethique) Levinas
believes to characterize one's relations with the 'Metaphysical' (77 78; Tel 76). The
flight from (j)uois was never going to be anything but traumatic for Levinas, yet in the
final analysis the trauma of 'awakening' remains productive for him.
In 'drive' (Trieb), however, one witnesses a splitting of the Ego, which while
not necessarily schizoid (although the 'creation' of the subject is schizogenic, i.e.,
formed by a fission or denucleation of sorts) is indicative of a state of affairs
somewhat more 'involved' than that itemized by Levinas under the thematic of
conation. The space of the oneself is a space of conflict between fractious parties. The
'will in my will,' Levinas describes, is itself bifurcated, the torsion of a complex more
pronounced than Levinas himself may have realized. Whether one trusts the 'face'
that assigns one to oneself, or the 'faces' from whom one 'learns' to identify with an
abject self-image (one thinks of the bully, for example, and as Levinas reminds us, 'in
alterity we can find an enemy' (Hand, 1989, 294; emphasis added)), one must, as
Levinas correctly argues, be pre-originarily susceptible to others. Yet self image is
governed by what we might call emplotment, which again sets the 'face,' its
recognition, and the siSos I accept as my own, against the horizon(s) of tertiality.
One's identity may, as Levinas argues, 'endure unto the limit' (OBBE 196 n.20), but
the uepas whose boundary prohibits the total conflagration of the self, or condones
its sacrifice, is installed generatively and secured through heritability. The
discernment of such a limit calls for a science of limits (which one might term a
peratology) to guard against 'false teachers' (and let us not take this trope too
literally) who may conspire to orchestrate one's demise, even if such teachers are, as
it were, subhuman forces whose assault upon the self is anything but premeditated.
Like Dasein, who, in the form of conscience, carries 'the voice of the friend'
along with it (BT §34 [163]), a voice that extricates Dasein from its dispersion in the
'They,' the subject, under the instruction of the 'teacher,' bears one within who
dispossesses it of itself and in so doing individuates it as such.15 Yet, in both cases,
one may wonder whether the friend (teacher) is a foe, that is, one who may mislead.
Certainly, for Levinas the equals in me is a foe to be conquered rather than appeased.
Again then, if I am, in a manner of speaking, compelled as Heidegger suggests, to
'become what I am' (BT §31 [145]), because ultimately I am what I am to become,
15 No doubt, for Levinas, the friend is the 'Master' or Talmudic 'Doctor.'
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then what I am to become may well prove to be a threat to me and to the life of
diacony I am called to lead.
Of course, the sacrifices demanded of 'me' by the Other are many, and while
responsibility might entail the 'ultimate gift of dying for another' (NM 163), the
situation of susception is such that the phenomenon of oblation it engenders, is
multiform. Sacrifice, like 'truth,' is produced in 'several times' and in various places
(77 284), once again confirming what Levinas will term, 'the anarchy essential to
multiplicity' (77 294). The limitations imposed upon my responsibility by the third
party oblige me to sacrifice commitments, abdicate relationships, and curtail
correspondences. Each 'act' (which, as Levinas has made clear, is proto-actional since
'my' actions are animated 'ethically,' T am created through them) in which I am
implicated is expiatory because each 'act' prohibits and inhibits others. Derrida
summarises this predicament thus:
As soon as I enter into a relation with the other, with the gaze, look, request,
command or call of the other, I know that I can respond only by
sacrificing ethics, that is, by sacrificing whatever obliges me to also respond,
in the same way, in the same instant, to all the others [...] But I am
sacrificing and betraying at every moment all my other obligations: my
obligations to the other others whom I know or don't know, the billions of
my fellows (without mentioning the animals that are even more other others
than my fellows), my fellows who are dying of starvation or sickness...
every one being sacrificed to every one else in this land of Moriah that is our
habitat every second of every day (Derrida, 1995, 68-69).
The space of proto-ethics cannot, it seems, be cleansed of this stench of death, since it
is death (in the sense of limitation (TO 71)) that delineates the field of obligation. But
this limit is something of an Aufhebung in Levinas' thought because it is only against
the limit of the Other's death that I am to measure my own. This limit is delimited,
however, by the third party whose intervention re-plots the co-ordinates of ethical
space and redefines its terms. Of course, this alternance at the limit is only revealed
inxby the face of the other person, the face being at once both the dimension of height
(viz. heritability) and that at inter-finition, a plot into which my 'plot' (mon sort),
which is to matter to me (OBBE 161; AE 250), is woven.
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§ 25. Regulation
If philosophy, in its traditional 'Greek' determination, is broadly speaking a
preparedness for death (a determination clearly operative in Being and Time) and if
the cj)iA6ao(j)os, as Heidegger reminds us in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic,
has an eye to the TrepiTTa, namely to what lies beyond the 'limits' of the usual, to that
which 'arouses wonder' (Heidegger, 1984, 12), then ought the 'wonder' (etonnement)
whose provocation Levinas cites as the impetus for writing Otherwise than Being or
Beyond Essence (C'est cet etonnement qui a ete I'objet du livre ici propose) (OBBE
181; AE 277)), the wonder at the deposition and abrogation of the self, not to motivate
one to ready oneselffor the 'traumatism of astonishment' (77 73) one invariably and
repeatedly undergoes in the face of the Other? Again, despite Levinas' veto on
'assumption' (assomption), must one not take up a position, and occupy a stance, to
enable one to meet the incessant demands of ethical life? Ought the cultivation of this
habitus not to feature as an integral part in any philosophical 'programme' seeking to
redress the status of morality in 'philosophy'? Arguably then, while the oneself is
begotten in passivity (I am always already de-centred), qua ethics, first-philosophy
(upcoTq 4)iAooocJ)ia) is remiss to the extent that it does not attend to what transpires
between the 'domicile' and the 'desert,' that is, between my being-at-home-with my
self and my being driven from the 'subterranean digs' of my self (OBBE 195 n.ll).
The interspace or rropos between these discrete regions of being is uncharted by
Levinas in his 'philosophical' works, although the phenomena of liturgy and study,
discussed in his Talmudic writings, name activities (or rather, in Levinas' case,
manieres d'etre), which structure this space and ready the subject for its vocation. Of
course, these phenomena are described by Levinas in exclusively Jewish terms.
Moreover, the form of Judaism Levinas takes to be normative is that of the
Mitnagdism of his native Lithuania.
Now, I would contend that the tripartite structure of susceptibility, self-
attestation and injunction upon which the 'presentation' of the 'face' depends, is both
sanctified and sustained by the kind of liturgical activity Levinas acclaims in his
Talmudic writings. One might even say, to deploy a Heideggerian phrase, that the
face is 'cleared' for signification through ritual, and thus that liturgical space
prefigures 'ethical' space, the organisation of which is structured in consonance with
the regulatory schemata enforced through the performance of ritual acts. Levinasian
first philosophy appeals to, takes as axiomatic, and draws its conceptual resources
from a Mitnagdic-Jewish mode of life, or SiatTa: a mode of life ordered by Jewish
liturgical practices. The kind of 'life' Levinas advocates in his work, the 'way' of
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diacony he so painstakingly enunciates, is unthinkable outside this sphere of this
liturgical activity. Or, to be more precise, the adventure of 'ethics' as Levinas outlines
it, is instituted and nourished liturgically. What Levinas will term the 'circumstance'
of the 'face' (DR 117), is conditioned aetiologically by social practices whose
legitimacy and imperative force attain the degree of invariance they do through
generative repetition and renewal.
If 'philosophers' are to co-opt Levinasian motifs, if that is, they are to
succumb to what one might call the attitudinism of Levinasism, then they must attend
to those practices whose performance renders the terms in which Levinas' thought is
dispatched meaningful and sets them within their context of signification. Levinas'
redrafting of phenomenological procedure (as indicated his method (procede) is an
o5os or path) may challenge the polarization between 08copia and TTpa^is, and
extend the sense of 'space' beyond the equipmentality (and the nothingness that
subtends it) advanced in Being and Time. However, to account for the regulatory
mechanisms by which the phenomenonxnoumenon of the face is canonized and
installed as injunctive, Levinas must provide a more detailed explication of the
liturgical practices that govern the outworking of his thought and the liturgical 'space'
that arguably prefigures his figuration of the face. Perhaps one must put Levinas'
'philosophy' on a diet (SiatTa), then, so bloated is it with the surety of its own
'staging' that it has lost sight of the ground that sustains it beneath the weight of self-
evidence it supports. To be sure, as Levinas contends, 'the ritualism that leads the Jew
to devote himself to service with no thought of reward' and 'to accept a burden
carried out at his own expense' may be, as he states, 'the original and incontestable
meaning of the Greek word liturgy' (DF xiv). Yet again, this 'ritualism' (ritualisme)
relies upon the antecedent structuration of 'ritual' for its sense and one must elucidate
this substructure and probe the nature of its relationship to the work of ethics if one is
to understand the significance of the 'face' and grasp it in its injunctive environment.
The sacrifice of the 'self,' whose expenditure we, along with Bernet, Bloechl
and Ricoeur, have had cause to question, is one consequence of ethical obligation that
pushes the 'logic' of Levinas' thought to the point of exulceration. No doubt a
problem for a philosophy so resolutely alvine as Levinas' and given to conceiving its
distinct phases in terms of the organs of the body and their function. However, this
sacrifice of self, which, as we have seen, is both suspended and extended by the
presence of the third party ('only the hunger of the third limits the right of the Other'
(DF xiv)), gestures, in the order of Levinas' thinking, to the dephasing of the ego vis-
a-vis the other person, and to the sublation of a certain conceptualization of the
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subject within philosophical and religious thought. If, as Jacques Rolland suggests,
Levinas, following in the wake of Nietzsche, 'should be understood as a thinker of the
death of God' (Rolland, 2003, 89), and, as Nietzsche forewarned us, along with the
demise of the 'God' of onto-theology, one must also bid farewell {adieu) to the
institutions, practices and moral landmarks through which such a 'God' reveals
'Himself,' then a subjectivity defined in terms of the 'insinuation of essence [comme
insinuation de I'Essence]' {OBBE 177; AE 272)) must likewise be gutted along with
the 'God' in whose scattered entrails Nietzsche divined the possibility of the
Ubermensch, and after whom Levinas foresaw the aspect of a 'God' uncontaminated
by Being. The 'sacrifice' of the oneself in Levinas must thus be interpreted in its
wider signification, and, in a manner entirely commensurate with the Destruktion of
Cartesianism in Being and Time, as a moment of transition within philosophical
'history,' a moment as momentous for the programme of philosophy initiated by
Levinas (and continued in the work of Derrida, Nancy, Marion, etc.) as 'the crisis of
European existence' was decisive for the ratio of Husserl's later thought {CRISIS,
Appendix I, 299). As Levinas himself explains, 'modern antihumanism.. .clears the
place for subjectivity positing itself in abnegation [il fait place nette a la subjectivite
se posant dans I'abnegation],' 'in sacrifice,' and 'in a substitution which precedes the
will' {OBBE 127; AE 203, emphasis added). This 'place' is the point of departure for
Levinas' ethic of ethics and the site to which his thinking returns again and again
during the course of its radical excursions. A tottos that is at once both historical and
prehistorical, since the subject, qua hostage, is 'older than the ego' {OBBE 117)
whose historical articulation it supplants.
Yet, while this subjectxsite, whose devastation Levinas oversees, must cede to
the non-site of what he terms, a 'layout without security [I'etalernent sans securite]'
{OBBE 179; AE 276), namely the subject qua 'lung,' 'heart,' or 'hands' that give, the
'subject' in question is perhaps more splenetic (a correspondence with Baudelaire
Levinas did not accept16), and its aspect more spleen like than the aforementioned
'organs' upon whose donative support Levinas draws. Indeed, the 'irritability' {OBBE
143) that troubles the subject of responsibility and attends its restlessness (is the
subject, qua spleen, the hypostatization of such irritability, the genealogico-generative
descendent of the Cartesian conarium or pineal gland, perhaps?) reflects the awkward
accord between the 'Jewish' and the 'Greek' currents of Levinas' thought. The 'stage'
16 Levinas often cites Baudelaire (see, for example, TI156), although usually disapprovingly, and
typically in connection with Baudelaire's poem 'le Chat.' This poem, featured among a cycle of
poems under the heading of 'Spleen et Ideal,' is to be found in the first part of Baudelaire's Les Fleurs
du mal (1857).
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upon which the transactions of Levinas' thinking take place (the stage 'cleared' by
anti-humanism) is one whose dimensions are themselves 'cleared' by and through the
alternance of Jewish and Greek (JewxGreek) symbological and axiological
'horizons,' horizons that admit of their own distinct hierarchies of organisation and
regulation. The concourse of ethical space issues from the concours of these horizons,
one might say. 'Me void,' whether one understands by this designation Emmanuel
Levinas, qua meforesh, 'volunteering' his 'vision' of ethical life and hence
universalising himself through the course of his 'work' ('here I am, send me') (OBBE
199 n.l), or the responsible subject as an avatar of a protracted process of historical
maturation culminating in a conception of subjectivity as susceptibility, names 'one'
bound by an alliance between the 'Greek' and the 'non-Hellenism of the Bible' (QA
85). But what manages this alliance and apportions each of its parties their share of
influence? After all, the 'face' Levinas deduces is a 'product' of this accord, arising
within the 'space' engendered by the vacillation of JewxGreek modes of
understanding and comportment.
The face may compel the understanding but its provocation is, I would
contend, an emergent property of the field delineated by the concord between these
two 'cultural' sites, sites whose topological distinctness we have already had occasion
to question. To be struck down by something is to move already within the possibility
of its affective range, that is, it is to project the space (whether this be termed world-
space or ethical space) within which what strikes one is encountered. The entry of the
face into one's world is prepared for prior to its arrival, I would argue, although the
uniqueness of the Other in her concrete specificity remains that for which one is ill, or
under, prepared. It is because communally oriented practices delimit the field of
proto-ethics that something like a face can instruct one.
One is encountered by the 'outside' (OBBE 179), I suggest, by the openness of
the 'face' whose indigence summons one to its aid, at the limit of one's 'world.'
Proto-ethics, as such, is limitrophic (a question of negotiations at the limit) and the
face a limitrophe, or border phenomenon, arising at the limit of one's projective
17
range. However, Levinas will ultimately claim, a claim of dubious standing, that
what he, following Heidegger, terms, 'the illuminated site' of understanding, is but
the 'passage' or 'withdrawal' of 'God' (EP 77). The face opens in the trace of illeity,
he adverts (MS 64). Thus, for Levinas, a very different sort of activityxpassivity
eventuates at the limit of the 'world' (let us be clear, the determination of 'world'
17
Perhaps, among other reasons, this is why Levinas suggests that the 'human subject' is 'called on the
brink of tears and laughter to responsibility' (OBBE 18; emphasis added).
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operative here is once again that espoused by Heidegger in Being and Time, that
J
relational totality 'wherein Dasein as such already is' (BT §18 [87])). It is the
anachoresis of God that makes room for the machinations of the understanding, or
what we might call, more aptly, the Mitnagdic imagination. It is from out of this space
that the face signifies as a face and not because one readies oneself for the face
circumspectively. Aping Heidegger one might say the 'face' Levinas assays is ahead
of itself (sich vorweg) - the face precedes its prehension and reception - because, as
Levinas avers, 'God first contracts himself' in order to make space for it (IGRHV
166). Not only, I believe, does 'Judaism' contract itself to accommodate 'philosophy'
within Levinas' thought (arguably Levinas' phenomenology stands in the trace of his
Jewry), thereby leaving a residue of itself within the latter by which the latter is
oriented. But the sense of the face, as Levinas presents it, depends upon one
submitting to the notion that 'God' may be, a rather unnerving proposal for many, no
doubt, and for this reader included, since the notion of 'God' is invariably enervative
for critical thought (or, as Janicaud suggests, the idea of God brings about 'a kind of
violation of critical consciousness' (Janicaud, 2000, 46)).18
But subtending the cultural sites over whose confluence Levinas presides is
the more archaic proto-site of the earth; a basis Husserl had recourse to appraise
phenomenologically and Heidegger to celebrate ontologically and poetically, but
whose repose Levinas identifies exclusively with the sustenance the earth provides for
humans in their enjoyment ('Food, Drink, Shelter...the earth is for that,' Levinas will
insist (HGU 233)). Now, in place of 'God,' whose phenomenological credentials lack
cogency, Levinas would do well to relate his presentation of the face more closely to
its telluric provenance. One may speak of interruption, disturbance, faith, prayer,
devotion and surrender, one may scan the horizons of the optatives of hope, charity
and compassion, but to moot 'God' as that to which these phenomena point, and to
predicate the sense of one's leading concepts upon the self-withdrawal (anachoresis)
of such a 'God,' is surely imprudent (unless this contraction is brought to bear
generatively by the human community and refers to the removal of 'God' from the
margins of history, thereby making room for the properly human, and, by default the
properly nonhuman). Levinas is fearful of 4>Gcns, despite the fact that the nourishment
("rpcxjnj) with whose provision the earth graces humanity is perhaps more indicative
of the earth's being one who rears (TpocJxDs) than its being that which one deploys to
one's nutrimental gain or that which fuels one's appetite (ops^ts), even if one is, so to
18 Levinas would, of course, deem this violence necessary in order that egoic consciousness be
deposed. Understandably, this is not the connotation Janicaud has in mind here.
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speak, anorexic, and elementality is pervaded by ilyaity. It may then be, that the trope
Levinas enlists from the author(s) of the Biblical Numbers (XI, 12) to describe the
ethical relation (I bear the other 'in my breast as the nurse bears the nurseling' (OBBE
91)) derives its sense from its terrene ancestry and not from its divine declension. One
might say that the nurse bears the nurseling as the earth bears the earthling, a
suggestion altogether consonant with Husserl's depiction of the earth as an Ark
(Husserl, 1981a, 225). Of course, if the earth is Ark and apxp, then as we will shortly
discover, the time of the living present Levinas is compelled to reduce to its
diachronic destructive, is always already crossed, or rather soiled, by another time,
the time of the earth, a grounding that dispossesses the ego of its status as origin and
sets its constitutive life within the context of a more enduring earthly heritage.
Although Husserl himself equivocates over the placement of this origin,
believing the Ego to be the source (Quelle) of all possible sense, he does recognize
that the earth plays a pivotal role in the genesis of sense. Levinas, however, fails to
develop his disquisition of the 'elemental' beyond the publication of Totality and
Infinity. Thus, where he might have employed Jean Wahl's notion of
'transdescendence' (and extended its application) to execute a reduction to the 'earth,'
and, following Husserl's lead, perhaps advance an understanding of time as in-terre-
finitude, he sees in transdescendence the 'phenomenon of degradation or erosion of
the absolute' (RS 8). For Levinas, the elemental is a buccal space - that which is given
as a modification of the 'bite' - to be transformed through expropriation and donative
acts. Whether the earth is construed according to the scholastic distinction between
materia secunda or natura naturata (nature as 'stuff') and Natura naturans (Nature as
Divine prototype) it remains a resource for Levinas rather than a source to be
accorded respect in its own right. Indeed, Levinas urges us to 'remain masters of the
mystery that the earth breathes' (HGU 233). A declaration that confirms, quite
forcibly, his identification of the earth with the 'intoxication' (ivresse) of 'paganism'
(paganisme), and to his mind, its most heinous manifestation in the form of Hitlerism.
As Levinas expresses it in the essay, 'Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity' (1957), this
'earth maternity determines the whole Western civilization of property exploitation,
political tyranny, and war' (PII 53). Yet, Levinas' own presentation of the elemental
arguably perpetuates this reign of exploitation, or at least reinforces its hold, because
the earth is deemed by him to be either a fund of nutriments or a treasury of
consecrated goods. If the earth is Tpo4>os, then evidently this nurse bears 'her'
nurseling to the point of mastitis in Levinas' work, a condition that could be relieved,
to some extent, were the nonhuman and elemental to be included within the sodality
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of the face-to-face relation. As Luce Irigary observes, what is unattended to in
Levinas' thought is that
participation in the construction of a world that does not forget natural
generation and the human being's role in safeguarding its efflorescene. A
gestation in which the subject as microcosm is not given to nourishing,
sheltering, fecundating itself at the expense of the macrocosm for which it no
longer shows any concern, believing that it is given once and for all, to be
exploited endlessly, carelessly, irretrievably (Irigary, 1993, 195).
Levinas inherits a Mitnagdic predilection to identify the earth with what he
terms 'the drunkenness of the Sacred' (BW 48) and it is the nature and severity of this
temulence that we must examine if we are to evaluate the legitimacy of Levinas'
claim. It is one thing to speak of a 'reverse conatus' (OBBE 70) and quite another to
disclaim the 'earth' as the province of the 'pagan,' both terms themselves poorly
explicated in Levinas' work. If the 'impure element of the 'Sacred' prolongs 'the
animal within the civilized,' as Levinas suggests (BW 48), then by implication, Judaic
conceptualizations of the 'Holy,' engendered by, and sustained through, liturgical
practices, civilize and tame the conatus in one (although Levinas would probably
maintain that the face is its own censor morum and therefore self-legislating). And
how does 'Judaism' accomplish this feat? Why by none other than a process of
demythicization (the extirpation of myth) and a policy of temperance. It is to a
consideration of these phenomena that we now turn for they perhaps provide the key
to understanding Levinas' entire oeuvre and to liberating his presentation of the face
from its more dubious suppositions. A phenomenological appraisal of the telluric need
not amount to teratology, as Levinas is apt to think (namely the study of biological
malformation and/or a collection of myths about the monstrous), but may assist one to
bright to light what Merleau-Ponty, endorsed approvingly by Janicaud, called 'the
invisible of this world' (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, 151; Janicaud, 2000, 34). That which
inhabits this world, sustains it, and renders it visible; that which gives rise to the
'clearing' (die Lichtung) adumbrated by Heidegger; that which shelters the face that
reveals itself in the encounter with the other person Levinas describes. To modify
what Levinas himself will say of the use of emphasis in his work, 'to describe this
mutation is also to do phenomenology' (QA 89). In part three, we will endeavour to
lay bare this 'mutation' and bring to light its phenomenological importation. To do so,
however, it will prove requisite to further complicate the conditions under which the
face signifies as a face within the work of Levinas, in order to demonstrate that the
upsurge of the face is constrained by Hebraic directives.
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Part III
The Institution of Ethical Space:
The legacy of the face
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5. EXCAVATION
Philosophy sustains itself through reflection and critique but the issue of its inception,
both historically, as an enterprise distinct from SsoAoyiKrj and pu0os, and
existentially, as a practice or 'work,' remains vexed. In this, the third and final part of
my study of Levinas, I do not intend to rehearse at length the arguments promulgated
by among others, Husserl and Heidegger, concerning the 'Greek' origins of
philosophy. Although I do wish to gauge the legitimacy of their efforts to purge this
'site' or point of origination of foreign influences, and, what is more, to present the
reign of philosophy as hegemonic in its Greek formulation. I endeavour, rather, to
consider the motive forces that occasion philosophical practice (and that give rise to
the phenomenological attitude) in order to further situate Levinas' philosophy against
the horizons of its constitution. In so doing, I will attempt to substantiate the thesis
that, as I see it, Levinas is engaged in a deliberate programme of demythicization, an
initiative, moreover, he believes to be consonant with the directives of ethical
metaphysics, yet which I would contend, threatens to undermine the tenor and
cogency of his own project.
The theological positings that saturate Levinas' thought ought not to be
rendered exempt from scrutiny and must, according to the logic of demythicization to
which Levinas adheres, and the trope of eradication he deploys, be excised from their
situs and absolved of their mythological denotations. To do this, however, would be to
deprive Levinas of his own ethico-metaphysical Nothelfer and to prohibit his appeal
to the self-evidences of Jewish theological culture (an appeal he makes, albeit in a
covert manner, despite his frequent repudiations of theological dogmatism). A move
surely regrettable to some (particularly those seeking to consolidate their own
theological position), and no doubt regarded as callow by others, but arguably
imperative if the internal mandate of Levinas' thought is to be heeded in its exigency.
Notably, of course, it is this very drive toward demythicization, a term we will
need to fix in its determination, that Levinas identifies as a major point of concord
between 'Jewish' teaching and 'Greek' philosophy and we must ascertain to what
extent these discrete sites of provenance regulate and deregulate one another
accordingly. We will then be in a position to evaluate the degree to which the conative
drive (conatus essendi) Levinas so readily disclaims throughout his work impels the
programme of demythicization he, himself, oversees. With these aims in view the
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trajectory of part three has been delineated and the topoi of chapters five and six
outlined for consideration.
§ 26. Dispensation and disaster
In the Third Book of his Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a
Phenomenological Philosophy, Husserl confers upon the discipline of
phenomenology the following shibboleth of investigation: 'the wonder of all
wonders,' he asserts, 'is pure Ego and pure consciousness' (Das Wunder oiler Wunder
ist reines Ich und reines Bewufitsein). This wonder, he continues, the wonder whose
motivation provokes philosophical inquiry:
disappears as soon as the light of phenomenology falls upon it and subjects
it to eidetic analysis. The wonder disappears by changing into an entire
science with a plethora of difficult scientific problems. Wonder is
something inconceivable; the problematical in the form of scientific
problems is something conceivable, it is the unconceived that in the solution
of problems turns out to be conceivable and conceived for reason (Id III §12
[75]).
Remaining loyal to the Aristotelian insight that 'it is precisely through wonder that
people today and at the beginning began to philosophise' (5ia yap to 0aupa(jsiv oi
av0pcorroi xai vuv xaj to ttpcotov qp^avto (jnAoao^etv) (Aristotle, Metaphysica,
A2, 982b 1 Iff.], and, indeed, like Aristotle opposing wonder (0aupa(^Eiv) to
knowledge (ETriaTqpq), Husserl identifies wonder, here construed as a fundamental
'attitude,' as that which incites one to pursue phenomenological investigation. Yet, in
the final analysis he appears content to suppress wonder beneath the science it
inspires. To be sure, phenomenology is palintropic, and the phenomenologist is one
who must begin, or as Husserl confides in the Cartesian Meditations, 'make a new
beginning' (CM §3 [48]), again and again; philosophical wonder (das philosophische
Staunen) being that which motivates such activity (Crisis §48). However the tsAoc of
phenomenology, or so Husserl will insist, is genuine knowledge (CM §1 [44]), a claim
that militates against the perdurance of wonder as a guiding principle for the scientific
enterprise it helps to excite.
Wonder does not, it seems, survive into the discipline it founds, but is
suspended as soon as that which is initially encountered as aporetic is elucidated and
secured for cognition. Like Aristotle then, Husserl assigns wonder a limited function
both historically and methodologically. Aristotle had circumscribed the range of
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0au|ja^Etv by aligning it with the awareness and displacement of 'ignorance' in those
prone to such affection. Hence one begins to philosophize, Aristotle avers, 'by
wondering that a matter is so,' whether the object of one's astonishment be the
occurrence of the solstices or the 'incommensurability of the diagonal of a square
with its side' (Aristotle, Metaphysica, A2, 983a 11). Knowledge renders Saupa^etv
redundant and quite superfluous to the requirements of philosophy, since philosophy
is accomplished as 'theory' (Oscopia), that is, as the very 'opposite' (e'ic Touvavrtov)
of wonder:
And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even
the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of wisdom, for the myth is composed of
wonders); therefore since they philosophised in order to escape from
ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not
for any utilitarian end (Aristotle, Metaphysica, A2, 982 b 17).
Now, the lover of myth (o (fnAopuSos) may attain the status of a philosopher
(4nA6ao(j)os) because the events narrated in myth are apt to induce a state of
perplexity (cxTropia) in those that hear them, thus prompting those individuals to
pursue 'knowledge' of that which dumfounds them. However, although pu0os" is a
tissue of wonders, its status in Aristotelian philosophy is suspect and myth is deemed
to be subordinate to knowledge acquired through theoretical understanding. Myth
reaches a terminus in wonder, one might say, as wonder cedes to 0Ecopia. For
Aristotle therefore, pu0os is synonymous with nescience, a state of mind (sijis) to be
surpassed and an impediment to the contemplative life ((3(os 0scopqTiKOs) he
believed to be the 'end' of philosophy. Myth is ultimately inferior to the ascendant
and magisterial Aoyos from which philosophy receives its mature form. Philosophy
can assume this mature identity only by suppressing the form of its inception (pu0os)
and repressing the grammar of its infancy (0aupa^Eiu).
In 'The Vienna Lecture' (1935), Husserl traces what he calls 'the outbreak of
the theoretical attitude' (der Einbruch der theoretischen Einstellung) back to the
founding figures of the 'first culminating period of Greek philosophy' (Plato and
Aristotle) and to their 'becoming gripped by the passion of a world-view' quite
distinct from that of the 'mythical-practical attitude' by which the interests of
quotidian life were governed (Crisis, Appendix 1, 285; Krisis, 331). This passion, or
TTa0os, is of course wonder, which Husserl describes as 'incipient theoretical
interest;' a 'variety of curiosity' that disrupts the. course of daily life and throws its
order of meaning into contention. Two points of note are worth highlighting here.
Firstly, Husserl, like Aristotle before him, imputes to wonder (qua historical
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occurrence and methodological procedure) the task of 'reorientating' the 'attitude of
original natural life' (Crisis, Appendix 1, 281). Secondly, he understands philosophy
in this connection to be a 'closed sphere of cognitive activity,' that is, as pure
'theoria.' As such, and in accordance with this guiding interpretation, the philosopher
assumes the guise of a 'non-participating spectator' and 'surveyor of the world'
(Crisis, Appendix 1, 285). While Saupa^siv clearly effects a reorientation of interest,
the presumption (inherited from Aristotle) that the remit of its motivation is confined
to the initial phases of philosophical activity is problematic. For not only does 0Ecopia
come to assume a position of prominence in philosophical life (an issue with which
Levinas will take umbrage), but philosophy is understood principally to comprise of a
form of disengaged contemplation.
Although Husserl himself believed 0scopia to be a 'new sort of praxis,' that of
the 'universal critique of all life and all life goals, all cultural products and systems
that have already arisen out of the life of man,' a praxis (Trpa^ig), moreover, whose
aim was to transform and elevate humanity through the application of 'universal
scientific reason,' this corporate 'self responsibility' (Selbstverantwortlichkeit) was to
be won on 'the basis of absolute theoretical insights' (Crisis, Appendix 1, 283).
Wonder, then, may be catalytic, igniting the theoretical quest, but it is
ultimately expendable, an affect to be set aside along with the 'mythical-practical'
attitude from whose spell, according to Husserl, the founding fathers of philosophy
delivered humanity, and from which, in its manifestation as scientific naturalism,
phenomenology is to emancipate European civilisation and put it 'on the road to
realisation' (Crisis, Appendix 1, 291). As such, phenomenology is a 'responsible
science' (verantwortlicher Wissenschaft), Husserl surmises, because its aims are at
once curative and liberatory (Crisis, Appendix 1, 298; Krisis, 346). Indeed, from the
rhetoric of 'The Vienna Lecture' one might even go so far as to say that
phenomenology is guided by a soteriological imperative.
§ 27. The occlusion ofBeing
For Heidegger, a philosopher more deeply entrenched in Aristotelian thought than
Husserl, even if the latter's early research into Aristotle fell under the purview of
Destruktion, 0aupa^Eiv is that disposition (Stimmung) which compels or transports
the philosopher ((j)iAooo(j)os) into the beginning of genuine thinking. Unlike Husserl,
for whom wonder is synonymous with curiosity (Neugier) - an association repudiated
by Heidegger in Being and Time where he asserts that 'curiosity has nothing to do
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with observing entities and marvelling at them - 0aupa(jeiv,' since it is defined by its
'never dwelling anywhere' (Anfenthaltslosigkeit) (BT §36 [172-173]) - Heidegger
discerns an inner multiplicity in the disposition concerned and thus strives to explicate
its meaning more precisely. Far from being something accomplished with ease (and,
as Husserl intimates in The Vienna Lecture, 'becoming habitual' (Crisis, Appendix 1,
285)), the transformation of thinking and questioning into which wonder affectively
compels one, is an ordeal or passage (Tropos) of arduous prospect.
In the Basic Questions of Philosophy, originally a lecture course given by
Heidegger during the winter semester of 1937-1938 at the University of Freiburg,
Heidegger presents a detailed analysis of wonder, developing a fourfold typology of
this fundamental attunement (Grundstimmung) in an effort to elucidate its
significance for philosophical reflection and restore its enduring probity. As a
fundamental attunement, wonder, or Er-staunen as Heidegger refers to it (hyphenating
the more common place Erstaunen which designates astonishment in a generic sense),
is to be distinguished from three related, although dissimilar forms of attunement
('marvel' (Verwunderung), 'admiration' (Bewunderung) and 'amazement'
(Bestaunen)) by the fact that it is not occasioned by a 'determinate individual object
of awe,' an object that might, for example, 'stand out as being unusual' in relation to
an 'equally determinate sphere of what is experienced precisely as usual.' Wonder,
rather, adverts to the usual as that which is most unusual, and unusual above all in
That it is what it is' {BQP 144). Wonder is, therefore, 'placed before the unusualness
of the usual, in the midst of the usual in everything,' namely beings as beings or ens
qua ens, throwing open the space of existential-hermeneutical understanding.
Ontological wonder (Er-staunen) is the wonder before Being. It is to be understood
transitively because it permits what is most usual (beings) to show itself in its
unusualness (in the play or Spielraum of its Being). As such, and in contradiction to
the Husserlian presentation of 0aupa^£tv, wonder is not exhausted in the pursuit of
0Ecopta but displaces Dasein into and before beings.1
This displacement (Versetzung), which is basic to 0aupa^etv, displaces 'man
into that essence whereby he then finds himself in the midst of beings as such' as 'one
who perceives and gathers in the open' {BQP 147). Wonder displaces Dasein into the
openness of its 'there' {Da) by 'casting asunder' the free-space of the 'between' {das
1 As Heidegger will relate in the essay 'What is Metaphysics?' it is 'only when the strangeness of
beings oppresses us' that wonder is 'aroused' and 'evoked.' It is this 'wonder' that occasions 'the basic
question of metaphysics,' namely 'why are there beings at all, and why not rather nothing?'
(Heidegger, 1996 [1949], 109-110).
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Zwischen) - a space Heidegger will refer to somewhat provocatively as 'time-space'
(Zeit-Raum) - from which beings manifest themselves in their Being. Wonder dwells,
or tarries, one might say, in this between, staying patiently with the usual in its
unusualness and suffering a decisive lack of passage (aTropia) to the knowledge
(ETTiaTrjpq) and certainty which the theoretical appraisal of things purports to provide.
Indeed, wonder displaces Dasein into a 'space' that is prior to and beyond the ambit
of 'explanation,' because that which can be explained away as such and such a thing,
quality, or event, is first encountered and moves within the Zeit-Spiel-Raum opened in
and by wonder.
Crucially, the basic disposition of Saupa^eiu disposes Dasein to thoughtful
questioning, and most importantly, to the posing of the question of Being
(.Seinsfrage). Such questioning, let us take heed, is not to be understood, Heidegger
will assure us, as an aspect of our quotidian dealings with the world, but as the
'tolerating and sustaining of the unexplainable as such,' a sufferance to be endured
despite our being 'overwhelmed by the pressure of what reveals itself (BQP 147-
148). One must not be mislead, however, into disclaiming wonder as a form of
quietism, Heidegger is quick to caution. The tolerance it engenders is marked by a
refusal to acquiesce in the face of the usual: wonder (Saupa^Eiv), Heidegger urges, is
'the carrying out of the necessity of the question of beings as such in their region,' a
questioning of beings in their emergence as that which they are, a questioning,
therefore, of beings in their unconcealedness (aAq0Eia). It is toward this beginning
that wonder displaces one, a beginning that is to be suffered as that which 'overgrows
man and in that way transforms him' (BQP 151).
As Heidegger intimates, the necessity that impels such questioning, and
motivates the 'metaphysical historical reflection' he undertakes (BQP 161), arises out
of a certain historical-cultural predicament - a predicament defined by Heidegger in
terms of the occlusion and occultation of Being - a situation into which Western
thinking, according to Heidegger, has been lead through its failure to suffer the
aporetic and remain with the difficulty that is its measure. The 'epoch of the highest
abandonment of beings by Being is the age of the total questionlessness of Being'
(BQP 160), he argues, an age in which the discipline of philosophy has been reduced
to an institutional activity wholly at odds with the risky venture entailed by primordial
questioning. For the questioning of Being into which philosophy is delivered (through
reflection upon, and subsequent repetition and renewal of its first 'Greek' beginning
(.Anfang)) threatens to undermine the self evidences upon which Western thought has
based its exercise; self evidences that must be called into question and dispatched
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with mercilessly lest they continue to impede the task of thinking proper. It is only
after thought has undergone and endured a transformation in orientation - a
transformation of 'attitude' precipitated by the 'destruction' Heidegger advocates -
that it may accede to the essence of truth in its unconcealment and Dasein may realize
its 'destiny' (Geschick) as a 'preserver of unconcealed beings' and 'the custodian of
the openness of Being' (BQP 163).
Wonder thus plays a central role in liberating the free space (das Freie) of
questioning from the constraints imposed upon it by tradition (by which Heidegger
means that process through which something is reduced to being self-evident, merely,
as it were, 'material for reworking' (BT §6 [22])) and exposing Dasein to the
questionability (Fraglichkeit) of its own being. Gaupa^Eiv gives rise to that which in
the Phenomenological Interpretations ofAristotle (1921-22), Heidegger will term the
'production of questionability [Zeitigung der Fraglichkeitf (Heidegger, 2001, 35). As
such, it is only when we recognise that we do not yet know who we are, Heidegger
insists, that 'we ground the one and only ground which may release the future of a
simple, essential existence [Dasein] of historical man from itself' {BQP 163).
Through a retrieval (Wiederholung) of its 'Greek' beginning, Heidegger
maintains, philosophy may regain the radicality it lost when its original
acknowledgement of beings in their unconcealedness (epitomised for Heidegger by
the figures of Heraclitus and Parmenides) became assimilated to those procedures
whereby beings, conceived now as the objects of representational acts, became
secured in their 'correctness' and understood as self-evident (selbstverstandlich), that
is when cxAfjGsia came to be identified with Tsxyq in the sense of knowledge against
4>uais (the very Gscopia commended by Aristotle and championed by Husserl). The
moment the Grundstimmung of wonder is eclipsed by 'the avidity for learning and
calculation' (BQP 155), or appropriated to educational ends (or for what, after Plato
we might call naiSeta or training), then its potential to transform thought in its
bearing is betrayed.
For Heidegger, then, Gaupa^siv, as ontological wonder or Er-staunen, is the
beginning and end of philosophy, surviving into the questioning it provokes as that
which sustains the adventure of thought on its difficult path. To be sure, the 'sober
anxiety' (niichternen Angst) such wonder is said to induce in those prepared, and
indeed capable, of suffering it (and for Heidegger only a few privileged thinkers,
poets and artists are able to endure the uncertainty into which this attunement places
them), the sober anxiety which, according to Being and Time, 'brings us face to face
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with our individualized potentiality-for-Being (BT §62 [310]), does not seem to
prevent Heidegger from resorting to the kind of 'mystification' he elsewhere deems a
hindrance to philosophical enquiry (BT §44 [220]). For, by invoking the notion of a
'Greek' beginning or Anfang, and by claiming that 0aupa^6iv displaces Dasein into
the situation of its 'there' in such a way that (and tarrying in wonder could certainly
be construed as a way or o5os) it is only through the 'renewal' of this Greek
beginning, and the attunement that is its Trd0os, that historical Dasein may attain to
itself through the very questionability of its essence (Wesen), Heidegger both limits
and delimits the 'potentiality for being' of those for whom 'Greece,' and the 'hidden
history' (BQP 138) it reveals to reflection (the history of Being in its epochality), does
not represent the site of origination to which they are called back in their 'distress,'
nor from which the future, into which they project their possibilities, whether
individually or as a people (Volk), is instantiated.
Heidegger will, of course, concede that the 0aupa^Eiv identified by the
Greeks with the beginning of philosophy, is an attunement to Being unique to the 'the
great age of the Greeks' and their 'brief but magnificent time' (Heidegger, 1977,131;
34). This epoch, one of several in the 'History of Being' (Seinsgeschichtliches), is one
to which reflection is compelled to return in order to expose thought, or rather
thinking (and by thought, Heidegger will understand 'the history we ourselves are'
(BQP 162), 'we' being Europeans and principally Germans) to the circumstances of
its inception, which, being precisely Presocratic, predate the corruption thought
undergoes, together with the 'clearing' in which Being releases itself to thought (the
free space cleared by wonder), in later Greek thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle, and
especially during what Heidegger will refer to as the Medieval or Christian periods
(Heidegger, 1977, 117).
The crisis of 'Modernity' so acutely diagnosed in the essay 'The Age of the
World Picture' (1938), a crisis defined by the forgetfulness of Being
0Seinsvergessenheit), motivates this attempt at 'historical' recovery because, as
Heidegger sees it, thinking has run aground in the Modern era and reached its end, its
EaxaTov, in an untimely fashion. Through a process of thinking-back (.Andenken) to
the beginning of philosophy in its incipience, to the 0aupa^Eiv in which the question
of Being was first formulated by the Greeks, and the 'why' of beings in their
manifestative being first proffered, Heidegger believes thinking can regain its
orientation to truth (aAq0Eia). As it was the basic disposition of 0aupd£siv that first
transported Greek Dasein into this basic relation to beings (and 'there is presence,'
Heidegger avers, only when 'the clearing (aletheia) holds sway' (Heidegger, 1996
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[1969], 447), it is thus through wonder, Heidegger argues, that such transport will
again come to pass, and in wonder that the transition from philosophy's end, in the
calculative thinking of the modern technocratic era, to its (second) beginning as
primordial or meditative thinking, will be accomplished.2
Now, again, the 'more sober minded' thinking that Heidegger espouses in the
essay 'The End of Philosophy and The Task of Thinking' (1969), a thinking that is-
putatively sober in contra-distinction to the 'incessant frenzy of rationalization' and
the 'intoxicating quality of cybernetics' (Heidegger, 1996 [1969], 449), presents itself,
if anything, as temulent in appearance. For not only does Heidegger appear to conflate
the 'beginnings' of Greek philosophy with 'the' beginning of philosophy, and
moreover, presume the trans-epochal Urphanomen of dXq0Eia (die Lichtung,
Ereignis) to be given expression by the Presocratics in a way determinate for future
thought, that is, determinate for the thinking that thinks the matter of its thought in an
originary way, but he also recounts a history of Being (Seinsgeschichtliches), a history
of the epochs of Being, a history he regards as normative for historical Dasein, that
excludes the greater part of humankind from its researches. Something of an oversight
and indicative of a certain giddiness on Heidegger's part, a giddiness no doubt
exacerbated by Heidegger's involvement in the politics of National Socialism, and
thus at odds with the very sobriety he lauds.
As Levinas notes in 'Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity' (1957), in Heidegger
'the presocratic texts' assume the status of 'anti-Scriptures' that show 'in what
intoxication the lucid sobriety of philosophers is steeped [dans quelle ivresse baigne
la sobriete lucide des philosophesY (PII 53; DEHH 171). Of course, the 'lucid
sobriety of those who call themselves friends of truth' is nothing but a ruse for
'paganism' (paganisme), Levinas believes, whose terms the latter will seek to reverse
'by following a tradition at least as ancient' as that of the 'Heideggerians' (PII 53). To
be sure, in the Basic Questions of Philosophy, Heidegger will insist that the
displacement effected by wonder displaces 'man into the beginning of a foundation of
his essence,' 'a foundation,' he continues, 'for we can never say that it is the absolute
one' (BQP 139). Such a qualification is important for it suggests (and despite
Heidegger's damning pronouncements in An Introduction to Metaphysics, relating the
2
Heidegger will admit that the aocpoi of Ionia did not thematize aXeBsia as dAeBsia, and that there is a
need to think truth in a way that is no longer 'Greek' (Heidegger, 1996 [1969], 447). In his
Phenomenological Interpretations ofAristotle (1922), Heidegger had, of course, maintained that 'the
real foundation of philosophy is the radical existentiell grasping and production of questionability. To
place oneself and life and the decisive realizations in question is the basic concept of all the most
radical elucidation. Scepticism is the beginning, and it is as the beginning also the end ofphilosophy'
(Heidegger, 2001, 35; emphasis added).
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destiny (Geschick) of thought to that of the German people) that the beginning(s) into
which 0aupa£eiv cast early Greek thinkers such as Heraclitus and Parmenides, and
indeed 'the' second beginning to which thinking is called 'today,' should we concur
with Heidegger in his assessment of the Modern era, ought not to be regarded as
archontic for thought, but rather as possible paths for the occasion of its inception and
renewal. The origin is plural, one might say, the apxh is dispersed beyond the
archology of the Greeks and their German curators and beyond the tradition brought
forth by the xpacng of Greek and German thought.
It may be that the origin of primordial questioning, and the thinking to which
it gives rise, is, as Heidegger intimates, obscured in the Modern era. However, the
drive to fix this origin (radically plural in determination) and delimit its place
geographically, to award it its tottos, is disastrous for the thought that would think its
history thus, and ultimately self-refuting, because to posit such an origin (even 'an'
origin bestrewn between two poles, or rather, two apxcci) is to withdraw this origin
from the world and from the earth that is its source. Worldly origins are always
already plural, and cannot be exhausted in or by place, especially when construed in
such crude nationalistic terms. As Jean-Francois Lyotard contends, Heidegger's
originary thinking (his thinking on and of the origin) is an exercise in
'Geophilosophy' (Lyotard, 1990, 80), a species of geopolitics bound to the myth of its
own incipience and held enthralled by the prospect of its own greatness.
One need not enter the debate concerning Heidegger's affiliation with Nazism,
which is certainly not our intention here, nor dissect the infamous Rektoratsrede of
1933 (delivered upon Heidegger's appointment as Rector of the University of
Freiburg), to appreciate that both overtly political texts, like An Introduction to
Metaphysics, and more obviously 'philosophical' works, such as Being and Time, are
'marked by the same terms' and that these terms are, as it were, 'canonical, or in any
case emblematic for existential-ontological thought' (Lyotard, 1990, 71), a point that
holds, I maintain, for the relationship between the 'Talmudic' and 'philosophical'
currents of Levinas' own thought.
The history of Being (Seinsgeschichtliches) cedes, at least during the texts of
thel930's (texts upon which much of Levinas' invective against Heidegger is based),
to the myth of Being's geopolitical assembly and Graeco-German destination. Hence,
Wonder does not dethrone pu0og, as Aristotle had proposed, but occasions and
sanctions its authority, an authority Levinas will repeatedly challenge while arguably
installing his own myth of privilege and election (itself no less peremptory than that
231
of Heidegger, although Levinas will claim that the tradition to which he appeals 'does
not read right in might' (PII 53)) to counter that of Heidegger and the political party
whose aspirations the latter hoped to underpin with his Seinsdenken.
There are, it must be noted, resources within Heidegger to recover a different
sense of origination than that adumbrated above, and to delineate its trajectory less
egregiously. Wonder need not reach a terminus in 0ecopia, nor fuel the kind of
mythomania to which Heidegger, at times, succumbs. Should we recall from Being
and Time that the 'whence' and the 'whither' of mood 'remain in darkness' (BT §29
[134]), and thus indeterminate, a sentiment echoed in the Basic Questions of
Philosophy where Heidegger states that the 'whence and the whither' of primordial
questioning 'as they exist in the beginning,' namely the beginning into which Dasein
is delivered in and by wonder, 'do not constitute some definite, determinate situation
or occasion' (BQP 138), but are rather set forth in the 'between,' or Zwischen, that
disparts beings from Being, we may discern a passage beyond the aporia in which
Heidegger's writings of the 1930's and 1940's cast us. If wonder throws open the
'between' (the ens qua ens), then the condition of its accomplishment surely
transcends its instantiation in either Greek or German 'thought' (or upon either Greek
or German soil (Boden)), and indicates that wonder is a trans-cultural, trans-epochal
attunement since, as Jean-Luc Nancy confers, 'the origin is the punctual and discrete
spacing between us, as between us and the rest of the world, as between all beings'
(Nancy, 2000,19).
Wonder liberates the between, it does not suspend it, nor terminate its range,
but rather interrupts the complicity between the first and second beginnings delimited
by Heidegger. The 'history of Being' is disturbed from within (and from without) by
alternative, heterodox histories that announce beginnings that are transgressive of
those limits circumscribed by the account of epochality Heidegger enunciates. Indeed,
in wonder one meets these limits head on, limits which assail one, and transport one
into the region of the between, exposing one to what lies beyond any singular point of
commencement, whether 'German' or 'Greek,' and opening one at the limit to a
situation of co-historization altogether more complex than that assayed by Heidegger
in his work.
Despite trading one form of historiographical representation of history for
another, Heidegger does indicate, albeit cryptically, that the dialogue with 'Greece' he
envisages, the 'dialogue that still awaits its beginning,' the beginning, furthermore, he
hoped to inaugurate through a recovery of the primordial questioning requisite to
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commencement, is itself the 'precondition for the inevitable dialogue with the East
Asian world' (Heidegger, 1977, 158). There are grounds to suggest, therefore, that
Heidegger saw his project as a propaedeutic to a form of trans-cultural 'thinking' (a
case Reinhard May has argued with great perspicuity in his monograph Heidegger's
Hidden Sources). Unfortunately, this imperative, if one may call it that, is largely
obscured by the rhetoric of Seinsgeschichtliches, and its mythico-poetic explication,
so that the encounter with the Fremd, which might have exposed the limits and
limitations of 'epochality,' is expedited by Heidegger in a few gnomic passages (with
the notable exception, perhaps, of the essay 'A dialogue on Language' (Unterwegs zur
Sprache) (1959 [1971]), which features a discussion between a Japanese and a
German scholar. No doubt quite an 'encounter' for a thinker as seemingly provincial
as Heidegger.)
§ 28. The norms ofmorality
Levinas, who declares himself to be for the Greek tradition - 'it is not at the
beginning of things,' he affirms, 'but everything must be able to be "translated into
Greek'" (WSNP 224) - contests, as we have seen, the Heideggerian presentation of
truth (aAfj0eia). Wonder, qua Er-staunen, is likewise is ill equipped, Levinas
believes, to serve as the founding impulse or disposition of philosophy, since Er-
staunen, being principally ontological in importation (namely the wonder before
Being), does not, or so Levinas will maintain, suffer the trauma of the human others in
its charge: 0aupa^eiv is insufficiently traumatic to occasion the supererogation in
which Levinas discerns the accomplishment of ethical relations. The question of
Being (Seinsfrage), provoked for Heidegger by the sheer oddity of the ordinary,
namely beings, does not mark the beginning of the philosophical programme Levinas
instigates, since ethics, he insists, is 'more sublime than ontology' (QA 90). Indeed,
the question of Being and the 'wonder in which it is opened' attest to the 'original
insomnia of thinking' (TBQO 120), and the passing of the near one, rather than to the
sufferance of that which arises, opens, and presences, itself before one
phainaesthetically. Levinas, of course, appeals to a somewhat truncated form of
wonder (etonnement) evoked solely in the face of the human other and thus regulated
by prevenient taxonomical distinctions which inhibit the ambit of its provocation. In
Levinas' case, therefore, one must speak of the contra-natural aspect of wonder, the
'wonder of the I claimed in the face of the neighbour,' the 'wonder of the I relieved of
self and fearing for the other' (EN 147), a wonder unaccommodating in its refusal to
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be affected by the non-human creature and hence numb to the solicitations of those
who are not endowed with 'language.' The 'beginning of philosophy' is 'the human
possibility of giving the other priority over oneself' (PJL 170), one is informed.
For Levinas, wonder arguably remains the Grundbestimmung or udSos of
philosophy. However, the term is denuded of its Heideggerian (ontological)
denotations and inflected ethically in Levinas' thought, such that the etonnement in
which 'first philosophy' begins, is inspired traumatically by the face that impeaches
one and summons one to respond to it. As Levinas adverts in Otherwise than Being,
the 'wonder' whose displacement (deplacement) he endeavours to chart in that work,
(and let us take note of the extract from Goethe's Faust with which Levinas begins
the closing chapter of Otherwise than Being (Am dehors), of which the last line reads
'Das Schaudern ist der Menschheit bester Teil [the greater part of man is
shuddering]') is the wonder aroused by the 'coring out' {denudeation) and 'trembling
of substantiality' (le fremissement de la substantialite) {OBBE 180; AE 276); a
shuddering (mm fremissement) which, according to Levinas, translates the Platonic
term 4>ptkt) {OBBE 192 n.22), a term Plato deploys in the Phaedrus to capture the
sense of awe one experiences upon beholding a 'successful copy of original beauty' in
'any godlike face or form' (Plato,1900, 56 [251]). This reference to Plato is not
incidental, for Levinas' privileging of the supersensible is decidedly Platonic in its
articulation, even if his work initiates, as he himself suggests, 'a return to Platonism in
a new way' (MS 58).
Clearly then, the wonder Husserl believes befits the 'pure Ego' {reines Ich)
retains its fascination for Levinas. The latter, however, fixes the determination of this
Stimmung more precisely than Husserl by restricting the compass of its affective sway
to the fissuring of the ego and the deposition of the 'I,' a movement that is itself 'in'
and 'of' the face, Levinas will proffer {MS 64). The etonnement Levinas prizes may
thus be characterized as a disturbance (derangement) of the site of the self. To be
sure, the relationship with the other is a relationship with a 'mystery' {TO 75), but the
wonder induced by the face of the other divests the ego of itself, and it is this very
deposition that sustains the wonder in which philosophy begins, prolonging its
affective influence. As Kosky affirms, 'the responsible self begins again in each
instant' such that its birth 'never has the status of an origin' (Kosky, 2001, 92;
emphasis added). Moreover, this predicament of perpetual incipience, termed, as we
have seen, recurrence {le recurrence) by Levinas, preserves the wonder Aristotle, and
to some extent Husserl, adjudged to be subordinate to knowledge (ETnaTppri), by
countering the charge of Sscopla and situating ethics at the heart of philosophy.
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Indeed, Levinas will describe recurrence, qua 'awakening' (I'eveil), as the 'shudder of
incarnation' in which a 'subject becomes a heart' (GP 144; emphasis added), a
beginning, furthermore, inaugurated an-archaically, that opens the field of proto-
ethics, the pneumatological space of the soul (I'ame) whose espacement Levinas
ventures to plot throughout the closing pages of Otherwise than Being. The soul, or
'pneumatism' (la pneumatisme) (OBBE 181; AE 278), is the name Levinas ascribes to
that figure of subjectivity he believes survives the dissolution of the autarkic ego and
best describes the situation of exposedness into which the 'I' is cast (and through
which it is formed) upon being encountered by the other person. An encounter, let us
be clear, that has always already elapsed, a meeting that has taken place before the
advent of the self.
This situation is to be understood historically and meta-physically, since the
post-Nietzschean climate of academic philosophy ('the death of a certain god
inhabiting the world behind the scenes' (OBBE 185)) sets the parameters for the
analysis of subjectivity Levinas advances and the horizons of ethical life he sketches3
(his polemic is waged against the order of the 'modern world' (OBBE 184)) and
because the 'soul' whose non-site he details, a soul that does not, he asserts, enter into
'the spaces of history' (OBBE 184), is the 'production' or 'creation' of a relationship
with exteriority which, according to Levinas, lies beyond the remit of what may
properly be construed as natural, that is, as being of (J>uais. Similarly, Levinas notes,
the face of the other puts into question mere historical configurations of value (those
authorized by the Western philosophical tradition(s)) and in so doing ratifies its own
trans-historical status by locating its site of provenance outside of history. The face
'bears witness to our age and marks it,' Levinas asserts (QA 81). To be sure, this is a
contentious claim and one whose legitimacy we have already had cause to doubt. For
we have argued, against Levinas, that although there are grounds to defend the
instantiation of trans-historical, trans-cultural structurations of meaning (embodied,
for example, in practices and attitudes such as dwelling, sharing, donation, the taking
of nourishment and nurture, or founded upon the basis of communally recognised
mores and interdicts), Levinas' proposal that in the gaze of one human being looking
at another, one arrives at 'meaning' in 'its nonhistorical simplicity,' and, moreover,
that this meaning ('the intelligible') permits one to judge 'the saraband of
3 The 'world weariness' Nietzsche treats in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Nietzsche, 1969, 224), one could
perhaps say, is the point of departure for the account of lassitude one reads in Existence and Existents,
lassitude, no doubt, brought on by the predicament of post-war Europe.
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innumerable and equivalent cultures on the basis of the ethical' (MS 58) is far from
convincing, and remains open to scrutiny.
Levinas will argue, of course, that moral conscience (delineated, we note, in
decidedly nuanced terms), is 'the critique of all principle of the presence of self to
self,' a proposition that allows him to conclude that 'if the essence of philosophy
consists in going back from all certainties toward the principle,' if, that is, philosophy
'lives from critique,' then it is the face of the other that is the 'starting point of
philosophy' (PII 59). However, this point of origination which, a propos of Levinas,
substructs the security of the subiectum, itself lacks the security of a ground or base
upon which the force of its injunctive appeal could be confirmed. Being precisely an¬
archic, this principium deprives itself of the certainty necessary to guarantee the
course of its critical movement and ensure the term of its influence. As such, one
might argue, proto-ethics is hypocritical, sub-liminal even, passing below the
threshold of consciousness and its phenomenological scansion. For if the wonder
(etonnement) of the face renders one otottos, or out of place, ejecting one from the
site of one's self, and if this process of cavitation is the movement by which the
oneself, qua soul, is produced, then the 'I' is in no position to be able to affirm the
identity of that which affects (and effectuates) it so absolutely. In the absence of an
apxq', the face, like the ego it deposes, is set adrift outside the figure or form (popcjuj)
that would enclose it and from which it would signify as a face.
Even in its absence, it seems, as 'the trace of a departure' (OBBE 179), the
face cannot be brought to light and made to appear in its phenomenality, and thus
made to appear as itself, because in its anarchy it is beyond exhibition. Yet Levinas
will persist in his belief that the 'norms of the absolute,' the 'norms of morality'
which are 'not embarked in history and culture,' permit one to 'judge Cultures' (MS
59). But upon what basis does one found such judgement if the 'space' into which one
is cast asunder by the face - the Zwischen or Zeit-Spiel-raum opened in wonder -
precludes the positionality the assumption of principia (apxat) would allow? Again,
if etonnement induces auopta or confusion, can one make the passage (rropos) to the
certainty of judgement in the midst of this unsettling perplexity? Indeed, is this
situation of a nop i a not, as Levinas appears to intimate, 'prior to the ethical
compulsion to the neighbour,' a situation (although a setting without situs) in which
the intrigue of ethics, and the illeity in whose trace the face signifies, is
indistinguishable from the ilyaity of the there is (TPA 224)? Rather than suffer the
'excellence' of this confusion, Levinas will discern in the agitation it provokes a
certain 'nobility' (a nobility reminiscent of the admiration (Bewunderung) Kant
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attributes to one's appreciation of the moral law within), a confusion in and through
which one's 'substitution for the neighbour grows in disinterestedness' (TPA 224),
rather than diminishes. But how can one trust that this predicament of 'confusion' will
engender the disinterestedness Levinas esteems? Levinas himself questions how one
'can specify concretely this antiquity which is the trauma of awakening' (CIOI 218),
but ultimately guards against the stupefaction such exposure occasions by presenting
it as though it were 'an order given' (CIOI 218). Thus, that which is aporetic ordains
me to my neighbour as my neighbour. And how is ordination possible amidst
confusion, one may wonder? A statement from Beyond the Verse facilitates an
answer. Responsibility for others, Levinas avers, is 'prescribed by a non-archaic
monotheism (BV xvii; emphasis added). The 'norms' of the morality, norms, or
apxcxt, that are purportedly not instituted historically, or culturally, are prescribed.
They are prescribed, furthermore, 'outside the order of the here below' and set forth in
a book (the Torah) which, according to Levinas, 'must already be from heaven by its
content,' from heaven, that is, because 'its demands clash with the pure ontology of
the world' (C77 61)!
§ 29. Breaking the spell
The axiomatics of the face, enforced vigorously throughout the Levinasian corpus,
draw their administrative power directly from the 'teachings' of the Torah; teachings
whose (putative) ouranic origin renders them all but impervious to the kind of
hermeneutical disquisition Levinas reserves for both the themata of 'philosophical'
discourse and the adherents of 'pagan' religious traditions. The face may be (peut-
etre) the 'starting point' of philosophy, however, if philosophy is to 'live from
critique' (PII 59), as Levinas maintains it must, ought the reduction it performs not to
extend to consider the aetiological conditions of its own delivery, in this case the
historical provenance of the face qua face, its historically and genealogical
derivation? The 'Teaching,' a synonym for the Torah, marking the equivalence of lore
and Law, begets the 'face,' but removes the traces of its installation (failing to
evaluate the legacy by which it came to be held as normative and compelling) from
the field of phenomenological enquiry, thus obscuring the historico-cultural
patinations of the face and concealing the horizons of its implication. Indeed, if to
philosophize is, as Levinas asserts, to 'decipher a hidden writing in a palimpsest' (HH
96), then Levinas' own work is, I would contend (if I may be permitted the following
neological indulgence), properly palimpsestual, since it erases from the thinking of
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the face to which it is committed, the traces of that thought's ancestry, while rewriting
history as 'Holy History' (Heilsgeschichte) - an act of revisionism certain to give
some readers the rub, but entirely in keeping with the Hebraic mandatum to purge
history of its 'pagan' heritage.
The 'truth' against which this lore of the face is to be measured 'comes from
elsewhere' and is 'dated according to a chronology called Holy History' (RIJT 129), a
chronology, moreover, foreclosed to archaeological interrogation because the events it
recounts are no longer of terrene origin: a 'history' as seemingly arcane as the 'history
of Being' enunciated by Heidegger and surely as phantastic (evidently such a history
is a product of midrashic free variation). If 'the norms of morality are not embarked in
history and culture' (MS 59), if they are visited upon us from 'beyond,' where the
'beyond' is that which transcends the open region of disclosedness (die Lichtung),
then it is clear from Levinas' Talmudic writings that the Torah (and, more explicitly,
the earnest study of it) is the point of contact between the 'world' and its 'beyond,'
the interface between heaven and earth, what we might call the hinge (le gond), or
axis, between the two. Now, if Derrida is correct in his assertion that 'the complicity
of theoretical objectivity and mystical communism' informs Levinas' criticism of
Heidegger (Derrida, 1978, 87), would we not be equally justified in highlighting a
similar, and no less dubious complicity between proto-ethical obligation, the putative
immutability of the Torah, and its teachings in Levinas' work? In principle, is such
complicity any less problematic than the aforementioned concordance in Heidegger's
thought? Again, if Judaism is 'the bearer and subject of Holy History' (JK 129), that
which 'ruptures the natural and the historical' (DJ 4), it must, one would assume, be
that which Levinas has in mind when, in the essay 'Meaning and Sense' (1972), he
claims that the 'norms of morality' (norms, no doubt, prescribed by the Torah) make
it possible to 'judge Cultures' (MS 59). And judge them of what we may ask? The
indictments are various and range from a culture being 'disoriented,' or 'infantile'
(MS 58), to it being 'idolatrous' (CTl 58), 'spiritually mediocre' (SWAB 138),
'barbarian' (OE 73) and 'pagan' (SWAB 137). Such pronouncements (and the above
examples can be multiplied easily), typically unqualified and rarely explicated,
punctuate Levinas' texts and form a point of accord (perhaps the point of accord)
between his 'Talmudic' and 'philosophical' writings.
If transcendence is to be thought in its sense as 'a change of site' (TIS 163) -
etonnement, we recall, attests to the devastation of the site of the self - and the 'event'
after which Levinas inquires is 'antecedent' to the 'given cosmos of Greek
rationalism' (EE 101), the xoopos upon which the 'beyond' purportedly opens, then
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is Levinas not equating the 'event' (evenement) of the face-to-face, in its positivity,
with the tottos of the Torah and, more specifically, a pointedly Hebraic apxq? To be
sure, 'the reverting of thematization into anarchy,'' by which the eversion of the self is
accomplished (the situation whose 'wonder' Levinas seeks to convey), pushes the
language of classical phenomenology to the limits of its articulation. However, can
Levinas be certain that the 'paradox into which phenomenology finds itself abruptly
thrown' here, the paradox of hetero-affection 'found at the level of this reverting,'
what Levinas will term ethics, is 'beyond politics' (OBBE 121; emphasis added)? For
does the change of site Levinas associates with transcendence (a change of site,
furthermore, upon which the redaction of 'holy History' is predicated by him) not
rather imply an amendment of political principles and mark a change in the ttoAis
(and the institution of its laws) from which this philosophy is brought forth; a move
therefore from 'Athens' to 'Jerusalem,' albeit a move that is always underway and
never reaches a terminus, for even anarchy must be repeatedly staged and rigorously
renewed?
Of course, Levinas is not claiming to have supplanted 'Greece' completely,
nor ousted the Aoyos from its 'Greek' source, since this apyq is generative in nature.
Thus, he insists, while Israel is to be defined by the fact that it promotes
'understanding between all men who are tied to morality,' the basis of this
'civilisation' is, Levinas will maintain, 'the Reason that the Greek philosophers
revealed to the world' (SC 109). The civilization adverted to is processual and not
fixed, however, as it defines a process of 'transformation' (DJ 5) and not a state
toward which things tend (or a State in which order might be accomplished, such as
Ersatz Israel, for example), despite the fact that it is oriented towards 'the Kingdom
of Heaven' (OBBE 183). As such, it is programmatic in determination: something to
be implemented by all those who are tied to morality. But what of those who fall
outside the 'city' precincts or refuse its uoAiTEia? What of those whose dwellings are
'rural,' the paganus or pagan (paien)? Do those who are not bound by the aegis of this
moral law, and who do not submit to the 'culture' in which it is encoded, require
civilization? Are these individuals beyond the pale, or simply beyond the face? What
form is this process to assume and by what stipulation is its performance to be
regulated?
Despite appealing to the 'Jew in every man' (DJ 4), a formal indication that
non-Jews are, of course, to be included in the 'programme' of outreach Levinas
envisages, I believe that in its application, Levinas' ethic of ethics fails to
accommodate admixture (according to Levinas, the Jewish tradition aspires toward
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that 'essence without admixture that can be called Spirit' (DD 141)), and remains
intolerant of figurations of 'morality' that do not resemble those truths ventured at
Sinai, which, as Derrida cautions, is both the name of 'the place where the Torah was
given' and a metonymy for 'the border or frontier between Israel and other nations,' a
'front and a frontier between war and peace,' and thus not without ambiguity
(Derrida, 1999, 63-64). Arguably, the unseating of the 'I' effectuated in the face of the
other person (proto-ethical orientation), is reprised at the level of culture by the
movement of ethics as it disseminates, renews and repeats its origin throughout the
nations of its exile, nations whose 'wisdom,' according to Levinas, it may be
necessary to 'overturn' (OE 73).
Is one to assume, then, that dissemination and desecration are conjoint
ventures? Certainly, for Levinas, Judaism has, and is to have, a thurifying role in
world-historical affairs, cleansing the Nations of the stench of the numinous to which
they have become accustomed, and, like a censer, clearing the space of world history
for the coming of the Holy one. Hence, he will maintain (and not without enthusiasm,
one must add, a 'passion' Levinas typically associates with the pagan, only to
admonish it) that 'Judaism has decharmed the world' (RFA 14), 'sublimated idols,'
and 'demystified the universe' (HGU 234). Furthermore, he will allege that Judaism is
'destructive of pagan gods' (TIS 166), 'breaking the spell' of the Sacred (ML 180),
and emancipating humankind from its disingenuity and guile. Judaism, Levinas
concludes, has the 'formidable privilege of being able to destroy and restore whole
worlds' (MI 51). Such comments are unfortunate and not a little spurious, not least
because they base their authority upon biblical proscription and align themselves with
that most subreptitious of Decalogical requirements prohibiting the erection of graven
images and reviling the worship of 'foreign' gods.
Despite his calumniation of 'song' - 'the idea of toil being connected with
study is essential,' Levinas will assert, 'it also serves to distinguish clearly between
the Torah and Song' (CTI 69)4 - the epinikion of Western rationality can clearly be
heard to resound behind statements of this sort, dare one say, like 'the echo of a sound
that would precede the resonance of this sound' (OBBE 111), or, more tellingly, like
the silent first letter of the Hebrew alphabet that precedes the first letter of that
4
Evidently the connection between suffering and song is lost on Levinas. One need only think of
'Negro' spirituals, the Blues, Flamenco, Fado, and Tango (to name a few music forms), to recognize
the profundity of the relationship between the two. The phonic structure of Talmudic reading is also
glossed over by Levinas here. That the Torah itself contains elements of hymnody, not to mention the
rhythmic use and repetition of language, is, I think, indisputable. Indeed, is Levinas' prose not itself, as
Janicaud has noted, 'incantatory' (Janicaud, 2000, 27)?
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alphabet. Philosophy and Judaism are unified in intent, Levinas believes, for
philosophy was born 'on Greek soil' to 'dethrone opinion' (P1I 48) and to put to rest
the poets of mimesis (pppqais-), while Judaism has 'sought only to bring an end to
mythologies and the violence they exert on reason' (SC 107).
Not only, then, does Levinas celebrate this accord of purpose between
'Athens' and 'Jerusalem,' but he identifies Judaism almost exclusively with the
Mitnagdism of his native Lithuania, a form of Judaism for which study of the Torah-
Talmud is paramount. Now, Levinas may contend that the contestation of the 'I' in
the face of the Other 'opens the infinite process of scrupulousness which causes the I
to coincide less and less with itself (TH 12). Transposed to the arena of inter-cultural
(or indeed, intra-cultural) encounter however, this process of mundification begins to
assume a more sinister prospect. For the deposition of the 'I', sanctioned under the
authority of the 'face' ('sacrifice is the norm of the approach' (EP 76), the norm of
morality prescribed by the Torah) legitimates a policy of inter-cultural militancy that,
while no doubt conducted as part of the 'just war waged against war' (OBBE 185), the
war fought against iniquity and injurious acts, positively encourages the destruction of
'sacred groves,' and condones the 'purity of this vandalism' (HGU 232) on ethical
grounds. A fate no doubt akin to that of the opulent statues of reclining Buddhas now
buried beneath the earth by the Taleban in the Bamian Valley of Afghanistan.5 To be
sure, the 'groves' (les bosquets) to be razed are apt to be construed in structural terms,
and as Husserl reminds us in Ideas, the 'sense' (Sinn) of something perceived 'cannot
burn' (Id §89 [184]). Thus, it is structurations of meaning that elide or obviate proto-
ethical 'orientation' that are to undergo Destruktion (Levinas will refer to the
'barbarism of being,' for example (PIC 187)). However, such structures, like the
'prelogical' mentality accented by Levy-Bruhl, to which, as we shall see, Levinas
refers frequently, are embedded culturally and embodied through a disparate range of
traditions, practices and modes of comportment. Quite how one 'decharms' (RFA 14)
a structure, without treating its egological, intersubjective, or cultural instantiations, is
moot.
Levinas may wish, as Adam Newton rightly contends, 'to transcendentalize
the local and particular.' Yet, these remain at the 'level of an inherited tradition for
5 In 'Judaism and Revolution,' Levinas will write: 'Let us destroy the alters of false gods! Let us cut
down the sacred groves! Let us not consecrate them to the true God. At the very most we can explain
the causes behind the customs, but let us rid humanity of them' (JR 101). That so called 'pagan'
religious traditions merit such treatment is, perhaps, hardly surprising, and is clearly prefigured in the
Old Testament. A graphic example is to be found in 2 Kings (23:20), where, in addition to his
destruction of pagan 'high places,' Josiah, we are informed, 'slew all the priests of the high places who
were there, upon the altars, and buried the bones of men upon them.'
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him,' a privilege, furthermore, of 'Jewish genealogy as well as Jewish intellectual
legacy' (Newton, 2001, 84). Arguably, then, the law of faciality is underwritten by the
teaching of the Torah, teaching that presages the execration of the 'sacred' (le sacre)
to be found throughout Levinas' work and justifies its abolition through appeal to the
logic of Hebraic lore, lore, moreover, whose propriety is safeguarded by the 'central
place in Judaism of teaching' in order 'to ensure the religiosity of religious discourse'
(ORLFG 97; emphasis added). An inherently circular and self-legitimating logic, I
would assert.
If Israel, as Levinas exhorts, is 'faithful to the law of those nations with an
excess of moral scruple' (OS 66), are we to assume that those nations for whom such
'scrupulousness' differs in its organization, or for whom the regard of the Other does
not engender responsibility in a manner commensurate with the 'Jewish' (Mitnagdic)
susceptibility for the face, are to be domesticated and brought under the rule of
'monotheism,' the law of the domicile, the tutelage of the Same?6 Are heterogenetic
ethical traditions, and the nations of their institution, to be subordinated to that
tradition, community, or people for whom 'the true spirit descended into a text in
order to be universally fulfilled' (SWAB 137)? Indeed, as Bernasconi argues with
considerable force, 'the ethics of asymmetry in favor of the Other is, when transferred
to the cultural level, readily converted into an inequality in favor of the culture which
produced that ethics of asymmetry.' Thus, Bernasconi continues, when Levinas 'does
exercise his capacity to judge transculturally this is the usual conclusion' (Bernasconi,
1990, 79). Of course, Levinas himself willingly concedes that for him, the Bible is
'the model of excellence,' an admission he freely grants himself despite 'knowing
nothing of Buddhism' (7?Vk 164). But this decisive lack of cross cultural
understanding does not, it seems, prevent Levinas from subsequently denouncing
Buddhism, and the religious traditions of Asia as 'Idolatry,' or as Levinas puts it,
mere 'fads' from 'India and China,' and from rejecting the 'intellectual temptations of
the relative' in which they purportedly trade (AGCW 176).
One could argue, in Levinas' defence, that ontological significance
(ontological structuration) is of broader relevance than its empirical exhibition and
therefore transcends cultural variation in meaning. However, the derogation of Asiatic
culture of which Levinas is guilty is not entailed by such a project, and betrays a
prejudice towards modalities of 'religious' expression that do not obey the ratio of
either 'Athens' or 'Jerusalem.' A prejudice no doubt partly accounted for by
6
Elsewhere, of course, Levinas will insist that 'monotheism signifies human kinship,' the 'idea of a
human race that refers back to the approach of the Other in the face' (77 214).
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discriminatory tendencies with Mitnagdic Judaism itself, the relationship between the
latter and Hasidism being a case in point. Hilary Putman's assessment of Levinas is
entirely apposite, then, when he suggests that he finds 'in Levinas' writings on
religion not an intolerance for other religions but an intolerance for other religious
sensibilities than his own' (Putman, 2002, 53). Thus, while Levinas will purport that
Judaism is a 'school of xenophilia and anti-racism,' the 'supernatural gift' of seeing
that one man is absolutely like another man 'beneath the variety of historical
traditions kept alive in each case' (ML 178), the tutelage offered by this 'school' is not
always true to its mandate. For by claiming for itself the status of that which
transcends the variance of history, and thereby assigning Jewish ethical teaching a
supra-historical authority, this humanism of the other man fails to interrogate the
historical media through which its 'heavenly' missive is sent.
Invariably, the agency of transmission adulterates even the 'purest' of
teachings (traduttore tradittore), and Levinas' 'teaching' (enseignement) on the face
suffers the impediment of its Mitnagdic provenance. Those who reject the truth of the
'Torah' (apikorsim), or who are unfaithful to its law (minim), are, according to
Levinas, to be sublimated, even though such charges of infidelity may issue from an
absence, on Levinas' part, of cross-cultural understanding, and an inability to
negotiate the conceptual and axiological complexities of heterodox systems of
thought, rather than from any shortcomings with the tradition or individuals in
question.
Once again, therefore, I believe a certain slippage has occurred between the
orders of the proto-ethical (the face-to-face in its immediacy) and the ethical (the
cultural administration of morality), since Levinas will introduce each as a
confirmation for the other, translating indiscriminately between them. This ploy,
notably olefiant in execution, is indicative of what we might call a philosophy on the
slide. Less a phenomenology of slippage (a phenomenology given to the description
and exhibition of such instances of interruption), than a philosophy unsure of its
footing, despite its appeal to what Husserl would term the 'validity ground' of its
dogmatic heritage (Crisis, Appendix VI, 373); a philosophy for which a horizon of
implicit certainty is presupposed, taken as unassailable and self evident, yet never
made thematic as such. A slippage, or glissement de sense, moreover, no less serious
than those 'relapses into the natural attitude [Ruckfalleindie naturliche Einstellung
KrisisY (Crisis §48) cautioned against by Husserl, relapses that indicate a lapse of
philosophical temperance and suggest that the work of Levinas is liable, at crucial
moments, to lability.
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Further, this slippage attests, I would contend, to an inversion of the 'one-way'
movement of 'unique sense' (MS 49), or at least the logic of its accomplishment, that
Levinas defends throughout his work, and I wish, as I proceed, to situate these lapses
with respect to the work whose order they disturb. The following may be volunteered
by way of demonstration. The 'identification of one who scorns the Torah with the
apikoros [idolater] requires an explanation,' Levinas advises, since
The Germara identifies the apikoros, disdainful of the Torah,
with one who offends his fellow in the presence of a rabbinic
doctor. Contempt that does not remain a theological attitude,
but immediately becomes contempt for humanity and a defiant
challenge to one's fellows (CT 62).
Because Levinas believes the meaning of the Torah already 'tears the texture in which
it is held' (OJRS 110), like the saying that undoes the said, and because this meaning
is immediately ethical, the identification of those who shirk their ethical responsibility
with the apikoros is not, he claims, without cause. However the slippage brokered
above occurs, I would maintain, because throughout his work Levinas inverts the
order of accomplishment between the terms in question, such that those who do not
'recognize' the Torah (qua Holy Scripture), those who do not genuflect before the
monotheist 'God,' are to be regarded as morally inferior, and, as we have seen,
'spiritually mediocre peoples' (SWAB 138).7 The polarity is thereby reversed and a
theologic, or theological conceptuality, explicitly denied one must note, is posited
(dare we say consecrated) as normative. To be sure, there are those for whom such
indictments will appear captious. However, Levinas' writings repeatedly confirm this
reading through their flagrantly injudicious, phenomenologically vague and
ethnographically tendentious appraisals of the 'pagan' other. Indeed, despite
distancing himself from Heidegger's Seinsdenken, Levinas' own thought as marked
by a municipalism no less 'Ulyssean' in outlook, a thought that returns again and
again to its point of origination, or site of provenance, in the scriptural tradition(s) of
Judaism. The being-at-home-with-oneself (le chez soi), of which apropos of Levinas,
'European history has been the conquest and jealous defence' (OBBE 178), is as much
the jurisdiction of Levinasian thought as those thinkers he arraigns for their regressive
ontological commitments.
If the face is the 'source from which all meaning appears' (77 299), then it is
through the spiritual optic of scripture that such meaning is refracted. Scripture is the
7 Levinas strives to legitimate this passage in the light of his observation that 'the crisis of sense is
experienced by our contemporaries as a crisis of monotheism' (MS 47).
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locus or place (tottos) where meaning is cleared (SAW 127), a Levinasian 'Open'
(Offene), or 'clearing' (Lichtung), and a 'region' as suitable for deconstruction, one
would imagine, as the pagan repositories of superstition and 'magic' Levinas
impugns. Levinas, of course, imposes a moratorium on such interpretation, insisting
that 'the vessel of Scripture' can 'hardly be endangered by the squalls of a few
philologists' (SAW 130). In what follows, Kosky's observations, typically so
instructive, verge on the platitudinous and are indicative of the prevailing movement
within Levinasian scholarship where Levinas is hailed as the doyen of the theological
'left':
But the religion, the Judaism, operative in Levinas' phenomenology' is
certainly not articulated in a dogmatic or orthodox form, and the fact of
Levinas' own Judaism does not decide the phenomenological status of his text
- neither for better or worse. If Judaism does appear in the phenomenology, it
is a Judaism that thinks or speaks heritically, hyperbolically, or perhaps
heterodoxically - what Judaism has not yet said about what it has always
secretly harboured (Kosky, 2001, 161).
Against Kosky, I would argue that Levinas' Mitnagdism does indeed determine the
phenomenological status of his work, founding the logic of its enunciation, and
establishing the formal criteria and figures by which the thought, to which it gives
rise, is regulated and deployed. Levinas' 'phenomenology' is situated within the field
of articulation of Mitnagdic Judaism, the space of interplay between the structures of
meaning and axiological proclivities formalized within this discursive economy, and
those ruptures of order which disturb its distribution of sense (sens). The 'pagan' is,
henceforth, one such figure of disruption, we may assume, an 'abuse of language,'
even (OBBE 9).
To be sure, Levinas will concede that 'a pagan who knows the Torah is the
equal of the High Priest.' This, he opines, illustrates 'the degree to which the notion of
Israel can be separated, in the Talmud, from any historical, national, local or racial
notion' (RFA 22; emphasis mine). However, despite this intra-textual, intra-
hemeneutical lenience, the exergual implementation of the rabbinic teaching Levinas
endorses here does not find its fulfilment in the work to which Levinas signs his own
name. Thus, while Llewelyn is in principle correct to conclude that 'ethical
"monotheism" is compatible with religious polytheism' (Llewelyn, 2002, 139), in
reality (and as Heidegger reminds us in the essay 'Science and Reflection,' the word
work (Werk), and the Greek ergon, are derived from the Indo-Germanic stem, uerg,
such that that which is real, or has reality (Uirklichkeit), that which works, is that
245
which has been brought forth from its concealment (Heidegger, 1977, 160)) the only
pluralism which to my mind Levinas readily acknowledges, the only pluralism he is
prepared to counter-sign, aside from that typified by the pluralistic metaphysic of
Totality and Infinity, is the pluralism of the monotheistic faiths for whom the pdgdnus
has, more often than not, been something of a pariah, one to be converted to the truth,
or worse, an idolater to be subjugated by the sword. After all, Levinas himself
professes that, as he puts it, 'forty centuries of monotheism have had no other end in
view than to liberate humanity' from its obsession with 'the petrifying effect of
myths,' myths to which the pagan willingly assents (ET40).
Within the work of Levinas, then, we witness a recrudescence of antipathy
toward the 'pagan' other, a redoubling of that prejudice found throughout the history
of monotheistic faith. Furthermore, if the 'essence of Judaism is not defined by any
human borderlines,' as Levinas adverts, 'but from within' (the 'extra-historical'
destiny of Israel' attests, Levinas will assert, to the 'permanent revelation of a
supranational universality (OS 62)), then is Judaism not guilty of a supreme form of
self-possession, or 'sovereignty,' traits Levinas disclaims in Otherwise than Being
(OBBE 99) for being symptomatic of the logic of the domicile? Certainly one may
wonder whether a tradition such as Judaism, whose institution is generative in nature,
generative that is, because qua tradition its development is ongoing, can define itself
from within (where the 'individuals' who compose that tradition are engendered
hetero-affectively) since the historicality determinate of tradition, when construed
phenomenologically, is constituted precisely as the history of co-constitutive
endeavour, where such endeavour reflects the complex interplay between the Other
and the Same, the home and the alien, the freund and thefremd, conducted at the level
of trans-cultural, inter-racial engagement. As Husserl intimates, the 'constitution of
existence-sense' involves 'an Ego community,' an Ego community that in turn draws
upon an intersubjective sphere of owness' in relation to an alien sphere of owness
(CM §49 [137]). Levinas himself acknowledges that 'history is worked over by the
ruptures of history' (77 52). Might this not, then, include disruptions of Holy History?
It is perhaps because Levinas lacks any 'philosophically' rigorous notion of
community that he is unable to account convincingly for those relationships that take
place on the periphery of one's home culture or tradition, a periphery at whose limit
the traditions of that culture ultimately begin, rather than terminate, a limit at which
difference is elevated and identity bestowed.
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§ 30. The culture of transcendence
Despite proposing what he calls 'a culture of transcendence' (EN 185), a culture
'preceding politics' and affairs of State, Levinas does not demonstrate how, in the
midst of this cultural space, the culture of proximity, no less, the other person
preserves her ethnic, religious and racial heritage. For if the other accedes to the rank
of Other (Autrui) if and when she is denuded of all cultural form, her alteriological
status is clearly threatened by her identification with the trappings of culture. Yet
significantly, both the 'Jew' and the 'pagan' retain their respective cultural identities
in Levinas' work, and it is this identity that mediates the proto-ethical significance
with which they are credited by Levinas. The staging of proto-ethical space is quite
purposively rigged, it seems, the field of susceptibility doctored in consultation with
those doctors of Talmudic science Levinas reveres.
Thus it is the erasure of cultural particularity that prefigures the opening of the
dimension of proto-ethics (is phenomenology not, in its Husserlian guise, an
emancipation from the sphere of brute fact through imaginative variation?), a space,
to be sure, a non-geometric space, governed by religious determinants (Jew:Pagan::
Holy:Sacred) between whose poles the field of proto-ethical transaction extends;
determinants which, with Nietzsche, we might term 'the two sets of valuations'
(Nietzsche, 1956, 185) whose opposition, and apposition, motivate the putatively non-
allergic relation of the face-to-face. Let us be clear. For Levinas there can be no
history of the face - no prosopography - since the face is juvenescent, youthful, and it
is precisely this juvenescence that accounts for the importunate nature of the demands
it visits upon the subject. The 'appearances' detailed by phenomenology are 'broken'
by the 'youthful epiphany' of the face, a youth 'already past in its youth' (OBBE 90).
Like the river in which Heraclitus is reported to have said one can but step only once,
one may wonder whether one can one respond to the 'same' face twice and,
furthermore, whether the aporia into which this question delivers us may be resolved.
The subject that ages within the world, whose futurity is accomplished as senescence,
is met by one whose sprightly mien defies their age. The calculations of the actuary
cannot gauge the Other's worth. No empirical history or historiographical appraisal of
the face is adequate to its anarchy, Levinas will insist. Moreover, the 'unlimited
responsibility for another as an enucleation [denucleation] of oneself' cannot be
translated into 'history's concreteness' (QA 81). Indeed, historiography is subtended
by hagiography, Levinas avers (OBBE 193, n.33), the one-for-the-other ante cedes the
organisation of society and the time of its administration. The face does not possess a
Stamm, base, or root, since it is concrete a priori, and literally without precedent.
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Yet, the face Levinas assays bears a legacy, 1 would contend, for it signifies in
a distinctly nuanced way (and there is no need to rehearse here the arguments of part
one). The face does not merely interrupt the time of my recollection, interrupting the
retentional activity by which the time of consciousness is marked, nor disturb the
forward march of my being toward death (Dasein may 'use itself up' and thus 'reckon
with' its time (BT §66 [333]) but me void is expendable, it seems, by virtue of itsxmy
being for-the-other). The face deduced by Levinas brokers its entry into the mundane
order in no uncertain terms, signification is proscription, interdiction, mandates that
are inflected with the mores of the culture in whose midst the face 'appears,' or rather,
disappears. The facundity of Levinas' phenomenological descriptions ought not to
divert our attention from what remains recondite within those descriptions
themselves, from what besmirches the field of phenomenological explication with
unsolicited positings, more often than not theological in nature. It is difficult to
reconcile Levinas' rancour toward the 'pagan' and the 'sacred' - Levinas' position,
i.e., the habituality of his Mitnagdism - with the Levinasism of his thought and the
reception of his corpus among scholars.
Does the obloquy Levinas pours upon the 'pagan' not vitiate his arguments for
the pre-history of the subject (OBBE 117), a self 'older than the ego' and 'prior to
principles'? To be sure, the moment of susception is fissured diachronically such that
the face impressed upon me dispossesses me of my self 'breaking up the prindple of
being in me' (OBBE 114) and casting me back to the hither side of my point of
initiation. The ego, which, as Husserl intimates in the fourth Cartesian Meditation,
'constitutes himself for himself in 'the unity of a history' (CM §37), is deposed. Yet
this inversion of cxpxq into anarchy, which purports to transcend 'being' (OBBE 117),
by which, as we have seen, Levinas means the 'being' of the conatus, does not sublate
the energy of conation entirely, nor divest the space of proto-ethics of its influence.
The translation between the natural attitude and the contra-natural, ethical
aptitude is incomplete. Arguably, the vestiges of conation are inscribed within the
field of susceptibility like a trace, decussating the trace of the infinite that, according
to Levinas, striates the opening of the present through which the face approaches.
Indeed, does the 'trace of infinity' (OBBE 117) Levinas adduces not dissimulate the
legacy of the face, and dissemble the heritability of its provocation? Again, is the face
not provocable precisely because its appeal, and impressibility, attest to what Husserl
would call 'a motivated course of particular constitutive performances' (CM §37),
performances that are undeniably generative and gesture to the execution of what we
have called generative Sinngebungenl Must we not speak, then, of chiachrony in this
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regard, that is, the intersection, or chiasm, of the diachronic (infinite being is
'produced in several times,' we recall (77 284)). The very infinition of the infinite
whose trace Levinas describes, is accomplished, after all, as the inter-finition of
ethico-phenomenological filiation: sense (sens) is disseminated and an ethical
sediment laid down through repetition and frequentation. As Nietzsche explains in
The Genealogy ofMorals, 'vast tracts of ritual ethics' precede our world history 'as
the truly determining history' (Nietzsche, 1956, 250). Is the responsible subject, like
the hyperanthropos exhorted by Nietzsche, willed into being by the tradition that
precedes it and engendered by the community that entertains its possibility; an
instance then of cultural-religious 'free variation' that can only be the work of the
Mitnagdic imagination?
If 'me voicV is a genuinely generative 'production,' or 'creation,' subject to
the laws of phenomenological phylogeny, then is Levinas not claiming to have
resolved the problem broached by Nietzsche in The Anti-Christ, the problem as the
latter sees it, of 'what type of human being one ought to breed,' or 'ought to will'
(Nietzsche, 1990a, 3), by presenting me voici as a veritable 'higher type,' albeit a type
without genus and one altogether distinct from that 'heroic being that the State
produces by its virile virtues' (Tl 306). Indeed, does me voici, the self whose ipseity is
defined by its suffering for others, not represent the culmination of what, in Difficult
Freedom, Levinas will call Judaism's 'reaching out for the coming of the Messiah'
(.DF 88)? Has this 'reaching out' (tendu vers la venue) not motivated (and we deploy
this term in keeping with its phenomenological importation) the field of proto-ethical
comportment, and organized the schema (axOMOt) of susception in such a way that the
self is made susceptible to the face qua face, or dare we say it, engineered with the
face in mind (v|ajxti)? This would be a truly audacious form of social engineering,
undergirded by the complex architectonic of Jewish thought.8
The 'triumph' of the messianic, perhaps akin to the victory of essence over
fact in Husserl (?), the 'extreme vigilance of messianic consciousness' over world-
historical time is a 'problem,' Levinas acknowledges, that 'exceeds the bounds' of
Totality and Infinity (TI 285), as, no doubt, it also exceeds the borders of Otherwise
than Being. It does so on two counts, because this triumph without triumphalism, this
8 Consider the following remarks by Husserl, for example. Philosophers, he states, are the 'heirs and
cobearers of the direction of the of the will which pervades [philosophical] humanity; they have
become this through a primal establishment which is at once a reestablishment [.Nachstiftung\ and a
modification of the Greek primal establishment.' 'Genuine self-reflection,' Husserl continues,
'inhabits' the philosopher 'as a will coming from the will and as the will of his spiritual forefathers'
(Crisis §15 [71]; emphasis added).
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'faith without triumph' (POO 218), is dramatized generatively, and because the
preservation of vigilance to which Levinas alludes, is the preserve of the Jewish
community. A problem, therefore, to be addressed within the context of 'study;' a
Levinasian synonym for the exegesis of the Talmud, and 'exegesis is spiritual life,'
Levinas notes {BVxi). In Textes Messianiques (1963), a series of commentary upon
commentary, charting the prominence of messianism within Talmudic literature,
Levinas attempts to fix the meaning of the messianic in 'concrete terms'
(.concretement). The 'Self as Self,' he avers, 'taking upon itself the whole suffering of
the world, is designated solely by this role.' Thus designated, he continues, 'each
person acts as though he were the Messiah' {DF 89-90; DL 130; emphasis added)
'Messianic sensibility' {la sensibilite messianique) is thus 'the very subjectivity of the
subject' (la subjectivite meme du sujet), Levinas continues, a sensibility, moreover,
that is 'inseparable from the knowledge of being chosen' {DF 96; DL 138; emphasis
added).
Such discourse on election rightly exceeds the remit of Totality and Infinity
and the jurisdiction of Otherwise than Being, texts that pride themselves upon their
phenomenological rigour and (apparent) theological neutrality. However, the issue of
electability is central to Levinas' work and it is ultimately this concept, and more
pointedly, its political and religious ramifications, that occasions the torsion between
Levinas' 'confessional' and 'philosophical' publications. For while Levinas will
radicalize the term, heightening its ethical signification, its deployment within his
texts retains an intimate connection with Jewish particularism, even, as we have seen,
within works otherwise 'philosophical' in orientation. The post-Holocaust
predicament of Western Jewry informs Levinas' understanding of election and
intensifies the acuity of his pronouncements. However, the electability of the Jew, and
the privilege accorded Judaism by Levinas (the putative privilege of supporting the
universe) are recurrent themes within Talmudic scholarship and Levinas' engagement
of these themata can be seen to be in broad concinnity with Talmudic exegetical
tradition. The question of 'Jewish' identity impels many of Levinas' Talmudic
commentaries and the reader will undoubtedly note a thematic concern common to
both genres of Levinasian thought here. Levinas conducts his disquisition of this
problem throughout his writings, treating its instantiation and stratification at a
subjective, religious and nationalistic level. Invariably, insights appurtenant to the
constitution of the subject are apt to appear specious when taken as determinative of
religious, racial or national identity, and, once again, it is the transit between these
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topoi (and the unlicensed commerce between levels or strata) that undermines the
authority of proto-ethical protocol.
For although Levinas will caution his Jewish audience against the dangers of
particularism ('the notion of Israel in the Talmud must be separated from all
particularism, except for that of election, he urges (NGTT 123)), he nevertheless
promulgates the idea of what he calls a 'universalist particularism [particularisme
universalisteY, a fusion of 'universal history' and a 'necessarily particularist
messianism [un messianisme necessairement particularisteY (DF 96; DL 138;
emphasis added). Terms proscribed within the context of Levinas' 'philosophical'
work are, it seems, requisite to the description of Jewish identity. An identity
confirmed by the 'certainty of the absolute's hold over man' (DF 174) and the
knowledge of being chosen' (DF 96). Such certainty and knowledge, to be sure, the
certainty and knowledge of finding oneself deposed, are imported into the field of
phenomenological enquiry and furtively deposited there. Yet the Jewish legacy of
which these terms admit, the legacy of a Judaic theological heritage, exceeds the
limits (deborde le cadre de) of a strictly philosophical reflection, even one for which
obstriction is rrpcoTq tjuAoaotjua. Jewish particularism is universalised as proto-
ethically normative. Furthermore, these notions are justified, or let us say
substantiated, as it is crucially a matter of the subject expiating itself for others,
through recourse to the shifting dialectic of rabbinical reasoning; reasoning which is
itself sustained by the performance of 'ritual law' (la loi rituelle), upon whose basis
ethical life is 'guaranteed' (DF 173; DL 243). This 'ethical life' (la vie ethique) is the
self-same life propounded by Levinas in among other places, Totality and Infinity and
Otherwise than Being, the life of diacony whose truth does not rest upon the
'acceptance of any dogmatic content' (77 25), nor the 'certainty or uncertainty' of any
'positive theology' (OBBE 147).
However, if the electability of Jewish identity is predicated upon the
Revelation at Sinai, if, that is, the 'whole of Jewish Law is commanded today, even
though Mount Sinai belongs to the past,' and, what is more, 'the present exists only
because there is Revelation' (DF 191), then the particularism Levinas defends does
indeed depend for its legitimacy upon a theological postulate. This act of foundation
laying (Grundlegung) we might say, founds the enterprise of proto-ethics, as
intellectual intuition, for Husserl, is founded upon sensuous perception. Mount Sinai
is less the datum of academic history than the sedimentum of Jewish mythography, a
postulate that is both posited, so as to orient the sense of 'Holy History,' and
deposited, drawing its constitutive force from a reserve of sedimented meaning which
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functions, like the Husserlian object of sense perception, as an intentional guide for
the elaboration of that very history.
§ 31. Selection
The particularism of Jewish identity vis-a-vis the nations (the 'gratuitous duty' of
election) does not turn into an 'imperialist expansion that devours all those who deny
it,' Levinas will maintain (DF 174). Yet are pronouncements of this sort not unduly
optimistic? For are they not dashed by Levinas' assertion that the Jewish faith already
includes, within the purview of its self-concept, the abolition of those differences that
divide the 'Jew' from the 'Greek' and the 'barbarian,' and, what is more, as a
necessary and indispensable moment of its accomplishment as a 'universalist
particularism [un particularisme universalisteY (DF 177)?9 Can the Jewish faith be
both tolerant of difference in its variegated forms ('from the beginning it bears the
entire weight of all other men' (DF 173)) and denounce so called religions of the
sacred 'as the essence of idolatry' (RFA 14)? After all, the noose bears the weight of
the condemned with admirable disinterest. Thus while 'Jewish existence is itself an
essential event of being,' a 'category of being,' no less (DF 183), the 'moral
degeneracy' indicative of paganism (DF 174) is derided for being the 'obverse of the
Real,' 'Nothingness condensed to mystery' (DD 141), mere 'sorcery' (DD 152).
Clearly, the disjunction accented here between the ordinances of tolerance and
derogation suggests a breach in the figure of election by which the identity of the
Jewxsubject is defined. The work of Levinas is riven by this breach which
transverses, and thus bridges, both his 'Talmudic' and 'philosophical' works.
Arguably, it is this breach that delimits (and limits) the work that unfolds within its
precincts. As such, this breach forms the peribolus of the work, I would contend.
However, need one be hypocritical to at once denounce and affirm? To denounce is to
affirm, one might add, since one must acknowledge the heterodox, or accept it as
other, in order to repress and sublate it. Does Levinas not, as he puts it, 'embrace
conjunctions of elements' that signify the break up of the subject in its constancy
(OBBE 184)? And is it not rather this break up that breaches, and therefore demarks,
the work in its totality, the breach, furthermore, by which the infinity that 'withstands
the invasion of totality' is produced (77 78)? To be sure, this apposition of terms is
further complicated by the fact that the sheer inordinacy of my being for-the-other, the
9
Indeed, the words 'Jew' and 'humankind' are virtually synonymous for Levinas. Judaism is the
subject for which humanity is the predicate, we are reliably informed (DF 50).
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situation of the subject qua me void pour les autres, is 'attenuated with hypocrisy as
soon as it enters my ears' (OBBE 185). The enunciation of responsibility attenuates
the 'saying' it articulates, since my testimony proceeds my susceptibility according to
the diachronic logic in which the terms of Levinas' later work are set forth. This
hypocrisy is itself denounced however, and denounced Levinas suggests, in
accordance with the norms of enormity to which it defers, because my witness is one
of pure disinterest. Moreover, as Levinas states in Sur Maurice Blanchot (1975),
philosophy is 'marvellously hypocritical' because the language it deploys excites the
very 'madness' over which it presides (PN 149; NP 42; translation altered).
Yet ought the hypocrisy Levinas condones, the hypocrisy which, with
Llewelyn, we might term, 'hypoCritical,' since the distinctions called for by the
Kantian Critiques, between, for example, rationality and sensibility, intellect and
imagination, are subtended by the more thoroughly hypo-critical criticism of
responsibility to and for others (Llewelyn, 2000, 212), to dissuade us from
denouncing what is hypocritical in Levinas' work, if not sanctimonious? In Levinas'
case, must we not distinguish between the method practised and the interpretation
brought to bear upon that method during the course of its performance, and is it not to
the spacing between the two that we ought to turn our critical gaze? For this spacing,
or breach, demarcates the plot of proto-ethics, as, indeed, it circumscribes the field of
phenomenological reflection by highlighting the difference between those ideas that
merely pertain to pure phenomenology and the practice of that phenomenology itself
(as the title of Husserl's masterwork confers). Of course, if this space commands our
attention, it does so after the fashion of the face Levinas describes because it is the
place where the face, to which Levinas' thought is oriented, is fashioned and
produced, the 'heart of a chiasmus' (like that at which, according to Levinas, his
thought and that of Derrida meet (WO 8)) between the said, the unsaid interwoven
with it, and the saying that exceeds it. Thus, while Levinas may champion the
denunciation of hypocrisy entailed by the crisis into which one is thrown by the other
person (OBBE 185) - one is posited as deposed - and in turn laud the 'excellence' of
those civilizations that exhibit 'a high degree of universality,' that is to say, as he puts
it, those civilizations whose 'generosity lacks hypocrisy' (DF 52), he remains
consistently vituperative in his treatment of the 'pagan,' the 'polytheistic' and the
'mythological,' a position that is hardly generous and not a little perfidious.
Here, then, we discern a conceptual opposition at work within the work of
Levinas that structures the organisation of his texts through the privilege it accords to
one term (Jew) above another (Pagan). These terms circulate between the self-styled
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'confessional' and 'philosophical' works as the termini of and for argumentation,
although Jewish explicata are typically erased from the 'philosophical' texts, leaving
only the trace of their influence, or offset as distant horizons whose motivation is felt
through the force they exert upon certain judgments delivered within those texts.
Now, phenomenology may be, as Husserl states, 'the science having the unique
function of effecting the criticism of all others and, at the same time, of itself (Id
§62), a science that probes beneath the empirical subsoil of the natural attitude to
plumb its eidetic depths, an enterprise that is eminently fossorial in character.
However, despite what we might term the meta-critique (or hyper-critique) Levinas
incorporates into the structure of Otherwise than Being (can the struggle against evil
'avoid the institution of violence out of this very struggle,' Levinas wonders; does
'the war perpetuate that which it is called to make disappear' and 'consecrate war and
its virile virtues in good conscience?' he asks (OBBE 177)) do we not have cause to
question, once again, the ease with which Levinas' analysis of identity moves
between a consideration of the matrix of proto-ethical susception and the nexus of
cultural, religious and political relations it purportedly substructs? How, other than by
what Husserl would term an apperceptive expansion (Erweiterung) of the subject's
ethically reconfigured Nahsphdre does Levinas legitimate this shift in emphasis, and
what authorizes this translation between levels or strata of signification?
Ultimately, of course, it is the face itself that authorizes this transfer of sense.
Yet unless the skin (peau) behind which, according to Levinas, I am ill at ease (etre
mal dans sa peau) is epicritical, and thus discriminant in its very passivity, the face
that faces me, summoning me to 'respond with responsibility' to its plight (OBBE
185), is always already, as intimated earlier, singularly-plural. Adapting Husserl, one
might say that even what is straightforwardly susceptible is 'communalized' (Crisis
§47 [163]). Therefore, even that which calls each 'chosen one' to 'leave in his turn'
the 'concept of the ego' and 'its extension in the people' (OBBE 185), must appeal to
the self-evidences of co-constitutive endeavour and draw upon the legacy of co-
historization.
But is it not precisely to the self-evidence of creaturality (la creaturalite) and
the testimony of the single one that Levinas turns in order to validate the modification
of sense by which the-one-for-the-other of substitution is accomplished corporately as
the (s)election of the Jewish people by God? Following the Husserl of The Crisis of
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, but inflecting the sense of
critique found in that late Husserlian text with an ethical valence, one might say that
Levinas regards the 'total historical complex' as a 'personal one,' and the 'historical
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task' of the philosopher as 'personally his own' (Crisis §15; emphasis added). This
task develops its own history, it becomes historical, through its exercise and
implementation. However its implementation is at once its embodiment qua me voici,
such that the 'infinite tasks [unendliche AufgabenY (Crisis, Appendix I, 289), toward
which philosophy is oriented in the elaboration of its 'destiny,' assume the prospect of
the 'everywhere of faces [le de-partout des visages]' that put me into question (OBBE
197 n.22; AE 188 n.l).
If phenomenology, in its Husserlian determination, is egology (the scientific
explication of the universe of sense appurtenant to the Ego, the Ego that I am, the Ego
of which I have original evidence), then proto-ethics is likewise, or more accurately,
otherwise (autrement), the exhibition of the creature in its creaturality, the bringing to
light, as senescence, of the pre-originary an-archy of susception. Arguably Levinas
reduces the 'quite personal responsibility [Die ganz personliche VerantwortungY in
which Husserl discerns the role of the philosopher as 'functionary of mankind
[Funktionare der MenschheitY (Crisis §7), to its proto-ethical signification. Thus, the
teAos which according to Husserl was 'inborn' in European humanity at the 'birth of
Greek philosophy,' the entelechy of a civilization with a 'latent orientation toward
reason' (Crisis §6), finds expression in the work of Levinas as the idea of the infinite -
in-me.
One may wonder, though, whether this 'idea,' the entelechy of the creature, or
the awakening of the subject to itself, does not attest, through the manner of its
articulation, to the community of its motivation, and therefore to its Mitnagdic
provenance. Significantly, Levinas will note that for Husserl 'the sedimentation of a
certain history in the thinking Ego' is, as he expresses it, 'necessary in order for the
representation of space to be formed' (PHH 132; emphasis added), an insight equally
applicable, I would insist, to the delimitation of ethical space and the espacement of
its basic terms. With Husserl, then, we might conclude this chapter by suggesting that
problems of 'genesis [GenerativitatY are, indeed, problems of 'transcendental
historicity [transzendentalen Geschichtlich KeitY (Crisis §55), whether such genesis
is construed phenomenologically or proto-ethically.
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6. EXECRATION
In setting forth what follows, I have been led to further complicate the relationship
between Levinas' proto-ethical insight and the religious and cultural exempla to
which he appeals to illustrate that insight. Within the framework of this relationship
and the problems raised by it, I will lay claim to the idea that 'disenchantment'
(desenchantement) is the work ofethics, that which the work of Levinas endeavours to
effect through its expurgation of myth (mythe), and eradication of the sacred (le
sacre), from the field of proto-ethical negotiation. My aims in this chapter are
twofold, therefore. Firstly, to situate Levinas' elaboration of 'myth' in relation to both
the 'philosophical' and 'Hebraic' currents of his thought, in order to bring into focus
his understanding of demythologization and to exhibit his presentation of 'holiness'
(saintete) upon this basis. Secondly, to accent the tension between exegetical custom
and proto-ethical risk, which, I believe, obtains throughout the work of Levinas and
limits the provocation of the face he details. I will conclude by arguing for what I
have called a 'pagan' attestation within the work of Levinas. A proposal consonant
with the directives of ethical metaphysics, if not with the legislation of its rule
(apXO)-
§ 32. Mere marginalia
Levinas would encourage his readers to be vigilant, lest they be duped by his
proposals. We begin this chapter, then, by posing a question and underscoring a
problem. Is my bearing of another not my bringing that other to birth (portage is
partage, we recall), and, moreover, my bringing the other to birth as a face? This is a
labour for which generations of 'Jews,' if we are to accept Levinas' definition of
Judaism, have toiled, the pole of infinity toward which they have aspired longingly;
the goal they have desiredxDesired? The face Levinas assays is born(e) as idea (it is
engendered notionally, let us say) from the struggle of what Husserl would call, the
'generations of philosophers' who 'are the bearers of its spiritual development'
(Crisis 339), and what Levinas would term, a 'drama between philosophers' (OBBE
20). The face is produced through exegesis because something like the face (and here
the importance of the trope in Levinas cannot be underestimated) commands attention
and inspires the discipline of the philosopher/sage, the <j)iA6ao(})os and the chakham.
Yet the 'production' (Leistung) of the face, together with its heritability, need
not be grounds to dismiss its provocation, nor challenge its injunctive force, but rather
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to question its instantiation in the figure of the face Levinas outlines and the ax"npc( to
which he appeals. For while, as Flusserl notes in the fourth Cartesian Meditation, 'the
beginning phenomenologist is bound involuntarily by the circumstance that he takes
himself as his initial example' (CM §37 [110]), a predicament from which Levinas
will deduce the 'persecution' {persecution) of the hostage-subject, and Levinas
himself concedes that the subject he 'universalizes' in his work ('I universalise
myself') belongs to 'generation and corruption' (OBBE 126), is it not the case that for
Levinas the community of Mitnagdic Jews remains the 'Zero-member' (Nullglied) of
the human community per se? To be sure, in Totality and Infinity it is filiation that is
seen to be integral to election ('each son of the father is the unique son, the chosen
son,' Levinas will urge (77 279)). Transposed thus to the level of 'culture,' all religio-
racial 'types' ought, at least according to the thread (fils) of this filial logic, to be
awarded equal status, a status reflecting their respective prominence within the
cultural Nahsphdren in which they hold sway constitutively. A proposal in direct
agreement with the pluralistic metaphysic that governs Totality and Infinity.
In the generative surge towards the face, arguably a putsch of sorts, do many
not suffer under the violence of this reduction? After all, in Husserl the actuality of
cognition is judged and preceded by the possibility of cognition. Empirical actuality is
judged according to the eidetic laws that precede it {Id §79). For Levinas, similarly, as
we noted earlier, the 'norms of the absolute,' norms which are putatively 'not
embarked in history and culture' make it possible to judge cultures {MS 59). Has an
impasse not been reached here and a limit breached? Certainly, Levinas does judge
cultures and traditions of thought foreign to his own, and often less than favourably.
His judgement is based, moreover, upon evidence that is at best desultory, and at
worst, prejudicial. In his Ideas of 1913, Husserl repeatedly warned against conflating
the phenomenological doctrine of essences with the actual existence of those noetic
processes upon which the phenomenologist bases his or her eidetic findings {Id §79).
By the Crisis, however, and held enthralled by the possibility of a 'socially and
generatively united civilization [generative und social verbundenen MenschheitenY
{Crisis §6), a civilization for whom the 'historical teleology of the infinite goals of
reason' would be its unique accomplishment {Crisis, Appendix I, 299), Husserl had
himself succumb to the dangers of what elsewhere in the Crisis he called 'mythical
construction [mythisch zu Konstruieren\ {Crisis §42). For by presenting the trajectory
of reason in 'European' terms, and by differentiating between a 'European' humanity
in which 'an absolute idea' is 'inborn,' and mere 'empirical anthropological types like
"China" or "India"' {Crisis §6), Husserl had imported speculative and evidentially
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invalid positings into the field of phenomenological self-reflection. Of course, Husserl
had qualified such remarks noting that 'it is a mistake' and 'a falsification of their
sense' to 'interpret India, Babylonia [and] China, in a European way' (Crisis,
Appendix I, 284-5). Yet, his belief that 'the Europeanization of all other civilizations
bears witness to the rule of an absolute meaning,' one, moreover, that is 'proper to the
sense,' rather than to 'the historical non-sense of the world,' remains at best
conjectural, if not peremptory.
As a thinker of his time, Levinas' is also prone to such 'reasoning,' and
certainly Levinas' confidence in the rationality of history is no less Hesperian in
outlook than that of Husserl. Take the following statement from Totality and Infinity,
for example, in which Levinas underscores the fact that, as he sees it, 'Greek
metaphysics conceived the Good as separate from the totality of essences,' and in this
way 'caught sight of a structure such that the totality could admit of a beyond,' an
achievement, Levinas will stress, realized 'without any contribution from an alleged
Oriental thought'' (77 102; emphasis added). Again, then, it is toward that 'essence
without admixture' (DD 141) that Levinas orients his thought. Whether that essence
be called 'Spirit,' in which case it is purportedly beyond essence, or 'History,' the
situs in which the latter is revealed. Indeed, what Levinas ventures to call the beyond
essence is borne by the 'history of the West' in its 'margins' (dans ses marges),
margins in which Levinas will discern the 'trace of events' whose signification is not
exhausted in the assimilating movement of ontology (OBBE 178; AE 273).
But does this thought, which summons us to the margins of Western
intellectual history, not relegate, as mere marginalia, those histories extruded from the
accord between 'Athens' and 'Jerusalem' of which it is both the product and the
effect? In support of this suggestion one might cite Levinas himself when, in an
interview in 1991, he confides that 'although it is a dangerous thing to say publicly,
humanity consists of the Bible and the Greeks.' The 'rest,' he continues, 'all the
exotic - is dance' (Mortley, 1991, 18). It is because Levinas understands ethics as the
'secularization of the sacred' (775 163) and, consequently, Western rationality as the
'secularization of idolatry' (7/5 164), that he feels justified in disclaiming the thought
of those peoples who fall outside the reaches of this history. A history that despite its
pretensions otherwise, appears increasingly totalitarian in character. No doubt a
chilling proposition upon which to reflect, although one likely to be dismissed as idle
cavillation by those loyal to the Levinasian 'cause.' Can Levinas' thought sustain
such criticism? More pointedly, can it afford not to? Let us be clear. Our remarks do
not conspire towards contumacy (at least they do not oppose the authority of the face),
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rather it is the sententious nature of Levinas' claims and, furthermore, the manner in
which the elision of cultural difference is dissimulated under the figure of the face
(and in the name of its sanctity) that arouse our suspicion.
The suggestion that non Western cultures lack the 'cultural' credentials
exhibited by their Graeco-Judaic (JewxGreek), or 'European,' counterparts is, to be
sure, already prefigured in Heidegger. Dasein may be of the opinion, we recall, that
'understanding the most alien cultures and "synthesizing" them with one's own may
lead to Dasein's becoming for the first time thoroughly and genuinely enlightened
about itself.' To think thus, Heidegger maintains, is to 'tranquilize' and deaden one's
ownmost potentiality-for-Being, since to surrender to the temptation to compare and
contrast oneself with others is nothing short of 'alienation' (Entfremdung) (BT §38
[178]). Why this should be so is perhaps justified within the context of the
Dciseinsanalytik, where such 'curiosity' is deemed a hindrance to one's becoming
visible to oneself in the questionability of one's Being. However, the cultural myopia
from which Levinas suffers cannot be so readily condoned, and the self-evidences
upon which he bases his judgement are, what we might with Husserl deem to be, 'no
better than an appeal to an oracle' (Crisis §55 [189]). Of course, Levinas would insist
that he, like Heidegger before him, does not seek to promulgate a 'philosophy of
culture' (BT §38 [178]), but rather to address the transcendental conditions of
sociality and account for their incidence. Yet to deride secular thought as a 'godless
theology that stirs in the soul of unbelievers' (SC 107), while censuring all forms of
religious expression that centre upon the 'sacred,' is to affirm the cultural primacy of
one's own tradition.
How, we may ask, has the 'outbreak of theoretical attitude' (Crisis, Appendix
1, 285), which, according to Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas, first broke forth in
Greece to 'dethrone' myth and put opinion to rest (PII 48), been constrained by
Hebraic imperatives? How has this outbreak (Einbruch) been contained and its
virulence managed by Mitnagdic directives? Yes, Husserl will speak of limiting the
universality of the epoche in order to delimit the field of phenomenological enquiry
more precisely (Id §110). However, might we not question the saliency of Levinas'
privileging of Judaism? Unlike the religions of 'Australia,' 'Africa' and 'Asia,' the
'God of the Jews is not the survivor of mythical gods,' Levinas will confer (RFA 14).
Nor has Judaism, again unlike the religions of Africa, Asia, and Australia, 'evolved
out of enthusiasm for the sacred,' he will charge (RFA 14). A notion one might wish
to contest. It seems then, that the 'de-structuring' of cultures (BVI 21 In.12) in which
Levinas engages, draws upon prejudices deeply entrenched within Mitnagdic culture.
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These prejudices inform his interpretation of religious beliefs and practices alien to
his own.
Levinas may wish to 'decharm' the sacred (RFA 14) but has he successfully
liberated himself from what Heidegger would term 'those idols everyone has, and to
which they are wont to go cringing' (Heidegger, 1996 [1929], 110)? To what extent is
the Hebraic God simply one more 'god' to be freed from the distorting context of its
myth? According to Levinas, the Hebraic scriptures require darchenov (exegesis) and
solicit strict attention. But do the texts of other faiths not warrant similar exegetical
care? How is it, one may ask, that 'whatever the origin' of Hebraic texts 'they are
authentic by virtue of their internal significance' (BTW 196), where those of
heterodox religious traditions are purportedly not? Surely if 'one cannot refute the
[Jewish] Scriptures without knowing how to read them' (MI 53), one cannot, by the
same principle, refute those of other religious traditions either. But of course, it is not
a matter of principle (apxq), Levinas assures us.
To argue thus, Levinas would no doubt contend, would be to argue in favour
of demythologization, an exegetical policy implemented with considerable assiduity
by the Talmudic scholars of Levinas' native Lithuania (for whom 'there was a
demythologizing texts' and also 'a demythologizing of what was already
demythologized' (JP 240)). Is it not then a question of limitation, of demarcating the
limits of demythologization and curtailing its enterprise? How does the chakham,
sage, or scholar, regulate this process and moderate its exercise? Levinas proffers the
following by way of clarification, relating the Greek and Jewish currents of his
thought:
[T]he beauty of Greece must dwell in the tents of Shem; the language of
deciphering. It demystifies. It demythicizes. It depoeticizes as well. Greek is
prose, the prose of commentary, of exegesis, of hermeneutics...but also the
language that "demetaphoricizes" metaphors, conceptualises them, even if it
must always begin anew. One must always demetaphorize the very metaphors
by which one has just demetaphorized the metaphors and wring eloquence's
neck (TS 53).
Despite the fact that Levinas cites the poet Verlaine approvingly here (a crapulent of
some renown and confrere of the equally debauched Rimbaud, to whom Levinas
appeals at crucial moments throughout his oeuvre1) it is the sober vigilance of the
exegete that is to be pursued and not the licentiousness of the poet, against which the
1 References to the poet Rimbaud (1854-1891) abound in Levinas' work. For the most prominent, see:
EE 59; 77 33; 5 92.
260
latter is on guard. It is quite beyond the scope of the present investigation to assess the
extent to which Levinas might be said to have 'demetaphorized' the metaphors that
are operative in his own work (one thinks of the recurrent root motif, for example).
However, it is clear that the intention is there to do so, even if such intentio often
manifests itself as the desire to extrude the 'pagan,' 'sacred, 'numinous,' and
'mystical' from the remit of phenomenological explication.
If the Hebraic is to accommodate the Greek (and one wonders whether
Levinas has 'demetaphorized' this figure of dwelling sufficiently), if, that is, the two
are to form an alliance and collude in the demythicization of myth, then ought one not
to situate myth (pu0og) against the horizons of its signification and determine its
sense precisely. That is, ought one not to return to myth its history? To be sure, this
would sharpen the acuity of Levinas' analysis and lend greater cogency to his claims.
His failure to define myth adequately then, must be seen as symptomatic either of a
failure on his part to grant myth the academic credibility it deserves, or a more general
reluctance to acknowledge the mythical elements within his own thought.
This is perhaps hardly surprising given the influence of Franz Rosenzweig
upon the development of Levinas' thinking. In The Star of Redemption (a work, as
Levinas informs us in the preface to Totality and Infinity 'too often present in this
book [Totality and Infinity] to be cited' (77 28)) Rosenzweig had denounced myth and
denigrated the religious traditions of Asia; and this with nothing more than a scant
knowledge of the traditions in question. Indeed, many of Levinas' remarks concerning
the above themes resemble those of statements advanced by Rosenzweig in The Star
of Redemption. Rosenzweig, for example, will conceptualise myth as 'a life that
knows nothing above and nothing beneath itself,' a life 'that constantly returns to
itself' (Rosenzweig, 1985, 34). Similarly, he will opine that 'the living "gods of
Greece" were worthier opponents of the living God than the phantoms of the Asiatic
Orient,' and this because 'the deities of China as of India are massive structures made
from the monoliths of primeval time which still protrude into our own times in the
cults of "primitives'" (Rosenzweig, 1985, 35). Moreover, these 'deities,' Rosenzweig
avers, 'a term favored by all those who flee the face of the living God for the mists of
abstraction,' are little more than 'retrogressions into the elemental' (Rosenzweig,
1985, 36). A suggestion altogether consonant with Levinas' insistence that 'the
nocturnal prolongation of the element is the reign of mythical gods,' 'faceless gods' to
whom 'one does not speak' (77 142). In short, Rosenzweig continues, 'it is the lot of
the adherents of Buddha and Lao-tzu alike that a luxuriant heathenism overtakes the
adamantine monoliths of its non-ideas' (Rosenzweig, 1985, 37).
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Rosenzweig's appraisal of 'Asiatic' thought is less than charitable, and his
presentation of myth far from instructive. His reproof of what he calls 'paganism' (a
term beneath which he subsumes the religions of the 'Orient' and the 'mythological
thought' of the Ancient Near East, Europe and Greece) for being, as he puts it,
'metaethical,' could not be closer to Levinas in this regard (Rosenzweig, 1985, 392).
Levinas, we recall, had identified the 'metaphysical relation' (the face-to-face) with
the 'dawn of a humanity without myths' (77 77). Yet one may again wonder whether
such a 'dawn' does not preclude the Hebraism that is its emissary, nor announce its
demise or further transformation. How does the 'founding myth' of Judaism, the
'trauma of the "bondage in the land of Egypt" which marks the Bible and the liturgy
of Judaism' (DJ 4), survive this dawn in which pu0os terminates? Do Judaic myths
resonate with a meaning which guarantees their perpetuity in ways non-Judaic myths
(the myths of 'spiritually mediocre people' (SWAB 138)) do not? When does the
hagiography of the one-for-the-other (OBBE 193n.33) become mythography, and the
use of hyperbole, mythomania?
§ 33. The archaic environment ofmyth
Richard Cohen, stalwart Levinasian and Levinas scholar, has consistently championed
Levinas' philosophy, including the latter's defamation of myth. Cohen will thus
conclude that:
Levinas does not fight myth with myth, superstition with superstition. Rather,
in what seems like myth, in what could be misunderstood as myth, he
understands the human by means of exegesis. It is a great difference (Cohen,
2001,230).
While one might concur with Cohen that something like the distinction he moots here
between myth and exegesis prevails within the work of Levinas, his engagement with
Levinas tends, as Critchley might say, to confine itself to 'commentary' and at its
worst, 'homage' (Critchley, 2004, 172). Not only does Cohen, in my opinion, ignore
the subtle nuances of mythopoeic thought, but like Levinas himself, he refuses to see
in myth anything but profligacy and temulence:
The enemy of Judaism, the enemy of all ethical monotheism, and the
enemy of genuine reason, then, would be myth, mythological thinking,
mythologized life (Cohen, 2001, 227).
Judaism and ethical monotheism therefore oppose myth, Cohen adverts:
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by loving truth associated with virtue, by articulating and supporting a sober
mentality, a clearheadedness, an ethical alertness anathema to any
submergence, participation, or intoxication in mythic consciousness. In
contrast to the high demands of philosophy and Judaism, the allure of myth
represents a violence, the return to an animal vitality that violates the moral
stature, the humanity of the human, the moral "election" of the singular one. In
a word, myth is irresponsible (Cohen, 2001, 339).
Principally Levinas' distrust of myth must, I believe, be understood within the context
of his Jewry, and to this end Cohen has correctly accented this aspect of Levinas'
thought (although he has been reluctant to admonish the latter where he arguably
ought to have done so). To summarise Levinas' position here one might situate his
pronouncements concerning pu0os in the following manner. Broadly speaking
Levinas' denunciation of myth is a reaction, an 'allergy,' one could say (motivated in
part by Mitnagdic proclivities), against Nazism, psychoanalysis, and what he will call
the 'whole religious revival' (PU 101), whether within departments of sociology and
anthropology, or among the youth of his day, centred around non-Western religious
traditions. Wherever myth is targeted for reproach by Levinas, these themata are
either explicitly, or tacitly, posited by him and held to account in various ways.
Clearly Levinas himself is beyond reproach for his excoriation of Nazism.
However, his readiness to deduce a complicity between Nazi ideology, the religions
of Asia, Africa and Australasia, and the practice of psychoanalysis, is tendentious to
say the least:
The renewal of mythology, the elevation of myth to the rank of superior
thought by secular thinkers ... conveys not a broadening of reason, but a
reversion to primitive mentality pure and simple. This is a nostalgia which is
perhaps explained by the insufficiency of technical reason and the catastrophes
it has unleashed. But is monotheistic civilization incapable of responding to
this crisis by an orientation liberated from the horrors of myths, the confusion
of thought they produce and the acts of cruelty they perpetuate in social
customs? (LB 51)
2 In the essay 'Jean Lacroix: Philosophy and Religion (1971), for example, Levinas confers his feelings
for psychoanalysis thus: 'By a strange privilege, some Olympian myths have resisted de-mythification,
and, like the myth of Oedipus, preside over the process, suggesting new dimensions for reflection and
providing "food for thought.'" The reason for Levinas' discomfort, though, is that with the resurgence
of 'mythology' one 'no longer focuses on the exegesis of the Scriptures: one studies their genesis' (JL
82). Levinas will not credit that within his own work certain motifs enjoy an equally 'strange privilege'
that appears to absolve them from critique and closer scrutiny. Again, in the essay 'The Ego and the
Totality' (1954), Levinas will write 'psychoanalysis consists in a predilection for some fundamental,
but elementary, fables...That they have been collected from among the remnants of the most diverse
civilizations and called myths adds nothing to their worth as clarifying ideas, and at most evinces a
return to mythologies' (ET40). Levinas' thinking on these issues is, I believe, fundamentally confused.
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The crisis to which 'monotheism' must respond is ambiguously represented here.
There can be little doubt, of course, that the Shoah is foremost in Levinas' mind.
However, the precise connection between the Holocaust and the rise of secularism is
poorly adumbrated by Levinas. For instance, Levinas will argue that 'technology as
secularisation is destructive of pagan gods,' and consequently, contra Heidegger, that
'secularising technology figures in the progress of the human spirit' (775 166).
Similarly, he will contend that disenchantment with the effects of this process of
secularisation has 'nourished a nostalgia for outdated, and retrograde forms' of
religiosity (LB 51). Yet Levinas does not provide the explication necessary to
consolidate his proposals, which are stated rather glibly without recourse to the
historical, sociological and ethnographic data required to substantiate them fully.
Where Levinas strays from the remit of 'ethical metaphysics' his
pronouncements seemed strained. The register of works such as Totality and Infinity
and Otherwise than Being, is poorly suited to rehearsing the complexities of social
change. Levinas' drash of nineteenth and twentieth century (Western) cultural history
is inadequate to its subject matter and typically specious in its execution of detail.
Once again, I believe, this attests to the difficulty, and ultimate failure, of Levinas'
thought to negotiate the passage (or make the transition) between proto-ethics and
what we might call politics. Where a slippage between these 'regions' of enquiry does
occur, Levinas' thinking, like the subject (le sujet) whose recurrence he charts, might
be said to be out-of-step with its time, and out-of-step with the 'saraband of
innumerable and equivalent cultures' (MS 58) he disregards (while being, as it were,
very much of its time). This thinking of and after the Other is thus out-of-place, since
the place to which it is called, one might suggest, is the interface between proto-ethics
and politics. This is a limit Levinas thinks in the figure of the third party (le tiers)
only to obviate the problem of how tertial space is delimited positively.
To be sure, the 'Cultures' Levinas would have us judge, the 'Cultures' it is
possible to judge on the basis ofmorality (MS 59), are, should we take seriously the
majuscular "C" with which Levinas often spells the word 'culture' (the essay
'Meaning and Sense' being no exception), those 'Cultures' of Fascism, the
presentiment and memory of which, as Levinas himself repeatedly tells us, have
informed the subject matter of his work.3 Of course, if philosophy is to be, so to
speak, theriacal against the rancour of Fascism, then it must interrogate the
31 am indebted to professor John Llewelyn for drawing my attention to this important distinction.
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preconditions (prealables) of such movements and investigate their genesis.4 Basing
one's suspicion of non-Western cultures upon questionable anthropology (Levy-
Bruhl), the conflation of Maoism with Taoism, and the presumption that ideologically
Nazism is concordant with the religions of Asia, Africa and Australia (not to mention
the appreciation of art (RS 12)) is ill advised however, and certainly of dubious
scholarly worth. Indeed, the notion that the confluence of Greek and Hebraic thought
gives rise to a history characterized by the expurgation of pu0os; that is, a history of
demythologization, is no less mythical than the myth it would debar and reflects a
shift in symbolic order rather than the elision ofmyth.
Equally mythical, one might contend, is the claim Derrida ventures at the close
of 'Violence and Metaphysics,' although it is a claim that is self-consciously fabulous,
that 'we live in the difference between the Jew and the Greek,' a difference, Derrida
continues, 'which is perhaps the unity of what is called history' (Derrida, 1978, 151).
Yet, if we live 'in and of difference,' as Derrida adverts, and it may be that we live of
difference as we live from the nutriments the earth provides, then the unity of what
perhaps might be called history (Holy or otherwise) is already one of disunity and
dissension. Arguably the difference between the 'Jew' and the 'Greek,' the difference
by which they are united, is their difference from the 'pagan' and the 'Barbarian' (the
(3ap[3aptKOs is, after all, the non-Greek, and the paganus the non Jew, Christian or
Muslim), a difference all too apparent in the effort of the former to suppress the latter
and to efface the evidence of their incidence. The world, whose 'rending'
(.dechirement) Levinas will attribute to 'both the philosophers and the prophets [a la
fois aux philosophes et aux prophetes]' (TI 24; Tel 9; emphasis added), is at once a
world rent by forces whose provenance cannot be traced back to either 'Athens' or
'Jerusalem' and the myths in which their significance is encoded.
Levinas' appeal to 'Holy History' draws upon a narrative which recounts the
emergence of Israel as a nation or a people privileged by 'God' and thus defers to
myth for its authority. Authority upon which Levinas will in turn base his derogation
of the pagan and the mythological. Levinas' disavowal of pG0os, and antipathy
toward the pagan, is itself informed by myth. As such, it is susceptible to the same
processes of demythologization and mundification to which Levinas will have us
4 That philosophy should be theriacal, is perhaps confirmed by the following statement from Levinas
(we would also do well to recall that the Hebrew word Shoah, means 'pit' or 'darkness'). Hence
Levinas writes: 'but the death of the starving children thrusts us into the snake pit, into places that are
no longer places, into places one cannot forget, but that do not succeed in placing themselves in
memory, in organizing themselves in the form of memories. We have known such pits in this century!'
(BM 85).
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expose the 'anti-Scriptures' (PII 53) of paganism and the symbolism of
psychoanalysis. If 'Jewish identity' is, as Levinas maintains inscribed in the
'Scriptures' of Judaism (MI 53), then along with it the identity of the pagan is also
inscribed and laid down as invariant. Yet, if 'a loss of Jewish identity' is called for in
order that this identity be renewed (MI 51), one may have to disburden the pagan of
their identity as a pagan to ensure that this ancient correspondence between 'Jew' and
'pagan' is preserved. To do so, however, is to challenge the invariance of these very
terms and to destabilize the narratives from which they derive their sense.
Beyond the cityscapes (Athens/Jerusalem) between which Levinas would have
us situate the origin (apxp) of that enterprise he calls ethics, from a region that can
only be described as rural or wild (the best place, then, for the 'wild barbarian
character of alterity' (TRA 347)), does the face of one extruded from this political
assembly not call the history that is its work to account, and therefore preside over the
auspication of another history; a history perhaps less 'Holy' and more terrene in
outlook? No doubt, as Jean-Luc Nancy avers, 'concentrated within the idea of myth is
perhaps the entire pretension on the part of the West to appropriate its own origin'
such that it might 'at last identify itself' (Nancy, 1991, 46). In Levinas, the suspension
or suppression of puOos is executed as a reduction of sorts in order that the face might
be released from the archaic environment of its birth. If the face falls under sense, that
is, if it is delivered to sense, then the media of its delivery (philosophical discourse,
scripture, symbol) must undergo destructuration.
However, if the face is to function as apXT rendering all approach to it an¬
archic, then by default, any narrative that would seek to justify the authority of its
pronouncements through a retrieval, as Nancy suggests, of its origin, and by way of
the repression of myth, is self refuting and ultimately fictive, since the principium to
which it appeals to corroborate its claims by necessity transcends the terms in which it
is proposed. Further, if the space of ethics 'defies myth in which tales about the origin
of the world are fixed, tales which already unfold in the world and among its
inhabitants,' as Levinas argues (OBBE 111), then it is a space that persists not in lieu
of myth, but rather in that (non)place, and at that moment, when myth most readily
asserts itself, when it attempts to repress its seity and deny its continuing prevalence.
It is because, Levinas suggests, 'myth dictates to us the fait accompli [and] the
constraint of custom and land' that it must be overcome (RIJT 142).
Yet the determinants of ethical space, at least the space Levinas deduces,
remain no less fixed (and Levinas no less obdurate in his views) than those identities
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which, he insists, are enshrined in myth. Aping Levinas, himself imitating Derrida,
one might say, in a chiasmus of sorts, that to demythologize is to mythologize still.5
Myth (pu0os) like wonder (Saupa^Etv) does not then reach a terminus in knowledge,
but undergoes what we might call a crisis in and as critique; or, in the case of Levinas,
as hypocrisy or hypo-critique (77 24; OBBE 185).
In The Transparent Society, Gianni Vattimo provides the following reflection
upon the jurisdiction and scope of demythologization. He writes:
To demythologize the demythologization does not mean to restore the rights
of myth, if only because amongst the myths we recognize as legitimate is that
of reason and its progression. Demythologization, or the idea of history as the
emancipation of reason, is not at all easy to exorcize ... If we wish to be
faithful to our historical experience, we have to recognize that once
demythologization has been exposed as a myth; our relation to myth does not
return as naive as before, but remains marked by this experience (Vattimo,
1992,40).
Levinas' thought is marked by the awareness that within myth demythologization
occurs as the interruption of myth. The myth he acknowledges as injunctive sets myth
and history apart while placing that by which history is oriented beyond history (77
23). Myth is designated as myth through recourse to the (hi)story of the decline in the
power of mythology. The face toward which the thought of Levinas is directed
interrupts the history that would recount its legacy because qua face the face signifies
as ordinance and word, a situation attested to by the 'fact' that it is the attestation of
testimony, according to Levinas, through which the authority of the face is revealed
('TDTT 105). A situation once again, that draws philosophy back into the element of
myth it would aspire to surpass.6 Of course, the element of pu0os differs markedly, or
so Levinas will contend, from the 'essential dimension of interpretation' in which the
'prophetic essence' of this revelation becomes 'lived experience' (C77 64; emphasis
added). It does so because interpretation, understood in terms of exegesis, breaks with
the immediacy of pu0os, disturbing the immanence of its reign.
If one's attestation of the face is called forth upon the basis of exegesis as 'the
very locus of response' (C77 64) to the textual enciphering of the face's provocation,
if, that is, like Dasein who in a state of resolute anticipation is 'ready for anxiety' (BT
§60 [297]), one is rendered ready for the face exegetically, then susceptibility to and
5 See: (Derrida, 1978, 150); and Levinas (GP 148).
6 It is perhaps of interest to note that, according to the Oxford Greek-English Lexicon, the root of pG—
0os is derived from pu, which connotes muttering and is suggestive of protestation; an utterance that
conveys unbridled emotion, passion, ttcx0os\
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for the face is likewise predetermined by exegetical activity, activity which thus
undercuts the putatively pure passivity of susception itself. What I have termed the
epicriticality of the flesh, is henceforth occasioned exegetically (and throughout his
work does Levinas not, in many respects, endeavour to provide an 'ontology in terms
of the book.' A relationship which, he insists, is 'as essential and irreducible for the
human condition as language itself (BV xi)?). One's discernment of the face qua face
is always already in conformity with the form (axPMa) of the face to which one has
become accustomed, and the imperative milieu within which one has been raised.
That the face is characterised by (its) height (hauteur) refers as much, I believe, to the
'processes' through which one is raised into an appreciation for the authority of the
face as it does to the face being heterogeneously provocable. The axfjpa of the face is
installed generatively though study, rite and lore. The 'production' of the face is
dramatized liturgically.
However, if the law of the 'face' is inscribed in the flesh (a concept 'essential
to Judaism,' Levinas urges, 'the consent to a corporeal wound [circumcision] to be
undergone' (CTI 63)) and the idolater (the pagan, barbarian, or non-Jew) is one who,
in the words of Numbers 15:31, shall be 'cut off from this world and cut off from the
world to come' (CTI 63), then the pagan, according to Jewish tradition, is arguably a
bit of (a) schmuck {prepuce) for scorning this teaching (and might this not be the
original connotation of this Yiddish word?). Talmudic witticism aside, of which there
is much in Levinas' work it must be noted, the pagan is 'cut off' from the world to
come, excised from (Holy) history (as the ethical relation 'cuts across [tranche] every
relation one could call mystical' (77 202)) because the pagan, apropos of Levinas, and
in accordance with the axOMCX under which Levinas labours, in consonance with the
(JU0OS to which he appeals, is one for whom 'its place in the sun, its ground, its site,
orient all signification' (PII 52). Paganism is 'putting down roots,' roots that 'possess
God inwardly,' 'a forest or prehuman humanity,' 'nationalism.' By contrast, Levinas
declares, the scriptural economy of Judaism is founded upon a substitution of the
letter for the soil (SWAB 137). A structural move, no doubt, which duplicates, while
prefiguring, the substitution of the subject for the Other, since both movements
involve a transposition of site and a shift in orientation. A shift again reflected in the
transference of the locus of Jewish spirituality from the 'Temple to the house of study,
from cult to study' (RIJT 135), although the yeshiva has in many ways preserved its
cultic heritage, I would maintain.
It is upon the 'arid soil of the desert, where nothing is fixed,' Levinas will
contend, that Judaism bases its exercise (CTI 58). Yet the ascian spaces across which
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Judaism roams remain amenable to 'dwelling' because the identities of the 'Jew' and
the 'pagan' are no less fixed, I believe, than the sod into which the 'roots' of
paganism extend. The pagan is ascribed a fixed place within the social edifice of
Levinas' thought and bears the mark within the latter's work of what with Visker we
might term an 'attachment.' For she is 'attached to something and suffers from that
attachment' without electing so to suffer. Should peoples, 'spiritually mediocre' or
otherwise, be impugned because 'they try to live with their attachments in different
symbolic articulations than ours' (Visker, 1999, 392)? As living symbolism is a
largely unconscious affair, and one is always symbolically predisposed to respond to
the alien qua alien (pagan), in contradistinction to the familiar qua familiar (Jew), is it
not rather this difference that interrupts the pu0os by which one lives one's life,
revealing it to one as myth, and is it not this revelation (at whatever level of
stratification it is realized, whether it be in terms of individual, cultural-religious or
political narratives) to which one is awakened or sobered up (degrise) by the Other?
§ 34. Translation
Revelation, Levinas will charge, entails a 'constant hermeneutics of the word' (RIJT
138). It is a question, then, of whether this hermeneutics, as it is practised by Levinas,
mires his thinking of the Other within the confines of a circulus vitiosus, or situates it
within the circulus probus of genuinely productive thought. Should we entertain, with
Newton, the suggestion that Levinasian proto-ethics might profitably be described as
a doing 'Torah-for-the-sake-of-the-Other' (Newton, 2001, 108), then we must
ascertain to what extent the embodiment of this performance (the performance of the
Torah as a being for-the-other) is regulated in Levinas' work by conservative
exegetical convention. Does the 'constancy' of the hermeneutic to which Levinas
adheres not elevate this endeavour generatively beyond the 'volume of the book' that
would be its 'living space' (RIJT 130)?
If the mark of a sound hermeneutic is its heritability, and if 'sense' is
generative in determination, can one restrict its exegetical compass and delimit its
course without suspending the dynamism that is its nisus? How do the directives of
demythologization and renewal (where the latter signifies at once the
'commemoration of Holy History' and 'a continuation of the events commemorated
through interpretation' (SAW 128)) maintain their respective integrity despite the
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tension that obtains between them?7 After all, Levinas will concede that 'we have not
yet finished translating the Bible.' Like the beginning phenomenologist, 'we have
hardly begun' (TP 75), he confers. The 'work of the Septuagint remains unfinished'
(ISM 97). If the process of 'liberating' and 'universalising' the meaning housed within
the scriptures to which Levinas refers is incomplete, if, that is, this work 'must be
continued' (TP 75), can the testimony of these texts and the commentaries they
inspire be safeguarded against the chicanery of heterodox interpretation? For
example, Levinas wishes to preserve both the sense that the Torah possesses a 'divine
origin' ('there is no question here of putting that meaning aside (CTI 61)), and to
proffer a Talmudic drash of this origin in which its celestial provenance is construed
generatively. The spiritual life of the text is sustained across generations (as if it were
sent down from heaven) such that 'the Torah not only reproduces what was taught
yesterday,' but is also 'read according to tomorrow' (CTI 66).
There is a disquietude here, I believe, a disquietude (inquietude) perhaps akin
to that which 'manifests itself within one's enjoyment of the element' (77 140;
translation altered), a disquietude exhibited, once again, as a tension, a tension under
which the Levinasian corpus strains. If it is, as Levinas states, 'the multiple stances of
the scholars' that 'constitute' the very life of the Torah (OJRS 101), or in more
egalitarian terms, 'humanity in its multipersonal plurality' that comprises the locus of
its revelation (CTI 64), how can one secrete behind, beyond, or on the hither side of
this heritable production an origin (apxp) that is purportedly ouranic in status? If we,
perhaps at Levinas' request, translate this grievance into 'Greek,' are we not
compelled to question the terms in which Levinas' account of the face is protracted?
If the 'multipersonal plurality' of the human community is the stage upon which the
face is cleared for signification, can 'one' determine its sense precisely without
trammelling the horizons of its institution?
The other person, I would insist, dashes the form (albeit the 0X91-13 of the
face) through which one would approach her, placing even the |_iu0os of the face to
which one strives to remain faithful within parentheses, in order to suspend the self-
evidences that are tacitly deposited along with it. It is my contention that Levinas
repeatedly conflates proto-ethical insight with its religious and cultural illustration and
thus limits the pertinence of the face unduly (and, according to Scots law, one's
7 This tension, or torsion, is well documented by Levinas himself. For example, in 'The Pact' (1981),
he confides that for the Jew 'there is constantly within us a struggle between our adherence to the spirit
and to what is called the letter' {TP 78). The title of Levinas 1963 collection of essays, Difficult
Freedom, again reflects this tension.
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pertinence is one's heritable estate). Where such conflation occurs, description of the
face (already symbolical) slides back into myth, restoring to it its unrestricted
plenitude and power. It may be that it is the 'historical continuity' (RIJT 135) of
interpretation that guarantees its probity (even though the 'history of each piece of
writing counts less than the lessons it contains,' Levinas admits (RIJT 137)). However
the continuity broached here moves within the ambit of myth, and draws upon its
resources, since it is the historicality of exegetical activity, rather than the
mythological nature of the stories (pu0oi) it treats, that must be upheld. Yet such
historicality must be upheld in order to support (and preserve) those pu0ot over whose
meaning Talmudic scholars pour.
The logic upon which this reasoning draws is pure mythologic, despite its
laudable intentions otherwise. Indeed, the attempt to draw the proto-ethical back into
the cultural or religious sphere of determinate meaning fails necessarily because
proto-ethicality, apropos of Levinas, presupposes the disjunction of face and form.
Moreover, this disjunction strips the face of its injunctive force, I would argue, since
it disengages the face from its imperative context, effacing both the inner and outer
horizons against which it signifies as a face. Seemingly, though, this is the move
Levinas will himself seek to make by laying claim to the idea that the positive religion
of Judaism, through recourse to its method, its 'method of procedure' being the
transmission (lelamed) of the Torah by way of tradition, makes it possible for 'true
revelation to take place' (TP 79).
Now, Levinas does wonder whether this 'revelation' is 'precarious enough,'
and questions whether it is 'protected from all contamination by being or culture'
(.NGTT 121). Ultimately, however, it is the 'consciousness of an indisputable
participation' in the 'responsibilities of a holy History' (DJ 9; EJ 24) that convinces
Levinas of the surety of his proposals. How very different, one might ask, is this
'consciousness of participation' (la conscience d'une participation irrecusable),
although of course, inflected quite distinctly within the religion of Judaism, from
those 'participations,' 'pre-liaisons,' and 'pre-reasonings,' Levinas, by way of the
anthropology of Levy-Bruhl, deems to be synonymous, and therefore reprehensible,
with the 'pre-logical mentality' of 'primitive' peoples (LB 49)? Certainly there is an
equivalence in kind here, if not in form. 'Primitive men live before all Revelation,'
one notes, 'before the light' of reason (EE 61) and, more pointedly, its Talmudic
exposition, alights upon their Culturexculture to liberate them from servilism and
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sorcery.8 As the proto-ethical relation is dramatised liturgically, and its staging or
mise-en-scene is founded upon the 'incomparable strength of ritual' (DJ 8), one can
only presume, from reading Levinas, that the 'pagan' is persona non grata et non
dramatis, since the impedimenta of paganism obstruct the 'path of deliverance and
elevation' (RIJT 138). The face being, as it were, the locus editus from which sense
signifies in its exorbitance, straightforwardness (droiture) and, what Levinas will refer
to tellingly as its 'non historical simplicity' (MS 58).
Of course, if phenomenology, as Merleau-Ponty confers, endeavours to
achieve a 'primitive contact' with the world of lived experience, and to 'endow that
contact with a philosophical status' (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, vii; emphasis added), and
the 'soul,' or 'psychism,' Levinas deduces is properly contactual, as we have
purported, then one might feasibly advance Levinasian first-philosophy (rrpcoTq
(juAoacxjMa) as a primitivism of sorts. This is a primitivism no doubt obliquely
inferred through Levinas' allusions to Robinson Crusoe, when the latter 'in the
tropical splendour of nature, though he has maintained his ties with
civilization...experiences in meeting Man Friday the greatest event of his insular life
- in which a man who speaks replaces the ineffable sadness of echoes' (TW 148).9
Only a world that has been sufficiently desacralized (the purview of the Jew, Levinas
will urge) permits what Robert Gibbs describes as 'that full translation of the relations
to God to become realized in our relations with other people' (Gibbs, 1992, 165;
emphasis added). Neither the paradisal splendour of Crusoe's Island, nor the element
into which things recede (nor, indeed, the things themselves) contest one's place in
being. For the element (I'element), like the 'things,' is 'faceless' (77 142) and thus
incapable of beleaguering one ethically. There can be 'no natural religion,' Levinas
will charge (77 117), no divination of the element, since the interhuman relation (the
meta-physical relation) is supra-natural and eschews the conative life that would bring
about its dissembly.
Yet is this very eschewal not marked by dissemblance? For does it not
dissemble the conative drive it would profess to sublate? The extirpation of the 'I'
8 What irony then, that Levinas should bemoan the fact that 'Christian theologians have presented
themselves as the men who perfected, carried out and rounded off Judaism' (SC 109), when he himself
advocates such supersedence in relation to non-western, 'pagan' cultures.
9
Significantly, Levinas will also allude to Robinson Crusoe in 'The Ego and The Totality' (1954),
where, once again, his reference to Defoe's eponymous protagonist is instructive. 'Pious souls,' he
states, 'are returning to the historically constituted religions.' However, 'when they create for
themselves an individual religion, they live off the wreckage of shipwrecked churches, like Robinson
Crusoe who achieves independence on his Island only thanks to the rifles and casks of gunpowder he
recovered from his lost ship' (ET 30). Evidently, to break with tradition is, for Levinas, to abandon
oneself to disaster.
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from its conatus, the extrication of a culture from its 'enrootedness' (enracinement),
derive their momentum from an equally imperious 'source,' one might contend, as the
conation they would seek to surpass. Indeed, the energeia upon which such endeavour
draws - the en-ergy deployed in the 'vision of the face [vision du visage]' (77 196) -
might, pace Levinas, be designated an allergy, and more specifically, what one might
term a theallergy (an allergy to both spectacle (0sa) and goddess (0ecic), alike). For the
'non-allergic relation with alterity' Levinas invokes (77 47), is accomplished as the
subjugation of an 'impersonal fecundity,' that 'faceless, generous mother' that is the
'matrix of particular beings' (77 46). To be sure, 'the reduction to restlessness [la
reduction a I'inquietude]' (OBBE 45; AE 77) Levinas implements, the reduction to
the subject in its diachrony, admits of what he calls 'assembled forces [forces
assemblies]'; that is, it admits of 'simultaneous forces in its union' [forces
simultanees dans son union]' (OBBE 45; AE 77; emphasis added). The management
of these forces does not perturb Levinas, however, nor does he appear willing to
concede that signification (the one-for-the-other) is buttressed by conation, at least in
so far as the staging of the former is prepared for through the extrusion, expurgation
and eradication of the latter in its various guises. Thus, it may be the 'subversion of
essence' (OBBE 164), that opens the field of ethics, yet this field receives its charge
from the conation it rescinds - or rather sublimates - as crucially, for Levinas, it is a
question of sublimating 'idols' in whatever form they are manifest (HGU 234)
particularly when it is the plasticity of form itself that is apt to beguile and seduce
one. Like Nietzsche, then, Levinas may be said to have an 'evil eye' for 'idols'
(Nietzsche, 1990, 31).
Now, it is one thing to denounce 'the philosophy of Hitler' as 'simplistic,' and
to disclaim 'the primitive powers that burn within it' for 'awakening elementary
feelings' within the 'German soul' (RPH 64; emphasis added). It is quite another, of
course, to discern the same 'powers' at work within the diverse cultures of 'Asia,'
'Africa,' and 'Australia,' or to discredit as 'pagan,' modalities of religious expression
for which 'God' is not personal, or is of no consequence at all (R1JT 134). One
wonders whether the mercy (rachamim) that 'attenuates the rigours' of Hebraic Law
(RIJT 142) - Law that is 'always subject to the review of love' (ETE 113) - might
extend to embrace the pagan estranged by that very Law, not to subsume the pagan
within the Jewish (or 'abolish' the differences between the 'Jew' and the 'pagan' (IU
177), only to then identify Judaism with humanity, but to honour the difference
through which justice is instituted and the 'political' space in which it produced.
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Might the pagan, in Levinas, not stand for that which resists the closure of the
work (oeuvre) and complicates the order it upholds? By opening the work of Levinas
to the other within its midst, might the pagan not put back into play (play having been
decisively suspended (OBBE 146)) the possibility of configurations of the 'face'
proscribed by Levinas? Must we not speak, then, within the context of Levinas' work
of a pagan attestation? This is indeed a risk to be run. But did Levinas himself not
concede, in Totality and Infinity, that 'the separated being must run the risk of the
paganism which evinces its separation and in which their separation is accomplished'
(77 142; emphasis added)? What Levinas intends to convey here, I think, is the sense
in which the existent accomplishes its 'separation' - through enjoyment - by wresting
itself from the anonymity of brute being (I'etre brut). The 'I' 'crystallizes' (se
cristallise) in enjoyment (77 143; Tel 154). Thus establishing, according to Levinas, a
distance between itself and the nutrimental source that nourishes it. It is this distance
(the interval of separation) that permits the 'I' to live 'interiorly' (interieurement) and
to take up residence in being, while maintaining its distance, and therefore its
independence, from that from which it lives (77 143; Tel 154). The 'I' is henceforth
'enrooted in what it is not' (it is pagan because 'dwelling' and 'inhabitation' belong to
the essence, or egoism of the 'I') yet separated 'within this enrootedness' (77 143). In
a suitably gnomic statement, Levinas will conclude that such paganism must be
brooked 'until the moment the death of these gods [namely one's 'aesthetic
orientation' (Tl 140)] will lead back to atheism and to the true transcendence' (77
142). The 'true' transcendence, of course, is that of the face and its epiphany, which
must not be conflated with the element, Levinas insists, since 'between the I and what
it lives from there does not extend the absolute distance that separates the same from
the other' (77 143).
The assurance with which Levinas defaces the element not only, as John Sallis
contends, deprives 'elemental nature of the capacity for heterogeneous provocation,'
thereby effacing the unique concurrence of elementals that constitute it, but also re-
inscribes Levinas' analysis of the element within the 'most classical philosophical
conceptually' (Sallis, 2000, 159n.l7). Moreover, by equating paganism (a term with
a distinctly dubious semantic history) with 'aesthetic orientation' (I'orientation
esthetique), and by doing so under the auspices of philosophical enquiry (that is as
translation), philosophical enquiry, furthermore, informed by the anthropology of
Levy-Bruhl, with its emphasis upon 'mentality' as an 'orientation' within being (LB
50), Levinas reinforces the primacy of his basic opposition between the 'pagan' and
the 'Jew' by assigning each their relative polarity and bearing. Through the
274
deducement of a structural parity, or parallelism, between; non-Western cultures,
Nazism, the philosophy of Heidegger, psychoanalysis and the appreciation of art
(quite a melange of terms, one notes), Levinas assimilates the above to his opposition
between the 'pagan' and the 'Jew,' the determinants between which his work unfolds,
determinants that may be transcribed thus:
Jew: ethical: holy: history :: Pagan: aesthetic: sacred: myth
One may concur with Visker, therefore, when he suggests that the distinction
'between the sacred and the holy (the sacred being that which results from a taboo;
the holy being that which has put a taboo on itself) is at work in every move that
Levinas makes in developing his ethics' (Visker, 1999, 283). However, to award the
sacred and the holy their proper names, and, after all, Levinas' work is a veritable
onomasticon, is to refer such terms to the explicata from which they derive their
concretion, specificity, and focus, within the work of Levinas (i.e., the 'Jew' and the
'pagan'). This is, then, to put a face to their formality, or at least, to situate both terms
face-a-face within the work they help to structure.
§ 35. Pagan attestation
What then of pagan attestation? The properly pagan attestation is necessarily
exergual, taking place outside the work, outwith its ruling and in defiance of its law,
in contestation of those 'norms' by which the figures, to which the pagan would be
reduced, are judged within the work. The pagan is indeed 'shut up in this world'
(Levinas, 1935 [1981], 90), this work-world, and hisxherxits testimony stifled. Yet
within the work of Levinas might the pagan not reveal itself, in a manner not
dissimilar to the call of conscience (Gewissensruf) in Heidegger, as 'something like
an alien voice' (BT §57 [277])? A voice which, within Levinas' work may very well
'discourse' in the mode of 'keeping silent' (how could it do, or rather be, otherwise,
for it is in discourse that the 'absolutely foreign alone can instruct us' (Tl 73)), but
which nonetheless, summons the work from 'the lostness in which it has forgotten
itself (BT §57 [277]), the abandon of its pu0os? Perhaps it is this voice, in its
obmutescence, that compels one to find les mots justes to describe, treat, and
entertain, those to whom the work is less than cordial. Those for whom 'discourse'
(Aoyos) is not pre-eminent (the nonhuman) - and if the pagan, as Nietzsche exhorts,
is one who says 'yes to all things' (Nietzsche, 1990a, 187), proto-ethics may need to
accommodate those it has hitherto only regarded as things - or for whom the 'severe
daily joy' (CTI 68) of study, and the erudition of the yeshiva, are not sanctioned.
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Those who are, perhaps, not invited to 'seek' and 'decipher,' that is, 'to Midrash'
(RIJT 133), because their gender, as that which gives an improper form (popcj)fj) to
their face, prohibits them from doing so according to exegetical custom.
If philosophy, as Merleau-Ponty adverts, is 'the reconversion of silence and
speech into one another' (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 129), then one must endeavour to
find a place within Levinas' philosophy for those extruded by the terms under which it
operates; lest one conflate, during the performance of that philosophy, the 'said' of its
enunciation with the 'saying' by which it is oriented, or confuse the generality of its
insight with the particularity of its illustration. Is this not what Derrida proposes when
he speaks of language as interruption, and interruption as 'another language' that
'comes to disturb' language, 'another text,' the 'text of the other,' which arrives 'in
silence' to displace the 'language of translation' (Derrida, 1980, 18), the language of
the accord, or pact, between 'Jerusalem' and 'Athens' as we have understood it?
Once again, it is a question of exegesis and its regulation, of the marshalling of
one's sensitivity and attunement to the Other, of the sense of sense (sens) that is
already settled and prescribed before the advent of the Other, of meaning that 'lies in
the future' (MT 67), ordering the present by its interdicts and thus impeding the
Other's arrival. If we must 'pass through interpretation to surpass interpretation' (MT
67), whether this be of texts or that which the latter prime us to encounter, namely the
face, then are we not under an obligation to suspend that which is merely tralaticious
(even though, according to Levinas, for him 'no credo orientates the reading of
[religious] texts' (RIJT 138)) and put on hold the lelamed, or transmission, that it
bestows (the Sendung it sends), so as to make the passage, along the fault line of this
interruption of tradition, custom and convention, to the limits of our heritable estate;
From where, to be sure, ilyaity threatens, but from which a truly heterogeneous space
opens?
Of course, it is not simply a case of awarding the pagan, paynim, or pai'en,
their panim, or face, since, let us be clear, Levinas no where deprives the human being
of its face (the same cannot be said of the non-human creature and the elemental), but
rather of ascribing the pagan a face within the context of Levinas' work and thus
delineating a space of contestation, within the work (oeuvre), from which the voice of
thisxthese other(s) might be heard. Perhaps the pagan may be said to disenchant the
work, to sober it from its very own 'intoxicating equivocations [envirantes
equivoques]' (77 202; Tel 22). Such disenchantment (desenchantement) - and is
disenchantment not the work of Levinas work, its teAos, as it were - is not restricted
276
in its exercise. The positive religion of Judaism cannot be indemnified against this
process. For, whether already calcified, or furtively deposited, self-evidences of
whatever provenance ('religious' or 'philosophical') are to be interrogated with equal
force. Interrogation of this sort is called for, summoned, by the Other before whom
this derangement (derangement) of the work is staged, I would contend.
The work of Levinas is enthused by the pagan, one might argue, enthused,
therefore, by the prospect of its own disenchantment, disenchantment which, in
accordance with the logic to which Levinas subscribes, is the necessary, precursive
condition for the 'holiness' (la saintete) his various studies seek to 'disengage'
(OBBE 59). This 'pagan mood' (77 47), or Stimmung - this enthusiasm - would be
suppressed by Levinas were it not that which animates his oeuvre and justifies its
course. Levinas himself will speak of attestation and he will do so as a Jew; Jews
being those who, as Adam Newton reminds us, 'are religiously bound to become
mefarshim (expounders),' and thus in Levinas' case also 'metzavim (commanders);'
that is 'to personalize, and give verbal consent to, [religious] criteria never placed in
jeopardy' (Newton, 2001, 175). Certainly Levinas' work attests to his Jewry, whether
it does so elliptically, through allusion to Jewish topoi, or emphatically, as that which
the work effects. The truth of Levinas' vision of the face, the truth of Levinas'
testimony (temoignage), is borne by the work and its performance, by the extent to
which the work dismantles itself to make space for the Other, by the extent to which
the work is prepared to place itself in jeopardy, that is, to place in jeopardy those
terms, themata, and figures that delimit the space of its attestation.
The truth of Levinas' testimony is therefore the work of ethics, the work of
freeing the space of attestation for-the-other, the work of liberating Levinas' works
from the assumptions that jeopardise their work, of eradicating such self-evidences as
those that might efface the face and limit its signification and thus of ensuring that
what Levinas refers to as the 'entirety of the spiritual procedure' which 'conditions
the upsurge of the given' be reconstituted in concreto (WSNP 222). Was it not
Levinas himself who confided that 'an orientation which goes freely from the Same to
the Other is a Work' (MS 49)?
§ 36. Determination andproduction
I have deliberately sought to problematize the disparity between Levinas' work and its
work, in order to hold Levinas to account before his own 'testimony.' The themes of
'testimony' (temoignage) and 'prophecy' (prophetisme) are deployed consistently
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throughout Levinas' later writings and treat the 'traumatism' (trciumatisme) of one's
being ordered to, in and by the face of the Other. The inscription of this order in the
for-the-other of obedience, Levinas will contend, 'is an anarchic being affected'
which 'slips into me "like a thief" (OBBE 148), making it possible for me to be 'the
author of what was, without my knowledge inspired in me - to have received, whence
we know not, that of which I am the author' (TDTT 105; emphasis added). This
testification is 'made before all theology' (OBBE 149), Levinas urges, and is the
'unforeseeable response of the chosen one' (OBBE 145) - the 'scandal of sincerity'
{OBBE 143) - substituting herself for the Other.
Yet, is the testimony to which Levinas attests, not theologically conditioned?
Have Hebraic directives not slipped into Levinas' witness 'like a thief' {comme un
voleur)? To be sure, I have endeavoured to accent such slippages wherever possible
and to underscore and clarify their motivation. It has proved requisite to question the
saliency of Levinas' pronouncements and, indeed, to disengage them from the 'said'
in which they are thematized, as Levinas himself would seek to disengage the
'otherwise than being' from the themes in which it is exhibited {OBBE 6). However,
have I been just in my appraisal of Levinas; has my reading of his work not, at times,
been rather puerile, given the advancement of specious claims and trifling objections?
It is hoped the objections I have raised will not be met with disapproval, for, like the
testimony of Levinas they have proffered to complicate, they have been set forth in
sincerity, in response to a work that astounds as it inspires. That such a work should
astound can be no surprise, since the wonder (etonnement) in which philosophy
begins (Saupa^Eiv), the wonder that for Levinas is traumatically inspired in the self
by the Other, has been the very ratio of his work {OBBE 181).
One may well wonder, though, how astonishment of this sort is managed, and
how its exorbitance is constrained. What protects wonder (etonnement), for example,
from the dissolution of delirium {deliref, the very 'delirium to be reduced by
philosophy [delire a reduire par la philosophieY {OBBE 152; AE 238)? If I am, as
Levinas suggests, 'the go-between for what I set forth' {GO 146), if the obligation or
command (commandement) to be for-the-other is, as it were, 'stated by the mouth of
him it commands,' revealing a 'plot' (intrigue) Levinas is 'tempted to call religious'
{OBBE 147), can I be certain that what is called forth in me is not, in the words of
Heidegger, a 'fantastical exaction' {BT §53 [266])? No doubt, there is a remarkable
congruence to be adduced here between the Levinasian account of testimony and the
Heideggerian presentation of 'attestation' {BT §§53-60 [260-295]), concinnity we
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have no need to reprise since we have submitted this structural consonance to scrutiny
above.10
Plainly, both modalities of 'witness' are predicated upon the anonymity of the
summons one receives. Whether this summons issues from Being, the other person, or
'elsewhere' (ailleurs), and whether, furthermore, this elsewhere attests, qua trace, to
the adventure of the Infinite (what Levinas will term illeity), or the 'indeterminate
menace' (menace indeterminee) of the il y a (EE 59; DEE 96): both are crossed to 'the
point of possible confusion,' we recall (TPA 224). But this decussation of in-
determinants deprives the subject of certainty in the face of that which assails it, since
the subject, formed in passivity, arises on the basis of this passivity. Dasein, then,
may project itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being upon the basis of a nullity
(Dasein is the Being of this basis (BT §58 [283])). The subject of responsibility,
however, presents itself upon the basis of its passivity ('here I am' (me voici)), taking
up the gauntlet of indeterminacy in recognition of this risk. In the midst of
indeterminacy and aporia - 'at the heart of the ambiguity of inspiration' (OBBE 149)
- from a space that may be both 'nocturnal,' that is, 'full of the nothingness of
everything' (EE 58), and the openness of a 'layout without security' (OBBE 179), the
subject, exposed in its inwardness, bears witness (il temoigne) to its responsibility for-
the-other. Such attestation is 'its very psyche' (OBBE 148) - the 'other in the same'
(OBBE 149) - Levinas avers.
Like the vectors of the face (ilyaity, illeity, tertiality) whose decussation
Levinas outlines, the modes of utterance we have previously outlined - the epotic
modes in and through which Levinas deduces the terms of his ethical metaphysics -
are chiastically intertwined. The modes of prescription, proscription, presentation and
proclamation are crossed and, in a manner not dissimilar to the decussation of the
optic nerves which permit sight, the laying bare of the face descriptively is always
already an attestation of one's being for-the-other ethically. Hence, the 'iteration of
exposure is expression, sincerity, saying,' Levinas will conclude (OBBE 153). The
'here I am' (me voici), for which, as Hilary Putman notes, the Hebrew word is hineni,
'performs the speech-act of calling attention to, or presenting.' Thus, hineni 'performs
the speech-act of presenting myself, the speech-act of making myself available to
another' (Putman, 2002, 38). Levinas' empiricism is indeed radical (77 196),
therefore, because the description of the face it assays is at once kerygmatic.
10 A perspicuous example of such consonance is to be found in Otherwise than Being, where Levinas
will speak of 'my proximity with the neighbour, where I state, in the autonomy of the voice of
conscience, a responsibility, which could not have begun in me' (OBBE 161).
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However, and here I recapitulate my earlier assertion, perhaps this empiricism is not
radical enough. Although it would purport to be eminently fossorial can it claim to
have fully excavated, and probed, the site of its own provenance?
Perhaps the face is decussated by transversals whose status within the work of
Levinas (one thinks here of the earth {la terre) qua Ark and the elemental {I'element))
is at best provisional. Why should the face and its generation not admit of a terrene
ancestry? Why should one not endeavour to 'present' this Urhistorie
phenomenologically and to relate the heritability of the face to what is arguably its
fourth transversal? Why, if the 'patience of passivity' is 'always at the limit [etre
toujours a bout]' {OBBE 153), must a limitation be imposed upon the signification of
the face? These are certainly moot points, points whose certainty, like the
'indefiniteness' of the certainty of Dasein's Being-towards-the-end {BT §53 [265]), I
have allowed myself to cultivate throughout my study of Levinas. I have adopted this
ploy not to abrogate the terms of Levinas' analyses (analyses which are, after all,
masterful in their complexity, scope and insight), as if such terms were mere delenda,
but to question the order of their assembly in Levinas' work and situate them against
the horizons of their institution.
Again, it may be that obligation, as Levinas confers, 'calls for a unique
response not inscribed in universal thought' {OBBE 145), a response for which the
medium of philosophical discourse is ill suited. Yet this admission, to be sure, made
before the face of the Other hie et nunc (although infinitely reiterative in its
dramatization), forsakes its own accession to truth, at least in so far as truth is
tantamount to universality, by limiting itself, as Husserl would limit the universality
of the phenomenological reduction to delimit the remit of his reflection {Id §32 [56]),
to the particularity of this other here, who faces me at this very moment {en ce
moment meme). Before this face, I am instructed to be for-the-other, as if this
instruction, which 'circumscribes me,' instructed me by my own voice {OBBE 147).
As if? Levinas cannot guarantee the legitimacy of this claim nor safeguard its probity,
for ventured as testimony, its truth is confirmed in its performance. Of course, 'Being
true as Being-uncovering' is a way of Being for Dasein {BT §44 [220]); a way, or
o5os, that is grounded (and thus un-grounded) in the ecstatico-horizonal unity of
temporality; a way, moreover, upon which the methodological proposals of Being and
Time are based, and upon which the cogency of the arguments found therein depend.
For Levinas, one might contend, prophecy is the method of ethics, its
possibility and execution, a trauma to be undergone both textually (the work must
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suffer the ambivalence of its pronouncements) and substantially ('the subject is
persecution and martyrdom' (OBBE 146)). This method entails that truth, and the very
question of truth appealed to in the works of Levinas, be conceived as diachrony and
alternance; a movement between terms, the alternation 'between universality and
individuation' (OBBE 126). It is in this alternance, this scintillation (scintillation), that
Levinas discerns the trace of the Infinite, the trace of an illeity that, as he expresses it,
'makes the word God be pronounced, without letting "divinity" be said' (OBBE 162).
Why must the word 'God' be said at this juncture; what compels its enunciation?
If one identifies prophecy with that 'reversal whereby the perception of an
order coincides with the meaning of this order made up by the one who obeys it'
(,tdtt 105), then is not to broach the name 'God' a rather fabulous construction, a
puSo? even; a myth to be worked loose from its situs? Now, Levinas does suggest
that he has recourse to the word God 'without suppressing the intermediaries [sans
supprimer les intermediaries]' that lead him to this word (OBBE 128; AE 204). Yet
one may perhaps question the sincerity of this concession, since the 'intermediaries'
(,intermediaries) Levinas moots within works such as Otherwise than Being, the
horizons he purportedly reconstitutes there, gesture beyond the remit of these works
and require further explication. To claim that sense {sens) cannot 'do without God'
(MS 48), and that God is 'other than the other [autre qu'autrui]' (GP 141), leaving a
trace of 'Himself in time by which the latter is oriented (time is a-Dieu, according to
Levinas (NM 166)) is to subvert the sense of phenomenological enquiry and interrupt
its elucidation of the given (even where the given is given as interruption). The
human, as Levinas adverts, may be the 'place where God works' (.IEO 148), where
God falls under sense. Arguably, however, it is 'God' who justifies the work of
Levinas' work, for it is 'God' that ordains its mandate.
That this is so, is evidenced by the following statement from 'Meaning and
Sense.' There Levinas remarks that 'the face, wholly open, can at the same time be in
itself because it is in the trace of illeity.' dlliety,' he continues 'is the origin of the
alterity of being' (MS 64). To root (and here I deploy this phrase purposefully) the
'alterity of being,' the alterity of the Other, in the trace of illeity, is, I believe, to
incline the work of Levinas toward theology and thus to rumble its an-archic
pretensions, that is, to see through its constation to the demonstration upon which it
depends. No doubt, Levinas would deduce from this rumbling the bourdonnement in
which the il y a is announced, the frolement, or rustling, by which the
'indeterminateness that constitutes its acuteness' (EE59) menaces one, since there is
'ambiguity of sense and non-sense in being,' he suggests (OBBE 163; emphasis
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added). Yet again, why postulate a 'God' when transcendence will suffice? Why take
a detour (detour) at the face where none is necessary?
To be sure, for Levinas, and the work for which he is known, it is precisely a
question of necessity here, as it is God that orients one toward the Other, and thus
God that orients one toward the Good (TPA 223). The 'curvature' of ethical space,
curvature whose elevation we have previously accented, is the 'very presence of
God,' Levinas will opine (77 291). The contraction of God 'makes space' for the
interaction of ethics, one might say (IGRHV 166), illeity being that which permits one
to 'accomplish a movement toward the neighbour' (OBBE 13). Taken strictly,
however, is it not the removal, rather than the withdrawal, of God from the field of
ethics that makes way for the sanctity (saintete) of the face; ethics being the 'field
sketched out by the paradox of an Infinite in relation' {WE 200), the sense {sens) of
which, I have argued, is sketched out, schematized and disseminated generatively?
§ 37. Conclusion
Throughout the present study care has been taken to emphasize what I have called the
heritability of the face. And while it would in no way compromise the integrity of the
proposals outlined to advance the face as the heir of the 'Infinite,' the infinity set forth
in this work need not pass for God (nor even, qua trace, as God). Levinas proffers this
word too soon, I would contend (and, against his own best intentions, deduces 'too
readily the truths of faith' {S 92)), as he does the word 'evil,' to describe Being in its
positivity {EE 20). Perhaps a little more reticence is in order, a little more patience, a
willingness to stay the course of indeterminacy and endure the aporetic, to avoid
conflating the upper case II (He) with the Latinate ille, and to efface even this name
for God (illeity) such that its effacement clears a space for the face-to-face relation it
putatively orientates. Yes, Levinas acknowledges the ilyaity basal to passivity
{passivite). Susceptibility without 'assumption' is laid bare, he will insist, upon the
basis of the il y a ('to support without compensation, the excessive or disheartening
hubbub and encumberment of the there is is needed' {OBBE 164)). Yet, despite this
appeal to ilyaity, and its subversion of essence, it is God that makes possible my
conversion from a presence to self (my auto-referentiality) to 'my presence as
present,' a movement in and through which my being delivered over as a hostage to
the Other is accomplished {OBBE 151), a conversion we have hitherto had cause to
problematize.
282
Levinas, then, requires God to be both an 'idea-in-me' that exceeds the
capacity of thought, and thus implicates 'me' in an 'ex-ceptional' relationship with
that which transcends cognition - the in of the Infinite signifies both non finitude and
within the finite (GP 136) - and the name for the 'institution of justice (SIRI 218). It is
under these circumstances, Levinas will maintain, that God comes to mind {vient a
I'idee). God's coming to mind in such ways, is not incompatible with God's being
'dead.' At least in so far as the Nietzschean apophthegm, like the Levinasian God,
describes a certain orientation within Being. In Nietzsche's case a cultural
predicament and the genesis of its possibility. Transcendence is, therefore, a 'passing
over to being's other,' a passing over that must surmount the 'anonymous rustling of
the there zs;' that essence that 'works as an invincible persistence in essence' and is
'confirmed positively to be the conatus of beings' (OBBE 3-4). Hence, the rustling
(.bruissement) of the il y a is likened by Levinas to the 'murmur of attendants
[murmure des postulants]' at the 'place left vacant by one who died [la place laissee
vacante par le mourantf (OBBE 3'AE 14). A place, whether construed culturally (the
death of a certain God (OBBE 185)), or metontologically ('the void left by the
negation of Being' (OBBE 4)), one must surpass in order that the moral turpitude
indicative of conation might be outstripped and its incessancy stalled.
That conation might be outstripped, and that I might be extirpated from my
conatus, is thanks to God (grace a Dieu), Levinas will assert, for it is God who directs
me to the Other despite myself, and despite the interest {interessement) I take in my
own being. As Levinas confirms, "'Here I am," just that! The word God is still absent
from the phrase in which God is for the first time involved in words. It does not at all
state "I believe in God'" {OBBE 149). God's involvement in discourse, and thus the
involvement of God in human affairs, can, apropos of Levinas, only be understood
through ethics, through the one-for-the-other of signification. The language of
theology, or so Levinas will claim, 'destroys the religious situation of transcendence.'
Such language 'rings false or becomes a myth [sonne faux ou se fait mythique],' he
concludes {OBBE 197n.25; AE 192n.l). Yet, if it is at the cusp of conceptuality, so to
speak, that thought suffers the name 'God' for that which, as the 'apex of vocabulary'
{OBBE 156), disturbs it absolutely, rendering the one in whom this name is hollowed
out (and thus hallowed), radically passive, then indeterminacy will always undermine
the tenure of this name and threaten its provision. Evidently, this is what Levinas has
in mind when, citing Isaiah 65:1, he intimates that the biblical 'search for God' in
which 'God is found,' is 'still expressed as God sought' {QA 85; translation altered).
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Therefore, the 'path that leads to God must be walked in part without God' (LTMG
143).
To be sure, these are audacious proposals for any 'theology' that should seek
to thematize its relata with precision, or contain its referent in the form of
propositions. Levinas, of course, does not purport to be doing theology (unless it is a
'theology without theodicy' (DR 111), or one that 'already announces itself in the
very wakefulness of insomnia' (TA1 159)), but rather to be broaching the 'meaning of
the beyond,' of 'transcendence,' which finds its sense in ethics (BPW 190n.22). Must
we not enquire, however (and to modify the titular order of the Kantian work, a
thinker to whom Levinas is, by his own admission, so very close {OF 10)), into the
groundwork of this metaphysic of morals? What eventuates at the limit of language is
prefigured culturally and predelineated socially, I suggest. The designata that fall
under sense at this limit, of which the term 'God' may be one, since according to
Levinas Gott fallt un sein where language breaks up (DTA1 282), are installed
generatively.
The installation of the 'idea of the Infinite' (enseignment) requires an
appropriate staging or mise-en-scene to account for its incidence. Ethical structuration
is conditioned liturgically (where by liturgy we understand the phenomena of study,
rite, and lore) and moulded pedagogically. Might one not circumvent the need for
'God' in ethics {MS 48) by conceding that assumption and susception are coaxial and
coordinate? Is not the 'trace,' in which the face signifies qua face, the
accomplishment of education and the achievement of tradition, rather than the furrow,
or tractatus, of 'God'? Might it not be in the tertiality of the third party (le tiers) that
the il of ilyaity and the ille of illeity convene, and the place of their conjunction, the
space or espacement of ethics? Indeed it might.
To lay claim to this deduction, however, is nevertheless to cede to its
uncertainty. For postulation of this kind takes place within an already predetermined
orientation, an orientation which, like that of Levinas and the ethical structure he
espouses, is constituted by posita that must be worked loose from the situation of their
positing and brought to appear against the horizons of their constitution. While every
effort has been made throughout the present study to interrogate such posita as and
when they are deposited, their presence within this work cannot be avoided. It is with
this in view that my concluding remarks, shortly to be advanced, should be
understood. For, they reflect a desire to situate the disquisition peculiar to
phenomenology at the limit of its exposition of the given, such that those interruptions
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and disturbances of phenomenological protocol might themselves be elucidated, those
slippages I have had occasion to accent in the work of Levinas throughout this study.
To position interpretation at the limit, to station exegesis at the breach, is to open
reflection (at its seams) to both that which conditions its appropriation of the given
and to that which transcends its reaches. It is to situate reflection before the face - and
to situate reflection face-to-face with its own procedure - a face of broader
signification than that toward which the thought of Levinas tends, a face reflection
cannot delimitate but to which it may attest.
Levinas would, no doubt, identify the reflection described here with the Torah
and its performance, since the 'essence' of the Torah is 'opening,' he contends (CTI
67), and the 'meaning of being' is 'to realize the Torah' (TOT 41). Yet, Levinas'
work, which is itself situated 'in the fullness of the documents, beliefs and moral
practices that characterize the positive fact of Judaism,' and which professes to be 'a
phenomenology prior to a theology' (ETE 109), remains to some extent invested in its
world and hence mired in it. That Levinas' work should be characterized by its
embedment in a world in no way entails that the ethical relation it sets forth and
dramatizes so effectively, is perfunctory. However, the provocation of the face is
limited by Levinas, and its imperative force regulated by ordinances that constrain the
upsurge of what is permitted to signify as a face within his work. It is the constraints
imposed upon signification, and the manner of its regulation, that I have sought to
examine throughout this treatise on Levinas.
That one should attempt, as it were, to 'sober up' (degriser) a work otherwise
so committed to describing the 'sobering up' (degrisement) of subjectivity and the
awakening (I'eveil) of the self by the Other is, I trust, condonable. That the verb
degriser should connote to sober up and to bring back down to earth is not, I believe,
incidental, though, and once again we may question whether Levinas does indeed
promulgate an 'earthly morality' (ET 33). Certainly, Levinas will seek to differentiate
between two forms of enthusiasm (enthousiasme): the enthusiasm through and by
which the subject is 'created' ('a sobering ever still to be sobered, a wakefulness on
the verge of a new awakening [degrisement toujours encore a degriser, une veille a la
veille d'un reveil nouveauf (CW 166; CV 57)), and the enthusiasm that is an
'intoxication' (ivresse), where intoxication, for Levinas, denotes 'the possibility of
going off [la possibility de I' eloignment],' the mere 'semblance of distance [le
semblant de I'eloignment],'' 'irresponsibility [irresponsabilite],' and the 'suppression
of fraternity [suppression de la fraternite]' (OBBE 192n.21; AE 138n.2).
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As we have seen, the pagan is one who has yet to sober up, a crapulent,
temulent. If, nonetheless, and despite the 'hangover' (gueule de bois) that so afflicts
the pagan (and the 'darkness' of the il y a 'which sweats in them [qu'elles suintentY
{EE 59; DEE 97)), we grant, as we have been prepared to do, that something like a
pagan attestation reveals itself within the work of Levinas and gives itself to be heard,
might we not concede that this voice, which summons us, rather than being 'the
voice' of the il y a {EE 58), although, of course, it may be that, might call to us in an
earthly manner? Perhaps the earth and the 'things' of the earth contest their place
within the work of Levinas through the figure of the pagan, the pagan being that
through which they are disincarnate within the work (as the face, according to
Levinas, is that by which the Other is 'disincarnate [desincarneY {TI 79; Tel 77)).
Furthermore, the earth may itself be the condition for the provocation of the face. That
is, the face's being provocable might draw upon a telluric source. For the earth is not,
as Levinas himself confers, simply 'a base on which things appear, but the condition
that the subject requires for their perception; the very situation of the subject' {RR
117). Likewise, Derrida will affirm that 'the earth gives hospitality before all else, a
hospitality already offered to the initial occupant' (Derrida, 1999, 92), an occupant
whose place in the sun Levinas has reason to contest, without contesting that
occupant's God-given right to appropriate the goods of the earth at will. And, let us
take heed, this right for Levinas is God-given {ET 28).
Perhaps the 'true figure of inspiration' (bearing in mind what has been said
previously of truth and attestation) is not (only) to be discerned in the story of the
Levites 'who carried the Floly Ark of the Tabernacle across the desert,' and who were
themselves, Levinas suggests, 'carried by that Ark' {JK 121), but is to be found in and
as that which founds and supports both acts of portage alluded to here: the earth qua
Ark and qua apXP- It may then be, that the human being, pace Levinas, is not 'the
unique terrain in which exteriority can appear' {RIJT 133) since the earth {terra) and
all things terrene arguably summon one to responsibility. At least, that is, if one has
been rendered susceptible to their provocation, such rendering, I have maintained,
being a product of heritability and the dissemination of sense.
In Levinas' estimation, of course, such affection to and for the earth is pagan,
and it is so precisely because on this account one's very sense of sense {sens) is rooted
{enracine) in the earth: one's determination of sense is terrene in origination. Yet, this
earthly precedence of sense need not lead to nationalism, as Levinas fears (unless one
conflates enrootedness {enracinement) with territoriality {territorialite), a temptation
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from which the religion of Judaism is not immune), but rather suggests that the earth,
or more pointedly, the 'element' (I'element), is that from which the face signifies.
Has it not been hitherto intimated, however, that the element is but one of four
transversals that decussate the face and in whose trace(s) the 'Other' stands? With
Jean Wahl, the dedicatee of Totality and Infinity, might we not concur that:
There is a meaning [sens] of the low that develops at the same time as the
meaning of the high (Wahl, 1948, 250).
The simultaneity adumbrated by Wahl here (central to the latter's understanding of
transcendence as at once a movement of trans-ascendance and trans-descendence (JW
81)) clearly informs Levinas' account of diachrony and instructs his presentation of
ilyaity and illeity. While throughout his work Levinas will endeavour, as he puts it, to
'remain attentive to the meaning of the divine that shines forth at the moment when
the second term [trans-ascendance] of Wahl's alternative is true' (JW 81; translation
altered), might one not reduce this moment further, beyond the reason that posits itself
as diachrony, and complicate the susception in which Levinas deduces 'the ultimate
figure of the meaningful [I'ultime figure du sense]' (CW 165; CV56)?
If Levinas' project does not move in the direction of being or non-being but
'toward an excluded middle' (JL 87), if it takes its bearing, qua work, from the
(non)site of this alternance of terms (and it is as such that it is sceptical), might the
destructure of diachrony not be reduced to what we have had occasion to call the
chiachrony that subtends it, since the decussation of transversals that intersect the face
(element, il y a, illeity, third party) arguably form a chiasm at their point of
confluence? We may represent this quadripartite, chiachronic structure thus, a figure
that might be termed the ethical circumstances of the face:
The ethical circumstances of the face
V
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The structure, or rather destructive, outlined here is, I would contend, 'the binding
place [point de nouement]' (OBBE 12; AE 27) of and for signification, the 'ethical
circumstances' (MM 94) of the face, its place of issuance and generation. The four
transversals decussate one another and the face is 'produced,' qua face, at their point
of decussation, which remains, apropos of Levinas, 'the point of a possible confusion'
(GP 141). To limit the signification of the face, to delimit its provocation, or to
restrict its appeal to the human being alone, is to disrupt the circumincession of
transversals and disturb their injunctive sway. The four transversals hold sway in, at,
and through the face. The face is heritable since the configuration of the face to which
one responds is bestowed generatively. The schema of the face to which one submits,
the figure of the face to which one is susceptible, is won through acquisition and
confirmed as normative through frequentation. The face retains its wonder
(etonnement), therefore, and retains its place as that which orients sense (sens),
because the circumstances of its provocation, the espacement of its appeal, repeatedly
expose thought to the situation of its birth, the an-archaic space of its delivery, that
place from which thought is called forth and summoned to account. Philosophy
begins and ends in wonder (0aupa^6iv), then, since it is in and as wonder that this
space of provocation opens. The limits of provocation are the limits of attestation,
limits I have sought to delimitate throughout this study of Levinas.
I bring to my reading of Levinas, then, a version of the question he himself
posed in 1974 when, in the essay 'De la conscience a la veille. A Partir de Husserl,'
he asks 'is the liveliness of life not excession - a rupture of the container by the
noncontainable that precisely thus animates or inspires?' (CW 166). This question, no
doubt inspired in me by Levinas (in accordance with the logic of heritability I have
assayed above) and marked by the latter's thought, a question that precedes me and
the time of this research, relates also to a certain disquietude, to disquiet I have felt so
often when reading and rereading Levinas, disquietude I have attempted to explain
and defend in this work: Why, finally, if the space of ethics is anarchic, as Levinas
purports, is the presentation of the face governed by regulative principles (apxou) and
organized by procedures of legitimation and description (vopot) that determine what
may or may not signify as a face? More finely put: If susception is, as Levinas
adverts, a 'passivity still more passive than the receptivity that assumes what affects
it,' if, furthermore, the 'ethical moment is not founded on any preliminary structure of
theoretical thought [le moment ethique ne vient se fonder sur aucune structure
preliminaire de pensee theorique]' (GP 148; DVI 126), but is founded rather in the
idea of infinity (77 26), why are limits imposed a priori upon alterity and its
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imperative force constrained by directives that precede the instance of its
provocation?
My reading of Levinas turns, therefore, on the issue of susceptibility (la
susceptibilite), upon its staging and regulation. I have subjected Levinas' account of
the 'straightforwardness' (la droiture) of sense to critique and contested his claim that
the 'signifyingness' (la signifiance) of the face is 'independent' of all 'meaning
received from the world [signification reque du monde],' 'outside of every order
[exterieure a tout ordre\ (MS 53; SS 51-52), and "'prior to" history and culture
[<avant> I'histoire et <avant> la culture]' (MS 58; SS 60). While I believe Levinas to
be correct in his assertion that the face disturbs the predelineated structures of
experience and challenges the autarky of the ego, the suggestion that the face undoes
thematization absolutely, eluding, as Levinas avers, 'principle, origin, and will' (S
81), cannot be so readily sustained and ultimately lacks cogency. The figure of the
face to which Levinas appeals throughout his many opera and opuscula is one which,
precisely as 'face' (visage), has been subdued by its representation within that work
and compelled to accept the limits against which it is set forth there. Yet, by drawing
the face back into the dimension of its historicality and charting its emergence qua
face, that is, by recounting its legacy, I have tried to formalize the conditions under
which that which faces does so within the work of Levinas and to exhibit the
provenance and range of its signification. By returning Levinas' presentation of the
face to the horizons of its constitution (to be sure, a move that is at once
phenomenological and hermeneutical), I have shown that the 'upsurge' of the face
admits of preparatory phases. The passage (iropos) from interiority to metaphysical
exteriority involves a rite of passage, a graduated education: susception to and for the
face is pedagogically primed and liturgically staged.
My engagement with Levinas has been informed throughout by a series of
interpretative principles (or principles of reading) that have facilitated my treatment of
his work. I have sought, wherever possible, to be rigorous in my application of these
principles, without, of course, forcing Levinas to be complicit in his own Destruktion,
or to endorse ideas that are foreign to his thought, while recognizing that a certain
violence is unavoidable in this regard. The principles to which I have had recourse
may be enumerated as follows and constitute collectively what I would call my
hermeneutical strategy:
1. To conduct a phenomenologico-hermeneutical excavation fouille) of the field
of inquiry (the space, spacing and espacement of ethics) and to probe, mine,
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tend and attend to its basic terms through the systematic interrogation of those
regulative concepts, ideas and modes of authorization upon which the
elaboration of that 'space' depends: the set of genera necessary for its
accomplishment (accomplissement).
2. To work loose or disengage tacitly deposited suppositions from the situation
of their positing and to determine the 'ancestry' of such posita in order to
underscore that which is peremptory, dogmatic or taken as self-evident within
Levinasian thought and to unravel its 'heritage' accordingly.
3. To bring to light interruptions (fissures, lacunae, aporias) in the internal
coherence of Levinas' thought and to situate those lapses or slippages in
relation to the order they disturb; to mark and demarcate these sites of tension
within Levinas' work and to account for their incidence.
Through the application of these principles I have advanced a series of arguments
against Levinas designed to unsettle the stability of his project and complicate the
legitimacy of its itinerary.
The foregoing investigation has shown that Levinas' work is pervaded by
positings that cannot be justified within the context of his 'radical empiricism
[I'empirisme radical]' (77 196; TEI 213) and that must be set back within the
perspective from which they were first constituted and brought forth. The ways in
which the face is revealed (or reveals itself xa0' auTo) are part of the meaning (sens)
of the 'face' posited by Levinas. In so far as I have tried to recover these access routes
to the face and question the privilege conferred upon them by Levinas, my analysis
may be said to be both restitutive and critical. I have shown that a complex ideational
montage undergirds the thought of Levinas and shapes his 'eschatological vision [la
vision eschatologiqueY (Tl 25; TEI 10). By exposing this nexus of signification to
scrutiny, I have, I believe, proved that the ethical mise-en-scene exceeds the
dimensions of the 'space' within which Levinas situates the work of ethics. My
primary aim, therefore, has been to sketch out, behind the Levinasian account of the
face-a-face, the outlines of another space, a space more accommodating of difference
in its variegated forms. I have thus sought to include within the sodality of the face-to-
face relation those extruded by the terms of Levinas' thought.
Arguably, the slippages to be found throughout Levinas' work, the slippages I
have been at pains to highlight throughout this thesis, repeat, in the figure of a
doubling, the vulnerability (la vulnerability) that is the subject matter of Levinas' later
writings. Levinas' texts, like the susceptibility of the subject (le sujet) they treat, must
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be turned again and again toward the 'face,' toward that outside (au dehors) from
which they derive their sense and to which they witness. The slippages I have
accented accomplish this movement concretely because they disrupt the order of the
work at that moment when the transcendence it supports and bears as its theme is
threatened by the terms of its enunciation. By identifying these slippages and
documenting their occurrence, I have attempted to deliver the 'face' Levinas details
from the 'form' of its assembly in his work, and to broaden the determination of
ethics he promotes. The 'torsion' to which I refer in the title of my thesis affirms this
objective by capturing the sense of tension that obtains between the transcendence of
the face and its philosophical reduction, or, as Levinas expresses it, between 'the said
[le Dit] in which everything is thematized' and 'its signification as saying [Dire]'
(OBBE 183; AE 280). This tension recurs throughout Levinas' work and manifests
itself, as I have demonstrated, in various ways, from the fraught relationship, the
difficile liberte, between Levinas' Mitnagdism and its philosophical articulation (the
conflux of 'Greek' and 'Hebraic' thought), to the 'separation' (separation) between
the face and the material format that harbours it, yet with which it is ultimately
disunited.
Related to this 'torsion' is the notion of 'temulence' or intoxication (ivresse),
to which I also refer in the title of my thesis. The latter deliberately plays upon the
sense of 'sobering up' (degrisement) Levinas deploys to characterize the subject's
exposure to the Other 'in the guise of wound and vulnerability [en guise de blessure
on vulnerability]' (CW 167; DVI 59). I have employed the term 'temulence' partly to
offset this sense (and therefore as a counterpoint), and partly to emphasize Levinas'
willingness to disclaim as 'pagan,' or 'primitive,' modes of thought that resist the
logic of his own attestation. Levinas' enthusiasm (enthousiasme) for the enterprise of
demythologization, and for the extirpation, eradication and expurgation with which he
associates this enterprise, itself borders on intoxication. I have attempted to check this
enthusiasm and question its motivation, in the manner, perhaps, that one checks a
haemorrhage by applying a torsion.
That this study should have its limitations and that its course should be
checked is, of course, inevitable. Many questions have been mooted to which I have
been unable to attend in sufficient depth. Areas for future research naturally suggest
themselves. Of these, I believe the phenomena of study, rite and lore warrant further
consideration. This catena of terms has been exhibited within the work of Levinas and
its structure brought to light. It has been argued that what Levinas calls the face, is
cleared for signification upon the basis of this structuration of terms. Reflection might
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be brought to bear upon these phenomena in order to evaluate their influence upon the
development of ethical sense (sens). The development or maturation of sense
nominated in this study under the heading of 'adolescence,' and treated here only
provisionally, likewise merits further examination. If sense undergoes a process of
maturation, what regulates its development and manages its transitional phases? Is
there a point at which the face first 'breaks through the form that nevertheless delimits
it' (77 198) to reveal itself as a face? Might this climacteric phase be appraised
phenomenologically and accounted for pedagogically? If it is in and as wonder that
the space of ethics opens, can wonder be taught?
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